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This thesis examines the political, religious, and economic circumstances in 
the Western Highlands and Isles between 1616 and 1649. This is a period in 
Highland history in which the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles were drawn 
onto the national theatre through the policies of James VI, only to be allowed to slip 
back into their autonomous roles during the reign of Charles I and the start of the 
Covenant Movement. This study looks at particular aspects of central government's 
policies toward the region, as well as the religious state of affairs and financial 
position of the chiefs in the Western Highlands and Isles. By examining these 
factors it becomes possible to deduce how they affected the motives of allegiance 
and how the involvement of the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles 
temporarily altered the course of the Civil Wars. The main focus of this thesis is to 
determine why the Western Highlands and Isles temporarily entered the Civil Wars, 
1644-45, what determined their allegiance to the Covenanters or Royalists and why 
some clans shifted from one faction to the other. 
Chapter one is an introduction, defining the geographical region, the 
inclusion or exclusion of particular clans, and the relevant sources both primary and 
secondary. Chapter two focuses on the more general history of the Western 
Highlands and Isles during the reigns of James VI and Charles I. This chapter 
allows the region to be placed in a broader Scottish context and forms the foundation 
for the following chapters which will detail the particular situations relevant to 
allegiance formation. Chapter three looks at the theoretical models of colonialism 
and state formation in an attempt to determine where the Western Highlands and 
Isles fit into the British polity. Included in this chapter is an analysis of Wales and 
Ireland to provide a comparative analysis to the Western Highlands and Isles to 
calculate whether policies toward the region were focused on colonialism or state 
formation. 
Chapter four focuses on the political relationship between central 
government and the Western Highlands and Isles. The main emphasis is placed on 
the effects that the annual meetings between clan chiefs and the Privy Council had 
on the region and, more importantly, how the end of the annual meetings allowed 
the chiefs to shift their attention away from national issues and back to local matters. 
Chapter five illustrates the state of religion in the region. This chapter looks at the 
difficulties faced by the Church of Scotland in trying to establish a strong religious 
foundation in the region, and its attempts to overcome the remoteness of the region 
as well as the inherent differences between the Lowland clergy and the Gaelic 
culture. Chapter six examines the issue of indebtedness among the chiefs in the 
Western Highlands and Isles. The first half of the chapter explains the source of 
financial difficulties and the mechanisms of the newly formed "debt networks". The 
second half of the chapter is made up of three case studies, Clanranald, Lamont, and 
Campbell of Glenorchy, to illustrate the processes of acquiring debts and attempts to 
prevent utter financial ruin. 
Chapter seven explains how the political, religious, and economic situations 
affected allegiances in the Western Highlands and Isles. Examples are given 
showing how various clans were affected by one or more factors. Chapter eight, the 
conclusion, focuses on the underlying issues of legitimacy of power and social 
hierarchy inherent in the formation of allegiances and how these issues developed 
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The entirety of this thesis is written in American English in regard to both spelling 
and grammar. In the few incidents where there is confusion over vocabulary the 
British term is preferred for the benefit of the readership. 
All clan spellings have been standardized in accordance with the Standing Council 
of Scottish Chiefs, The Court of The Lord Lyon, and the Scottish Clan and Family 
Encyclopedia by George Way of Plean & Romilly Squire. Gaelic personal names 
have been Anglicized, for example Ruaridh has been changed to Rory. However, 
where a person is better known by their Gaelic name that has been preferred, such as 
Coll MacDonald, Laird of Colonsay, who is better known to Highland historians as 
Colla Ciotach. 
Every attempt has been made to modernize the spelling of place names in 
accordance with the Ordnance Survey. 
All sums of money are given in £Scots unless otherwise stated. The £Scot was 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
On 15 June 1638 the Duke of Hamilton wrote to Charles I stating that 
support for the monarch was prevalent in the Western Highlands and Isles, but 
warned that their allegiance was "less however from affection to the king than from 
spleen against Lord Lome". ' It is on this backdrop that the role of the Western 
Highlands and Isles in the Scottish Revolution can best be seen. Whereas the 
majority of Scotland had divided between support for the Covenant Movement and 
support for Charles I out of religious and political differences, the Western 
Highlands and Isles' support for the Covenanters and royalists was based more on 
local politics and personal agendas than on the national religious and political 
platforms of the two factions. Therefore, Hamilton's warning that support for the 
king was based on animosity towards Lord Lorne is indicative of the local politics 
and personal agendas of the clans in the region that impacted their allegiance 
formations. 
The rise in importance of local politics in the Western Highlands and Isles 
was the result of the collapse of the annual meetings between the chiefs of the region 
and the Privy Council. Prior to the Regulations of 1616, in which central 
government dictated that a meeting was to be held every July, 2 the policies aimed at 
subduing the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles were a disjointed 
amalgamation of personal agendas devised by James VI and various courtiers. The 
arbitrary policies during the reign of James VI slowly evolved from various attempts 
at colonization along the lines of the policies enacted in Ireland toward a less hostile 
form of integration which culminated in the Regulations of 1616, mostly agreed to 
by both the Privy Council and the chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles. The 
mode of integration which had the largest effect on the Western Highlands and Isles 
was the mandatory meetings between the chiefs and the Privy Council through 
which the chiefs were required to account for their behavior and able to acquire 
HMC, Report XI Appendix vi, Mss of Duke of Hamilton, 95. 
2 The annual meetings were not officially mandated until the Regulations of 1616 imposed monetary 
consequences for non-attendance. Therefore, this thesis will use 1616 as the official start of the 
meetings. 
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licenses and appointments as government agents. These meetings effectively drew 
the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles out of their quasi political vacuum that 
facilitated their continued unrest and thrust them onto the national theatre through 
their role as government agents. An added benefit to the chiefs who attended these 
meetings was the power they were able to acquire in their capacity as government 
agents, essentially having their power within the region legitimized through their 
closer relationship with central government. However, the end of the meetings in 
1629 meant that the relationship between the chiefs and central government was 
severed and political power could no longer be derived from central government. 
This loss of power from central government forced the chiefs to revert to their pre- 
1616 mentalities which meant a renewed focus on local politics and sources for 
political power. This shift away from national issues, such as the Act of Revocation, 
toward local issues, predominantly disputes over land tenure, effectively allowed the 
region to regain its autonomy. 
By the outbreak of hostilities between the Covenanters and Charles I in 1639, 
the Western Highlands and Isles had little vested interest in the dispute; as a whole 
they were not affected by Charles I's Act of Revocation nor his religious 
innovations. The region was relatively apathetic to any changes that were happening 
at the centre because it had become more focused on local politics and subsequent 
personal agendas. Although verbal support for the king was given in 1638 by a 
number of clans while many others were intimidated into subscribing the National 
Covenant, the region did not enter the conflict for another six years. The delayed 
involvement of the region came to an end with the arrival of Alasdair MacColla and 
his Irish regiments which afforded the chiefs the opportunity to use the national 
crisis of the Covenant as a means to influence local politics and to carry out their 
personal agendas. The arrival of MacColla and the participation of the clans of the 
Western Highlands and Isles marked a period of royalist victories between 1644 and 
1645. This study attempts to answer the question as to why the Western Highlands 
and Isles entered the Scottish Revolution in 1644, six years after the start of the 
conflict, as well as why they were involved for such a short period. In order to 
answer these questions the factors behind the clans' allegiances need to be 
determined which raises secondary questions: what were the political, religious, and 
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economic situations in the Western Highlands and Isles, and how did these 
situations influence the allegiances of the chiefs? 
The time period covered in this study is roughly from the start of the annual 
meetings between the chiefs and the Privy Council to the aftermath of the royalists' 
victories; in essence the period covered is from 1616 to 1649. The beginning of the 
annual meetings serves as a clear starting point for an examination of the Western 
Highlands and Isles because it was when the region was first pulled into seventeenth 
century national politics and was no longer allowed to remain an autonomous entity. 
As this study progresses through the timeline the lapse of the annual meetings in 
1629 illustrates a shift among the chiefs of the region back to local politics and 
autonomy, only to be drawn out again in 1644 with the arrival of Alasdair MacColla 
and the Western Highlands and Isles' involvement in the Scottish Revolution. The 
end date of 1649 has been chosen because it allows for discussion of the counter 
attacks of the Covenanters and the measures taken by the Committee of Estates and 
the Synod of Argyll against the royalists, while not delving into the Cromwellian 
regime which would entail an entire study in its own right. Although the period 
specified is 1616 to 1649 some discussions of prior history are necessary to 
understand the evolution of the political, religious, and economic situation in the 
region and to put the current topic in perspective. Therefore, some mention of the 
sixteenth century and a brief discussion of the Reformation are made but are 
intended to better an understanding of the situation at hand. 
Once the timeframe has been established, a more difficult task in conducting 
a regional study is to actually define the geographical boundaries of the region; in 
this case, where the line can be drawn between the Lowlands and the Highlands and 
where the Western Highlands can be demarcated. The issue of a Highland Line, the 
dividing line between Lowlands and Highlands, has been debated by historians due 
to the fact that it is more of a cultural divide than a definitive geo-political line. The 
first and most basic thing to look at when attempting to draw the Highland Line is 
the topographical difference between the Highlands and Lowlands. As indicated by 
the name the Highlands is a primarily mountainous region with numerous large hills 
and glens, while the Lowlands is predominantly low rolling hills and plains. 
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Because of the difference of the topography between the Lowlands and Highlands 
two distinct societies emerged which helps to define the two regions. The hostile 
environment and rugged terrain of the Highlands gave rise to a subsistence based 
society, whereas the Lowlands were able to foster a market based society due to the 
ease in traveling the territory. Another basis for drawing the Highland Line is the 
language divide between the Highlands and Lowlands. Traditionally, the Highlands 
were native Gaelic speakers while the Lowlands were predominantly English or 
Scots speakers, with the exception of a few pockets of Gaelic speakers in the south- 
west and north-east. All three issues, topography, economics, and linguistics, 
created two starkly contrasting societies which effectively divided the kingdom in 
two. By analyzing the societal polarization between the Highlands and Lowlands, 
the Highland Line can be drawn across the southern border of Argyll east through 
the northern parts of Perthshire, also known as Highland Perthshire. From Highland 
Perthshire the Highland Line swings north at Dunkeld through Braemar running 
along the west of Aberdeenshire. 
Having carved out the Highlands the next line to be drawn for this study is 
between the Highlands as a whole and the Western Highlands. For the purpose of 
this study the demarcation of the eastern boundary of the Western Highlands is 
roughly drawn south from Inverness to Dumbarton along the Druim Alban Range. 
This region is primarily the territory formerly under the Lordship of the Isles but 
also includes the Campbells' seat of Argyll. Due to the Earldoms of Sutherland and 
Caithness and their roles as more Lowland noble than Highland chief, as seen in 
their estate management and lack of Gaelic practices, these earls will be included 
primarily when their actions have had an impact on the clans in their districts or 
where they have had a definite effect on the chain of events before and during the 
Civil Wars, such as the troubles between Sutherland and Lord Reay, chief of 
MacKay. Lastly, included in this study are the numerous inner and outer islands off 
the western seaboard of Scotland. Again, these islands were once under the 
authority of the Lordship of the Isles and include among others Jura, Islay, Skye, 
Lewis and Barra. 3 
3 See Appendix 1-3 for maps demarcating the Highland and Western Highland boundaries. 
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Having defined the time period and the region an explanation of the clans 
selected for this study is necessary. There were roughly fifty clans who occupied the 
Highlands, and about half were located within the Western Highlands and Isles. 
Two main issues were taken into consideration when deciding which clans to 
include and exclude. The first deciding factor was based on the list provided by the 
Privy Council of chiefs who were required to attend the annual meetings. Due to the 
fact that the meetings were intended to consist of the most important chiefs in the 
Western Highlands and Isles it was decided for this study that they would constitute 
the majority of the clans studied because of the government's perception that they 
wielded the greatest influence in the region and the documentation of the clans in the 
Register of the Privy Council of Scotland. The other deciding factor was simply the 
availability of sources, both primary and secondary, for the various clans. 
Unfortunately, the shortage of sources from the Western Highlands and Isles 
severely reduced the number of clans which could be adequately discussed. The 
majority of data collected for many of the clans provided only glimpses of their 
history and did not allow for any in-depth analysis. As a result, only about fifteen 
clans are discussed in detail of which a few are clans that bordered the Western 
Highlands and Isles or interacted with clans in the region, such as the Clan MacKay, 
and are used for comparison or elaboration. 
One of the primary difficulties in conducting a regional study of the Western 
Highlands and Isles is the shortage of archives available from the various clans in 
the region. For example, the papers of the Earls of Seaforth have not survived and 
of those clan archives that have survived few have anything of relevance to the 
Scottish Revolution. Of great disappointment was the Clan Donald Trust at 
Armadale Castle on Skye. The Clan Donald Trust is a private archive which 
contains a large portion of the papers of MacDonald of Sleat. Unfortunately, the 
collection has very few documents for the first half of the seventeenth century, only 
one document being of any use to this study. Likewise, the Loudoun Scottish 
Collection at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California showed great 
promise but thorough examination of the collection provided only one interesting 
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letter from Archibald Campbell, Marquis of Argyll, 4 to John Campbell, I" Earl of 
Loudoun, dated 8 January 1647 in which Argyll states "I fear my condition as a 
curtier be in the old maner yit I pray god non wisched the king wors nor I doe and so 
he might be weall I should be content never to see his dominions always gods will 
be donne". 5 It was hoped that the Loudoun Scottish Collection would compensate 
for the fact that access to the Campbell of Argyll Papers at Inveraray Castle is 
normally closed and would hopefully provide more information on the Marquis of 
Argyll; 6 however, the majority of the Loudoun Collection focuses on the Jacobite 
period. 
The main challenge in examining the Western Highlands and Isles is the fact 
that there is no definitive manuscript collection which one can get immersed in, 
rather pieces have to be collected from various sources and pulled together to 
complete the puzzle. As a result, the Gifts and Deposits (GD), Parliamentary Papers 
(PA), and Church records (CH2) at the National Archives of Scotland had to be 
gleaned for any scrap of information regarding the clans during the seventeenth 
century. Fortunately, this proved a useful source of information and in the end 
yielded a large amount of primary material. The Papers of Lord Reay, the 
Breadalbane Muniments, and the Clanranald Papers were especially useful and 
provided vast amounts of detailed information on such aspects as finance and 
alliances. The Parliamentary Papers and Supplemental Parliamentary Papers were 
crucial to understanding the political dealings of the Committee of Estates and 
central government's reactions to the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles and 
the royalists, particularly through detailed documentation of the military campaigns 
of Montrose and MacColla and the Covenanters' reprisals against the same. The 
scarcity of Church records from the Western Highlands and Isles hindered the 
progress of an examination of religion in the region, only yielding one relevant 
° Archibald Campbell, 86' Earl of Argyll, became Marquis of Argyll in 1641. For continuity he will 
normally be referred to as Marquis of Argyll throughout this thesis. 
5 Huntington Library, Loudoun Scottish Collection, Letter from Marquis of Argyll to John, ls` Earl of 
Loudoun, Edinburgh 8 January 1647, L08057. 
6 It bears mentioning that as of the summer of 2003 the archive has been opened on occasion to a few 
prominent historians. 
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presbytery record and one kirk session minute book. However, the lack of records 
indicated that a strong religious structure was lacking in the region. 7 
Although there is a shortage of relevant manuscript sources in comparison to 
other topics of Scottish history the availability of printed primary sources helps to 
fill in the gaps which could not be addressed by the manuscript sources. By 
concentrating on the chiefs summoned to the annual meetings with the Privy 
Council a large amount of information can be gathered from the Register of the 
Privy Council of Scotland. 8 For the purpose of this study the Register provided a 
great deal of information on conflicts between clans through both the supplications 
for redress from one clan against another and the lists of sureties and cautions 
provided by the chiefs. The Register also proved a good source for an examination 
of the economic situation of the clans by shedding considerable light on the financial 
status of many clans by recording the chiefs' requests for excuses from the 
mandatory meetings and the lists of protections from creditors granted by the Privy 
Council. 
Just as the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland complements the 
political records contained in the Parliamentary and Supplemental Parliamentary 
Papers, the Minutes of the Synod of Argyll is an ideal companion to the Church 
Records .9 The creation of the Synod of Argyll in 1638 meant that all religious 
activities within the majority of the Western Highlands and Isles were centrally 
controlled. As the governing body for the church in the region the scope of the 
Synod of Argyll's responsibilities ranged from appointments of ministers to their 
respective parishes to excommunications of royalists in the wake of the destructive 
military campaigns of Montrose and MacColla. As a result the Minutes of the Synod 
of Argyll provides the majority of religious documentation for the period 1638-61 
and counter-balances the shortage of manuscripts pertaining to the state of religion 
in the region. 
An added benefit in attempting to study the clans is the publication of 
specific clan archives. Due to the antiquity of many of the clan archives numerous 
7 These are the Presbytery of Dunoon Records, CH2/111, and the Kingarth Kirk Session Minute 
Book, CH2/219 currently held at the NAS. The issue of religion is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
8 Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 37 vols. (Edinburgh, 1877-). 
9 D. C. MacTavish (ed. ), Minutes of the Synod of Argyll, 1638-61 (Edinburgh, 1943). 
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individuals and societies have published large portions of various archives in order 
to preserve their content. Among the most prominent published collections are The 
Book of Dunvegan, The Black Book of Taymouth, The Book of the Thanes of 
Cawdor, and The Lamont Papers-10 Both the Book of Dunvegan and The Lamont 
Papers provide considerable quantities of information on the finances of the chiefs, 
especially in regards to MacLeod of Dunvegan's household and legal expenses and 
Lamont's excessive borrowing. Again, because of the closure of the archive at 
Inveraray Castle, the Campbell of Glenorchy papers published in The Black Book of 
Taymouth and the Campbell of Cawdor papers published in The Book of the Thanes 
of Cawdor compensate for the lack of original documents on the Clan Campbell and 
have preserved numerous letters written by Archibald Campbell, Marquis of Argyll, 
to the heads of the cadet branches of Clan Campbell. By combining the available 
manuscript sources with the large amount of published material the end result in 
conducting a study on the Western Highlands and Isles during the Scottish 
Revolution is that a large amount of primary material can be found and an adequate 
picture can be compiled from a plethora of sources. 
One obstacle in conducting research on the clans during this period is the 
questionable accuracy of many of the contemporary accounts and clan histories. As 
discussed in Martin MacGregor's article, "The Genealogical Histories of Gaelic 
Scotland", " many of the histories are based on oral tradition and are often written by 
a biased author. Some of the most prominent contemporary works were written by 
members of the church, such as John Spottiswoode, and clansmen, such as Hugh 
MacDonald of Sleat, who had motives for writing their histories either to justify 
their position or to re-write history in an attempt to reverse the negative effect 
caused by a particular person or event. Therefore, although contemporary sources, 
such as The Book of Clanranald, A Genealogical History of the Earldom of 
Sutherland, and John Spalding's The Memoriall of the Trubles of Scotland and 
10 R. C. MacLeod (ed. ), The Book of Dunvegan: Being Documents from the Muniment Room of the 
MacLeods of MacLeod at Dunvegan Castle, Isle of Skye (Edinburgh, 1939); C. Innes (ed. ), The Black 
Book of Taymouth: With other papers from the Breadalbane Charter Room (1855); C. Innes (ed. ), 
The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor: A Series of Papers Selected from the Charter Room at Cawdor, 
1236-1742 (Edinburgh, 1859); N. Lamont, of Knockdow (ed. ), An Inventory of Lamont Papers, 
1231-1897 (Edinburgh, 1914). 
11 M. MacGregor, "The Genealogical Histories of Gaelic Scotland", in A. Fox & D. Woolf (eds. ), The 
Spoken Word.: Oral Culture in Britain 1500-1850 (Manchester, 2002), 196-239. 
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England, 12 are valuable starting points for research on this topic they need to be 
cross-referenced and substantiated by other, more reliable sources in order to 
validate their historical accuracy. 
Similar to the availability of primary material, the secondary literature 
relating specifically to this topic is limited; yet, much can be deduced by combining 
sources on the region with more nationally focused studies of the period. One 
predecessor to this study is the work done by Audrey Cunningham in 1932. 
Cunningham's book, The Loyal Clans, 13 attempts to explain the allegiances of the 
Highland clans to the Stewart monarchy and focuses a great deal on the Jacobite 
period and the clans of the central highlands. Although this was a valiant and 
pioneering undertaking, her methodology was based on two misconceptions which 
produced a very romanticized view of the motives behind the clans' allegiances to 
the crown. 
Cunningham's conclusions are based on an overwhelming emphasis on the 
clans' belief in Divine Right and repeatedly draws correlations between chiefly 
power and James VI's interpretation of Divine Right, "moral claims of the 
highlanders to an hereditary authority of their own and to a prescriptive right to their 
`kindly' possessions, were seen to harmonize with the king's theories of monarchy 
and with the legal principles of the strength of possession". 14 By using these two 
points, based on ideals rather than practice, as her hypothesis she echoes the 
romantic perception of the Highlands as propagated by Sir Walter Scott and only 
scratches the surface of the motives of the clans. On the surface the relationship 
between chiefship and Divine Right would appear a valid point, but there are 
numerous incidents where a clan chief was killed by members of their own clan or 
where branches of the clan seceded; for example, both the captain of Clanranald and 
Campbell of Cawdor were assassinated and the Clan Chattan confederacy fell apart 
under the leadership of MacIntosh resulting in clans such as the MacPhersons 
claiming their autonomy. Unlike James VI's Divine Right theory the chiefs were 
unable to act unilaterally and were held accountable by the clan elite, the loyalty 
12 A. MacBain (ed. ), The Book of Clanranald (Inverness, 1893); Sir R. Gordon of Gordonstoun, A 
Genealogical History of the Earldom of Sutherland. - with a continuation to the year 1651 (Edinburgh, 
1813); J. Spalding, The Memoriall of the Trubles of Scotland and England 2vols. (Aberdeen, 1792). 
13 A. Cunningham, The Loyal Clans (Cambridge, 1932). 
14 A. Cunningham, Loyal Clans, 222. 
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which Cunningham's equates with their support of Divine Right is a tenuous 
position on which to make her point because the clans are not seen as using the 
theory in action. 
The other misconception which The Loyal Clans is based on is the 
incompatibility between the traditional clan system and feudalism. Robert 
Dodgshon's work on the structure of the clan system indirectly refutes 
Cunningham's point. 15 Although the imposition of feudalism did create difficulties 
for the management of resources, such as the distribution of food and the allocation 
of manpower, Dodgshon explains that the clan system was flexible enough to adjust 
to changes in land tenure and that the structure of the clan was clearly able to coexist 
with the demands of feudalism. One valid point that Cunningham did make was the 
power of the feudal superior which had the potential for creating conflict, especially 
in regards to the Campbells of Argyll. The desire of the clans of the Western 
Highlands and Isles to overthrow Argyll as their feudal superior was a major 
contributor to their involvement in the royalist campaign. Unfortunately, 
Cunningham's discussion of the Western Highlands and Isles' position on the eve of 
the Covenant is devoid of any detailed discussion of the individual clans' situation 
and relation to Argyll. Where one would expect a lengthy discussion regarding the 
political, religious, and economic status of specific clans there is a two page 
overview which glosses over the motives of the clans in favor of her romanticized 
loyalty to the Stewart monarchy. Although Cunningham's conclusions are faulty, 
the questions she posed on the subject of allegiances were ground-breaking and 
provided a framework on which to formulate the questions asked in this thesis. 
A more helpful secondary source in conducting this study was the work by 
Donald Gregory in 1836 which provides a less biased comprehensive study 
specifically on the Western Highlands and Isles. 
16 His work is the most complete 
study of its kind thus far, but unfortunately he ends his investigation with the death 
of James VI in 1625. As a result his work provides a great deal of information and 
insight into the Highland policies of James VI and the overall position of the clans 
15 R. Dodgshon, From Chiefs to Landlords: social and economic change in the Western Highlands 
and Islands, c. 1493-1820 (Edinburgh, 1998), chapters 2&3. 16 D. Gregory, History of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland from A. D. 1493 to A. D. 1625 
(Edinburgh, 1836). 
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on the eve of Charles I's succession. Gregory's extensive research details the 
attempts to colonize the region as conducted by the Fife Adventures in Lewis, the 
restrictions on Campbell of Cawdor's grant to Islay limiting who was allowed to be 
on the land, and the numerous grants and commissions issued to Argyll, all points 
which culminated in a great deal of discontent among the local clans by the outbreak 
of the war. By using Gregory's work as a basic model for a regional study of the 
Western Highlands and Isles and as a foundation to expand such a study into the 
reign of Charles I it is hoped that this research will not just enhance our 
understanding of the allegiances of the clans in the region but provides for a better 
understanding of the region in general. 
Although Donald Gregory's work is the only comprehensive research 
conducted on the Western Highlands and Isles, there are some notable contributions 
which help to reveal the complexities of the region. One of the greatest 
contributions to our knowledge of the Highlands and to a degree the Western 
Highlands is Allan Macinnes's Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603- 
1788.17 Prof. Macinnes provides us with the most complete view of the Highlands 
during this time period as well as a detailed explanation of the structure of the clan 
system which is a vital tool in attempting to decipher the hierarchy of the clans and 
how power was distributed among the clansmen. Although Macinnes looks at the 
entire Highland region he does commit large portions of his research specifically to 
the Western Highlands and Isles and is able to advance our understanding of the 
dynamics of the region through his remarkable access to the Argyll Papers at 
Inveraray Castle. 
While Macinnes provides an excellent overall study of the Highlands two 
studies on the social and economic situation of the Western Highlands and Isles 
merit mentioning. The first study of note is Frances Shaw's The Northern and 
Western Islands of Scotland: Their Economy and Society in the Seventeenth 
Century. ' 8 Dr. Shaw's work focuses more on the history of Orkney and Shetland 
than on the Western Isles, but her investigation into the financial positions of the 
clan chiefs during this period provided a great resource from which to conduct a 
17 A. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuartt, 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996). 
18 F. Shaw, The Northern and Western Islands of Scotland: Their Economy and Society in the 
Seventeenth Century (Edinburgh, 1980). 
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more detailed analysis of the level of indebtedness in the region. Furthermore, her 
analysis of the Bishop of the Isles' report to James VI on the state of his diocese 
imparts a useful summary of the state of religion in the area. The other significant 
contributor to the study of economics and society is by geographer Robert Dodgshon 
who takes an anthropological look at the dynamics of the Western Highlands and 
Isles between 1493 and 1820. Prof. Dodgshon's research focuses first on the 
structure of the clan system and the distribution of power, similar to the approach 
taken by Prof. Macinnes. In his book, From Chiefs to Landlords: social and 
economic change in the Western Highlands and Islands, c. 1493-1820,19 he conducts 
a complex analysis of the transformation of the clans from a agriculturally based 
economy to a cash driven economy and the effects this change had on the 
distribution of authority within the clans and the region as a whole. 
The significant research on the annual meetings between the chiefs of the 
Western Highlands and Isles and the Privy Council by Dr. Jean Munro was essential 
to the chapters within this study on the politics and economics of the region. As the 
advent of the annual meetings has been relatively neglected, a thorough 
investigation of this innovative Highland policy is found in Dr. Munro's article, 
"When Island Chiefs came to Town". 20 Dr. Munro's article provides vital details of 
the annual meetings including the means used to summon chiefs, lists of the chiefs 
included, and the amounts of cautions and sureties charged to the chiefs. Through 
Dr. Munro's thorough research the foundation is laid for a more detailed study of the 
impact of these meetings both politically and economically. 
The overwhelming bulk of Scottish historical literature poses a significant 
problem when attempting to conduct a regional study of the Western Highlands and 
Isles during the reign of Charles I; either the studies include the Western Highlands 
and Isles but cover a different time period or they cover the right time period but do 
not address the region. As a result the political and religious research done on the 
Western Highlands and Isles seldom stretches to the 1630s and 1640s due to the 
political dominance of the Lowlands inherent in their closer relationship to central 
19 R. Dodghson, From Chiefs to Landlords: social and economic change in the Western Highlands 
and Islands, c. 1493-1820 (Edinburgh, 1998). 
20 J. Munro, "When Island Chiefs came to Town" in Notes & Queries: Society of West Highland and 
Island Historical Research XIX (Dec. 1982), 11-19. 
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government and involvement in the Covenant Movement. For example, Robert 
Black's article "Colla Ciotach" and the series of articles on the Clan Campbell by 
Edward J. Cowan focus on the local politics and particular events in the history of 
the Western Highlands and Isles but they deal primarily with events during the reign 
of James VI. 21 Although these studies are essential to understanding the local 
politics of the region and provide the foundation for an analysis on the formation of 
allegiances during the Scottish Revolution to be traced back to long standing 
alliances and rivalries they offer little discussion of subsequent developments in the 
region. 
Two notable exception to this are Edward J. Cowan's article on Archibald 
Campbell, Marquis of Argyll, in which he discusses the ideology and politics of the 
marquis during the Covenant Movement and Montrose: For Covenant and King 
which details Montrose's career as both a Covenanter and later a Royalist. 22 Both 
works provide a great deal of information and insight into the careers and 
philosophies of both Argyll and Montrose whom had once been on the same side 
and later opposed each other on the field of battle. In Montrose: For Covenant and 
King Cowan's focus is on Montrose himself, but at the high point of his career 
Montrose mobilized many of the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles that are 
the subject of this thesis. The manner in which Cowan addresses the shift in 
Montrose's allegiance from the Covenanters to the Royalists and the apprehensions 
Montrose had in relation to the direction the Covenant regime was taking under the 
leadership of Argyll enabled the shifts in allegiances of the clans to be better 
understood. Cowan makes it clear that opposition to the Covenant regime was not 
necessarily a rejection of the National Covenant but the manner in which it was 
being enforced. In looking at Montrose's career, Cowan's central chapters provide a 
detailed narrative of Montrose's military exploits for the Royalists' army, resulting 
in providing additional details of the clans who joined him. 
21 R. Black, "Colla Ciotach", TGS1,48 (1976), 201-43; E. J. Cowan, "The Angus Campbells and the 
Origin of the Campbell-Ogilvie Feud", Scottish Studies, 25 (1981), 25-38; E. J. Cowan, "Fishers in 
Drumlie Waters: Clanship and Campbell Expansion in the Time of Gilleasbuig Gruamach", TGSI, 54 
(1987), 269-312; E. J. Cowan, "Clanship, Kinship and the Campbell Acquisition of Islay", SHR, 58 
(1979), 132-57. 
E. J. Cowan, "The Political Ideas of a Covenanting Leader: Archibald Campbell, marquis of Argyll, 
1607-61", in R. A. Mason (ed. ), Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603 
(Cambridge, 1994); E. J. Cowan, Montrose: For Covenant and King (London, 1977). 
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The companion to Cowan's work on Montrose is his analysis of the political 
and philosophical ideals of the Marquis of Argyll. When Cowan's article, "The 
Political Ideas of a Covenanting Leader: Archibald Campbell, marquis of Argyll, 
1607-61", is placed alongside Montrose: For Covenant and King the increasing 
animosity during the Civil Wars can be seen as not only a confrontation between 
Royalists and Covenanters but also a result of the division within the Covenanting 
ranks between radicals and conservatives. Cowan's article on Argyll analyzed a 
series of letters between Argyll and the Earl of Strafford during the period in which 
the earl was Lord Deputy of Ireland. Cowan illustrates that a great deal of Argyll's 
rebuttals to Strafford were echoes of earlier philosophers and theologians both in 
Britain and on the continent. The most notable aspect of this article is that Argyll 
rarely put his thoughts in writing and the discovery of these letters by Cowan allows 
for a deeper insight in the mind of one of the most radical Covenanters. Finally, it 
must be noted that Cowan's access to the Argyll archives at Inverarary Castle proves 
invaluable to this thesis due to the present closure of the archives. Cowan's use of 
the Argyll archives provides a vast amount of indirect research material and his 
biographical studies provide a great deal of ideas and perspectives from which to 
work with and expand upon. 
In looking at the secondary literature on religion a great deal of work has 
been conducted by Jane Dawson and James Kirk. Both Dawson and Kirk focus 
primarily on the state of religion in the Western Highlands and Isles during the 
Reformation era and the Jacobean church. 23 Although Dawson has published 
articles which do extend into the period covered in this thesis, 
24 the main focus of 
her research is on the 5t" Earl of Argyll and his relationship with the Church of 
Scotland and Bishop John Carswell. Dr. Dawson argues that the Reformation was a 
23 J. Dawson, "The Origins of the `Road to the Isles': Trade, Communications and Campbell Power 
in Early Modern Scotland", in R. Mason and N. Macdougall (eds. ), People and Power in Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1992); J. Dawson, "Clan, Kin and Kirk: the Campbells and the Scottish Reformation", in 
N. S. Amos et al. (eds. ), The Education of a Christian Society: Humanism and the 
Reformation in 
Britain and the Netherlands (Aldershot, 1999); J. Kirk, "The Kirk and the Highlands at the 
Reformation", Northern Scotland, 7 (1986), 1-22; J. Kirk, "The Jacobean Church in the Highlands, 
1567-1625", in L. MacLean (ed. ), The Seventeenth Century in the Highlands (Inverness Field Club, 
1986). 
240f great significance are J. Dawson, "The Gaidhealtachd and the emergence of the Scottish 
Highlands", in B. Bradshaw and P. Roberts (eds. ), British Consciousness and Identity: The making of 
Britain, 1533-1707 (Cambridge, 1998); J. Dawson, "Calvinism and the Gaidhealtach in Scotland", in 
A. Pettegree ei al. (eds. ), Calvinism in Europe, 1560-1620 (Cambridge, 1994). 
15 
success in the Western Highlands and Isles and that the Protestant religion had a 
strong foundation in the region thanks primarily to the earls of Argyll. This 
argument is continued by James Kirk in his work on the Jacobean church in the 
Highlands; however, Kirk does concede the counterargument that although the 
church was present this does not void the point that the locals could simply ignore 
the church. 25 The work done by Dawson and Kirk provides a backdrop on which to 
compare and contrast the state of religion during the reign of James VI and Charles I 
that highlights the fact that there was a definite shift in religious fervor which 
manifested itself into a blatant lack of religious structure in the Western Highlands 
and Isles by the 1630s. 
Similar to the secondary sources that cover the Western Highlands and Isles 
but during earlier time periods, the vast quantity of commentary on the politics, 
economics, and religion which does focus on the first half of the seventeenth century 
but looks primarily at the Lowlands proposes useful theories and models on which 
to compare and contrast the Western Highlands and Isles. These "national" studies, 
which center on events in Edinburgh, often are useful in understanding the broader 
context into which the region fits. A prime example of this is the enormous 
contribution made by Prof. David Stevenson through his plethora of studies on the 
Covenant Movement. 26 Although Prof. Stevenson focuses on events at the national 
level, thus primarily the situations in Edinburgh and Aberdeen, his work allows for 
regional studies to be conducted within the framework of his research and in 
numerous incidences Stevenson highlights where these studies can be inserted. 
Stevenson even wrote a quasi-regional study through his study of the life and career 
of Alasdair MacColla in his book entitled Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla 
and the Civil Wars. 27 
25 In his article, "The Kirk and the Highlands at the Reformation", Kirk concludes his article by 
claiming that although the kirk had a presence in the region "There was ample opportunity, therefore, 
even in more settled times, for parishioners in remoter communities-and even in not so remote 
communities-to avoid all contact with the kirk", p. 19. 
26 D. Stevenson, King or Covenant? Voices from Civil War (East Linton, 1996); D. Stevenson, The 
Scottish Revolution 1637-44: The Triumph of the Covenanters (Newton Abbot, 1973); D. Stevenson, 
Revolution and Counter Revolution in Scotland, 1644-5/ (London, 1977); D. Stevenson, Scottish 
Covenanters and Irish Confederates (Belfast, 1981). 
27 D. Stevenson, Highland Warrior: A lasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 2003). 
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While "national" studies are significant for the framework they provide so 
too are the studies specifically relating to the economics and religion of the 
seventeenth century. General economic and religious histories of this period are 
useful due to their commentary on and discussion of national patterns which can be 
applied to a specific region. In this case, the analysis of aristocratic finances and 
debt by Keith Brown provides several models for accruing debt and discusses the 
levels of indebtedness among Lowland nobles. 28 The models and discussions 
offered up by Prof. Brown were beneficial to an understanding of the functioning of 
the debt market and the ease with which the chiefs could borrow funds. As will be 
seen in chapter seven, although Prof. Brown and I find similar patterns of 
indebtedness our conclusions on the effect this had on allegiance differ due to the 
inherent differences between the Lowlands and Highlands and the external forces 
which are found in the specific regions. Discussions on the state of religion in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century by Margo Todd and Michael Lynch also provided 
models on which to apply the details of the Western Highlands and Isles. 29 Margo 
Todd's work on The Culture of Protestantism in Early Modern Scotland provides a 
generalized view of religion during the period which does not appear to allow for the 
uniqueness of the state of religion, or lack thereof, in the Western Highlands and 
Isles. However, a more significant correlation between the discussion of religion on 
a national level and on a regional level was found in Prof. Lynch's discussion of 
"Calvinism in Scotland, 1559-1638" where he states that "The result was that in 
many respects the progress of th,, - Reformed Church after 1560 depended on a series 
of local reformations, each moving at its own pace and with its own distinctive 
problems to surmount. "30 This statement allowed for an in-depth discussion of 
religion in the Western Highlands and Isles by proposing the idea that every locality 
differed in its religious affirmation and highlighted that the Reformed Church had 
obstacles to overcome which were indigenous to the various regions of Scotland. 
28 K. Brown, "Aristocratic Finances and the Origins of the Scottish Revolution", English Historical 
Review, 104 (1989), 46-87; K. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland (Edinburgh, 2000). 
29 M. Todd, The Culture of Protestantism in Early Modern Scotland (New Haven, 2002); M. Lynch, 
"Calvinism in Scotland, 1559-1638", in M. Prestwich (ed. ), International Calvinism, 1541-1715 
(Oxford, 1985); M. Lynch, Scotland. - A New History (London, 1992), 115-55. 
30 M. Lynch, "Calvinism in Scotland, 1559-1638", 229. 
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When trying to understand the intricacies of the Western Highlands and Isles 
sometimes the theories and models within Scottish commentaries do not adequately 
explain the situation. On many occasions research on England, Ireland and Wales 
proved more beneficial, if not to provide actual models than to at least help facilitate 
an understanding of the possible variant models. The inclusion of the other three 
countries were primarily used to provide possible modes with which the Scottish 
government attempted to incorporate the chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles 
as well as the clans' reaction seen through their allegiances during the conflict. The 
history of Wales served as a prime example of Michael Braddick's definition of state 
formation through integration and the transformation of local elites into government 
agents. 31 One of the most definitive works on Wales during the Tudor and Stuart 
periods was written by Glanmor Williams in which he charted the process of the 
union between Wales and England in Renewal and Reformation: Wales, c. 1415- 
1642.32 The addition of Peter Roberts's work specifically on the Act of Union and 
the "language clause" allowed for specific correlations to be drawn between the 
policies imposed on Wales and on the Western Highlands and Isles. 33 Similarly the 
history of Ireland provided evidence of internal colonization through the plantation 
schemes in Ulster and Munster as theorized by Michael Hechter. 
34 R. F. Foster's 
Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 and Nicholas Canny's Making Ireland British, 1580- 
1650 both give extensive details of the political relationship between central 
government and the Irish elites and the process of colonization through plantation. 
35 
By comparing and contrasting the events in Wales and Ireland to the Western 
Highlands and Isles, the Highland policies of James VI and Charles I can be placed 
within a British context and the region's position within the kingdom can be 
determined. 
31 M. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge, 2000). 
32 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation Wales, c. 1415-1642 (Oxford, 1993). 
33 Roberts, P., "The `Act of Union' in Welsh History", Transactions of the Honourable Society of 
Cymmrodorion (London, 1974), 49-72; Roberts, P., "The Welsh Language, English Law and Tudor 
Legislation", Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion (London, 1989), 19-75. 
34 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 2d ed. 
(New Brunswick, 1999). 
35 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1988); N. Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580- 
1650 (Oxford, 2001). 
18 
The history of England during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms likewise 
provided evidence which could be compared and contrasted to events in the Western 
Highlands and Isles, especially on the issue of allegiances. Due to the fact that 
relatively little has been written on models of allegiance within Scotland, the 
research on allegiances within English counties conducted by John Morrill helped to 
compensate for the lack of Scottish evidence. Prof. Morrill's research offered the 
closest comparison for studying allegiances within the Western Highlands and Isles 
and provided a clear framework for understanding the underlying motives of those 
involved in the Civil Wars. 36 
Due to the nature of the research questions contained in this study the most 
coherent structure is to divide the thesis into six thematic chapters: historical 
context, theoretical models of nation building, politics, religion, economics, and 
allegiance. By structuring the research in a thematic format the political, religious, 
and economic situations can be isolated in order to determine their effect on the 
allegiances of the Western Highlands and Isles. The inclusion of a historical context 
chapter and a theoretical chapter enables the various circumstances to be placed 
within a broader context. 
In order to begin a comprehensive work on the Western Highlands and Isles 
an understanding of the historical framework is needed. Therefore, chapter two, 
"The Western Highlands and Isles in Context", focuses on the general history of the 
Western Highlands and Isles during the reigns of James VI and Charles I. This 
chapter pays particular attention to the position of clans during the reign of James VI 
and Charles I. Also contained in this chapter is an overview of the Scottish 
Revolution which examines the conflict from a national perspective and lays the 
foundation for more detailed research to be conducted which focuses on the 
involvement of the Western Highlands and Isles. In general, chapter two allows the 
region to be placed in a broader Scottish context and forms the foundation for the 
following chapters which detail the particular situations relevant to the development 
of allegiances in the Western Highlands and Isles. 
36 J Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (London, 1993); J. Morrill, Cheshire, 1630-1660: 
county government and society during the English Revolution (London, 1974); J. Morrill, Revolt in 
the provinces: the people of England and the tragedies of war, 1630-1648,3`d ed. (London, 1999). 
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Chapter three, "The Western Highlands and Isles' Place in the British 
Kingdom: Colonialism or State Formation? ", looks at the theoretical models of 
internal colonialism and state formation. Through an examination of the policies 
directed toward Ireland and Wales, the numerous and diverse Highland policies can 
be put in context. This furthers the analysis of issues related to the formation of 
allegiances in the Western Highlands and Isles. Using Ireland as a model for 
internal colonialism through the plantation schemes and Wales as an example of 
state formation through integration, direct correlations can be drawn to policies 
employed in the Highlands. By conducting this type of comparative investigation 
the relevance of the theoretical models to the developments in the Western 
Highlands and Isles can be determined. 
Chapter four, "Central Government and the Western Highlands and Isles", 
focuses on the political relationship between central government and the Western 
Highlands and Isles. The main emphasis of this chapter is the development and later 
breakdown of a closer connection between the government in Edinburgh and the 
chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles. It will be argued that the annual meetings 
between the clan chiefs and the Privy Council were the primary link between the 
two entities. The most important aspect of this chapter is the effect that the end of 
the meetings had on the relationship between the clan chiefs and government and 
how the lapse allowed the chiefs to shift their attention away from national issues 
back to local affairs. To illustrate this point, an analysis of the increase in land 
disputes between chiefs and the difficulty faced by central government, primarily the 
Committee of Estates, when attempting to enforce national committees and 
commissions will be conducted. By tracing the shifts from autonomy prior to the 
meetings, to cooperation with central government during the meetings, and back to 
autonomy with the collapse of the meetings, the rise in personal agendas and a 
renewed struggle for local political dominance can be seen which would later play a 
large role in the allegiances of the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles. 
Chapter five, "Religion from Reformation to War", analyzes the state of 
religion in the Western Highlands and Isles. By the outbreak of the Civil Wars, the 
Western Highlands and Isles could not be clearly labeled Protestant or Catholic. 
This chapter looks at the difficulties faced by the Church of Scotland in trying to 
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establish a strong religious foundation in the region, and its attempts to overcome 
the remoteness of the region as well as the inherent differences between Lowland 
clergy and the Gaelic culture. Particular emphasis will be placed on the inability of 
the Church of Scotland to breach the Gaelic language barrier that hindered the 
spread of the Protestant faith and severely limited the number of adequate ministers 
appointed to predominantly Gaelic parishes. Another obstacle faced by the Kirk was 
the geographical isolation of many of the parishes; it will be seen that the vastness of 
the region created numerous problems for accessibility and attendance at the 
parishes. To illustrate the fact that the region lacked a strong religious foundation, 
whether Protestant or Catholic, an analysis of the limitations of the Irish Franciscan 
Missions will also be conducted and will include discussion of the actions of 
Catholics, especially their outward conformity. 
The last factor behind the development of allegiances, economics, is 
addressed in chapter six, "Indebtedness in the Western Highlands and Isles". This 
chapter examines the issue of the increasing indebtedness among the chiefs in the 
Western Highlands and Isles. Due to the complexities of this chapter, it is divided 
into two parts. The first half of the chapter provides an explanation of the sources of 
financial difficulties and the mechanisms of the newly formed debt market. It will 
be seen that a great deal of the financial difficulties experienced by the chiefs relate 
to the annual meetings with the Privy Council. The cautions and sureties, legal fees, 
traveling expenses, and conspicuous consumption while in Edinburgh, dramatically 
increased the financial burden of many of the chiefs. When these factors are 
combined with the expenses of the Civil Wars and the loss of rents due to the 
devastation of the royalist victories the end result was near financial ruin for some 
chiefs. The increase of indebtedness among the chiefs forced many into the debt 
market found within the Lowlands and slowly extended the market into the Western 
Highlands and Isles. The first half of this chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
the procedures of acquiring debt and of collecting on outstanding debts, such as 
obligations, wadsets and apprisings. The second half of the chapter consists of three 
case studies to illustrate the processes of acquiring debts and attempts to prevent 
utter financial ruin. Through the financial accounting of the Captain of Clanranald, 
Clan Lamont, and the Campbells of Glenorchy the various reasons for indebtedness, 
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especially the costs of lawlessness, military recruiting and territorial devastation 
during the Civil Wars, and the financial ramifications of insolvency are represented. 
Once the political, religious, and economic factors are determined, chapter 
seven, "Western Highlands and Isles Allegiances", explains how these issues 
affected allegiances in the region. Specific examples are given showing how various 
clans were affected by one or more factors. In order to fully understand how the 
political, religious, and economic situations affected the clans, motives, such as self- 
advancement and self-preservation, are discussed. It is argued that the 
overwhelming reason for the region's involvement in the Scottish Revolution was 
the effect that the clans' involvement, as well as the outcome of the war, would have 
on local politics and that involvement was based on personal agendas rather than for 
the "traditional" platforms of the Covenanters and royalists. 
Chapter eight, the conclusion, discusses the importance regional studies and 
allegiance formation have on the history of the Civil Wars, and concludes with a 
brief discussion of the region's involvement in subsequent Highland Risings, such as 
Glencairn's Rising and the Jacobite Risings. By highlighting the findings of this 
study and how they culminated in the temporary involvement of the Western 
Highlands and Isles in the Civil Wars, it is intended that the uniqueness of the 
region's involvement and motives are made clear. 
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Chapter 2 
The Western Highlands and Isles in Context 
"The Scottish business is extreme ill indeed, and what will become of 
it God knows, but certainly no good, and his majesty hath been 
notoriously betrayed by some of them. " 
Letter from Archbishop Laud to Viscount Wentworth, 20`h July 1638' 
To fully understand the role of the Western Highlands and Isles in the 
struggle between Covenanters and Royalists particular events and key issues need to 
be highlighted, especially those which separated the region from other areas of 
Scotland. It is essential to include an overview of the situation in the Western 
Highlands and Isles in order to lay the foundation for the following chapters which 
detail specific aspects, such as politics, religion and economics. Due to the plethora 
of studies available which detail the royalist campaign of James Graham, Marquis of 
Montrose, and Alasdair MacColla, the following discussions will not address the 
specific battles; rather the focus will be on the impact that the arrival of MacColla 
and his Irish regiments had on the sequence of events. Although "the Scottish 
business [was] extreme ill indeed" the stance of the Western Highlands and Isles 
formed the strongest contingent of royalist support between 1637 and 1650. As will 
be seen in this overview of events in the Western Highlands and Isles, the actions of 
James VI and Charles I laid the foundation for the rising of the MacDonalds in both 
Ireland and Scotland which resulted in the temporary period of royalist supremacy in 
the mid 1640s under the leadership of Ranald MacDonnell, 2nd Earl of Antrim, 
Alasdair MacColla, and James Graham, Marquis of Montrose. 
I 
The structure of the Highland clan system was a complex hierarchy 
involving every level of Highland society with each individual providing an 
essential role in the functioning of the clan. As head of the kindred, the chief acted 
as the patriarch of the clan, but, like the Stuart monarchs, was restricted 
in his 
J. H. Parker (ed. ), The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God William Laud D. D. 7 vol. 
(New 
York, 1975), VI, pt. i, 531. 
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actions which prevented him from acting as a despot. Although in theory the 
monarch was answerable only to God, in practice he was required to consult 
parliament -a point incomprehensible for Charles I. Similar to the relationship 
between king and council, the chief was the head of the clan elite and was therefore 
answerable to his own council. The power of the chief was derived from the loyalty 
and service of their subordinates in return for the chiefs practicing "good lordship", 
meaning acting in the best interest of the kin-group. This relationship was 
emphasized through the frequent use of "we", indicating the corporate body of 
which the chief was head. Although the chief of his clan, one could not unilaterally 
impose a particular line of policy, Highland chiefs were answerable to their kin- 
group and were expected to lead but not command. The clan elites, especially the 
tacksmen, were consulted by their chief on policy making and their consent was 
essential to the functioning of the kin-group because the tacksmen were the ones 
able to mobilize the whole clan and its resources. Therefore, the chiefs and the clan 
elites had to work together. 
Just as the monarch was to provide for and protect his subjects, the chief, as 
trustee of the clan, was responsible for providing protection for his clansmen, which 
entailed not only protection from attacks by neighboring clans but also protection 
from other issues such as food shortages and injustice. The relationship between 
chief and clansman was addressed by the MacLean bard, lain Lom, when he claimed 
that the chief was ordained by God as a "peacemaker", "who should protect us with 
vigour, and to whom we ought to submit as long as we live". 
2 A more complete 
analysis of the chiefs' role within the clan system is provided by John Leslie, Bishop 
of Ross, who stated that: 
It was the custom in the Yrishe country to acknowledge ane principall 
for thair cheif capitane, to quhome they are obedient, tyme of wear 
and peace, for he is mediatour betwixt theame and the prince, he 
defendis thame aganis the invasionis of thair enemies, thair 
nychboures, and he causis mynistir justice to thame all in the maner 
of the country, sua that none suld be suffered to maike spoile or go in 
sorning, as they call it, or as vagabondes in the cuntrey. 
3 
2 As quoted in Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 3. 
3 As quoted in E. Cowan, "The Discovery of the Gaidhealtachd in Sixteenth 
Century Scotland", 
TGSI, 60 (1998), 259-84, at p. 273-4. 
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The relationship between chief and the idea of "good lordship" not only supported 
the chiefs position within his clan but allowed the clan to expand by incorporating 
those lesser families in need of assistance. As Prof. Allan Macinnes states, "The 
clan, literally the children, as a political, social and cultural entity was the collective 
product of feudalism, kinship and local association". 4 
The clan system combined these factors through the use of bonds and tacks 
which served to strengthen and expand the clan's power over the region, as well as 
through marriage and the practice of fosterage. Bonds of manrent and friendship 
established a complex network of alliances between families and chiefs and chiefs 
with others of their similar status. Bonds of manrent were contracts between a lesser 
family and their local chief. Families who wanted the protection that would be 
afforded to them through association with a clan would approach the chief and offer 
a bond. These bonds often detailed the family's promise to serve the chief for life 
including giving counsel, accompanying him when required, and averting harm to 
the chief. 5 In return the chief gave his promise to protect the family as his own 
kinsmen. A prime example of a bond of manrent was a contract entered into 
between Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, and John Chisholm of Comer. On 13 March 
1621 Chisholm of Comer, as the lower ranked chief, obliged himself to attend Lord 
Fraser's court and committed his clan to the service of the Frasers of Lovat. 6 This 
bond expanded Fraser of Lovat's power and status while at the same time provided 
protection to Chisholm of Comer from attacks on his person or property. As Jenny 
Wormald states, the alliances these bonds created were "the most effective method 
of complementing and adding to the kin-group, and imposing on those who were not 
of the lord's kin the obligations which bound those that were. "' 
Similarly, the use of bonds of friendship linked clans and families of the 
same status with the obligation that they would behave towards each other as if they 
were kin, thus ensuring "good neighborhood" and creating a network of alliances. 8 
During the "Scottish troubles" the use of bonds of friendship served to preserve the 
4 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1. 
5 J. Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland. - Bonds of Manrent, 1442-1603 (Edinburgh, 1985), 2. 
6 J. Munro, ed., Inventory of Chisholm Writs 1456-1810, New Series 18 (Scottish Record Society, 
1992), 17. 
7 Wormald, Lords and Men, 76. 
8 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 10. 
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peace between clans and reinforce their alliance. In June 1639 Sir Donald MacKay, 
Lord Reay, entered into a bond with George MacKenzie, Earl of Seaforth, "that our 
friendship under God and our sovereign lord the King's Majesty may very much 
conduce to the particular weal and standing of either our houses and families, and to 
the good of all our friends, vassals, and tenants". 9 In some cases, bonds of 
friendship were used to end a dispute between two clans to bring about the sense of 
a "good neighborhood". In an attempt to halt the animosity between the MacLeods 
of Dunvegan and the MacDonalds of Sleat bonds of friendship were entered into by 
Rory Mor MacLeod of Dunvegan and Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat in 1601 
and 1609.10 
The use of marriage contracts served a slightly different purpose in the 
structuring of alliance networks. Whereas bonds of manrent and friendship 
connected two clans who were to behave as if they were kin the use of marriages 
created an extended family with an actual kin relation being formed. In many 
situations the alliance created by a marriage contract was just as important as the 
financial benefits to either the bride or groom's clans. A prime example of a 
marriage contract that involved a large financial transaction was the contract 
between John MacDonald of Moidart, Captain of Clanranald, and Marion, daughter 
of Sir Rory Mor MacLeod of Dunvegan. In 1613 Clanranald received from 
MacLeod 200 cows and a galley of 24 oars and three sails, ' 1 which helped to bolster 
Clanranald's assets at a time when he was just starting to feel the financial 
consequences of his clan's turbulent behavior. 12 The alliance between Clanranald 
and MacLeod remained steadfast throughout the 1610s and 1620s; in one instance 
MacLeod, in his capacity as father-in-law, was able to acquire for Clanranald an 
excuse from the obligation of attending the annual meetings with the Privy Council 
on the grounds of Clanranald's debt. 13 
Whereas marriage contracts were often used to extend families the use of 
fosterage was more often used to strengthen existing ties within a clan. Foster 
9 A. Mackay, ed., The Book of Mackay (Edinburgh, 1906), 431-3. 
10 R. C. MacLeod, ed., The Book of Dunvegan: Being Documents from the Munimeni Room of the 
MacLeods of MacLeod at Dunvegan Castle (Spalding Club, 1939), 46. 
' The Book of Dunvegan, 52-4. 
12 For details of Clanranald's financial situation see chapter 6, "Indebtedness in the Western 
Highlands and Isles". 
13 NLS, MSS 2133, Letter from MacLeod of Dunvegan to James VI, 1622. 
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parents were members of the lower strata within the clan who were selected to care 
for one of the sons of a higher ranking member of the clan which included providing 
room and board and ensuring the foster child's education. Often the chiefs sons 
were brought up within the household of one of the clan gentry who would in turn 
delegate the care of his sons to a member of the lesser gentry. As a result, it was a 
great honor and privilege to be a foster parent as it increased the parents' status 
within the clan, but of greater importance was the strengthening of the hierarchical 
relationship between the chief, clan elites, and lesser gentry. 
The practice of fosterage was viewed by central government as one of the 
primary problems of the clan system due to the perpetuation of the Gaelic language 
and the strength of the alliances that fosterage created. To both weaken the strength 
of the clans and to instill Lowland values in the Highlands, central government 
began a direct attack on the traditional practice as early as 1609. One of the statutes 
included in the Statutes of Iona in 1609 was the stipulation that the eldest son of the 
chief was to be educated in Lowland or continental schools. This statute was 
repeated in the conference held with the island chiefs in 1610 and ordered again in 
the 1616 regulations with the addition that the chiefs heir would not be allowed to 
inherit the chiefship unless they were educated in the Lowlands. Central 
government's position against fosterage was intended to break down the clan system 
by attacking its hierarchical structure, as well as the indigenous Gaelic language, 
both of which were thought to be sources of the Highland problem . 
14 
One clan which continued the tradition of fosterage was the Clan Campbell. 
The Campbells were particularly adept at utilizing fosterage to both strengthen the 
connection between different branches of the clan as well as enhancing ties with 
neighboring clans. Within the Clan Campbell it appears that fosterage of the 
Marquis of Argyll's sons continued as late as 1647. Between 1633 and 1637 it is 
recorded that Sir Colin Campbell of Glenorchy was responsible for the education of 
Archibald, later 9th Earl of Argyll, while Sir Donald Campbell of Ardnamurchan was 
prepared to be foster parent to Archibald's brother, Neil. A letter from Argyll to 
John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, as late as January 1647 concludes with Argyll 
referring to his son being in Loudoun's care, "direct my sonne as your Lo[rdship] 
14 For discussion of Highland policies between 1609 and 1616 see below, p. 35-7. 
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thinks fit and command me as your Lo[rdship's] cusin and servant". 15 Not only did 
Argyll send his sons to be foster but he also had taken in Ewen Cameron, who 
would later turn against the Clan Campbell and lead his clan in the numerous 
Jacobite movements. In 1641 Ewen Cameron of Lochiel was placed under the 
charge of Argyll. It appears to have been Argyll's intention to gain the support of 
the Clan Cameron and groom the young Ewen to be an ardent supporter of Argyll's 
philosophies. However, after viewing the atrocities carried out after the battle of 
Philiphaugh Ewen conspired with his kinsmen to leave Argyll's charge and returned 
home in 1647.16 Although central government was opposed to the practice of 
fosterage, even as a high ranking official within the Covenanting government Argyll 
continued without facing any consequences from the courts. Argyll's fosterage 
served as a key component in maintaining the integrity of his clan while it was 
recovering from Royalist attacks by preserving the relationship between the various 
branches of the clan while at the same time maintaining a hold on one of his allies 
through the fosterage of Ewen Cameron. 
The expansion of the clan through the numerous types of bonds created a 
clear hierarchy of power which placed the chief at the head of the kindred, followed 
by the clan elites, the tacksmen, and, lastly, the tenants. The most vital link on the 
chain of clan power was the tacksman. By the seventeenth century the chief held his 
territory primarily through crown charter, and in turn gave a tack, an oral or written 
lease, to a member of the lesser gentry within his clan. As a result, the tacksman 
was given the job of manager over a piece of the clan's territory. As manager, the 
tacksman was responsible for overseeing the clan's resources in his bounds, such as 
food rents and man power. The reason the tacksman was a vital instrument in the 
clan system was because he was the cornerstone to the reciprocal relationship 
between the clan elites and tenants. In his capacity as resource manager, the 
tacksman was responsible for the collection from his tenants and distribution to the 
clan elites of the calps, the best beast given on the death of the head of the family, 
15 C. Innes, ed., The Black Book of Taymouth: With other papers from the Breadalbane Charter 
Room (Kilchurn Society, 1986), 84; Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 13; 
Huntington Library, San Marino, California, L08057, Letter from Marquis of Argyll to John, I" Earl 
of Loudoun, Edinburgh, January 8,1647. 
16 A. Mackenzie, History of the Camerons; with Genealogies of the Principle Families of the Name 
(Inverness, 1884), 94-105. 
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and cuid-oidhche, or hospitality, as well as to distribute to the clansmen steelbow 
and food in times of need which was collected from the clan elites. This reciprocal 
relationship was precisely what maintained the clan system; the tenants supported 
the chief and the clan elites, while they in turn provided for and protected their 
clansmen. As a result, the clan system was almost completely self-sufficient and 
was able to function independently of central government-thus leading to the 
attempts by James VI to integrate the clans in an effort to abolish many of the 
institutions of the clan system seen to be uncivilized. 
II 
One of the primary causes of discontent in the Western Highlands and Isles 
was a direct result of the policies and political position of the Campbells. The 
Campbells of Argyll developed a close relationship with the monarch dating back to 
Robert the Bruce and over the years rose from petty chiefs in Argyllshire to 
powerful barons; their only rival was the Lordship of the Isles. The fall of the 
lordship in 1493 opened the door for the talented and crafty Campbells of Argyll to 
increase their position and prestige further at the expense of many of the clans in the 
region. The following examination of the political position of the prominent clans in 
the Western Highlands and Isles places James VI's policies in perspective and 
illustrates how events in the late 1500s continued to affect those policies as well as 
the social dynamics in the region. What emerges from conducting a clan-by-clan 
survey is the precarious position a number of clans were put in as a result of the 
ineptitude of central government when dealing with the region and the negative 
effect the crown's reliance on the Campbells of Argyll had on the region. 
The destruction of the MacDonalds of Dunyveg was brought about by 
Archibald Campbell, 7`h Earl of Argyll's, manipulation and subsequent crown 
interference in the feud between the MacDonalds of Dunyveg and the MacLeans of 
Duart. Since the early 1580s, Angus MacDonald of Dunyveg and Lachlan Mor 
MacLean of Duart had been at odds over possession of the Rinns of Islay-the 
MacDonalds were hereditary holders of the land, but Duart attempted to claim it as 
his own through an old office held by his ancestors during the reign of the Lordship 
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of the Isles. As Sir Robert Gordon retold in his history, "For a while [they] did 
continually vex one another with slaughters and outrages". " 
The continued rift between the MacDonalds and the MacLeans had 
effectively divided the isles; a handful of clans had flocked to the banner of the 
MacDonalds and MacLeans. The MacDonalds were supported by clansmen from the 
MacDonalds of Keppoch, MacDonalds of Sleat, MacDonalds of Glengarry, Maclans 
of Ardnamurchan, MacNeils of Gigha, MacAllisters of Loup, and MacPhees of 
Colonsay. With the support and encouragement of Argyll, MacLean of Duart was 
given a commission of fire and sword against Sir James MacDonald and the rebels 
on Islay in 1598. Aided by the MacLeods of Dunvegan, Camerons of Lochiel, 
MacKinnons of Strathordale, MacQuarries of Mull, and the MacNeils of Barra an 
assault on the MacDonalds was carried out and the entire island was ravaged. ' 8 
As hostilities continued, James VI was forced to turn to the Earl of Argyll to 
instill order; in the 1640s Argyll would face the repercussions for his actions and 
manipulation of both MacDonald and MacLean. An order was issued to Angus 
MacDonald and Hector MacLean to surrender their holding in Islay and Kintyre to 
Argyll in September 1603 and by October of the same year Argyll had been given a 
commission of fire and sword against both chiefs. '9 MacDonald's resistance to the 
earl was futile. In 1608 Dunyveg Castle was surrendered and as a reward for 
Argyll's service he was granted the charter for Kintyre with the stipulation that no 
lease was to be granted to MacDonalds, MacLeans, MacLeods, MacAllistairs, or 
MacNeils-all of whom were considered barbarous Highland clans. 20 With Argyll's 
new charter of Kintyre his kinsman, Sir John Campbell of Cawdor, had begun to set 
his sights on Islay. Cawdor's opportunity of acquiring Islay came to fruition when a 
revolt amongst the Islaymen led to the detention of Andrew Knox, Bishop of the 
Isles. 
The Privy Council, furious with the MacDonalds in Islay, promised Cawdor 
the charter of Islay on the condition that he would personally fund an expedition to 
1' As quoted in E. J. Cowan, "Clanship, Kindred and the Campbell acquisition of Islay, ", SHR 58 
(1979), 132-57, at pp. 133-4. 
18 D. Gregory, History of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotlanch from A. D. 1493 to A. D. 1625 
(Edinburgh, 1975), 285. 
19 E. J. Cowan, "Fishers in Drumlie Waters: Clanship and Campbell Expansion in the Time of 
Gilleasbuig Grumach", TGSI LIV(1987), 269-312, at pp. 286-7. Also in E. J. Cowan, "Clanship", 150. 
20 Gregory, History, 311. 
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Islay to put down the insurrection. On 27 January 1615, Cawdor positioned his 
cannons at Dunyveg and on the 1 s` of February began to lay siege to the castle . 
21 By 
the next day Angus Og MacDonald had surrendered and Colla Ciotach had fled. 
Even though Sir John Campbell of Cawdor was granted his charter to Islay in 
October 1615, one last attempt to regain possession of Dunyveg Castle had been 
made by the MacDonalds but was defeated in September 1616 and the remnants of 
the clan were finally destroyed. 
A number of chiefs, primarily of the Clan Donald, became entangled in the 
destruction of the MacDonalds of Dunyveg either through direct involvement or 
association. For example, under the leadership of Alistair MacRanald of Keppoch, 
the MacDonalds of Keppoch joined in the Islay rebellion which resulted in the clan 
being denounced rebels and the clan elites being put to the horn. Unfortunately for 
Alistair his troubles did not end with the Islay rebellion. While put to the horn for 
their actions on Islay, a commission of fire and sword was granted to Sir Lachlan 
Mackintosh against Alistair and his sons for their wasting of Sir Lachlan's lands in 
Lochaber. A similar commission had been issued to the Earl of Enzie, eldest son of 
the Marquis of Huntly, and both Mackintosh and Enzie were pursuing Alistair and 
his family. The combination of being put to the horn for Islay and having a 
commission of fire and sword issued against them was enough incentive for 
Keppoch and his second son, Donald Glas, to flee to Spain in 1616.22 The 
MacDonalds of Keppoch would remain out of the picture until 1620 when both men 
returned and were granted pardons by James VI in exchange for information of a 
contemplated Spanish invasion of Britain. 23 
Only a few incidents of note arise in the history of the MacDonalds of Sleat 
between 1603 and 1616, "The first decade of the 17th century was a somewhat quiet 
and uneventful period in the annuals of the House of Sleat"; 24 however, one incident 
was a result of the Islay rebellion. Although Sleat did not personally join the 
rebellion a number of his men had and he personally came under suspicion for 
aiding Sir James MacDonald in the rebellion on Islay. Fortunately for Sleat, he was 
21 Black, "Colla Ciotach", 206; Gregory, History, 363. 
22 A. M. Shaw, Historical Memoirs of the House and Clan of Mackintosh and of the Clan Chattan 
(London, 1880), 301. 
23 A. MacDonald & A. MacDonald, The Clan Donald, 3vols. (Inverness, 1896-1904) ii, 625-6. 
24 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, iii, 48 
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not reprimanded for his suspicious behavior and was able to busy himself by 
acquiring a new charter for his lands of Sleat, North Uist and Skeirhough which was 
granted on 21 July 1614 for a fixed rent of £257 6s 8d. 25 By 1616 Donald Gorme 
appears to have remained relatively quiet, following along with the compulsory 
annual meetings and conducting land transactions; his good behavior was rewarded 
with his knighthood in 1617. 
Although the Islay rebellion was a concern for many chiefs, Sleat's main 
concern during this period was his feud with his brother-in-law, Rory Mor MacLeod 
of Dunvegan. Hostilities appear to have begun with Sleat offending MacLeod 
leading to MacLeod's attack on Trotternish which Sleat responded to by raiding 
Harris. 26 The mutual raids continued until 1601 when the Privy Council became 
involved and ordered MacLeod into the custody of Argyll and Sleat into the custody 
of the Marquis of Huntly. The Privy Council then ordered both chiefs to give up 
their prisoners and to execute mutual assurances for keeping the peace. Although 
both chiefs had given up open warfare they would continue to occasionally harass 
each other and eventually end up on opposite sides during the Covenant 
Movement. 27 
As with MacDonald of Sleat, Donald MacAllan of Moidart, Captain of 
Clanranald, was able to avoid a personal link with the MacDonalds of Dunyveg, but 
unfortunately Clanranald was unable to avoid involvement in the collapse of the 
MacLeods of Lewis. Clanranald became involved in the conflict when Neil 
MacLeod and the surviving members of the clan were being pursued by MacKenzie 
of Kintail and pleaded for refuge within Clanranald's bounds. As a result of his 
aiding and abetting the Clan MacLeod, Clanranald was denounced a rebel. 
28 After 
being involved in the escape of Neil MacLeod, Clanranald appears to have remained 
relatively quiet and was not directly involved in any conflicts; however, he was 
constantly forced to answer for his kinsmen's behavior. 
In 1616 Clanranald agreed to all the regulations negotiated during the July 
meeting, including the stipulation to keep good rule and to reside on the isle of 
25 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, iii, 50. 
26 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, iii, 39-42. 
27 I. F. Grant, The MacLeods: The History of a Clan, 1200-1956 (London, 1959), 196-7; MacDonald 
& MacDonald, Clan Donald, iii, 45-6. 
28 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, ii, 315 
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Tioram, and on 24 August he entered into a bond of friendship with Sir Rory Mor 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, Sir Lachlan MacKinnon of Strathordale, and Lachlan 
MacLean of Co11; 29 all chiefs who were likewise beholden to the compulsory annual 
meetings. Although Clanranald was able to keep himself out of trouble he 
unfortunately had a great deal of trouble keeping his kinsmen in order in accordance 
with the 1616 Regulations; "Clanranald, however well disposed towards the 
Government, had more than enough to do to keep order among his unruly clansmen, 
his own nearest kinsmen being the most unmanageable of all". 30 Donald MacAllan, 
Captain of Clanranald, died in 1618 which may explain why he was not instrumental 
in the turmoil created by the Islay rebellion; however, his son, John, who would 
inherit the captaincy would be plagued by the debts incurred by his father in his 
attempts to instill order among the clan. 
Another branch of the Clan Donald that had difficulty keeping order was the 
MacDonalds of Glengarry. Although Glengarry was able to personally avoid 
participation in the Islay rebellion his son, Alasdair, had been taken prisoner by Sir 
James MacDonald and upon his release joined the rebellion. 31 However, the biggest 
problems Glengarry faced between 1601 and 1622 were his dispute with MacKenzie 
of Kintail over possession of Morar and his clan's raiding of Clanranald territory. 
As a result of these feuds Glengarry was denounced a rebel on 25 March 1609 for 
failing to appear before the Privy Council to answer for his, and his clansmen's, 
conduct and again on 21 February 1610 for not answering for his clansmen's raids 
on Clanranald. 32 Even though he was denounced a rebel as early as 1609 his feud 
with Kintail would continue until 1622 with the occasional wasting of each other's 
land. 33 However, in 1616, Glengarry's feud with Clanranald ended when the two 
chiefs entered into a bond of friendship; Clanranald was willing to repair injuries 
done by his men to Glengarry's lands in Knoydart and Glengarry offered to make 
good any damage caused by his men to Clanranald's territory. 
34 
29 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, ii, 317 
30 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, ii, 318 
31 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, ii, 414 
32 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, ii, 411 
33 N. H. MacDonald, The Clan Ranald of Knoydart & Glengarry: a History of the MacDonalds or 
MacDonnells of Glengarry (Edinburgh, 1979), 33-7. 
34 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, ii, 415 
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The hostile situation in the Western Highlands and Isles appeared to be 
reaching a lull by 1616; the rebellion on Islay had come to an end as did many of the 
feuds. However, this was not to be the case for the MacIans of Ardnamurchan. The 
events recorded in the history of the Clan MacIan are similar to those of the 
MacDonalds of Dunyveg in that they had become victims of Campbell of Argyll's 
increasing power in the region. The Maclans were faced with internal problems 
resulting from disputes within the clan elite over leadership of the clan during the 
minority of its chief. The dissension of the clan, begun in 1596, led the Earl of 
Argyll to enforce his feudal superiority over Ardnamurchan in 1602.35 Once 
superiority was gained, Argyll turned to his extensive network of kinsmen to 
complete the destruction of the clan in much the same way as he turned to Campbell 
of Cawdor to ensure acquisition of Islay. The task of managing Ardnamurchan and 
the Clan Maclan was assigned to Donald Campbell of Barbreck-Lochawe, half- 
brother to Sir John Campbell of Cawdor, in 1612.36 However, the managerial skills 
of Donald Campbell increased the instability of the Clan Maclan; as Donald 
Gregory stated, Donald Campbell "made himself very obnoxious to the natives by 
his severities". 37 The heavy handed administration of Donald Campbell created a 
period of uneasy co-existence and resulted in continuous problems over payments of 
rents and obedience to Argyll which would culminate in open hostilities and piracy 
among the Clan Maclan in 1625.38 
The rapacious measures taken by the Campbells of Argyll were not solely 
aimed at the Clan Donald; even their own allies were sometimes victimized by 
Campbell policies. The position of MacLean of Duart was severely undermined by 
the Campbells' manipulative tactics in their acquisition of Islay. As discussed 
previously, the MacLeans of Duart were at the heart of the conflict in Islay. Lachlan 
MacLean appears to have welcomed the assistance of the Earl of Argyll in his effort 
to claim the Rinns of Islay for himself; in fact, Lachlan would ensure the alliance 
with Argyll by joining the earl in the suppression of the rebellion of Catholics in 
Ulster. However, the relationship between Argyll and Duart seems to have been 
35 Gregory, History, 405-8. 
36 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, 180. 
37 Gregory, History, 408. 
38 See chapter 4 "Central Government and the Western Highlands and Isles" for details of the 
commissions granted against the Maclans for their piracy and lawlessness in 1625. 
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strained by Argyll's betrayal. After Duart had spent large sums in both Ulster and 
Islay he had expected to receive the charter for Islay as compensation once Argyll 
had successfully defeated the MacDonalds. This was not to be the case, instead 
Duart was overlooked and Campbell of Cawdor was granted Islay. 
MacLean of Duart's involvement in Ulster and Islay placed the clan in an 
unsettling situation. Without the charter for Islay, and its corresponding rental 
income, the sum of Sir Lachlan MacLean's financial expenditures created an 
enormous deficit in the clan's resources. By 1616, the MacLean fine was forced to 
place the Duart estate in the hands of a group of trustees to protect the estate from 
the incompetence of Hector MacLean of Duart. 39 
The policies of the Campbells of Argyll not only had an effect on their 
immediate surroundings but also made an impact on the MacKenzies of Kintail. 
The actions of Kenneth MacKenzie, Lord Kintail, appear to be an emulation of the 
tactics used by Argyll. Kintail's involvement in the destruction of the MacLeods of 
Lewis and his relationship with Neil MacLeod mirrored the means by which Argyll 
and Cawdor were able to acquire Kintyre and Islay, respectively. Although Kenneth 
MacKenzie's seat was at Kintail and his territory extended through Ross and 
Cromarty, with the exception of Easter Ross, he was eager to increase his power and 
prestige; this mentality would carry through the first half of the seventeenth century 
and became a primary motive behind the clan's involvement in the Civil Wars. 
The attempted extirpation of the MacLeods of Lewis was begun in 1597 with 
the creation of the Fife Undertakers by James VI and parliament. The MacLeods of 
Lewis had been deeply entrenched in a family feud over inheritance of the head of 
the clan; outright bloodshed and kidnapping between legitimate and illegitimate sons 
had been rampant. As a result, the Fife Undertakers were given the task of removing 
the MacLeods of Lewis and establishing royal burghs in Stornoway and Lochaber, 
as well as erecting six parish churches in the area. 40 Similar to James's attitude to 
the feud between MacDonald of Dunyveg and MacLean of Duart, there were early 
attempts to settle the dispute, but when they proved ineffective James was forced to 
proceed to complete annihilation of the clan in order to instill peace. 
39 N. Maclean-Bristol, "The MacLeans from 1560-1707: A Re-Appraisal", Seventeenth Century in 
the Highlands (Inverness Field Club, 1986), 82. 
40 Mathew, Scotland under Charles 1,187. 
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MacKenzie of Kintail's involvement in the struggle for Lewis began when he 
obtained a re-grant of his lands which he was able to extend to include Lewis. When 
James was informed of the re-grant he ordered Kintail to resign it to the crown and, 
in turn, granted it to the three remaining Fife Undertakers: Lord Balmerino, Sir 
George Hay, and Sir James Spence of Wormiston. 41 With his plan to peacefully 
acquire Lewis thwarted, MacKenzie joined forces with Neil MacLeod, surviving 
heir to the MacLeod of Lewis, in his attempt to remove the Fife Undertakers from 
Lewis and the two entered into a conspiracy to seize a supply ship bound for Lewis. 
Once the Fife Undertakers abandoned their mission and MacKenzie finally 
acquired legal title to Lewis he betrayed Neil MacLeod and sailed to Lewis with 700 
men to enforce his superiority. Many inhabitants submitted to MacKenzie, but Neil 
and his closest followers took refuge on Berinsay and awaited an opportunity to 
counter-attack. The death of Kenneth MacKenzie afforded Neil and his men the 
opportunity to make one last attempt to regain Lewis in 1612. The attempt failed 
and Neil was forced to flee to Harris where he secretly stayed under the protection of 
his kinsmen Rory Mor MacLeod of Dunvegan. Neil eventually surrendered to Rory 
Mor and asked to be turned over to James in England, rather than Edinburgh. The 
two slowly made their way to England and while in Glasgow the Privy Council had 
received word of Rory's harboring of Neil and charged him with treason. As a 
result, Rory had little choice but to turn over Neil or risk losing his own territory; 
Neil was summarily executed in April 1613.42 
With the MacDonalds of Dunyveg and the MacLeods of Lewis essentially 
destroyed and a number of clans in a precarious position the Western Highlands and 
Isles began a slow transformation from a land fraught with feuds and rebellions into 
a less violent and, in the eyes of central government, a more acceptable region in 
respect of their increasing law-abiding behavior. A letter from Rory Mor MacLeod 
of Dunvegan in 1622 praised James for his success in the region and for "this 
delectable time of peace". 3 Sixteen years later, in 1638, the Gentlemen of the Isles 
would claim "that the Yles for the present is in as good estate as manie parts of the 
41 "The Genealogie of the Surname of M'Kenzie", J. R. N. MacPhail, (ed. ), Highland Papers, 4 vols. 
(SHS, 1914 -1934), ii, 61-62; Grant, Clan MacLeod, 204-5. 42 "The Ewill Trowbies of the Lewes", Highland Papers, ii, 278; Grant, Clan MacLeod, 216-7. 
43 RPC, xii, 744-5. 
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countrey". 4It was due to the 1616 Regulations that these claims of peace in the 
region could be made. Through the regulations, central government was able to 
standardize the policies employed for instilling law and order in the Western 
Highlands and Isles and was able to enforce the compulsory annual meetings 
between the island chiefs and the Privy Council. By expanding on previous 
agreements reached with the island chiefs, the 1616 Regulations diminished the 
polarization between the Highlands and Lowlands and hindered the traditional clan 
system. 
One of the key agreements reached between a representative of the crown 
and the chiefs was the Statutes of Iona in 1609. Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles, 
took it upon himself to try to enforce a scheme of his own device to resolve the 
problems within the Western Highlands and Isles. In 1609, Knox arranged for the 
release of the prominent chiefs of the isles who had been incarcerated by Andrew 
Stewart, Lord Ochiltree, in 1608 and brought them to his court of justiciary on the 
Isle of Iona on 23 August. With broad instructions from James to reduce the power 
of the chiefs, the bishop forced the chiefs in attendance to submit to him and to sign 
a series of statutes. The final draft of the Statutes of Iona included nine statutes and 
a bond of allegiance which was merely the Bishop of the Isles' attempt to prove that 
the statutes were drafted for the king's benefit and not his own. Of the nine statutes 
agreed to on Iona, the most significant were the establishing of churches and the 
maintaining parish ministers, the abolition of hospitality which included a ban on the 
sale of wine, and the requirement of chiefs and clan gentry to education their 
children in the Lowlands with an emphasis on the English language. 45 The 
effectiveness of these statutes was minuscule; no actions were taken by central 
government to actually enforce any of the statutes and Knox did not even get the 
usual and customary congratulations on his return to the Privy Council. 46 However, 
these statutes are key to the evolution of Highland policies not for what they 
accomplished in 1609 but the fact that many of the issues were repeated in the 1616 
Regulations. It appears that the only real effect that Knox's endeavor had in 1609 
was to prove that the chiefs could be peacefully dealt with and that he was 
44RPC, 2nd series, vii, 26. 
as RPC, ix, 26-30. 
46J. Goodare, "The Statutes of Iona in Context", SHR LXXVII (1998), 31-57, at p. 39-40. 
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successful in getting the chiefs to agree to meet with the Privy Council at a future 
date. 
A great deal of progress was made in 1610 when a conference was held with 
the island chiefs in Edinburgh. No new agreements were made, nor were the 
Statutes of Iona renewed, in fact no mention of the statutes was even made, but the 
two parties finally began to realize they could be in the same room with each other 
and could possibly work together. As a result, detailed arrangements were made to 
meet regularly as it appeared that they could possibly resolve the problems in the 
region through negotiation. Between 1610 and 1615 the chiefs were summoned by 
the Privy Council to Edinburgh in accordance with the agreement reached at the 
1610 conference primarily for the purpose of paying their royal rents which was at 
the heart of James VI's plan dating back to his instructions to Knox which were 
ignored by the bishop. However, because of the rebellions on Islay and the decline 
in royal rent payments, central government was forced to draw up a new set of 
regulations in 1616 many of which echoed the Statutes of Iona though they were 
never directly cited. 
On 10 July 1616 six chiefs from the Western Highlands and Isles presented 
themselves before the Privy Council and found themselves compelled to accept a 
series of regulations which had the potential of placing the clan system in jeopardy. 
The new regulations stipulated that the chiefs were to present themselves yearly with 
their leading kinsmen to answer any complaints made against them and to provide 
cautions for their future good behavior and sureties for their next attendance. The 
chiefs also had the size of their households reduced and were to live in houses, 
rather than castles, where they would supervise farming. Chiefs were no longer 
allowed to have more than one galley and were no longer to uplift hospitality as they 
toured their territory as it was now deemed oppressive. All leases to tenants were 
now to be set at a fixed rent and it was the responsibility of the chief to rid his estate 
of "idle" people. Within the chiefs household the consumption of wine was limited, 
while the carrying of weapons was strictly regulated. 'Lastly, the regulations dictated 
that parish schools were to be erected and all the chiefs were to send their children to 
be educated in the Lowlands. 47 
47 RPC, x, 773-6. 
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One important aspect of the new regulations was the reiteration of the 
mandate for all chiefs' children over the age of nine to be sent to the Lowlands to be 
educated in the English language. To ensure this directive was adhered to the Privy 
Council added the stipulation that if a child was not sent to school they had no legal 
claim to their inheritance. The regulation on education was a direct attack on both 
the Gaelic culture of the Highlands and the fostering practices of the clans 
previously discussed. 8 According to the Privy Council, the intention was "That the 
vulgar English Tongue be universalie planted, and the Irish language, which is one 
of the chiefe and principal causes of the continuance of barbaritie and incivilitie 
among the inhabitants of the Isles and Highlands, may be removit". 49 By forcing 
children to attend schoolhouses, not only were they attempting to bring to an end the 
culture of the region by removing the indigenous language, but the government also 
attempted to block any alliances that could be developed by sending a child to live 
and be cared for by another family. 
The largest impact which the 1616 Regulations had on the clans was an order 
to the chiefs to present themselves before the Privy Council once a year on the loth 
of July to ensure their obedience, as well as their clansmen's, without having to be 
officially summoned. The chiefs involved in these meetings were those who had 
been seen as either the cause of the unrest in the isles or those powerful enough to 
warrant the harnessing of their strength; hence the original list of chiefs included the 
Captain of Clanranald, MacDonald of Sleat, MacLean of Duart, MacLean of 
Lochbuie, MacLean of Coll, MacLeod of Dunvegan and MacKinnon of 
Strathordale. 50 At first glance it may come as a surprise that such powerful chiefs 
would submit themselves to the Privy Council; however, one must realize that these 
chiefs had recently seen the destruction of three clans at the hands of the 
government, the MacLeods of Lewis, the MacDonalds of Dunyveg, and the 
MacGregors, and many were in an uncertain position themselves. Therefore, the 
chiefs' compliance with the Privy Council's annual meetings was a means of self- 
preservation rather than surrender. 
48 For a discussion of fosterage see above, p. 23. 
49 RPC, x, 773-6. 
50 This list would later include MacNeil of Barra in 1629 and MacLean of Morvern in 1632. 
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The reasoning behind the Privy Council's "annual visit" was simply to force 
the chiefs to answer any charges against them and more importantly to ensure "that 
by their comeing heir yeirlie thay may be reducit to civilitie and maid to 
acknowledge their obedience to his Majestie and his lawis". 51 The chiefs themselves 
expanded on the issue of "civility", when in a petition for relief of their annual visit 
they claimed the purpose for their attendance was that they "might learn civility and, 
by imitation of the noblemen and others of the incountry, might become peaceable 
and obedient subjects". 52 In order to guarantee that the chiefs would adhere to the 
order for an annual meeting, the Council mandated that each chief was to appoint an 
agent in Edinburgh, as well as requiring them to find cautions and sureties for their 
good behavior and regular attendance. All three of the conditions had not only the 
effect of limiting the chiefs' strength but would also make certain that the impact on 
the chiefs' pocket book would also force their obedience. 
The 1616 Regulations and the subsequent annual meetings finally brought an 
end to the disorganized attempts to civilize the region and laid down, for what 
appears to be the first time, a uniform policy for the Western Highlands and Isles. 
The regulations marked a shift in policy away from hostile, aggressive "pet- 
projects" towards a more cooperative relationship between the chiefs and central 
government. Although the regulations limited the power of the chiefs, central 
government began to work within the existing framework of the clan system to 
instill peace and to control its strength rather than attempting to aggressively destroy 
it. 
Due to the success of the meetings in subduing the Western Highlands and 
Isles, Charles I's government was not forced to cultivate any semblance of a 
Highland policy because the region had been deemed civilized. Throughout the 
reign of Charles I the Western Highlands and Isles, as well as the whole of the 
Highlands, were dealt with on a need only basis and often resulted in central 
government merely presiding over judicial cases. The relative peace in the 
Highlands which Charles I had inherited from his father allowed him to direct his 
focus on his desire to reclaim the crown's wealth and power from the nobility. To 
51 Ibid. 
52 RPC, 2nd series, v, 560. 
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facilitate these reclamations Charles enacted an Act of Revocation in 1625. An Act 
of Revocation had been used in the past to protect the king from the consequences of 
misgovernment during a previous reign. Essentially, the use of such an act allowed 
the king to revoke any grants of land or authority that were deemed detrimental to 
the crown and central government. Not only did Charles's actions anger the 
landholders targeted by the act, but it made many landholders fearful of the king's 
lust for their land in the future. 
Even though the Act of Revocation was unable to enact sweeping 
landholding reform, there were some members of the elites who fell victim to the 
compulsory surrender. In the Western Highlands and Isles both MacLean of Duart 
and Archibald Campbell, later Marquis of Argyll, were singled out to surrender their 
land and hereditary office respectively. In practice, the act was used to order 
MacLean of Duart in 1635 to surrender his possession of Iona granted to his family 
by the Bishop of the Isles in the 1570s. The loss of the income from Iona 
complicated matters for Duart who was facing financial difficulties, but the 
transaction had little effect on the region. On the other hand, Argyll's surrender in 
1628 of his hereditary position as Justice General in exchange for the office of 
Justiciar for Argyll and the Isles created a controversy within the Western Highlands 
and Isles due to the location of the new justice courts. 53 
The Campbells of Argyll had held the position of Justice General of Scotland 
since 1514 when the office was granted to Colin, 1St Earl of Argyll. As Justice 
General the earls of Argyll were able to increase their political position to such an 
extent that in practice they were second in power and dignity to only the monarch 
within the Western Highlands and Isles. In their capacity as Justice General the earls 
of Argyll exercised judicial authority over criminal cases, occasionally presiding 
over cases of treason, and were issued commissions of lieutenancy from the crown, 
as needed, for military endeavors necessary to facilitate law and order. In April 
1628 Archibald Campbell, Lord Lorne, later Marquis of Argyll, attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to have the hereditary office renewed through the Revocation. A 
contract between Charles I and Lorne was entered into in which the Campbells of 
Argyll were forced to renounce their office to Charles and his successors in 
53 Collectanea de Rebus Albanicis (Iona Club, 1848), 185-6; HMC, Report 4 MSS of Argyll, 486. 
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exchange for £4,000 and the heritable office of Justiciar within the bounds of the 
sheriffdoms of Argyll, Tarbert, and all of the isles with the right to half of the fines 
and escheats raised. 54 The infefting of Argyll as Justiciar for Argyll and the Isles 
created a source of contention between the island chiefs and Lorne because of the 
new jurisdictional bounds of the office. Even though the new office had a limited 
impact on the Campbells of Argyll's role in the region, the main difference being 
that he could no longer preside over cases involving treason, the fact that the 
locations of the courts were not specifically detailed in the new charter made the 
island chiefs question whether or not Lorne had the authority to hold court wherever 
he chose. In December 1628, Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat, on behalf of all 
island chiefs, submitted a petition to the council in response to Lorne's new office 
claiming the grant violated a 1504 Act of Parliament passed during the reign of 
James IV. The Act dictated that the court for the North Isles was to be held at 
Dingwall or Inverness and for the South Isles it was to be held at Tarbert or 
Lochkinkerran. 55 The petition was endorsed by the council, and the case was to be 
heard the following June; in the meantime, Lorne was forbidden to hold court for the 
North Isles and was not to take legal proceedings against any of the inhabitants. 56 
In June 1629 the island chiefs and Lorne presented their cases before the Privy 
Council and after much discussion Lorne agreed to hold the southern court in 
Tarbert and the northern court in Inverness, with the condition "it wer not privative 
nor exclusive of him to keep courts indefinitely against particular delinquents in the 
Isles where they dwell". 57 The chiefs were quick to object to such a condition based 
on the fact that no advocate would journey to the Hebrides to try a case, and the 
inhabitants would be denied a proper defense. The matter was eventually settled by 
an Act of the Privy Council, 4 September 1629, giving Lorne the power to hold his 
primary justice court for the Northern Isles in Inverness and "His Majesty's 
Commission" granted Lorne the right to hold court in any other part as needed. 58 
For all intensive purposes Lorne got what he wanted, he was able to hold court 
anywhere he needed to. Many of the island chiefs would add this issue to the 
sa HMC, Report 4,486. 
ss RPC, 2"d series, ii, 632. 
56 RPC, 2"d series, ii, 634. 
57 RPC, 2"d series, iii, 164. 
58 HMC Report IV Appendix, 487; RPC, 2"d series, iii, 272; HMC Report V1 Appendix, 624. 
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growing list of grievances they had against the Campbells which would culminate in 
the numerous attacks on the Campbell estates during the 1640s. 
Other than the forfeit of MacLean's lands and the surrender and regrant of 
Argyll office, as a whole the Act of Revocation had little effect on the clans of the 
Western Highlands and Isles even though in theory the act could have had major 
consequences for the region. In theory, Charles could have done serious damage to 
the clans by enforcing the act in the region because technically the islands were 
crown property. 59 However, since the clans had begun to cooperate with central 
government through the annual meetings and had proved valuable as government 
agents in enforcing commissions, it is quite possible that Charles did not want to 
meddle in the region without the financial resources to fulfill his obligation for 
compensation and to halt any potential uprisings. 
Another problem Charles created for himself was his alteration to the Church 
of Scotland and his increasing reliance on bishops for counsel, which became clearly 
evident during the Parliament of 1633. One of the main issues during the 1633 
Parliament concerned the king's prerogative rights in the structure of the church. 
Many ministers in Scotland were worried about the impact this parliament would 
have on the future of the Kirk. As Samuel Rutherford wrote, "I see and hear, at 
home and abroad, nothing but matter of grief and discouragement, which indeed 
maketh my life bitter ... I am afraid now 
(as many other are) that, at the sitting 
down of our Parliament, our Lord Jesus and His spouse [the Kirk] shall be roughly 
handled. "60 As many members of the clergy soon found out, their fears became 
realities. A total of thirty-one acts were presented to the House; all passed smoothly, 
except for two. 61 One of the debated acts dealt with the reinstitution of previous 
religious legislation, chiefly the Five Articles of Perth which had been ratified in 
59 As mentioned on p. 27, by the 17th century the majority of the clans' territories were confirmed and 
held by crown charter and were, therefore, vulnerable to Charles's revocation if he chose to enforce 
his position over the chieftains. 
60 A. A. Boner (ed. ), Letters of Samuel Rutherford (Edinburgh, 1891), 79 & 87. 
61 G. W. Johnson (ed. ), The Fairfax Correspondence: Memoirs of the Reign of Charles the First 
(London, 1848), 286. 
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1621 but had re-emerged as a hotly contested issue in 1633; 62 the other addressed 
the scope of the king's prerogative in regard to dictating the clergy's apparel. 
The animosity towards the innovations in the Kirk and the increasing power 
of the episcopacy was not felt within the Western Highlands and Isles as a whole. 
As will be detailed in chapter 5, the religious organization in the region was 
extremely frail. Many parishes in the Western Highlands and Isles were vacant or 
poorly ministered. Therefore, the potential for any form of revolt was severely 
diminished by the fact that few were aware such changes to the Kirk were even 
being undertaken. By the time a clear and concise religious program was 
established in the Western Highlands and Isles, primarily through the erection of the 
Synod of Argyll in 1638, the Covenanters were in control of both the Church of 
Scotland and central government. Thus, when religious conformity was re- 
introduced with the support of an organized body, such as the Synod of Argyll, the 
innovations Charles implemented were summarily removed. Where Charles's 
religious innovations would have an effect in the Western Highlands and Isles is in 
the fact that these issues would lay the foundation for the emergence of the 
Covenant Movement and Argyll's support for the cause would further increase his 
dominance over the region. 
III 
The Covenant regime which began to develop in 1637 was a grass-roots movement 
started among ministers and a handful of nobles irate at the innovations imposed on 
the Kirk by Charles and his advisors. The growth of the movement was more of a 
bottom to top spreading of support culminating in a nationwide campaign in favor of 
the National Covenant. Once the movement spread from ministers to the nobility the 
tone of the argument changed from anger towards the changes in the Kirk to open 
hostility to the royal prerogative that created the alterations to both temporal and 
secular institutions. Therefore, the National Covenant was drafted as a critique of 
Charles's system of government under the guise of a concern for religion. On the 
62 The Five Articles of Perth were passed by the General Assembly at Perth in 1618. The articles 
reintroduced private baptism, private communion, confirmation by bishops, observance of holy days, 
and kneeling at communion. 
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surface the Covenant regime's primary goal was the removal of bishops out of 
concern for the Presbyterian religion. In actuality, the intention of the nobility who 
signed the Covenant was to limit Charles's powers and regain the authority they 
possessed prior to the Act of Revocation and before the increasing power of the 
episcopacy in secular offices. As the historian John Spalding stated "here you may 
see they began at religion as the grounds of their quarrel, whereas their intention was 
only bent against the King's majesty and his royal prerogative". 63 
The overall tenor of the Covenant Movement became an open opposition to 
the absolutism of Charles I and his use of the royal prerogative. Many supporters of 
the Covenant were angered by the fact that Charles had sought little consultation 
from the Scots on his Revocation and religious innovations. Although many within 
the nobility wanted a constitutional monarch, one answerable to Parliament, a 
struggle ensued between the desire to destroy the principle of Royal Prerogative and 
the preservation of the monarch. As I. B. Cowan states, "most authorities are agreed 
that the prime cause of division lay in the basic inconsistency of the covenant 
whereby an attempt was made to defend the person and authority of the king while 
at the same time promoting policies contrary to his interest". 64 This inconsistency 
laid the foundation for the Engagement of 1647-8, which divided the Covenanters 
into moderate and radical factions. As the radicals, under the Marquis of Argyll, 
made more blatant attacks on the monarchy resulting in Charles's surrender and 
transfer to the English Parliamentarians, the moderates formed a weak alliance intent 
on rescuing the king and preserving the monarchy. 
The royalist ideology that spread through Scotland was primarily a reaction 
to the Covenanters' attacks on the role of the monarch and the "new" religion. 
Unlike the Covenant Movement, the spread of the royalist faction began at the top of 
the social order and spread downward. The root of the Royalist party was among 
the Scottish courtiers, the majority of which supported Charles's policies both 
secular and temporal and were reaping the benefits of life at Charles's court. Not 
surprisingly, the ranks of the royalists swelled as the Covenanters increased their 
attacks on the position of the monarch. Men, such as the Marquis of Montrose, 
63 John Spalding, The Memorial! of the Trubles of Scotland and England 2vols. (Aberdeen, 1792) i, 
58. 
64 I. B. Cowan, "The Covenanters: A Revision Article", SHR XLVII(1968), 35-52, at p. 40. 
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broke away from the Covenanters and joined the royalists fearing the repercussions 
of overthrowing the king. Therefore, the royalist faction was not wholly opposed to 
the National Covenant, but was a conglomeration of royalists and moderate 
Covenanters who believed in the National Covenant but were opposed to the 
infringement of the king's authority called for by the radical Covenanters. 
As the hostilities between the Covenanters and the monarch escalated so too 
did the possibility of an armed conflict. It appears the Covenanters were the first to 
take action in order to defend and maintain their hold within Scotland. The 
Covenanters quickly organized a warning system in response to the threat of 
invasion by sea from both Ireland and England. A system of warning beacons was 
established; these beacons were primarily installed by the Earl of Argyll along the 
Kintyre peninsula and were manned by Campbells in response to the threats from 
the Earl of Antrim and the sighting of Charles's fleet off the western coast. 65 The 
Covenanters also placed garrisons and maintained fortifications throughout the 
kingdom. A supplication from the Earl of Argyll on 25 June 1642 requested a 
warrant to maintain the fortification he erected in Loch Kilherran that indicates the 
level of concern amongst the Covenant leadership of an invasion from Ireland and 
the potential uprising by the Clan Donald. According to the supplication, Argyll 
erected the fortification "during the late troubles" opposite Ireland and he had 
intended to demolish it but thought it better to get the Privy Council's advice. The 
council instructed Argyll to maintain the fort and to do everything required to 
strengthen himself, friends, and followers to counter the Clan Donald's alliance with 
the Earl of Antrim, their role in the Irish Rebellion, and the enmity of Antrim and 
Clan Donald for Argyll. 66 The bulk of the Covenanters' preparations were pre- 
emptive measures against the rumored plans for an invasion of royalists both across 
the North Channel and across the Border. 
The royalists were not as well organized as the Covenanters in their military 
planning and the rumored invasions were severely flawed in their planning, resulting 
in a haphazard attempt to invade in 1639 before success was had with the arrival of 
MacColla's Irish regiments in 1644. Charles's grandiose plan to oppose the 
65 D. Stevenson, Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 2003), 67; 
Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, 101. 
66 RPC, 2nd vii, 185. 
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Covenanters was successfully diminished by the pre-emptive preparations of the 
Covenant Army. The plan for invasion of Scotland was four-fold: 30,000 men in 
England under the leadership of Charles were to cross the border, Hamilton and the 
Royal Navy were to land 5,000 men at Aberdeen to join with the Earl of Huntly's 
forces, Antrim was to invade the Western Isles with 5,000 men to join forces with 
Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat, and, once Antrim was safely across, Wentworth 
was to send a force to Dumbarton of roughly 10,000 and establish a base for the fleet 
on Arran. 67 Unfortunately for Charles his plan proved to be a failure. Charles was 
hopelessly optimistic as to the size and speed of mustering Englishmen to fight in 
Scotland and made little real attempt to muster royalist Scots. At the same time that 
Charles was having difficulties mustering in England, Huntly was struggling to 
maintain his hold on Aberdeen and was eventually defeated by James Graham, Earl 
of Montrose, and Lt. Col. David Leslie, military leaders of the Covenant Army in 
Scotland. 68 The defeat of Huntly in Aberdeen meant that Hamilton had nowhere to 
land his forces, and no army to join him. Problems were also experienced across the 
North Channel as Antrim's boasts of mustering capabilities were out of proportion 
with reality and the large army intended to come out of Ulster never fully 
materialized. To make matters worse for the royalists, Wentworth's men in Ireland 
were not ready until June, by which time Dumbarton and Arran were already 
occupied by the Covenanters, leaving him no safe place to land his forces. 69 
The failure of Charles's plan prompted Wentworth to advise Charles to 
postpone the attack until 1640 rather than risk failure. However, Charles would not 
listen and he and Hamilton remained optimistic that they would be able to defeat 
what was seen as a rising of ministers. 70 Hamilton's optimism was rooted in his 
belief in the Scottish support provided by the Marquis of Huntly in the north-east, 
Lord Ogilvie in the Central Highlands and the clans in the Western Highlands and 
Isles. Hamilton was proved correct in his confidence by a letter sent from Sir 
Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat to Huntly 24 September 1638; yet, it would take 
67 M. C. Fissell, The Bishops' Wars: Charles Is Campaign against Scotland, 1638-40 (Cambridge, 
1994), 5&8; J. Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of 
Ranald MacDonnell, marquis ofAntrim, 1609-1683 (Cambridge, 1993), 82. 
Montrose was an active Covenanter during the Bishops' Wars, it would not be until 1640 that he 
would defect to the royalists. 
69 Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration, 88. 
70 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, 141. 
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years before support from the Western Highlands and Isles would come to fruition. 
In the letter, Donald Gorme MacDonald wrote that he, the captain of Clanranald, the 
MacDonalds of Glengarry, and the whole name of Clan Donald held a clan 
gathering and swore to "live and die" in the King's service, 71 but Hamilton was 
forced to warn Charles that the Clan Donald would act only out of hatred for the 
Campbells and not through loyalty to the crown. 72 Regardless of the reasons behind 
Clan Donald's support, the addition of a clan as large as Clan Donald provided the 
backbone to Montrose and MacColla's campaign in 1644 and thus was a significant 
addition to Charles's ailing royalist forces. 
Charles's inclusion of an Irish force under the leadership of Antrim in his 
plan to defeat the Covenanters was a key component of the "Scottish troubles". Due 
to the period of neglect of the Western Highlands and Isles by central government 
the region was vulnerable to invasion from Ireland and was in a position to aid an 
armed incursion of well-trained Irishmen, a majority of whom had military 
experience on the continent during the Thirty Years' War. The involvement of the 
Western Highlands and Isles in the "Scottish troubles" effectively began with what 
has been termed the "Antrim Plot", an invasion planned by Irish Confederates into 
Scotland for the king's cause. Although the plot implicated the clans on the western 
seaboard due to the kin relation between MacDonalds and MacDonnells on both 
sides of the channel, the Covenanters were more concerned with the actions of 
Ranald MacDonnell, 2"d Earl of Antrim. The Committee of Estates relied almost 
completely on the Campbell network for protection of the coastline in the event 
Antrim crossed the channel, as is evident in the system of warning beacons and the 
manning of garrisons throughout the Western Highlands, including the fort at 
Lochhead in Kintyre. Surprisingly, little was done by the government under the 
Covenanters or by the Earl of Argyll to thwart Antrim's attempts to incite a 
MacDonald rising in the region. 
The driving force behind the Antrim Plot was the lingering MacDonald quest 
to rejoin the MacDonalds in Ireland with those in Scotland reminiscent of the 
'1 HMC, Report XI appendix vi, MSS of Duke of Hamilton, 101. 
72 HMC, Report XI appendix vi, 95. 
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Lordship of the Isles. 73 It was the desire of the Earl of Antrim and other MacDonalds 
to recreate the Lordship of Isles that had been forfeited in 1493. The forfeiture of the 
Lordship of the Isles resulted in the dissecting of the Clan Donald with various 
ancestral lands being sold or granted to neighboring clans and the displacement of 
vast numbers of the Clan Donald. As seen in the destruction of the MacDonalds of 
Dunyveg the clan that profited most from the dissolving of the lordship was the Clan 
Campbell. The 7th Earl of Argyll's attacks following the demise of the MacDonalds 
of Dunyveg included imposing punitive fines on the remnant gentry in Kintyre 
whose loyalty was questionable and by evicting a number of the Clan Donald from 
Islay, Jura, and, more importantly, from Colonsay taking captive in the process 
Colla Ciotach, father of Alasdair MacColla. 74 In the wake of the collapse of the 
MacDonalds of Dunyveg and the evictions of MacDonalds from the isles a number 
of the clan sought refuge in Ireland under the protection of the Earl of Antrim. Not 
only had the Clan Campbell benefited from the destruction of the Clan Donald after 
the forfeiture of the lordship, but since the outbreak of the Bishops' Wars the 8th 
Earl, and later Marquis, of Argyll had begun using the conflict as further 
justification to attack the Clan Donald. Therefore, many MacDonalds within 
Antrim's ranks had a score to settle with Argyll and the Campbells. Little 
provoking was necessary to employ the Clan Donald on both sides of the Irish Sea 
in the "Scottish troubles" as the opportunity to regain their ancestral lands at the cost 
of the Clan Campbell was too good to pass up. 
By playing on the desires for a united Gaelic world and revenge against the 
Clan Campbell, Charles I was able to enlist the aid of the Clan Donald with relative 
ease. As early as 1639 Charles was negotiating with the Earl of Antrim and Sir 
Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat, enticing them with offers of land at the expense 
of Clan Campbell; Antrim was promised "whatsoever land he can conquer from 
them [Campbells], he, having pretense of right shall have the same, ' . 
75 The 
negotiations resulted in commissions to MacDonald of Sleat and Antrim on 5 June 
73 A thorough discussion of the breakdown of the pan-Gaelic world and division between Irish and 
Scottish Gaedhil which Antrim and the Clan Donald wished to resurrect is given in S. Ellis, "The 
collapse of the Gaelic World, 1450-1650", Irish Historical Studies 31: 124 (Nov. 1999), pages 449- 
69. Especially relevant is his discussion of the demise of the Lordship of the Isles, p. 450 & 463-5. 
74 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 70; Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 95-6. 
75 As quoted in Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration, 79. 
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1639. The commissions appointed Antrim and MacDonald of Sleat "conjunctlie and 
severallie" as his Majesty's Lieutenants and Commissioners in the Western 
Highlands and Isles, with full power to convocate the lieges, and pursue the King's 
"rebellious" subjects with fire and sword. In exchange for their service, Charles 
promised to the Earl of Antrim the land of Kintyre and to MacDonald of Sleat the 
lands of Ardnamurchan, Strathordale and the islands of Rhum, Muck and Canna 
from the expected forfeiture of Argyll and his accomplice the Clan MacKinnon at 
the end of the war. 76 The commission was later expanded on dictating that Sleat 
would unite the Clan Donald in Scotland, specifically the MacDonalds of Glengarry 
and Clanranald, while Antrim sent an army of about 10,000 to England to join 
Charles and about 3,000 to the Western Highlands to join with the MacDonalds. 77 
Although Glengarry and Clanranald were ready to join the Royalist forces, the 
troops to be raised by Antrim were not. 
Unfortunately, for the Royalists, Antrim faced severe difficulty in fulfilling 
his promises to Charles, primarily in the number of men he could muster and the 
amount of funds he could raise for the expedition. Antrim's problems with meeting 
his quota were exposed by his rival Viscount Wentworth, Lord Deputy of Ireland. 
Since Antrim's ascendancy within Charles's court, Wentworth became increasingly 
disapproving of both Antrim personally and of his actions; he was fond of "Neither 
his activities, nor his methods, nor the case with which he moved at court". 78 
Furthermore, Wentworth believed Antrim's plan could prove to be counter- 
productive and could result in a pre-emptive strike on Ulster from the Scots Army 
and doubted that the 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse of the Irish Confederate Army could 
stop an invasion, especially since invading Scots would get aid from Presbyterians 
in Ulster. 79 The hostility with which Wentworth treated Antrim grew to such an 
extent that Charles wrote to Wentworth in January 1639 instructing him to put aside 
76 Macdonald & Macdonald, The Clan Donald, ii, 720 & iii, 56; Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 71. 
77 D. Stevenson, King or Covenant? Voices from the Civil War (East Linton, 1996), 140; J. Lowe, 
"The Earl of Antrim and Irish Aid to Montrose in 1644", Irish Sword, IV (1959-60), 191-198, at p. 
193. 
78 A. Clarke, "The Earl of Antrim and the First Bishops' War", Irish Sword, VI (1962-3), 108-115, at 
110. 
W. Kelly, "James Butler, twelfth Earl of Ormond, the Irish Government and the Bishops' Wars 
1638-40", in J. Young (ed. ), Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 1997), 36; 
Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration, 81. 
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their differences and to supply Antrim with what he needs, "For he may be of much 
use to me at this time to shake loose upon the earl of Argyll". 80 
It took almost four years for Charles to finally be able to unleash Antrim on 
the Campbells of Argyll. According to Charles's missive to Antrim, "You are 
further to persuade our Catholic subjects to lend for our service two thousand men 
well armed, to be transported... into the Islands of Scotland and the Highlands; 
where you are to excite your party to rise with you to fall upon the Marquis of 
Argyle's country". 8' The orders specified that the 2,000 men were to be divided into 
three regiments and placed under the command of Alasdair MacColla. This time 
Antrim's mustering proved successful; he was able to raise the 2,000 men primarily 
from among his own tenants and neighbors. The first attempted sailing by MacColla 
with his 2,000 fighting Irish was halted by a severe storm that forced them back to 
port; however, once the ships and men had recovered the invasion party, reduced to 
1,600 armed soldiers because of lack of provisions, left Ireland on 27 June 1644 
bound for the isles of Scotland. 
While the royalist party was preparing its invasion of Scotland from Ireland 
and England, Charles I's attempts to end the Covenant Movement were greatly 
improved with the addition of James Graham, Marquis of Montrose to the royalist 
faction. Montrose had been one of the leaders in the early stages of the Covenant 
Movement, but he broke rank in response to the actions of the Marquis of Argyll. 
Prior to Montrose's departure from the Covenanting regime, Montrose was 
attempting to guide the Covenanters along a moderate line that resulted in a power 
struggle between Argyll and Montrose. Montrose and other moderate Covenanters 
were becoming increasingly suspicious of Argyll's actions and believed, as have 
many historians, that Argyll acted only to increase his own and his clan's power 
rather than out of a devotion to the Covenant. 82 Furthermore, rumors that Argyll 
80 As quoted in Clarke, "Earl of Antrim", 111; Fissell, The Bishops' Wars, 168. 
81 As quoted in C. Danachair, "Montrose's Irish Regiments", Irish Sword, IV (1959-60), 61-67, at p. 
61; Ohl meyer, Civil War and Restoration, 130. 
82 In A. Macinnes, "Gaelic culture in the seventeenth century: polarization and assimilation", in S. 
Ellis & S. Barber (eds. ), Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725 (New York, 
1995), 173, Allan Macinnes states that "clans were reacting against powerful noble houses, pre- 
eminently the Campbells of Argyll and the Gordons of Sutherland, whose public espousal of the 
Covenanting cause cloaked their private territorial ambitions". 
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intended to depose the king prompted Montrose to become a Covenanting royalist. 83 
Montrose believed in the National Covenant but was opposed to the direction Argyll 
was leading the regime under the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, especially 
the rumored attacks on the monarch. 
IV 
Thair is certane adverteisment come from the committie of warre 
within the shereffdome of Argyll that Alex[ande]r mcdonald soune to 
[Colkitto] is come from Ireland to the yles of this kingdome and by 
said shereffdome of Argyll with three hundreth of the rebellious 
irisches all papists armed and provydeit with all part of hostill 
provisioun ... and that Rannald makdonald brother to the said Alex[ande]r is to follow eftir with shipping and greater number of 
these godless and rebellious miscreants. 
The arrival of the Irish contingent under the leadership of Alasdair MacColla 
led to the royalist victories between 1644 and 1645. The involvement of MacColla 
in the Scottish Revolution was driven by his desire for revenge against the Marquis 
of Argyll and the whole Clan Campbell rather than a devotion to the royalist cause. 
As Prof. David Stevenson cleverly summarizes, MacColla "probably didn't give a 
damn about the king"; 85 however, the ferocity he and his men fought with was vital 
to the temporary royalist supremacy. MacColla's personal hatred for Argyll 
originated in Argyll's seizure of Colonsay from MacColla's family and the 
subsequent imprisonment of Colla Ciotach, MacColla's father. According to the 
"Supplication by Argyll anent maintenance of MacDonalds" submitted on 25 
January 1642, Argyll had apprehended Colla Ciotach and two of his sons, John and 
Angus, for not finding caution to answer criminal charges for their involvement in 
the rebellion on Islay in 1616. Argyll's supplication was submitted due to 
intelligence received that Colla Ciotach's two other sons, Alasdair and Randal, with 
their followers had joined the Irish Confederates, thus posing a threat to the Clan 
Campbell. Finding that a definite threat of invasion existed, the Privy Council 
83 For details of the rumor, especially the intelligence report provided to Montrose and the Earl of 
Atholl, see Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, 200. 
84 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PAI I/1/64r-v. 
85 Stevenson, King or Covenant?, 140. 
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ordered Argyll to continue to hold Colla Ciotach and his sons at the expense of the 
crown in order to prevent them from joining in the fray. 86 
Unfortunately for the Covenanters the continued imprisonment of Alasdair 
MacColla's father and brothers only served to heighten MacColla's hostility toward 
Clan Campbell. MacColla's first attack on Argyll began in November 1643 with a 
raid on the western seaboard. In an attempt to defeat the invasion, Argyll deputized 
John Campbell of Ardkinglass to muster 600 men, to which Ardkinglass added 500 
more from his own estate, to fight off MacColla and his associates. Outnumbered 
by the forces under Ardkinglass, MacColla and his men were forced to take refuge 
on the Isle of Mull before fleeing to Ireland. However, MacColla apparently left 
some men on Rathlin Isle who were later pursued by Ardkinglass in May 1644. 
Ardkinglass continued his attack on the remaining rebels when they arrived on Islay 
and Jura and had proceeded to raid the islands. In the end, 115 of MacColla's men 
were killed but none were taken prisoner. 87 Although the raid was completely 
"freelance" and was defeated by Ardkinglass, the association between MacColla and 
the Confederates gave further credit to the supposed Antrim Plot and heightened the 
fears of a full scale invasion of the western seaboard from Ireland. 
Once back in Ireland, MacColla accepted a commission to lead an Irish force 
provided by the Earl of Antrim in a second invasion of Scotland with the intention 
of joining forces with the royalist army of the Marquis of Montrose. In the summer 
of 1644 MacColla returned to Scotland with 3,000 Irishmen, primarily from Antrim, 
and was surprisingly faced with difficulty in recruiting more men from the west 
coast of Scotland. Some clan chiefs on the western seaboard deliberately blocked 
recruiting attempts by MacColla after he arrived in Ardnamurchan and the clans in 
the central Highlands attempted to block his march into Speyside. The opposition 
faced by MacColla was largely due to the number of Irishmen in his army, as many 
clans were hesitant to align with members of the Irish Confederacy who were 
already at odds with central government and MacDonald of Sleat and the Earl of 
Seaforth were both skeptical of the possibility of victory. 88 However, the eventual 
rendezvous with Montrose ensured military viability, as MacColla needed the 
86 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 185. 
87 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 99-101. 
88 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 112-3. 
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Scottish contingent under Montrose to legitimize his army and provide "a veneer of 
respectability in the eyes of the royalists". 89 
Prior to the arrival of the Irish forces under MacColla, Montrose had been 
struggling to form a competent army to defeat the Covenanters. The addition of 
MacColla ensured royalist victories between 1644 and 1645 due to his military 
tactics and character. When Montrose and MacColla finally rendezvoused in Atholl 
in 1644 Montrose's forces were roughly 300 men raised in Atholl while MacColla 
brought about 1600 Irishmen, the remainder being left in the Isles. 90 Over the 
course of Montrose and MacColla's campaign the composition of their Royalist 
army was relatively fluid with only a small contingent making up any form of a 
standing army. As was often the case with the clansmen's involvement in the 
royalist victories, a large number of men would return to their homes after each 
battle to deliver the booty they had acquired then return to their ranks for the next 
battle. 91 
Although there appears to be no surviving muster records from Montrose and 
MacColla, if such records were even kept, some rough estimates can be made as to 
the number of men and subsequent level of involvement of the clans of the Western 
Highlands and Isles by compiling any mentions made in the numerous primary and 
secondary histories of the period. What emerges is that the number of men recruited 
from the Western Highlands and Isles made up at least half of the royalist army at 
the various pitched battles and the majority of MacColla's forces when he pillaged 
Argyllshire. As early as October 1644 MacColla was able to recruit approximately 
1,500 men from the Isles and western seaboard with the support of Clanranald, 
MacDonald of Glengarry, MacDonald of Keppoch, Stewart of Appin, and the 
MacIans. 92 By the time Montrose and MacColla reached Inverlochy their army was 
89 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 121. 
90 C. Danachair, "Montrose's Irish Regiments" in Irish Sword iv (1959-60), 61-67, at p. 61; G. Hill, 
An Historical Account of the Macdonnells of Antrim (Belfast, 1873), 80; Stevenson, Highland 
Warrior, 106. 
91 M. MacLaren of MacLaren, The MacLarens: A History of Clan Labhran (Norfolk, ND), 61. 
92 G. Wishart, The History of the Kings Majesties affairs in Scotland under the conduct of the most 
Honourable James Marques of Montrose, Earl of Kincardin, etc. and generall governour of that 
kingdome In the yers 1644,1645 & 1646 Wing, 2nd ed. W3120,59; Anon., A true relation of the 
happy success of His Majesties forces in Scotland under the conduct of Lord James Marquisse of 
Montrose His Excellencie, again the rebels there Wing, 2"d ed. T2964,12; E. Furgol, "The Civil 
Wars in Scotland" in J. Kenyon & J. Ohlmeyer (eds. ), The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, 
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a little over 3,000 fighting men and was about fifty percent clansmen from the 
Western Highlands and Isles. 93 It was at the battle of Inverlochy that the MacLeans 
came out in support of the Royalist cause although it would not be until after the 
battle that all of MacLean's able bodied men arrived. 
MacColla's second recruiting mission in July 1645 resulted in an estimated 
1,500 more men being added to his forces. During this period a number of Irishmen 
began to desert the small standing army that MacColla maintained but this was 
compensated for by Clanranald sending close to 500 men who had not already been 
put in arms while MacLean of Duart armed another 700 men. The remainder of the 
men recruited were small contingents sent by MacDonald of Glengarry, Stewart of 
Appin, the MacNabs, and the MacGregors. 94 The additional forces raised by 
MacColla resulted in the total armed forces of Montrose and MacColla reaching 
nearly 5,000 men at the battle of Kilsyth, close to 2,000 of which Montrose had 
mustered with the help of Lord Ogilvie and Gordon of Aboyne from the central 
Highlands. 95 
The departure of Alasdair MacColla following the royalist victory at Kilsyth 
on 15 August 1645 and subsequent absence from the battle at Philiphaugh on 13 
September indicates that the Royalist victories were the result of the Irish regiments 
and the clans of the Western Highland and Isles' involvement in the royalist army. 
After Kilsyth MacColla requested permission from Montrose to return to Argyll 
because he had received word that the Marquis of Argyll was harassing his kinsmen. 
After being knighted by Montrose, MacColla was allowed to return to the Western 
Highlands. Once in Argyllshire, MacColla and his regiments raided and destroyed 
various Campbell lands as retribution for Argyll's attacks on the Clan Donald. The 
reports of the number of men MacColla took with him to Argyllshire vary anywhere 
between 3,000 and 500 men. 96 However, when MacColla's forces are examined at 
Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660 (Oxford, 1998), 55; Macdonald & Macdonald, The Clan Donald, ii, 
333; Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 140-1. 
93 G. Wishart, The memoirs of James marquis of Montrose (London, 1903), 79; J. Spalding, 
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the time he joined forces with Sir James Lamont it appears he had taken about 1,000 
men. Early in September the combined forces were 2,000 men with Lamont 
mustering among his kin and friends in Cowal, Argyll, Lorne and Kintyre. 
Sometime in September the MacDougalls also raised 500 men to join the attacks on 
the Clan Campbell. By the end of MacColla's campaign there were anywhere 
between 1,000 and 1,400 men raiding Kintyre in May 1647.97 Oral tradition records 
one particularly brutal incident, known as the "Barn of Bones". As the story is told, 
after a raid on a small Campbell village in Argyllshire, MacColla and his men filled 
a nearby barn with Campbell women and children then lit the barn on fire. 98 The 
facts regarding this situation can be challenged, but the brutality of MacColla and 
his regiment is unquestionable due to reports of post-battle massacres recorded by 
both Covenanters and royalists. MacColla's actions in Argyll clearly illustrate that 
he was more concerned with revenge against Argyll than with the royalist platform. 
One of the keys to the military success of the royalist campaign under 
Montrose and MacColla was the strategic use of the "Highland charge". Alasdair 
MacColla has been credited with the success of the Highland charge as the first 
written record of its use was during MacColla's victory at the Battle of Langey in 
Ireland in February 1642, although there are indications that it was possibly a tactic 
he learne i from the Irish Confederates. In the Highland charge, the Highlanders took 
the initiative by firing the first volley then waited for the enemy to counter volley. 
Once the enemy had fired, the Highlanders would then lay down their guns and 
charge with sword and targe while the enemy reloaded, thus catching the opposition 
off guard. 99 In addition to the military strategy that MacColla brought to the royalist 
army, the details of the Irish regiments' actions in Scotland indicate he brought with 
him soldiers of remarkable stamina and endurance. It is reported that 600 men were 
on their feet for close to forty-eight hours marching over 60 miles and were still able 
to defeat a cavalry attack at Dundee. The Irish stamina can also been seen in their 
40 mile march from Kilcummin over Glen Roy and the shoulder of Ben Nevis 
97 N. Lamont (ed. ), An Inventory of Lamont Papers (Edinburgh, 1914), 230-1; H. McKechnie, The 
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through heavy frost and snow after which they were still able to join in the defeat of 
Argyll at the battle of Inverlochy. Even when faced with armies superior in number, 
as was the case in almost every battle fought in Scotland between 1644 and 1645, 
the Irish were reported to possess an unquestionable level of courage and high 
morale and "never flinched" when faced with adversity. 100 The combination of the 
surprise tactic of the Highland charge, the character of the Irish soldiers, and the 
resolve of the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles formed the backbone of the 
royalists' army, which resulted in the loss of no more than eight to nine hundred of 
Montrose's men while the enemy forces suffered between twelve and fourteen 
thousand casualties. '°' 
The subsequent defeat of Montrose at Philiphaugh indicates who the real 
military leader of the royalist army was. With MacColla and the bulk of the 
Highlanders, mostly MacDonalds, and the Irish regiments in Argyllshire, 
Montrose's forces were sufficiently destroyed and suffered a severe post-battle 
massacre. Without the strength of the Highlanders and MacColla's military tactics, 
Montrose's army lacked the resources to effectively cope with the overwhelming 
Covenant forces. After Montrose was defeated the Covenant army chased the 
retreating royalists and executed the majority of those caught. Due to the notorious 
actions of the Irish, those still with Montrose bore the brunt of the casualties. 
According to the Covenanters' propaganda, the battle of Philiphaugh resulted in the 
death of one to three thousand royalists. Although Montrose reported to Charles that 
he only lost two hundred men this total probably excluded those executed upon 
surrendering. 102 The battle of Philiphaugh effectively turned the tides of war in 
favor of the Covenanters, because without MacColla, Montrose's army was unable 
to regain its composure and could no longer dominate the conflict. Ultimately, 
Montrose lacked the ability to inspire the clans to regroup for the next confrontation 
because his emphasis was directed towards the royalist cause whereas MacColla's 
was aimed specifically at destroying the Clan Campbell. 
Due to the number of clansmen who did not return to Montrose's ranks and 
the large number of men lost at the battle of Philiphaugh, Montrose marched the 
100 Danachair, "Montrose's Irish Regiment", 62. 
101 Danachair, "Montrose's Irish Regiment", 61-2. 
102 Cowan, Montrose, 232. 
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remnants of his army north into Mackenzie territory in an attempt to recruit troops at 
the beginning of 1646. Although George Mackenzie, Earl of Seaforth, raised his 
men and sent word to neighbors to do the same, the only one who joined was Sir 
James MacDonald of Sleat. Aided by the forces of Seaforth and MacDonald of 
Sleat, Montrose led his penultimate campaign and besieged Inverness. Responding 
to the siege, the Covenanters sent orders to General Middleton, who was serving in 
the Scots Army in England, to march north with 1,000 horse and 800 foot. 
Outnumbered by Middleton's army, Montrose was forced to lift the siege and fled 
with Seaforth and MacDonald to the hills of Strathglass. Faced with temporary 
defeat, Montrose boarded a ship in the harbor of Montrose and left Scotland with a 
handful of associates. With Montrose gone MacDonald of Sleat returned home and 
was pardoned by the Committee of Estates on the condition he did not raise in arms 
again. Seaforth, on the other hand, continued his royalist actions until 1648, leading 
4,000 men in the Earl of Lanark's ranks and, after a failed negotiation with the 
Committee of Estates and the Church to get back in their good graces, fled to 
Holland in 1649 where he was appointed Principal Secretary of State under Charles 
II. 
Surprisingly, the counter attacks of the Covenanters were not as widespread 
as one would anticipate. Due to the devastation caused by Alasdair MacColla and 
Montrose, throughout much of Scotland, the Covenanters were more concerned with 
providing relief to those affected by the brutality of the Royalist Army and opted to 
offer pardons to those Royalists who agreed to lay down their weapons and return to 
their homes peacefully rather than attempt to continue a full-scale military campaign 
against them. ' 03 One such pardon was given to Sir James MacDonald of Sleat in a 
declaration from the Committee of Estates that confirmed the offer of immunity and 
pardon for his clan's involvement in the "rebellion" given by Middleton on 12 
August 1648.104 However, those who chose to continue in the active support of the 
royalist cause did face severe consequences. 
The reprisal devastation by the Covenanters against the steadfast remnants of 
the royalists in the Western Highlands and Isles began almost immediately after the 
103 See chapter 3 "Central Government and the Western Highlands and Isles" for details of the 
policies of the Covenanters after the royalist victories. 
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battle of Philiphaugh. After the massacre of royalists at Slain Man's Lea near 
Newark Castle, the Covenant Army began forcefully removing the strongholds of 
the royalist opposition. Although isolated incidents, the facts surrounding the 
surrender of Sir Lachlan MacLean of Duart's castles on Mull and the surrender of 
Dunaverty Castle by the MacDougalls provide two clear illustrations that MacColla 
was not the only one capable of committing bloody atrocities. After surrendering 
his castles and handing over his son as hostage for his future behavior, MacLean of 
Duart was forced to give in to demands that he turn over fourteen Irish soldiers who 
had taken refuge with him. All fourteen soldiers were immediately executed. 
However, the most shocking action taken against the royalists was the massacre at 
the surrendering of Dunaverty Castle in June 1647. At his departure, Alasdair 
MacColla had left three hundred MacDougalls to garrison Dunaverty Castle. After 
an extended siege by the Covenant Army under the command of Lt. Col. David 
Leslie, the MacDougalls were forced to negotiate a surrender. However, at the 
instigation of two Presbyterian zealots, all MacDougalls were slaughtered upon 
surrender. The actions of the zealots mirrored those of MacColla by provoking a 
"slaughter under trust", meaning the MacDougalls surrendered on the promise of the 
safety of their person but instead were killed when they exited the castle. '05 
Although devastating, it must be stressed that this was not the norm for the 
Covenanters' policies in the wake of the victories of Montrose and MacColla. The 
departure of Alasdair MacColla, and later of Montrose, left the clans of the Western 
Highlands and Isles without much by way of strong leadership; thus, a large 
proportion of the clans ceased their attacks on the Clan Campbell and peacefully 
returned to their homes. 
Furthermore, the lack of involvement in the "Engagement" of 1647-8 on the 
part of the clans greatly contributed to reducing the number of blatant attacks on 
royalists in the area. In 1648 the Covenant regime was faced with an uprising of 
royalists and moderate Covenanters who were opposed to the imprisonment of 
Charles I. The "Engagers", as they were termed, felt that the regime had gone too 
far in its attack on the monarchy and plotted to free Charles from captivity. Because 
the majority of support for the royalist cause in the Western Highlands and Isles was 
pos Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 100. 
59 
the result of hostility towards the Clan Campbell and not out of devotion to the 
monarch, the actions of the "Engagers" offered little enticement to the clans to 
resume any military action. Furthermore, the weak political position of the 
"Engagers" meant that the clans would not be able to financially benefit from 
plundering the opposition as they had with Montrose and MacColla. Although the 
attempt to free Charles I failed, it diverted the Covenanters' attention away from the 
Western Highlands and Isles and allowed many clansmen to resume their isolationist 
position, focusing again on local issues rather than national. 
The link between Ranald MacDonnell, 2 °d Earl of Antrim, and the clans of 
the Western Highlands and Isles brought the clans out onto the national stage. When 
the issues and events in the Western Highlands and Isles are put in the broader 
context of the Covenant Movement what emerges is that the events in the region 
prior to the movement and the issues that were are at the heart of the matter for the 
clans had an enormous amount to do with the actions of Clan Campbell. During the 
dispute over the possession of Islay between the MacDonalds and the MacLeans 
numerous alliances and rivalries were formed with nearly every clan in the region 
taking a side, but the manipulative actions of Argyll in his acquisition of Kintyre and 
Islay realigned those allegiances. Clearly the MacDonalds would be angered by 
losing another piece of the former Lordship of the Isles to Argyll, but Argyll's 
affront to MacLean, who was considered a close ally, led the clan to align with the 
Royalist army when the opportunity to thwart the Clan Campbell presented itself. 
While a number of clans were recovering from the Islay rebellion and having to 
adjust to all of the legal ramifications, primarily the 1616 Regulations, Argyll again 
caused tempers to rise in response to his appointment as Justiciar for Argyll and the 
Isles. After years of dispute before the Privy Council over the location of the courts 
for the Isles the clans, citing legal text dating back centuries, lost their case and 
Argyll was re-granted powers in the region that were second only to the king. 
Therefore, the long history of Clan Campbell domination in the region was 
magnified by the recent actions of the 7th earl and Lord Lorne. This resulted in a 
heightened sense of animosity towards the Clan Campbell which would manifest 
into outright anti-Campbell sentiment by the time MacColla arrived to unite the 
clans. As seen in the numbers and names of those who joined the Royalist forces 
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and the atrocities they carried out in Argyllshire, support for the monarch was the 
result of the opportunity afforded to the clans to wreak havoc on the Earl of Argyll 
and the Clan Campbell network. Thus, once the prospect of destroying the 
Campbell network departed with Alasdair MacColla the involvement of the clans of 
the Western Highlands and Isles dramatically decreased. 
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Chapter 3 
The Western Highlands and Isles' Place in the British Kingdom: 
Colonialism or State Formation? 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the relationship between 
the crown and the Western Highlands and Isles, as well as the region's relationship 
with the Church of Scotland, was unique or typical in comparison to other regions 
within the British kingdom. As will be seen in the following chapters, the 
relationship between these entities was unstable, swinging from cooperation in some 
cases to complete disregard in others. In order to answer this question an 
understanding of the early modern process of state expansion is essential, primarily 
the processes of internal colonialism and state formation as employed by the English 
crown in Ireland and Wales respectively. 
Although the Western Highlands and Isles was not a kingdom, it was a 
region somewhat autonomous from central government and culturally at odds with 
the ideals of the state. The varying constitutional statuses of the Western Highlands 
and Isles, Ireland, and Wales are not as significant as the similarities of all three 
regions in their cultural differences from the English crown. Direct correlations can 
be drawn between the position of the chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles and 
their counterparts in Ireland and Wales, namely the Gaelic lords and Old English of 
Ireland and the Marcher lords in Wales. As kingdoms are a composition of the 
collective peoples it was impera.. ive for the state to address the inhabitants in order 
to gain control of the region or kingdom. Analysis of the English crown's dealings 
with the indigenous political structures, religion, and vernacular languages of all 
three regions shows that although the Western Highlands and Isles was not a 
kingdom in its own right this point does not make it exempt from the crown's 
enacting of policies previously deemed beneficial in the kingdom of Ireland and in 
Wales through which they were able to subdue the people and thus integrate the 
region. 
Using the theoretical models of internal colonialism as proposed by Michael 
Hechter and of state formation formulated by Michael Braddick the government and 
religious policies enacted in Ireland and Wales can be classified into these two 
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models. By analyzing the relationships between the crown and Ireland and Wales 
comparisons can be drawn to the relationship between the crown and the Western 
Highlands and Isles allowing for the region to be loosely placed within the 
theoretical models of Hechter and Braddick. What will be seen is that both styles of 
governing are evident in central government's policies in regards to the Western 
Highlands and Isles. The failure to colonize gave rise to state formation practices; 
however, the breakdown of both programs led to an increase in local politics which 
would greatly affect the development of allegiances during the Civil Wars. 
I 
The theoretical model of internal colonialism was first discussed in British political 
history by Michael Hechter in Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British 
National Development. ' According to Hechter's definition of internal colonialism 
there are four main points to the model. The first point is that the core is seen to 
dominate politics and to exploit the resources of the peripheral region. The 
domination of the region results in an unequal distribution of power and resources. 
The second feature is the product of the core's need to stabilize and monopolize the 
region to its advantage which invariably includes the regulating of social roles. In 
order to maximize its power, the core instills a cultural division of labor through 
which it allocates those social and political roles deemed to be of high prestige to 
members of its own body politic, while positioning the indigenous members at the 
bottom of the stratification system. This preferential treatment contributes to the 
development of distinctive ethnic identifications through which the merging of 
cultures does not occur, because it is not in the best interests of the institutions of the 
core. The third feature of internal colonialism is that the economic development of 
the periphery is dependent on and complementary to the core. This aspect translates 
as the peripheral industrialization being highly specialized and geared toward export 
to the core. The dependency of the periphery is increased by its relative sensitivity 
to price fluctuations as an exporter and on the decisions of the core in regards to 
investment, credit, and wages. The last feature discussed by Hechter is the effect 
1 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 2"d ed. (New 
Brunswick, 1999). 
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which social stratification has on relations between the core and periphery. The 
social stratification imposed in the region creates the probability that the 
disadvantaged group, those being colonized, will eventually assert their own culture 
as equal or superior to that of the core and will give rise to the idea of a separate 
nation and seek independence. 2 
In an attempt to simplify the process of defining a colony, internal colony 
and a strictly peripheral region, Hechter gives five variables by which to rate the 
level of inclusion: (1) degree of administrative integration, (2) extensiveness of 
citizenship in the region, (3) prestige of the region's culture, (4) existence of 
geographical contiguity, (5) length of association between the periphery and core. 
According to Hechter's model, a colony, such as an overseas possession, will rank 
the lowest on all five variables while the internal colony will rank high on 
integration, citizenship, and geographical contiguity but low on length of 
association. The most autonomous region that will emerge from this exercise is the 
peripheral region which will rank the highest on all five variables. 3 In assessing the 
political histories of Wales and Ireland on this exercise Ireland ranks somewhere 
between a colony and an internal colony, while Wales clearly meets the 
requirements for a peripheral region. However, this is not the same conclusion that 
Hechter reaches. Through a series of over-simplifications and broad generalizations 
Hechter's findings place Ireland squarely in an internal colonial model while at the 
same time placing Wales in the same category. For the purpose of this study, 
however, we will take Hechter's internal colonialism approach to Ireland, but we 
have to highlight a few misconceptions which illustrate that Wales can not be 
classified in the same manner. 
In all fairness to Prof. Hechter, it bears mentioning at this point that in the 
second edition of Internal Colonialism he included a revised introduction in which 
he acknowledges the criticism he received for his first edition, but does not change 
his position. 4 However, in the original introduction Hechter admitted that he does 
2 Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 9-10 & 30-1. 
3 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 349. 
4 Hechter's argument that Wales was incorporated through Internal Colonialism was effectively 
criticized by Ciaran Brady four years prior to Hechter's second edition; C. Brady, "Comparable 
Histories? Tudor Reformation in Wales and Ireland", in S. Barber & S. Ellis, eds., Conquest and 
Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725 (London, 1995), 66. 
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make generalizations and acknowledges the fact that historians may take exception 
with some of his work. ' The generalizations and over-simplifications made 
regarding the politics within Wales indicate a manipulation of the historical facts 
which Dr. Hechter uses to fit Wales within the scope of his theoretical model and 
results in a number of half truths. For example, Hechter states that "The Act of 
Union itself forbade Welsh-speakers from office holding", 6 which equates to his 
colonial feature of a "cultural division of labor" by excluding the indigenous 
members. The truth is that the "language clause" to which he is referring forbade 
the use of the Welsh language not the Welsh-speaker; Welsh-speakers were allowed 
to hold offices as long as they were bilingual in Welsh and English. Another 
misconception on the issue of language is the statement made on religious services: 
"For instance, despite the publication of a Welsh translation of the Bible in 1588, 
services in the Anglican Church of Wales continued to be given in English". 7 
Again, this is an over-simplification because, as will be discussed later, Bishop 
Bulkeley of Bangor and his successors instructed their clergy to employ both 
English and Welsh in their services, especially in giving the Catechism. The last 
point to be made may be considered semantics; however, it shows how Hechter 
already had his conclusion in mind when he created his model. In discussing the 
reign of Henry VIII, Hechter states that "Henry VIII had managed to conquer Wales 
during the early part of his reign". 8 The problem with this statement is the word 
"conquer" because it does not take into account the series of petitions submitted to 
the king pleading for the extension of English common law: is it really conquering if 
they were pleading for inclusion? Due to the problems inherent in Hechter's 
inclusion of Wales within his model of internal colonialism an investigation of the 
model of state formation is necessary. 
Brendan Bradshaw explains early modern state formation as the assimilation 
of peripheral territories by Europe's Renaissance monarchies which "strived to 
transmute feudal patrimonies into centralized unitary realms". According to 
Bradshaw, Wales was on the path of assimilation alongside the rest of Europe while 
5 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 5-6. 
6 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 74. 
M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 110. 
8 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 102. 
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"Ireland's intransigence made it an anomaly". 9 The model of state formation 
formulated by Michael Braddick explains that this transmutation from patrimonies 
to unitary realms is based on the use of agents of state authority and claims that the 
expansion of the English state was due to the establishment of a network of offices 
which exercised political power. According to Braddick's assessment of 
government officials, these officeholders had access to a distinctive kind of power 
which was territorially bounded but centrally coordinated. Local officeholders acted 
as intermediaries between governmental policy and local interests, while at the same 
time seeking legal validity for their own innovations through proposed local 
initiatives. This combination of roles allowed for an increase in local influence, and 
service in this capacity was regarded as a confirmation of social status. The use of 
government agents created a social hierarchy closely related to the political 
hierarchy. However, political power resided in the office, not the individual. As a 
result, when an individual lost office they often lost the power that went with it. 1° It 
is through the promotion of local elites to government agents that Braddick explains 
the expansion of English authority into Wales, Ireland, and the Highlands and 
Borders of Scotland. 
According to Braddick, state formation was not a matter of central will or 
direction but was conducted through influential groups within the localities that 
called the state into action while also making use of legitimate authority to serve 
their interests. Because of these influential groups the process of state formation 
went hand in hand with the process of elite formation. Braddick explains that access 
to political power through office holding was integral to social status and that "social 
differentiation was reflected in, and compounded by, the distribution of political 
power". " As a result, state formation was created out of a complex relationship 
between the needs of the crown and the social interests of the elites upon whom 
government depended. This duality of interests encouraged cooperation of the local 
elites and laid the foundation for stable government in the periphery. 
12 
9 B. Bradshaw, "The Tudor Reformation and Revolution in Wales and Ireland: The Origins of the 
British Problem" in B. Bradshaw & J. Morrill, eds., The British Problem c. 1534-1707: State 
Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago (London, 1996), 42. 
10 M. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge, 2000), ch. 1. 
11 M. Braddick, State Formation, 337. 
12 M. Braddick, State Formation, 338. 
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The discussion of Welsh politics put forward by Michael Braddick clearly 
summarizes his model of state formation through assimilation and claims that the 
reason for its long term success in Wales was the mutual benefits afforded to the 
crown and the local elites. Braddick's first point is that the increasing authority of 
the crown came in tandem with the spread of government through magistrate offices 
which created a mutuality of interests between the crown and the elites. This meant 
that the crown gained authority while at the same time the local elites gained status 
and economic benefits. Furthermore, the social and commercial ties which arose 
from the union bound the Welsh gentry more closely to London, the Inns of Court, 
and universities. The closer contact with these types of institutions meant that elites 
were exposed to government interests at the same time that institutions of royal 
government were providing the means to cement local social status and resolutions 
of local conflicts. Again, this represented a mutuality of interests and benefits for 
both the crown and the gentry; Welsh gentry would become proponents of 
government issues while government became proponents of local issues. Lastly, 
Braddick points out that the integration of the Welsh gentry did not come at the 
expense of local identity. The assimilation of Wales was not dependent on the 
cooperation of the population below the gentry and the persistence of linguistic 
differences among the Welsh peasantry did not prevent the adoption of the shire 
system. 13 While Braddick's model of state formation based on the employment of 
local elites as government agents adequately accounts for the policies of assimilation 
in Wales, like Michael Hechter, there are problems with including the other extreme 
of the political spectrum, chiefly the plantation of Ireland. 
Michael Braddick's discussion of "The Failure of the Kingdom of Ireland", a 
subheading he himself uses, 14 emphasizes that Tudor policies in Ireland were a 
"concerted attempt to create a sister kingdom that foundered on the failure of the 
Reformation", ' 5 and, surprisingly, provides evidence contrary to his model of state 
formation. While it can be argued that assimilation was attempted for a short period 
during the reign of Henry VIII, its failure gave rise to a much longer period of 
colonization which dominates Irish political history. The authority of the early 
13 M. Braddick, State Formation, 355. 
14 M. Braddick, State Formation, 379. 
15 M. Braddick, State Formation, 379. 
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Tudors was dependent on the cooperation of the Old English and leading Gaelic 
chieftains; however, both groups were unyielding to the efforts of the Reformation. 
The failure of the latter to take root in Ireland resulted in the natural governors, 
meaning the Old English and few leading chieftains, becoming increasingly 
alienated due to religious differences, a point which Braddick concedes. Due to the 
increasing perceived threat of foreign invasion in response to England's 
Reformation policies and the possibility of Ireland's participation in an attack from 
Spain or France, the attempts at tighter government control became associated with 
moral and religious claims. The government's solution to the problems posed by 
Ireland's autonomy was the creation of plantations which undermines Braddick's 
argument for mutuality of interests necessary for state formation. Braddick claims 
that the government's plantation scheme and "brutal intervention" was increasingly 
aimed at creating a new elite "more suitable for exercise of civil governance than the 
Gaelic or Old English elites". 16 The fact that the government was introducing a new 
group, commonly termed the New English, to dominate does not equate with 
Braddick's model of assimilation through the promotion of existing local elites to 
government agents, instead it provides evidence of domination along the lines of 
colonialism. 
In order to determine how Michael Hechter's model of internal colonialism 
as implemented in Ireland and Michael Braddick's model of state formation 
executed in Wales can be applied to the Western Highlands and Isles an 
understanding of how these two models functioned in reality is essential. The 
following two sections provide discussions of the policies of state formation 
implemented in Wales and of the planting of colonies in Ireland, as well as the 
approach taken by their respective churches in dealing with the vernacular. The 
examination of Wales and Ireland is not intended to be a comprehensive study of 
their political histories, but through engagement with the secondary literature on the 
respective countries and through comparative works an overview of policies 
16 M. Braddick, State Formation, 380. This is a similar conclusion to one reached by many historians 
although they rightly claimed this was an example of colonialism, such as R. F. Foster, Nicholas 
Canny, and Ciaran Brady. See R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 (London, 1988); N. Canny, 
Making Ireland British, 1580-1650 (Oxford, 2001); C. Brady, "The Decline of the Irish Kingdom" in 
M. Greengrass (ed. ), Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe 
(London, 1991). 
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emerges that adequately serve as indicators of internal colonialism and state 
formation. Therefore, it is through a general analysis of these two countries' 
politics and religion that the theoretical models will be illustrated. This analysis 
provides examples with which to compare the policies in the Western Highlands and 
Isles to establish central government's course of action in the region. 
II 
The policies enacted in Wales during the 1530s follow Michael Braddick's theory of 
state formation through the assimilation of local elites and their promotion to 
government agents. The assimilation of Wales derived from the 1536 policies which 
were the end result of English rule over Wales. Between 1284 and 1536 English 
kings had become the largest Marcher lords through inheritance, purchase, attainder, 
escheat and in their capacity as Dukes of Lancaster which put Henry VIII in a 
position to obtain loyalty from other Marcher lords and lesser Welsh gentry. As a 
result, many Welsh gentry were conscious of their changed position and were eager 
to obtain a more legal status and take advantage of the political and economic 
opportunities available to them. 
The establishment of the Council in the Marches was one of a number of 
institutions used by the crown to govern the furthest reaches of its realm. The 
Council was intended to exert royal authority and to promote order where royal 
influence was relatively weak. 17 The main problems within the administration of the 
Council were that its authority was not regularly enforced throughout the Marches, 
the officials on the Council were severely corrupt or negligent in their duties and 
went undisciplined, and criminals were often unpunished. The consequence of the 
unrest in the Marches resulting from the corruption and injustice of the region was 
the passing of a "Bill concerning the Council of Wales" in 1534-5. The bill outlined 
a number of remedies for the corruptions within the Council and represented a 
serious incursion into the autonomy of the Marches and its Council. The bill was 
passed due to the threat of a possible uprising of papists in Wales and of foreign 
17 M. Jones, "Cultural Boundaries within the Tudor State: Bishop Rowland Lee and the Welsh 
Settlement of 1536", The Welsh History Review 20 (2000), 227-53, at p. 230. 
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invasion from France and Spain in reaction to Henry VIII's religious policies. 
Therefore, the bill included six measures intended to subdue hostilities and 
corruption in the region to protect against invasion: enforced court decisions, 
compensation for wrongful imprisonment at the rate of 6s 8d per day and 
punishment of officers who committed the imprisonment, prohibition of weapons at 
court or places of assembly, authorized English Justices of the Peace to extradite 
criminals taking refuge in the Marches, and directed fines on those who found 
sureties for good behavior to be paid to the king. ' 8 
The policies enacted during the reign of Henry VIII, primarily those of 1536, 
were intended to bring Welsh laws and institutions in line with those practiced in 
England. The instilling of uniformity within the king's dominions was considered 
highly desirable for any possibility of successful enforcement of the statutes passed 
by the Reformation Parliament. It was planned that the transformation of Wales was 
to coincide with the dissolution of monasteries resulting from the Reformation, and 
that the dissolution would create an enfranchised Welsh gentry who would be able to 
secure a share of the dissolved monastic lands. The newly enfranchised gentry were 
to emerge as Members of the Commons and as Justices of the Peace and would 
possess a vested interest in the success of the Henrican Reformation. ' 9 
As a result, specific points in the 1536 Act of Union were aimed at law and 
order, primarily against the "sinister usuages and customs" of Wales. The act 
dictated that land inheritance was to be conducted on the English model of 
primogeniture, thus abolishing the Welsh practice of equal partition of the estate 
between all sons. It also abolished the Marcher lordships on the grounds of the high 
incidences of crime within them and because the king as the largest March lord held 
the majority of the lordships. The abolition of the lordships meant that lords could 
no longer try pleas of the crown and established the English shire system in their 
place. According to the act, the newly established shires in Wales were granted 
parliamentary representation and the members were to be paid wages. Lastly, the act 
dictated that all administrative and judicial business was to be conducted in the 
18 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 260. 
19 P. Roberts, "The English Crown, the Principality of Wales and the Council in the Marches, 1534- 
1641", in B. Bradshaw & J. Morrill eds., The British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the 
Atlantic Archipelago (London, 1996), 122. 
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English language, no one using "the Welsh speech or language shall have or enjoy 
any manner of office... unless he or they use the English speech or language". 20 The 
imposition of the act was not aimed at an unreceptive population, to the contrary the 
acts were in response to series of petitions sent by individuals and communities in 
north and central Wales. The administrative settlement outlined in the act formed 
part of a larger strategy for integration of peripheral areas of the realm. 21 
The subsequent 1543 Act for Certain Ordinances in the King's Dominion 
and Principality, commonly referred to as the "Second Act of Union", contained 130 
clauses spelling out the arrangements for future administration and justice in Wales 
and expanded on the policies of the 1536 act. The act confirmed the creation of 
Welsh shires and delineated the establishment of hundreds within them. However, 
the most prominent feature of the act was that it established the Court of Great 
Sessions which was to act in "as large and ample manner" as King's Bench, Court of 
Common Pleas, and Assize Courts. Accompanying the Court of Great Session was 
the power given to the Lord Chancellor to appoint for each county eight Justices of 
the Peace who would hold regular Quarter Sessions and the appointment of a sheriff 
in each county who was nominated by the Council of the Marches and chosen by the 
22 Privy Council. 
The desire of the Welsh gentry to be completely united with their English 
neighbors is clearly seen in a series of petitions to the king; one in particular was 
sent from the inhabitants of Montgomery in 1536. The petition claimed that the 
petitioners had "ever lived under the oppression of their lords and their officers" 
under customs "always applied and interpreted after the pleasure of the lord and his 
officers to their best profit" and craved to be "received and adopted into the same 
laws and privileges" enjoyed by the king's English subjects wishing to be "united 
ourselves to the greater and better parts of the island". 
23 As a result of this petition 
and others of a similar tone, the Welsh gentry can be considered well disposed to the 
idea of a union. The Welsh gentry did not see union as a suppression of their 
community's distinctive "rights, usages, law and custom"; rather they saw the 
20 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 268-9. 
21 P. Roberts, "The English Crown", 123-4. 
22 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 270-1. 
23 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 265. 
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benefits of the extension to the Welsh of the "privileges and liberties" enjoyed by 
their English neighbors. Within these "privileges and liberties" were the extension 
of government by consent through parliamentary representation, open access to 
English common law which could be employed to secure vulnerable property titles, 
and an increase in the opportunities for status and profit through participation in 
local administration under the English shire system. 24 Furthermore, the Welsh 
gentry had a propensity toward patriotism to the Tudor regime due to the belief that 
the Tudors were the rightful heirs of Wales as lineal descendants of the ancient 
Britons. This belief resulted in their perception that the Tudor program for 
assimilation was directed toward the re-inauguration of the British kingdom and was 
aimed at liberating Wales from papal and Saxon oppression. 25 Even though few 
Tudor monarchs actually displayed any great affection for Wales, the idea that the 
Welsh held a special place in the hearts of the Tudor monarchs was a persistent and 
highly persuasive propaganda theme. 26 
The peacefulness of Wales following the union indicates that the program 
launched in 1536 was unproblematic from the start. There are no rebellions 
recorded between the union and the outbreak of the Civil Wars and the Welsh literati 
took to eulogizing the new dispensation. 27 Welsh allegiances during the Civil Wars 
were primarily to the Royalist cause. The reason for support for Charles I was that 
Wales was isolated from constitutional and religious disagreements due to the lack 
of a strong commercial interest and lack of Puritan conviction. Therefore, the region 
had no reason to break its ties with the monarch whom they still deemed to be the 
rightful king of the Britons through his supposed genealogical descendency to King 
Arthur. 
In contrast to Wales, the overriding mentality of the government towards 
Ireland was for the complete abolition of Irish laws and practices and the 
establishment of a new elite to enforce direct rule from London. After the failure of 
Henry VIII's Kingship Act of 1541, there were few attempts made to integrate the 
local lords and more emphasis was placed on colonization, domination, and direct 
24 B. Bradshaw, "The Tudor Reformation and Revolution", 51. 
25 B. Bradshaw, "The Tudor Reformation and Revolution", 52. 
26 C. Brady, "Comparable Histories? ", 68. 
27 B. Bradshaw, "The Tudor Reformation and Revolution", 40. 
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rule through plantation schemes; thus, the practices enforced in Ireland follow the 
theoretical model of internal colonialism proposed by Michael Hechter. 
The key source of trouble experienced throughout Irish political history was 
the decrease of royal authority and the process of "degeneracy" or "Gaelicization" of 
the early colonial communities that were originally intended to function as outposts 
of royal authority. The Gaelicized English, commonly known as the Old English, 
became local magnates through their networks of protection and patronage across 
the colonies and into the Gaelic regions and began to function independently of 
royal authority. To counteract the increasing power of the Old English over 
government affairs the policies of the Tudor regimes toward Ireland were intended 
to abolish the divide between the Englishries and Irishries and to extend English rule 
and administration throughout Ireland. An early measure taken was the Kingship 
Act of 1541, asserted by Henry VIII, which converted Ireland from a lordship to a 
kingdom under the direct authority of the English monarch. The act declared Henry 
VIII king over all inhabitants in Ireland and extended order and protection through 
royal justice in return for allegiance and obedience from the inhabitants. Although 
given the status of a kingdom, Ireland remained an English dependency with all 
policies for Ireland being determined by the monarch and council with little, if any, 
Irish voice in matters relating to Ireland. The dependency of Ireland meant that 
King's Bench tried all Irish lawsuits on appeal, appointments of Irish ministers were 
made under the Great Seal of England, the Irish Parliament could not meet or pass 
legislation without warrant from the crown, and the English Parliament retained the 
right to legislate for Ireland even though the Irish did not have parliamentary 
representation. However, this act was near impossible to enforce. Ireland, at this 
point, was fragmented and unstable consisting of sixty lordships, both Old English 
and Gaelic, struggling for political dominance which resulted in chronic warfare and 
factionalism. The ineffectiveness of the act illustrates the gap between the intentions 
of Tudor policy and the reality it was faced with. 28 
The evolution of Tudor policies in Ireland constituted a piecemeal 
introduction of English law through the revitalization of central and provincial 
28 C. Brady, "The Decline of the Irish Kingdom", M. Greengrass ed., Conquest and Coalescence: The 
Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe (London, 1991), 94. 
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government. 29 Under the rule of Elizabeth I, Irish policies drew on a wide range of 
medieval English political ideas which, through their enactment, gradually polarized 
the Old English from the New English, those settlers who constituted a second wave 
of colonialism and maintained their close connection to England and Protestantism. 
A number of policies were directed specifically at the indigenous Gaelic warlords in 
the hopes of transforming them into upstanding English noblemen while numerous 
policies were intended to attack the autonomy of the Old English. The 
establishment of English colonies originally introduced to control strategically 
important districts, such as in East Ulster between 1570 and 1573 and in Munster 
between 1584 and 1589, and the founding of regional councils in Connacht and 
Munster to oversee the administration of frontier regions resulted in mounting levels 
of unrest and rebellion among both the Gaelic lords and the Old English. 
The plantation in Munster is a good example of an early colonial enterprise 
which was intended to lead the Irish toward civility through example. The 
plantation of Munster was a direct result of the rebellion of the Earl of Desmond in 
Munster which left the county in near ruin. The plantation was established as an 
instrument of royal policy and private enterprise aimed at re-creating a world of 
south-east England on the confiscated Munster estate of the Earl of Desmond. The 
grants of land in the plantation ranged from 4,000 to 12,000 acres and were given to 
thirty-five English landlords who were typically needy gentry hoping to make their 
fortune in Ireland and saw Munster as an avenue for social upward mobility. The 
grants were issued on the condition that the landlords vowed to introduce English 
colonists and to practice an English style agriculture based on grain-growing. 
Furthermore, all start up goods, such as grain, livestock and furnishings, were to be 
collected in England and transported to Munster. 30 By the end of the sixteenth 
century the Munster plantation could be considered a success. The plantation had 
roughly 12,000 settlers actively engaged in farming the land, 31 the raw material 
exports from Munster to England were performing impressively by the 1630s, and 
29 J. Ohlmeyer, "`Civilizinge of those Rude Partes': Colonization within Britain and Ireland, 1580- 
1640s", in N. Canny, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Origins of Empire, British 
Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1998), 133. 
30 N. Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580-1650 (Oxford, 2001), 130. 
31 J. Ohlmeyer, "Civilizinge of those Rude Partes", 137. 
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the fisheries trade was reportedly worth £29,000 in 1626.32 Furthermore, 
Anglicization worked to a certain extent in the plantation; however, it involved more 
subtle changes with the settlers preferring the old Gaelic place names rather than 
adopting English names. The treatment of the natives in Munster followed its own 
pattern and circumvented the government's policies against the natives, allowing 
one-third of the native population to return to ownership of land by 1611. The 
prominence of the Irish resulted in a relaxation of attitudes toward the natives and 
Irish tenants who were the norm on the Boyle estate in Cork and in Bandontown. 
Unfortunately, the plantation in Ulster would vary drastically from the plantation in 
Munster and few allowances would be made for the inhabitants. 
The Plantation scheme for Ireland between 1610 and 1622 was based on the 
proposal submitted by Sir Robert Jacob, solicitor general, and Mathew de Renzy, a 
German adventurer turned naturalized Englishman. Their scheme was based on the 
process of surrender and re-grant. This allowed those Irish lords who acknowledged 
the crown's superiority and surrendered their titles to be re-granted three quarters of 
their original estate and those lords who opposed the crown's superiority were only 
allowed to keep two-thirds of their estate. It was intended that colonization would 
take place by the establishment of Protestant proprietors on the portions of estates 
not re-granted to Irish lords, creating pockets of English settlers within the Gaelic 
regions. However, due to the crisis in Ulster, Viceroy Chichester recommended a 
modified form of colonization to be instituted in the region. Taking into account the 
Irish behavior during the Nine Years' War and the subsequent O'Doherty 
rebellion, 33 Chichester had little positive to say about the natives. His 
recommendation was for the complete forfeiture of the estates of Niall Garbh and 
Donal O'Cahan as main actors in the rebellion. However, he suggested provisions 
be made for lesser septs because he claimed it would prove "hard and almost 
impossible to displace them" and the septs of the Earl of Tyrone were "warlike 
people and many in number" who would "neither be ruled nor removed" 34 
Chichester's recommendation was motivated by reality not generosity. He assumed 
32 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 (London, 1989), 68. 
33 The O'Doherty rebellion in February 1608 was an uprising of lesser lords who believed they had 
been betrayed by the government when they were not granted portions of the estates of the Earls of 
Tyrone and Tyrconnell as compensation for their support of the government against the earls. 
34 As quoted in N. Canny, Making Ireland British, 191. 
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that plantation would rely on private investment of "well chosen undertakers" who 
would be captains and officers of the army who were to be "seated in the places of 
most danger and of the best advantage for His Majesty's service and defence of the 
rest of the undertakers". 35 
As a result of the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell's departure to the 
Continent, commonly known as the Flight of the Earls, and the O'Doherty rebellion, 
the crown was able to confiscate large tracts of land in Ulster and establish the 
largest plantation in Ireland. In contrast to the plantation of Munster, the allocations 
of land were in relatively small parcels, ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 acres. James 
VI and I granted the land to 100 Scottish and English undertakers and about fifty 
servitors who consisted primarily of English army officers who had settled in Ireland 
at the end of the Nine Years' War. It was hoped that they would create a British 
type of rural society and were to set aside acres for civilizing institutions such as 
churches, towns, and schools to facilitate the new society. One stipulation added to 
the grants to the primary undertakers was that no Irish were to reside on their estate 
resulting in segregation and dislocation of many natives. However, along with the 
allocations to British settlers, allocations were also granted to 300 "deserving 
Irishmen" that allowed them to have native tenants in the hopes that they would 
have a vested interest in the settlement and the promotion of civility. 36 The 
problems with the plantation of Ulster were that segregation proved impractical and 
the grants were so large that the native Irish were rapidly accepted as rent-paying 
tenants in order to fulfill the obligations ordered in the grants, such as building and 
farming. A report on the types of colonists in Ulster also shows the problem in 
trying to found the colony. It was reported that the English settlers were generally 
"plain country gentlemen" who were tight-fisted but also easily scared away with 
many having already sold or exchanged their portions, while the Scots settlers were 
a tougher proposition but were too ready to lease land to the natives and to use them 
to supply their needs. It was hoped that the offers for land in Ulster would draw 
skilled and prosperous artisan settlers, but there was no incentive for them to leave 
35 N. Canny, Making Ireland British, 192. 
36 J. Ohlmeyer, "Civilizinge of those Rude Partes", 138. 
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their established businesses and what the crown got instead was a mixture of rogues, 
vagabonds and opportunists. 37 
The overall effect of policies in Ireland through the Tudor and Stuart reigns 
was an increasing level of resentment that steadily escalated from violent protests, 
such as the Fitzgerald Rebellion in 1534-5 and the Geraldine League in 1539-40, to 
the Nine Years' War and eventual Civil Wars in the 1640s. The fact that Ireland 
was governed with English priorities and interests at heart meant that a large part of 
the strategy was Protestantization. In order to ease the burden of administering 
Ireland, the government preferred a Protestant population so that they were not 
dependent on cajoling the Catholic political classes. The heavy-handed colonization 
which was employed as a means of direct rule over Ireland and the preferment of 
Protestants sparked considerable resentment at its practical implications and raised 
the issue of religion to such a level that it proved to be one of the chief ideological 
38 motives for revolt. 
III 
Many nationalists have pointed to the 1536 Act of Union clause which 
dictated that all official business was to be conducted in English as an attempt by 
central government to abolish the Welsh language and thus the Welsh culture. In 
actuality the "language clause" makes no mention of the abolition of the Welsh 
language but calls for the inclusion of the English language within Wales when 
dealing with state business. As Peter Roberts explains, the "language clause" was 
not an attempt to exclude Welsh speakers or abolish the language, rather it was 
meant to be "an inducement to the Welsh to become bilingual". Furthermore, the 
nationalist claims have little merit because the clause was not strictly enforced and 
the need for vernacular scripture to promote the Reformation overrode the clause. 
39 
The use of the Welsh vernacular in religion had its beginnings in 1542 under 
the authority of Bishop Bulkeley of Bangor. Even though there was a scarce amount 
37 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 67. 
38 B. Bradshaw, "The Tudor Reformation and Revolution", 41. 
39 P. Roberts, "The Welsh Language, English Law and Tudor Legislation", Transactions of the 
Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion (London, 1989), 19-75, at p. 28. For details of Roberts 
argument against nationalist claims see "The `Act of Union' in Welsh History", Transactions of the 
Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion (London, 1974), 49-72. 
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of vernacular literary sources available at the time, Bishop Bulkeley ordered the 
clergy, schoolmasters, and heads of households under his charge to give religious 
instructions in the Welsh language. The use of the Welsh vernacular gained 
momentum through the increasing popularity of Tyndale's English New Testament 
and Cranmer's Liturgy, both of which were steadily undergoing partial translations 
in Wales. The increasing demand for Welsh literature resulted in Sir John Price of 
Brecon's publication, Yny Lhyvyr Hwnn, which was a straightforward religious 
primer and William Salesbury's translation of the epistles and gospels of the Prayer 
Book and substantial portions of scripture, Kynniver Llith a Ban. 40 
Following the success of Sir John Price's and William Salesbury's 
publications, the proposal for a publication of a Welsh Bible was promoted by 
Richard Davies, Bishop of St. Asaph, and William Salesbury in the hopes of saving 
the Welsh people from irreligion and Catholic superstition out of ignorance of the 
Word of God. Davies and Salesbury presented an anonymous petition to the crown 
for the Scripture to be translated and pleaded that Welsh and Cornish children be 
taught the Catechism in their native language 41 Their efforts were met with royal 
approval and an act for the translation of the Bible was approved in 1563. The act 
dictated a short timeline for the completion of the work, provided official sanction, 
and included a specific mandate for the translations' use in parish worship. 
However, the act did not provide any financial support and had an added proviso 
from the House of Lords ordering the Welsh Bible to be placed alongside the 
English Bible to enable parishioners to learn English. The New Testament and 
Prayer Book were published in 1567 and it is estimated that 1,000 copies were 
printed. However, the translations did not provide a complete version of the Bible 
and garnered criticism due to the possibility of Salesbury's "linguistic 
idiosyncrasies". 42 
The issue of the Welsh Bible reemerged in 1587 at the instigation of John 
Penry. Penry was a staunch Puritan who criticized the church hierarchy for being 
responsible for the failure to produce a complete Welsh Bible. As a result, 
Archbishop Whitgift responded by increasing the publication of the translation 
40 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 295. 
41 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 314. 
42 G Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 315. 
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already in use while commissioning William Morgan to produce a complete version. 
Morgan's Bible was deemed more lucid and intelligible than Salesbury's 
translations and in September 1588 the Privy Council issued instructions to the 
Welsh bishops to ensure copies were purchased and employed by their clergy. 43 The 
completion of Morgan's Bible effectively completed the process of integration in 
Wales. A term often used by James VI in relation to the union between Scotland 
and England had its beginnings in the reign of Elizabeth and the union between 
Wales and England, the integration of the Welsh gentry into English politics and the 
inclusion of the Welsh language in the church meant that there was a clear union of 
"hearts and minds". 
While the government and political aspects of Wales were undergoing the 
process of integration, so too was the church. As stated above, the use of the Welsh 
vernacular was essential to the success of the Reformation and overrode any 
implications in the 1536 Act of Union which could be construed as the call for the 
abolition of the Welsh language. It was believed that for assimilation to succeed 
adherence to the Reformation was crucial and meant that integration of the Welsh 
people into the Protestant faith was just as necessary as their integration into politics. 
Similar to the attitude taken during the reign of Elizabeth I toward the Welsh 
vernacular, there was a shift in policy at roughly the same time in favor of the Irish 
vernacular out of necessity. Prior to this shift in attitude to the Irish vernacular, the 
Irish Act of Uniformity was issued in 1560 as an attempt to strengthen the Church`öf 
Ireland. The act which enforced the adherence to Protestantism had an added 
stipulation which permitted the church functionaries who did not know English to 
conduct their services in Latin. Although the use of the vernacular for scripture and 
public worship was one of the most significant features of the Protestant 
Reformation, no allowances were made for the vernacular to be used in Ireland. 
Royal officials in Dublin discarded the use of the vernacular inherent in the 
Reformation on the belief that the cultivation of Gaelic was disloyal to the crown 
and would slow the Gaelic speakers' Anglicization. 44 The continued use of the 
Gaelic language in Ireland was quickly becoming associated with Gaelic resistance 
43 G. Williams, Renewal and Reformation, 322-3. 
44 M. MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction to the Reformation", in S. Barber & S. Ellis, eds., Conquest 
and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725 (London, 1995), 140. 
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and eventually became synonymous with Catholicism. Surprisingly though, Trinity 
College in Dublin still allowed the Gaelic language although the ethos of the college 
was Elizabethan and Protestant. 45 
The shift in attitude toward the Irish vernacular was out of an effort to 
circumvent the continuing influence of Catholic clerics in Ireland. As a result of the 
Catholic threat, Elizabeth I reversed the government's position concerning the Irish 
language and commissioned a Gaelic version of the New Testament to be printed 
and circulated to the benefit of the Reformation. Elizabeth sent £66 13s 4d to Adam 
Loftus, Archbishop of Armagh, and Hugh Brady, Bishop of Meath, "for the making 
of character to print the New Testament in Irish"; 46 by the end of 1567 there was still 
no translation and Elizabeth threatened to demand the money back. However, the 
Gaelic New Testament was finally completed in 1602 and was followed by a Gaelic 
Book of Common Prayer printed in 1608 47 In the interim Sean O'Cearnaigh, 
treasurer of St. Patrick's Cathedral, took on the task of publishing the first Gaelic 
book to be printed in Ireland which acted on the initiative for vernacular usage in 
religion as indicated in Elizabeth's commission for the New Testament. 
O'Cearnaigh published 200 copies of his work entitled, Aibidil Gaoldheilge 7 
Caiticiosma; unfortunately there is no evidence indicating how the copies were 
distributed. An interesting feature of the work is the inclusion of liturgically neutral 
prayers taken from Bishop John Carswell's book Foirm na n-Urrnuidheadh 
published in the Western Highlands. O'Cearnaigh was conscious of the sensitivity 
of the Anglican Church and chose those prayers from Carswell's book that would in 
no way prove offensive. Added to these prayers were translations of the catechism, 
various prayers for private recitation, and a translation of Archbishop Matthew 
Parker's twelve articles of religion. Unfortunately, this was not enough to halt the 
influence of the Irish Franciscans who were likewise busy printing religious material 
in Gaelic. 48 
During the Counter-Reformation, the Irish clerical exiles residing on the 
continent were devoted to countering Protestant religious material by promoting 
as R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 30. 
46 M. MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction", 153. 
47 M. MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction", 154. 
48 M. MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction", 154. 
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Gaelic works on Catholic religious doctrine. The focus for this new educational 
campaign was founded in the Irish Franciscan College of Louvain by Florence 
Conry in 1606. Conry had already been using his Gaelic skills while at the 
University of Salamanca in Spain where in 1593 he composed an unpublished 
Gaelic version of the catechism. 49 Within five years of the founding of the College 
of Louvain the first Catholic work in Gaelic was published. Bonabhentura 
O'hEoghusa composed a Gaelic catechism that was printed in Antwerp in 1611 and 
again in 1615 on the friars' own printing press in Louvain. 50 Following on this 
translation, Conry published his Desiderius in Louvain in 1615. Conry's translation 
was of a very popular Spanish religious text with which he took considerable 
liberties, both in omissions and additions. Among Conry's additions was one 
particularly intended to encourage Irish Catholics to remain steadfast in their faith. 
The most provocative addition Conry made was a direct attack on James VI and I's 
theory of Divine Right. The tract stated that power was derived from the people and 
it is possible that Conry was trying to indicate to James that he would have to earn 
the allegiance of the Irish Catholics. 51 
Added to the problem of erecting a new government in Ireland through 
plantation was the continued problem of religion with the majority of the population 
remaining Catholic. Similar to Wales, the enforcement of Protestantism in Ireland 
was deemed essential to the success of government. Although allowances were 
made for the Irish vernacular to promote Protestantism there followed a series of 
measures and attacks on Irish Catholics. Unlike the crown's reaction to Catholicism 
in Wales which was basically indifferent because of increasing support of 
Protestantism in the periphery, the crown's reaction to Catholicism in Ireland and 
the influence of the Irish Franciscans was to do what they could to stop the spread of 
the religion and to limit the amount of power wielded by the Catholics. The 
government's reaction was often intended to make examples out of Catholics by 
issuing punitive fines, through imprisonment, and even death. As a result, animosity 
towards central government and the New English was rampant because of their 
concurrent attacks to landownership and religion. This animosity would manifest 
49 M. MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction", 148. 
50 M. MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction", 149. 
51 M. MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction", 150. 
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itself in the creation of the Irish Confederacy that would wage war against their 
colonizers during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. 
IV 
There is some difficulty in conducting an exercise similar to those carried out in 
Ireland and Wales when attempting to classify government policies in the 
Highlands. The complexity that emerges in trying to categorize the Western 
Highlands and Isles is a result of the simple fact that there was no coherent agenda 
followed; however, shifts in the attitude of central government toward the Highlands 
can be seen and some semblance of central government's attitude towards the region 
can be deduced. As Professor Michael Lynch has pointed out, "What was 
happening, however, was more like a scatter-gun of official projects, some pet 
theories, private or quasi-official initiatives and ad hoc reactions by the royal 
administration to problems as they arose". 52 The result of this "scatter-gun" agenda 
was that government policies ranged from direct conquest and colonization to the 
promotion of local elites to government agents. In looking at Wales and Ireland as 
examples of state formation and internal colonialism respectively, direct correlations 
can be drawn to the policies enacted in the Highlands. The fact that no clear agenda 
was followed in the Western Highlands and Isles is clearly unique because in 
comparison to the other peripheral regions the crown's mentality was more obvious; 
however, when a particular scheme was put into action in the region the subsequent 
developments tend to mirror those seen in Ireland and Wales depending on whether 
the policies were of a colonial nature or state formation. The outcome of such a 
comparison is that between the 1590s and 1616 there was a movement toward 
colonization and domination based on the plantation models in Ireland, but the 
advent of the annual meetings in 1616 points to a shift in Highland policies toward 
assimilation and cooperation which were deemed beneficial and successful in 
government's dealings with Wales. 
The policies of James VI towards the Western Highlands and Isles 
originated with an intention to colonize the region in an attempt to "civilize" the 
inhabitants. Between 1596 and 1609 three attempts were made by the Fife 
52 M. Lynch, "James VI and the `Highland Problem"', 216. 
82 
Adventurers to colonize the island of Lewis which paralleled the plantation schemes 
in Ulster and Munster. However, because of the resilient nature of the MacLeods of 
Lewis all three missions ended in failure. Although the MacLeods of Lewis were 
effectively destroyed it was more of a consequence of inter-clan turmoil than a result 
of the Fife Adventurers. Taking Michael Hechter's five principles used to define a 
region as a colony, internal colony or peripheral region we can see that the actions of 
the Fife Adventurers fall somewhere between colonialism and internal colonialism 
because the region ranked low in all but two categories, there was little 
administrative integration, no prestige given to the culture, and relatively no lasting 
association between the periphery and the core. The failure of the Fife Adventurers 
forced James VI and central government to look at other avenues through which to 
get the Western Highlands and Isles in line with the rest of the kingdom and resulted 
in the abandonment of colonizing policies. Although some continued to promote the 
idea of colonizing the Highlands, such as Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles, the 
official government position discarded the policy of dispossession and settlement in 
the Highlands. 
Due to the failure of James VI's colonization scheme, the focus of central 
government shifted from domination to integration by empowering the local chiefs 
and working within the existing power structure of the Western Highlands and Isles. 
The fact that Kenneth MacKenzie, Lord Kintail, was granted a charter to the island 
of Lewis after the defeat of the Fife Adventurers illustrates the realization that it was 
better for the center if the existing power structure of the locality was employed 
rather than destroyed; thus using state formation tactics by promoting the elites to 
government agents. 
This shift in policy is more clearly seen in the 1609 Statutes and the 
subsequent 1616 Regulations. The underlying intention in both these policies was to 
expose the chiefs to "civility" and to increase their power by holding them 
accountable for their clansmen, essentially creating government agents responsible 
for addressing the perceived lawlessness in the region. 53 Although both the Statutes 
and the Regulations attacked the Highland practices of fostering and the continued 
use of the "Irish tongue" it was intended to bring the region in line with the rest of 
53 M. Braddick, State Formation, 340 & 373. 
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the kingdom. By conducting a comparative analysis with the details of the Welsh 
Acts of Union there are clear indications that the measures taken in the Highlands 
were aimed at integration along the lines of the policies enacted in Wales. For 
example, whether intentional or not on the part of central government, the attacks on 
Highland practices correlate with the attacks on Welsh customs of inheritance and 
laws, both of which were intended to bring about cultural congruency between the 
periphery and the core, as well as continuity of the legal system. An even more 
direct correlation between the Highlands and Wales is the crown's reaction to the 
indigenous languages. Both the Acts of Union in Wales and the 1609 and 1616 
policies in the Highlands required the English language to be used; but again these 
"language clauses" were intended to provide continuity through the promotion of 
English in conjunction with the native language and did not remove the opportunity 
for the inhabitants to be bilingual. Where a difference is revealed is in the 
encouragement of the use of the vernacular for the promotion of Protestantism. In 
Wales and Ireland the Protestant church, as well as the Catholic church in Ireland, 
were busy since the 1580s publishing religious works in the vernacular in order to 
win the hearts of the inhabitants to one religion or the other. However, as will be 
discussed in chapter five, after the printing of Bishop Carswell's Foirm na n- 
Urrnuidheadh no attempts were made to further the use of the vernacular in the 
Western Highlands and Isles until the erection of the Synod of Argyll in 1638 . 
54 
Although this appears to be a stark contrast to assimilation it had little effect on the 
political integration of the chiefs. 
Similar to Wales, the new relationship between central government and the 
Western Highlands and Isles had positive and negative effects for both the crown 
and the chief creating a degree of coercion on both sides. In order for the chiefs to 
be employed as government agents and, as a result, increase their local authority 
they were forced to make certain concessions. To be eligible for promotion the 
chiefs were required to adopt the English language, as well as their heirs to be 
permitted to inherit the chiefship. Although this has been viewed as an attack on 
Gaelic it must be clarified that this stipulation did not outlaw the indigenous 
5' For a detailed discussion of Bishop Carswell and Foirm na n-Urrnuidheadh, see chapter 4, 
"Religion from Reformation to War", p. 105-07. 
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language but served to encourage bilingualism, which many chiefs were by 1609. 
Another concession the chiefs were forced to make was to abandon some of their 
traditional practices, primarily fosterage, and later the taking of calps, or the best 
beast on the death of a tenant. The ban on fosterage and taking calps had a definite 
negative effect on the clans. The proscription of fosterage removed a vital 
instrument in the clans' development and maintenance of their alliance networks, 
thus representing an attempt by the state to limit the powers of the clans. Similarly, 
as the taking of calps was seen by outsiders to be a form of oppression by the chief 
over his tenants, the outlawing of the practice was aimed at limiting the chiefs' 
power over his own clansmen and attempted to reduce his income by removing one 
of his sources of revenue. However, the positive effect that arose in this closer 
relationship with central government was that the chief and, subsequently the clan, 
was able to increase their political position and status in the region in their new 
capacity as government agent. Likewise, the crown was compelled to make 
concessions in order to achieve its goal of incorporating the Western Highlands and 
Isles. For the crown to be able to spread royal authority in the region it had to 
abandon its desire for direct rule and instead rely on the existing political structure. 
To do so meant that the crown had to empower the local elites whom they originally 
wanted to dominate, a concession which some members of government, for example 
the Earl of Strafford, had trouble stomaching. To reach a level of a mutually 
beneficial relationship, just as in Wales, both parties had to make sacrifices for the 
final outcome to become a relationship where the locality and central government 
were better able to cooperate and coexist while taking an increasing interest in each 
other's issues. 
The most important aspect of central government's shift in policies toward 
assimilation of the Western Highlands and Isles was the advent of the annual 
meetings between the chiefs and Privy Council. The meetings were clearly intended 
to integrate the chiefs into central government and also to teach them by example the 
way to "civility". As a result of the meetings, chiefs were given powers which 
derived from central government and they were increasingly being used as agents to 
deal with such issues as brokenmen and Jesuits. Again, this is a striking correlation 
to the advent of Justices of the Peace in Wales and the promotion of the existing 
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local elites to government agents. Through this process the chiefs changed their 
focus away from locally derived power, which was often acquired through hostile 
means such as feuding, to their newly acquired power granted from the center. Once 
politically integrated into the kingdom, the exposure of the chiefs to Lowland 
practices and manners served to further integrate the chiefs into the social and 
economic spheres of the kingdom, thus increasing the level of mutual benefits 
between the chiefs and central administration along similar lines to those Welsh 
gentry who gained greater access to London and the Inns of Court. The end result of 
the annual meetings was the subduing of hostilities in the Western Highlands and 
Isles and the incorporation of the region into the entire kingdom; therefore, the 
policies derived from state formation proved successful in their attempt to get the 
locality to function as a component for the betterment of the entire kingdom. 
Unfortunately, the use of state formation policies, primarily the annual 
meetings, partially collapsed. The increasing difficulties of central government to 
deal with the emerging crisis created by the Covenant regime shifted the focus of 
government away from state formation in the Western Highlands and Isles. Because 
the chiefs in the region were seen as more civilized and were proving themselves as 
adequate government agents the annual meetings were allowed to lapse. It was once 
thought that the way to abolish the lawlessness of the region was to summon the 
chiefs before the Privy Council to answer for their clansmen's behavior, but by the 
late 1620s it was determined that the best tactic was to allow the chiefs to remain 
home to deal with any disorders. Therefore, when problems began emerging as a 
result of the Covenant Movement the Privy Council granted the chiefs excuses from 
their obligatory meetings. The problem that the end of the annual meetings created 
was that the chiefs were no longer looking towards the center for political power; 
they instead reverted to striving for power within the locality. 
By not following through with the policies of state formation on the political 
level, central government lost the ability to hold chiefs accountable as government 
agents and it meant that the chiefs were no longer required to work as a component 
of the whole. Although the Western Highlands and Isles were integrated along the 
same lines as Wales the problem was that the integration of the chiefs was still in the 
development stage when problems arose in the 1630s and was therefore relatively 
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short lived; Wales had been integrated for roughly one hundred years before the 
outbreak of the Civil Wars while the Western Highlands and Isles had only been 
integrated for, at the most, twenty years. The demise of the Western Highlands and 
Isles integration would later cause problems during the Civil Wars as the region no 
longer had a vested interest in the issues of central government and the clans used 
the conflict as a means to conduct their own form of justice and retaliation. 
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Chapter 4 
Central Government and the Western Highlands and Isles 
As the focus of this thesis is to determine why the Western Highlands and 
Isles delayed their entry into the conflict and why their involvement was short lived 
it is important to identify issues and events that were relevant to the patterns of 
allegiances. The study of politics during this period is crucial because of the 
obvious fact that politics would play an influential part in the chieftains' decision- 
making and subsequent actions. The key component to understanding how politics 
could have influenced the clans is the tenuous relationship between the Western 
Highlands and Isles and central government that would later manifest into struggles 
for political dominance in the region. Therefore, this chapter serves as an overview 
of the dealings between central government and the Western Highlands and Isles 
throughout the reign of Charles I and will highlight specific incidents that indicate a 
withdrawal of the region from the dealings of central government and a re-focusing 
on local issues which allowed the region to refrain from active participation in the 
"Scottish troubles" and to then align themselves in 1644-5 with the faction that best 
served their political needs. 
The reign of Charles I saw the progressive decline of central government's 
control over the Western Highlands and Isles. Charles I's government no longer 
pursued the array of Highland policies of his father, James VI, which were at times 
heavy-handed yet successful in subduing a region whose inhabitants were once 
thought to be "allutterly barbares, with out any sort or shew of civilitie". l Although 
the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles were not barbarians it is understandable 
how their societal structure and the processes of Highland justice could be 
misinterpreted as such. In looking at the first half of James's reign it is possible to 
see how his perception of the region came about; the region, in comparison to the 
Lowlands, continued to be fraught with excessive cattle thieving, murder for 
retribution, open rebellion, their economy was based on subsistence farming and 
lacked the regular use of a monetary unit, and many of the clans functioned 
1 J. Sommerville (ed. ), Political Writings of James VI (Cambridge, 1994), 24. 
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independent of central government only obeying the state when it was forced to 
directly intervene. By 1616 the Western Highlands and Isles was seen as a liability 
to the safety and security of the rest of the kingdom due to the clans' hostile 
behavior and the renewed possibility that the region's instability would provide an 
opportunity for invasion from Catholic nations. Through James VI's policies of 
colonization, the planting of lowlanders in the Isles, and the compulsory annual 
meetings between the Privy Council and the island chiefs, the perception of James's 
administration was that it transformed the Western Highlands and Isles from 
"alluterly barbares" into law-abiding subjects and government agents. The true 
cornerstone to this transformation was a reliance on annual meetings where the 
Privy Council was able to hold chiefs accountable for their behavior and that of their 
kinsmen as well as to expose the chiefs to a more sophisticated and less violent way 
of life. 
By the succession of Charles I, the Western Highlands and Isles were 
generally subdued. With the exception of a few isolated incidents, such as the Clan 
Maclan's piracy, the perceived period of blood feuds and lawlessness appeared to be 
over. This relative peace in the region led to a decline in government intervention. 
By the time the Scottish Revolution broke out in 1638 central government had 
almost completely neglected the island chiefs, allowing the inhabitants of the 
Western Highlands and Isles to regain their autonomy. 
I 
Since 1616 it had become customary that the island chiefs were to appear before the 
Council every year in early July. It was believed by members of the Privy Council 
"that by their comeing heir yeirlie thay may be reducit to civilitie and maid to 
acknowledge their obedience to his Majestie and his lawis". 2 In order to enforce this 
"obedience" the Council ordered the island chiefs to nominate between three and 
eight leading gentry who were also to be accountable for the clan being "reduceit to 
2 As quoted in D. Gregory, History of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland, from A. D. 1493 
to A. D. 1625 (Edinburgh, 1975), 393-5. 
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civilitie". Out of the nominated gentry, one to three gentry attended the annual 
meetings with their respective chief. If a clan was found to be in violation of the law 
or was in any way found to be hostile, then one or all of the gentry brought to the 
meeting would be held by the Privy Council, often in Edinburgh Castle, until order 
was restored. As the clan gentry were often tacksmen their freedom was essential to 
the functioning of the clan system and for the subsistence of the clan chief; 
therefore, the imprisonment of the gentry served as an incentive to regain order in 
the clan's territory. 
Another measure employed by the Privy Council, which proved more 
effective than warding clan gentry, was the exaction of cautions and sureties. These 
were financial guarantees for the clan's continued good behavior and for the chief's 
appearance at the next year's meeting. Depending on the size of the clan and their 
past behavior sureties would range from 5,000 merks to £10,000 Scots. The system 
of demands for sureties was found to be so successful that it was later implemented 
also to underwrite the payment of rents, duties and taxes. The combination of 
imprisonment of the gentry and the exacting of sureties increased clan obedience 
and in many ways increased the chief's "civility" to such an extent that by 1625 it 
was common for island chiefs to be employed as government agents, being granted 
commissions against neighboring troublesome clans or even against their own 
disruptive clansmen. 
Unfortunately, the only surviving records of the meetings are found in the 
Register of the Privy Council and do not provide details of the annual meetings, nor 
is there a surviving minute book if one was ever written. What are recorded in the 
Register are the attendance records of the chiefs with the amounts of their cautions 
and sureties, commissions issued while the chiefs were in Edinburgh, and any legal 
disputes that needed to be addressed by the Privy Council. By piecing together the 
evidence found in the Register it appears that the chiefs presented themselves to the 
Privy Council and made whatever payments were due to the crown, then awaited 
word of any complaints or charges being brought against them. If a complaint was 
filed and upheld the chief would forfeit his surety and the matter was either dealt 
with by the Privy Council or referred to the justice court. If no charges were brought 
against the chief then he would be granted any commissions for which the Privy 
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Council needed his services and be allowed to return home. In comparing the 
records that arise out of the annual meetings with the general history of the area it 
becomes apparent that the time period in which the chiefs were held accountable for 
their clan's behavior coincides with a period during which there was a decrease in 
the frequency and longevity of blood feuds recorded and an increase in the number 
of disputes being resolved through the legal system in Edinburgh. 
A common measure used by central government in dealing with lawlessness 
in the Highlands was to issue a commission of fire and sword. These commissions 
were generally licenses to take military action against those deemed by central 
government to be in defiance of the law. A commission of fire and sword gave 
power to the commissioners to use whatever means necessary to enforce the law 
with a full indemnity of their actions in carrying out their commission. 
Commissions were usually granted to landed superiors, such as the Earls of Argyll 
and the MaKenzies of Kintail, but during the 1620s they were increasingly being 
issued to lesser chiefs through the course of the annual meetings because they were 
steadily proving themselves to be capable of implementing the laws of the kingdom. 
The first large scale commission handed down in the early months of Charles 
I's reign illustrated the degree to which central government had come to rely on the 
island chiefs for help with general problems. This commission, issued in 1625, was 
in response to the Clan Maclan's rebellion in Ardnamurchan and their subsequent 
piracy in the Irish Sea. As was common during the early modem period in Scotland, 
the Clan Campbell's expansion into Ardnamurchan led to a rebellion, in this case 
against Donald Campbell of Barbreck-Lochawe. Archibald, 4th Earl of Argyll had 
acquired the superiority over Ardnamurchan but the Campbells did not enforce the 
claim until 1612 when John MacIan, chief of Clan Maclan, died, leaving a minor as 
heir. As was customary for Clan Campbell, Argyll handed over the superiority to a 
kinsman, on this occasion to Donald Campbell of Barbreck-Lochawe. 
Unfortunately, Donald Campbell had a heavy-handed way of dealing with the 
Maclans. Even though William Stirling of Auchyle wrote to Donald Campbell on 
behalf of Argyll recommending him to "press to win the people with kindness rather 
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nor extremitie", the oppression of the Maclans continued until September 1624 
when the clan broke out in rebellion and piracy. 3 
The Privy Council's response to the Clan Maclan's piracy was first a 
commission of fire and sword issued to the Campbells, specifically naming Lord 
Lorne and the Campbells of Cawdor, Lochnell, Ardkinglass, and Auchenbreck. 
However, the Campbells proved unsuccessful and a proclamation was issued in 
1625 ordering all of "his Majesties lieges and subjects betuix saxtie and saxtene 
yearis... within the boundis of the shirefdomes of Argyll and Tarbett, and within the 
south, west and north Illis... [to] assist the saidis commissionaris [Campbells] in the 
persute of the saidis rebellis [Maclans] be sea or land. "4 By including the Isles, the 
proclamation implicated the chiefs in the region and the subsequent records in the 
Register of the Privy Council verify the fact that the chiefs were expected to act as 
junior commissioners against the Maclans. Two letters written to Rory Mor 
MacLeod of Dunvegan chastised the chief for his lack of service claiming "so far as 
we consave in the bussienes, your behaviour hes bene more in show and 
ostentatioun nor in substance and effect". 5 Because communication with the isles 
was difficult, claimed the Privy Council, it wrote the aforesaid letters based on 
inaccurate information and was quick to issue an apology when it became apparent 
that Rory Mor MacLeod was key in the final subduing of the rebels. 6 The inclusion 
of the chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles in this commission marks the point 
at which the government was comfortable giving the chiefs powers that put them in 
a more powerful position and re-emphasized the benefits of gaining power derived 
from central government. The inclusion of men such as Rory Mor MacLeod and 
Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat illustrates a reciprocal relationship that was 
beginning to develop between the crown and the chiefs. The chiefs were now being 
seen as beneficial to the instilling of law and order as the Earl of Argyll had been, 
while the acknowledgement and legitimization by the crown of the chiefs' power in 
the region offered the chiefs the possibility of increasing their status and local 
influence if they worked in cooperation with the crown. 
3 E. J. Cowan, "Fishers in Drumlie Waters: Clanship and Campbell expansion in the time of 
Gilleasbuig Gruamach", TGSI, LIV (1987), 269-312, at p. 294. 
a RPC, 2nd series, i, 23. 
5 RPC, 2nd series, i, 34. 
6 Ibid. 
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Although the crown and the local chiefs were developing a closer 
relationship and were formulating a mutually beneficial arrangement the cornerstone 
to this accord was beginning to erode, namely the annual meetings. Due to the 
increased role of the chiefs as government agents and the subsequent peace resulting 
from the chiefs' new position of authority, attendance at the July meetings appears 
to have become inconsistent as early as 1624. None of the chiefs appeared for the 
1624,1625,1629 and 1631 meetings, only MacLean of Coll, due to his indisposition 
and age, actually having been given an excuse prior his non-attendance in 1631.7 In 
April 1632, the island chiefs' lawyers in Edinburgh presented a series of petitions to 
the Privy Council requesting to be excused from the 1632 annual meeting. The first 
petition recorded was on behalf of Sir Lachlan MacLean of Morvern, younger son of 
Hector of Duart. The petition argued that he, his father, and brother had already 
been in Edinburgh for nearly a year and there had been no complaints brought 
against them since their last appearance. A similar petition was submitted on behalf 
of the captain of Clanranald who claimed that he had already been to Edinburgh in 
March and April and likewise had no complaints against him. MacDonald of Sleat's 
petition claimed that he was under the impression that the Council had agreed to a 
previous petition from "the gentlemen of the Isles" which stated that if proper 
representation was made early in March and there were no complaints against them 
they did not have to appear for one year, and such was the case for himself. The 
final petition was from Hector MacNeil of Barra which claimed he was not a 
"chiftane of ane clan nor ane frehalder" because Sir John MacKenzie of Tarbat was 
superior of Barra, and MacNeil explained that it took three years of his living to 
make the round-trip from Barra to Edinburgh, thus he had exhausted his funds by 
appearing once or twice. 8 All of the April petitions were granted for one year only, 
on the condition the chiefs appeared in 1633 which four chiefs complied with. 
9 
After repeated lapses in attendance the Privy Council attempted to reinstate 
the island chiefs' annual meetings in 1636. The revival of the meetings was an 
attempt by the Privy Council to maintain a hold on the region. However, the 
7 RPC, 2"d series, iv, 280. 
$ RPC, 2"d series, iv, 675-7; R. L. MacNeil, The Clan MacNeil: clann Niall of Scotland (New York, 
1923), 76. 
9 For a breakdown of attendance see Appendix 5: Attendance Record of Annual Meetings 1616-1642. 
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Council's efforts were generally ineffective as some clans were already beginning to 
enjoy increased freedom from government intervention while others were already 
having to look to local politics to fill the void left by the collapse of power derived 
from central government. Therefore, on 21 July 1636, Mr. James Logy, attorney for 
MacDonald of Sleat, MacLean of Morvern and the captain of Clanranald, appeared 
before the Privy Council alongside George Campbell, attorney for MacLean of Coll 
and MacKinnon of that Strathordale, requesting an excuse from their meeting that 
was supposed to take place in July 1636. The requests were made "in regarde of a 
great famine within these bounds, of the necessitie of Sir Donald [et al] his 
remaining at home to keepe the countrie in order the time of the fishing, and in 
respect of thair notour legall behaviour and that there wes no complaint made upon 
thame". The Council disagreed with the necessity to stay at home but conceded that 
"if, upon the like incident necessities the saids ylanders sail be disabled to appeare" 
they could apply for dispensation no later than the first council day of June. 1° 
Clearly this ruling was not adhered to as no chiefs appeared in 1637 and the Council 
subsequently gave them until the 17`h of November to comply with their previous 
order to appear. 
After this feeble attempt to reinforce the chiefs' meetings in Edinburgh, the 
Council again changed their attitude toward the meetings in June 1638. As a result 
of the National Covenant and the emergence of the Covenant Movement, Donald 
Gorme MacDonald of Sleat and Rory Mor MacLeod of Dunvegan applied and were 
granted excuses from attendance on the grounds that "the country was very 
disturbed and their presence was needed in their awne countrey". 1 1 The granting of 
this petition served as the definitive end of the annual meetings by allowing 
MacDonald and MacLeod to use the current turmoil as the reason for not attending. 
On the heels of MacDonald and MacLeod's petition came a "Supplication from 
Gentlemen of the Isles", presented in person by Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat 
on behalf of all the island chiefs. The supplication claimed that the chiefs had 
striven to maintain obedience to law and justice and requested to remain at home "in 
good hop to retaine and hald thair haill bounds under obedience". The supplication 
'o RPC, 2°a series, vi, 300-1. 
" RPC, 2"d series, vii, 22,26. 
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was granted on 26 June 1638 and although it did not specifically cancel all future 
meetings it had the effect of doing so. ' 2 
When the annual meetings first began in 1610 it was believed essential to 
summon the chiefs to Edinburgh during times of trouble to enforce order and subdue 
hostilities, but by the end of the 1620s the chiefs proved themselves to be useful in 
maintaining the peace in the Western Highlands and Isles and the Privy Council 
began to accept the idea that chiefs should stay at home to enforce law and order 
among their clan and territory. It can be argued that the chiefs gained their 
autonomy in the 1620s as a result of a partnership that had developed between 
central government and the chiefs through the course of the annual meetings. 
Although the chiefs were increasingly being seen as reliable in implementing law 
and order in the region, the relationship between the council and the chiefs was one 
of superior over subordinate with both entities having different agendas because the 
process of assimilation was still relatively new. A partnership implies a joint 
venture with both parties working towards a common goal; however the council's 
main objective was the subjugating of the inhabitants of the Western Highlands and 
Isles while the chiefs' goal was to maintain or increase their position within the 
locality. What is seen in the transactions between the council and the chiefs during 
the meetings was a realization that cooperation would enable both parties to achieve 
their goal, but this should not be construed as their entering into a joint venture with 
central government and the chiefs adopting a common goal. The dynamics of this 
relationship cannot account for the region gaining their autonomy because the 
purpose for allowing the chiefs to stay home during times of trouble was to better 
enable the chiefs to continue their work for the council and was not intended to 
allow them to function independent from central government, which is what 
inevitably happened. 
The increase in autonomy of the chiefs which resulted from the Privy 
Council's ideology that chiefs should remain in their territories during times of 
trouble was further increased by central government's preoccupation with the 
emergence of the Covenant Movement in 1638. It is surprising that the Privy 
Council allowed the annual meetings to fall into disuse when they had proven so 
12 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 26. 
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effective in ending the hostilities in the region. On the other hand, it could also be 
assumed that because the chiefs had, by 1638, been subdued that they did not pose a 
threat and, therefore, could be left on their own for a short time while central 
government dealt with the grander problems of religion. Whatever the reason may 
be, hindsight indicates that the meetings could have been continued by either the 
royalist government of Charles or the Covenant regime. The meetings would have 
been most useful for the Covenant regime if they wanted to enforce the National 
Covenant and later the Solemn League and Covenant throughout the kingdom. By 
using sureties and warding of clan gentry they would have been able to enforce the 
Covenant, and the same could be said if Charles had wanted to enforce the King's 
Covenant on a larger scale. Furthermore, the meetings would have allowed the 
Covenanters to commission chiefs for the Covenant cause, specifically in opposition 
to Alasdair MacColla and the Antrim threat. Instead of using the meetings to their 
advantage, allowing the meetings to end opened the door for chiefs to revert to local 
issues. Chiefs were no longer being held accountable for their behavior on a regular 
basis, were not being imposed on by the external forces from central government, 
and were no longer able to increase their status in the locality through a reciprocal 
relationship with the crown. This allowed local political issues to impose on a 
national theatre with the arrival of MacColla and the Irish Army. 
II 
An analysis of the Western Highlands and Isles post-1637 indicates that the 
inhabitants had reverted to their local mentality, preoccupying themselves with local 
issues almost completely indifferent to what was happening on a national level. The 
difference between local and national mentalities can be defined as a heightened 
concern and awareness of issues that would only have a direct effect on the clan's 
position within its community, rather than a concern for issues that would impact the 
kingdom as a whole; for example, disputes over territory would take precedence 
over a new Book of Common Prayer. There is little documentation of the Western 
Highlands and Isles' involvement in national politics between 1638 and 1644, as 
well as of their involvement in the royalist campaign of James Graham, Marquis of 
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Montrose, and Alasdair MacColla. The lack of documentation of the region further 
supports the fact that the clans and central government were uninterested in each 
other's agendas during the early stages of the Covenant Movement. What are 
available are references in the Acts of Parliament, Register of the Privy Council, and 
in the Stair Society's Selected Justiciary Cases, 1624-1650 of clan versus clan 
lawsuits indicating that the government under the Covenanters dealt with the region, 
and the clans, on a case by case basis in the form of judicial actions. These lawsuits, 
ranging from petty to large-scale issues, provide evidence that the chiefs went back 
to focusing on personal business and in some cases resumed feuding with one 
another. 
A case concerning local politics that was brought before central government 
was a complex suit that first appeared in the Acts of Parliament in 1641, filed by 
Angus MacLeod of Assynt against George MacKenzie, 2"d earl of Seaforth. This 
case is difficult to comprehend initially because the supplication by MacLeod of 
Assynt against Seaforth, 10 November 1641, asked for his August supplication to be 
dealt with, and claimed Seaforth had been cited and called numerous times to 
answer. 13 Further investigation in the minutes of the Acts of Parliament reveals a 
second supplication filed by MacLeod of Assynt on 16 November 1641 in which he 
resubmitted his August supplication craving repossession of his lands. 14 A second 
entry in the minutes is the government's response to the 16th of November 
supplication stating that Charles I and the Committee of Estates remitted the 
supplication to the Privy Council. 15 Fortunately, the details of the discharge to 
Seaforth from MacLeod of Assynt are recorded in the Register of the Privy Council 
on 22 December 1642. The discharge reveals that the original supplication claimed 
that "injuries" were done to MacLeod of Assynt and his tenants in Aluein and 
Leadmore by the earl of Seaforth claiming superiority over Assynt's territory. 16 
However, in the discharge Assynt retracted his previous claim on the grounds that he 
realized that Seaforth had been given authority in Aluein and Leadmore by 
13 APS, v, 698. 
14 APS, v, 425. 
15 APS, v, 713. 
16 Ledmore can be located at NC247121. Aluein is assumed to be somewhere in the proximity of 
Ledmore but can not be exactly located. The RPC has three variant spellings: in the marginal note as 
Alnein, in the text of the document as Aluein, and in the index as Alvein. 
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MacLeod of Assynt's father. The discharge states that "seeing that what was done 
by the Earl of Seafort in the apprising was for just and true duties and in a lawful 
way, as he is informed, and that the complaints were therefore unadvisedly given in 
by him", Assynt admitted he acted "unbecomingly and rashly". " Possession of clan 
territory was often difficult to prove and resulted in long periods of feuding between 
neighbors due to the scarcity of written charters. Whether or not Assynt dropped his 
claim against Seaforth because he found actual documents can only be speculated; it 
is quite possible that Assynt was intimidated by the powerful Earl of Seaforth to 
drop the lawsuit. The value of this case, in an overview of the central government's 
dealings with the clans, lies not in the reasons the case was brought forward and 
later dropped but in the fact that it was submitted. The suit between Assynt and 
Seaforth, with many other similar disputes, indicates that while the kingdom was 
concerned with the emergence of the Covenant Movement the clans were less 
involved in the national theatre and were concerned with local issues, such as land 
possession. 
Another dispute to be examined clearly shows that the clans of the Western 
Highlands and Isles did in fact revert to the bygone practice of feuding and violence 
when government intervention collapsed and chiefs were no longer held accountable 
for their clans' actions. On 27 August 1641 Lachlan Mackintosh of Torcastle filed a 
supplication against MacDonald of Glengarry claiming that certain Glengarry 
friends and kinsmen went to Kilravock in Moray in August 1640 and stole oxen and 
horses. The detailed supplication reports that the inhabitants of Kilravock followed 
and killed two of the thieves, and that the younger Glengarry and others were so 
enraged at the murder of their kinsmen that they went armed into Inverness the 15th 
August. Glengarry's men, who included three of the old Laird's sons and 80 to 100 
kinsmen, attacked Lachlan Mackintosh and nine to ten of his men in Inverness, 
firing 40 to 50 shots from their pistols, killing two of Mackintosh's men and 
wounding four to five others. ' 8 The Privy Council found that the Laird of Glengarry 
was too old to adequately address the situation and ruled that Angus, younger 
17 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 364. 
18 APS, v, 649. 
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Glengarry and grandson to the Laird, was to be held accountable. 19 As a result, the 
act of caution filed on 27 August 1641 cited that Glengarry, younger, requested to 
read the supplication presented by Mackintosh and agreed to return the following 
morning to answer the charges, to which the Laird of MacLeod acted as cautioner 
for Glengarry's return the following day. 20 On 6 October 1641 Mackintosh and the 
Millers, the family of the two killed by Glengarry's men, produced an act of horning 
on the grounds that Glengarry, younger, had yet to find caution and present the 
guilty kinsmen. 1 
Apparently, Glengarry, younger, still neglected to comply; his supplication 
filed on 1 March 1642 requested he be released from ward, claiming that he had 
been warded in Edinburgh Castle for thirteen weeks and could no longer provide the 
necessary maintenance for himself and his two keepers. Sir John MacKenzie of 
Tarbat agreed to stand caution for £10,000 guaranteeing that Glengarry, younger, 
would stay within the bounds of Edinburgh and appear before the Privy Council the 
first meeting day of June. It was further agreed that if Glengarry, younger, did not 
exhibit the guilty persons he would re-enter ward in Edinburgh Castle. 22 Upon being 
released from ward Glengarry set about providing "satisfaction" to Mackintosh as is 
evident in a series of notarial instruments recorded on 29 October, 11 December, 17 
December 1642, and 3 January 1643. Throughout the records Glengarry, younger, 
agreed to give satisfaction to Mackintosh, but there appears to have been a dispute 
over what was "reasonable satisfaction". According to the notarial instrument 
witnessed by Hugh, Lord Lovat, he attested to Glengarry giving reasonable 
satisfaction on 11 December 1642. Although the details of what was offered by 
Glengarry, younger, for "reasonable satisfaction" are not available it is clear that it 
was not deemed sufficient, because another supplication was filed by Mackintosh of 
Torcastle requesting to have Glengarry returned to ward for not exhibiting certain 
kinsmen on 3 January 1643. After months of negotiating with Mackintosh, 
Glengarry finally offered to give Mackintosh whatever satisfaction the Privy 
19 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 174. 
20 APS, v, 346. 
21 Although filed on the 6th of October, the homing was actually produced on 20 September 1641. 
Selected Justiciary Cases, 1624-1650 (Stair Society, 1972), ii, 461. 
22 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 213. 
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Council found reasonable. 23 As with the previous case, this suit indicates that the 
region was transgressing from their peaceful cooperative position within the Scottish 
kingdom toward the traditional practices of feuding essential to reestablishing the 
clans' position within the locality. 
The limited number of documents concerning the Western Highlands and 
Isles between 1637 and 1644 reflects the fact that the region had little concern for 
the emergence of the Covenant Movement. The sources that are available clearly 
indicate that a greater emphasis was put on issues close to home, such as land 
disputes and cattle rustling. As will later be discussed, the reassertion of local 
politics would facilitate the recruitment of the region for the royalist faction, 
primarily because of the negative impact that Clan Campbell had on the Western 
Highlands and Isles, as well as the existing alliances and rivalries between clans that 
resulted from their heightened sense of local politics. 
III 
While the Western Highlands and Isles were occupied with local issues and politics, 
the rest of Scotland was increasingly becoming involved in the national issues 
relating to the Covenant Movement. In order to impose national politics on even the 
most remote regions of the kingdom subscription to the National Covenant was 
ruled compulsory by the Committee of Estates. The decision made by the Estates 
was that all those holding or aspiring to hold offices, including all civil, military, and 
ecclesiastical posts, must subscribe the National Covenant. Furthermore, disaffected 
members of the landed class would be deemed delinquent and were liable to have 
their rents uplifted for use in the Covenant cause, and were also subject to 
ecclesiastical censure. 24 In order to facilitate such a widespread campaign the 
Committee of Estates held meetings at various locations throughout Scotland, during 
which the Covenant was read and those summoned to attend were expected to come 
forward and subscribe to the document. 
23 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 559-63. 
24 A. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart: 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996), 90. 
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Although the Western Highlands and Isles were far removed from anything 
pertaining to central government, they were not exempt from attending these local 
Covenanting meetings and subscribing. In a letter from the Committee of Estates, 
dated 26 May 1638, the attendance of Lord Reay, chief of Clan MacKay, was 
requested at a meeting in Inverness where the commissioners would meet with local 
barons and gentlemen, "Informing yow truelie how loyalie we haue proceidit from 
the beginning". This letter also makes evident the fact that the Committee of Estates 
was willing to use intimidation and threats to acquire the necessary signatures, to the 
National Covenant when they implied that Lord Reay's non-attendance would be 
viewed as a defiance of his feudal superior, the Earl of Sutherland. 25 Of those in 
attendance at the Inverness meeting, most Grants and Mackintoshes did not sign as 
their territory was "invyroned amidst the Hieland"; however, all others present 
agreed to sign including the Master of Berridale, heir to the Earl of Caithness, plus 
forty of his friends and vassals, the Earl of Sutherland, and the gentry of Sutherland, 
Donald MacKay, Lord Reay, and the chiefs of Clan Ross, Munro, and Fraser. 26 
Subscription to the National Covenant was essentially a signature gathering 
exercise. Those in attendance at the Inverness meeting were not pushed to act on 
behalf of the Covenant Movement. In actuality, Lord Reay and others who signed 
the document returned home and the Earl of Sutherland, whose power was used to 
intimidate Reay to subscribe, was not seen as being an active Covenanter through 
most of the "troubles". In essence the purpose of the Inverness meeting was to get 
the nobles, lairds and gentlemen to merely put pen to paper. Furthermore, the 
Committee of Estates' use of threats and innuendoes to gain subscription, such as 
the threat to Lord Reay, makes the usefulness of the signatures even more 
questionable because the subscribers' true intention is blurred through the possible 
intimidation used to acquire the subscription. Not surprisingly a number of people 
credited with signing the Covenant were actually neutral or even royalists, some 
signed but did not actively participate and others were credited with signing but in 
fact had not. The exaggerated list of names of those who subscribed included names 
25 NAS, Papers of Lord Reay, GD84/2/194. 
26 As quoted in D. Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-44: The Triumph of the Covenanters 
(Newton Abbot, 1973), 92. 
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such as Forbes, Fraser, Grant, Mackintosh, MacKenzie, MacKay, MacLean, 
MacDonald, Innes, and every man by the name of Campbell. 27 
On the surface it would appear that almost every subject in Charles I's 
northern kingdom was against his religious innovations, but more thorough 
investigation reveals the list of subscribers to be a padded list used for intimidation; 
it included men known to have already sworn allegiance to the king, such as the 
MacDonalds. The National Covenant was intended to be a bond through which all 
those who subscribed were opposed to Charles's innovation, therefore, the larger the 
list the larger the opposition would appear. The inaccuracies in the lists of 
subscribers suggest that the intention was to persuade Charles into complying with 
the demands of the Covenant regime because he was simply outnumbered. 
The Covenant regime's attempts to collect subscriptions for the Solemn 
League and Covenant in 1644 proved to be more complex than their original 
campaign to acquire signatures to the National Covenant. This difficulty serves as 
another reason why allowing the annual meetings to lapse was detrimental to central 
government. As has been seen, once the annual meetings lapsed central government 
began to lose control over a large portion of the Highlands and once control was lost 
and the Highlanders regained their autonomy it would prove nearly impossible to 
regain that control. Therefore, without any structured avenue to control the 
Highlands, the Covenant regime was left with having to make specific summonses 
and revert to direct threats to get the necessary signatures. An example of the tactics 
used by the Covenanters is seen in a summons dated 1 April 1644 to the Marquis of 
Huntly and several hundred others who, according to the document, had neglected to 
subscribe the Solemn League and Covenant. All those named in the summons were 
to appear on 4 June 1644 or be subjected to the penalties as a delinquent. 28 Although 
similar tactics were sometimes used in the campaign for the National Covenant, 
summonses and threats were more widespread during the campaign for the Solemn 
League and Covenant as the subscription meetings used previously for subscription 
were no longer effective. 
27 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 99. 
28 NAS, Montrose Papers, GD220/3/72. 
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Further difficulties were had in the Western Highlands and Isles as they were 
almost completely out of the government's grasp. By enforcing their autonomy from 
central government through their non-subscription the clans in the region made a 
passive statement on the issues concerning national politics. Furthermore, by 1644 
the region was less inclined to sign anything put forward by the Covenant regime 
because many clans in the region were beginning to align with the royalists. 
Between 1644 and 1645 the Western Highlands and Isles switched from passive to 
active participation in national politics due to the arrival of Alasdair MacColla and 
the preparations for war that were beginning amongst royalists throughout the 
Highlands, especially the Clan Donald in the west. As a result, numerous areas 
throughout the Western Highlands and Isles remained refractory either because they 
were directly involved in the upcoming royalist campaign or because of the 
repercussions they would face if they aligned themselves with the Covenant regime; 
for example, Badenoch in April 1644 was reputed to "absolutlie refuse obedience" 
while the whole of Skye and the Outer Hebrides in May 1650 were reported to still 
be negligent in their subscription. 29 
IV 
During the Scottish "troubles" the Committee of Estates established numerous 
committees and issued commissions to deal with the Highlands regionally. As with 
the lawsuits between clans that central government was forced to address, the 
issuance of committees and commissions was conducted on a case by case basis. 
What is significant in looking at the "Trot of Turriff' and the commissions issued 
against the Athollmen is the fact participants in both risings were harshly dealt with 
when they threatened the Covenant Movement; yet, similar commissions and 
committees were not aimed at the Western Highlands to thwart their involvement 
with the royalists. Comparisons can be drawn between the confrontational actions 
taken during the incident known as the "Trot of Turriff', which launched the Gordon 
Risings, and the actions taken by royalist clans in the west; as will be seen, central 
government's response to the two regions uprisings was drastically different. 
29 As quoted in Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 90. 
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Likewise, the Covenant Regime's response to the preparations being made in Atholl 
for a royalist rising in the Central Highlands was not paralleled in the west to 
preempt a royalist attack from the Clan Donald. 
One of the largest committees created by the Estates was the Committee for 
Disturbances of the North that dealt with the Gordon Risings in the northeast, 
primarily in Aberdeenshire and Banff. The Aberdeenshire royalists under the 
leadership of Lord Aboyne, second son of the Marquis of Huntly, were determined 
to prevent a Covenanting meeting from taking place in Turriff. Lord Aboyne had 
received intelligence that the Covenanters were to hold a meeting on 26 April 1639 
to determine their future conduct, but were forced to postpone the meeting until the 
20th of May. As a result, the royalists' forces marched to Turriff and reached the 
town at dawn on the 14th of May. The royalist arrival caught the Covenanters off 
guard and after a brief skirmish the Covenanters fled. Once Turriff was secured the 
royalists marched to Aberdeen under the leadership of Sir George Ogilvie of Banff 
and occupied the burgh on 15 May 1639. This started a series of occupations of 
Aberdeen between the royalists and Covenanters. From the 15th to the 23`' of May 
the royalists controlled the burgh, then the Covenanters re-took Aberdeen between 
the 23`d of May and 2nd of June, and finally the royalists occupied the city again on 6 
June 163 9.30 
The struggles to occupy Aberdeen and to control the rest of the north-east 
prompted the Committee for Disturbances of the North to be created on an "Order 
from his Majesty for suppression of hostilities in North" written on 29 June 1639. 
The order stated that if the north should return to hostilities then "we have heirby 
thought fett to require yow [the Committee of Estates] to give speddie order for the 
repressing thairof after such maner as yow sail find to be most necessarie at this 
time". 31 The Estates responded by electing a group of commissioners to follow what 
course they deemed appropriate for halting the troubles. The commissioners 
selected were those most susceptible to any injuries done by the "rebels"; those 
named included James, Earl of Moray, James, Earl of Findlater, Sir Robert Innes of 
that Ilk, James Grant of Freuchie, James Crichton of Frendraught, Alexander Dunbar 
30 W Fraser, The Chiefs of Grant, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1883), i, 246; Stevenson, The Scottish 
Revolution, 147-8. 
31 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 120. 
104 
of Westfield, Sheriff of Moray, Sir William Forbes of Craigievar, Robert Cumming 
of Altyre, and Thomas MacKenzie of Pluscarden. According to the Committee of 
Estates' "Approval of proceedings of the commission for dealing with the North" 
written on 1 December 1641 the commissioners held court at the Tolbooth of Elgin 
in February and March 1641 where delinquents were convicted and fined, and at the 
Kirk of Keith in May 1641 where offenders were processed and convicted but not 
fined. The Privy Council approved the two rolls of the courts presented by the 
commissioners and ordered letters of horning and the like to be written in 
accordance with the commission's decisions. Due to the success of the commission 
the Privy Council further ordered the commission to continue in their duties. 32 
However, it seems that the committee's success was limited as the Register 
of the Privy Council entry for 22 March 1642 notes "Sheriffs in North to attend 
meeting of Commission for repressing disorder in the North" in which letters were 
sent to all sheriffs in the north to meet the commissioners in Perth on the 6th of April 
to discuss the current situation in the region. 33 It proved a difficult task to employ 
highlanders to persecute their own as is evident in a "Charge to sheriffs of northern 
shires to put in execution the precepts of justice courts". On 14 April 1642, the 
Privy Council claimed that it had been informed that some sheriffs were neglecting 
the duties assigned to them in the aforementioned letters and were not executing the 
precepts handed down from the Commission for repressing disorder in the north. 
Therefore, a second series of letters was issued by the Council charging all sheriffs, 
baillies and stewarts to "caus duelie and orderlie executt the same". 34 Two years 
later a second appointment to the "Committee for the North" was issued on 16 April 
1644, this time directly in response to the open rebellion of the Marquis of Huntly 
and Gordon of Haddo. These appointments were similar to the original in that the 
Estates deemed a committee necessary for the securing of peace in the region and 
granted the commissioners the power to do everything possible to prevent and 
suppress the rebellion; again this commission included all those most vulnerable 
32 RPC, 2nd seies, vii, 159. 
33 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 228. 
34 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 237. 
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such as Lords Gordon, Forbes, and Fraser and the Lairds of Glenorchy, Forbes, 
Grant, and Innes. 35 
The establishment of the Committee for the Disturbances of the North clearly 
attempted to control the inhabitants of the northeast, but failed due to the strength of 
their royalist commitment. Although the northeast had not been involved in the 
annual meetings between the chiefs and the Privy Council, their autonomy proved 
too strong for the government to be able to control. The fact that the likes of the 
Marquis of Huntly and the Gordons in the northeast were allowed to conduct 
business with limited government interaction throughout the reigns of James VI and 
Charles I only served to increase their autonomy to such an extent that the power of 
the Marquis of Huntly over the region rivaled, if not surpassed, that of central 
government. The inclusion of the "Trot of Turriff' is important to a discussion of 
the Western Highlands and Isles because of the similarities between the actions of 
the Gordons in 1641 and events in the Western Highlands between 1644 and 1645. 
Although both the Gordons and the royalist clans in the west were clearly 
adversaries to the Covenant Movement it is noteworthy that measures similar to 
those imposed on the north were not taken by the Covenant regime in dealing with 
the rising of the western clans. This discrepancy in dealing with royalist factions 
illustrates central government's lack of interest in the Western Highlands and Isles 
and its belief that the region was not a primary concern for the success or failure of 
the regime. 
Similar to the Covenanters response to the northern rising, in response to 
growing support for Charles I in the central Highlands the Covenanters took a 
proactive position and issued a commission to the Earl of Argyll on 12 June 1640 
against all `Athollmen' and specifically named the royalist Earl of Atholl, Lord 
Ogilvie, their accomplices in Atholl and the Braes of Angus, the clan Farquharson 
and their accomplices in the Braes of Mar, and other royalists in Badenoch, 
Lochaber, and Rannoch. The commission claimed that those named proved to be 
"intestine enemies" to the country and the "true" religion and awaited an opportunity 
to attack the Covenant regime or join the invaders. The fears of a royalist rising in 
the Central Highlands were presumably based on intelligence gathered that forces 
35 APS, vi, i, 91. 
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were preparing to enter Scotland from Ireland and England and that the earl of 
Atholl and Lord Ogilvie were in communication with other leading royalists. 
Although there had been a long running feud between the Campbells and Ogilvies 
the situation was exacerbated by the fact that Ogilvie was royalist while the 
Campbells were Covenanters; thus the Covenanters were quick to employ the 
Campbells because of the hostile history between the two clans. 36 By the 
commission, the Earl of Argyll was ordered to pursue the royalists with fire and 
sword until they were subdued and "rooted out", or gave assurance for their future 
good conduct. Argyll was further given the power to raise men in the sheriffdom of 
Argyll, and authority to require assistance from other shires if necessary. 37 The 
ratification and exoneration in favor of Argyll, recorded in the Acts of Parliament on 
15 November 1641, reported that Argyll marched from 18 June to 2 August 1640, 
"Wherby the said erle of Athole and the men of athole and diverse other great clanes 
and otheres persones were brought to conformity". The ratification and exoneration 
further declared that Argyll faithfully executed his commission and granted 
immunity to all those involved in the commission from any lawsuits, excusing the 
behavior of all those with Argyll, who was specifically to "be frie liberat and 
exonered of all and whatsomevir actione cleame questione and persute criminall or 
civeill whilkis may be intentit moved or persued againes the said erle". 38 Not only 
does this commission illustrate the measures taken by central government to regain 
control over the central Highlands but it also highlights the role of the Earl of Argyll 
as a government agent for the Covenant Movement which was essential to his 
continued dominance through the entire Highlands. 
No committees or commissions were ever issued on a regional basis for the 
Western Highlands and Isles, even though it was feared that the Earl of Antrim, 
Ranald MacDonnell, was planning to use the region as an entry point and launching 
pad for the royalist army. During the royalist victories under Montrose and 
MacColla blanket committees or commissions, such as the ones against the Northern 
and Central Highlands, were not issued in an attempt to punish or prevent 
36 For details of the Campbell-Ogilvie feud see E. J. Cowan, "The Angus Campbells and the Origin of 
the Campbell-Ogilvie Feud", Scottish Studies, 25 (1981), 25-38. 
37 HMC, Report IV, MSS of Earl of Argyll 491-2; Cowan, "The Angus Campbells and the Origin of 
the Campbell-Ogilvie Feud", 25. 
38APS, v, 398-9. 
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inhabitants of the Western Highlands and Isles from joining the royalist forces; 
rather, they were specifically against Montrose, MacColla and their chief officers. 39 
This neglect of the region allowed the clans to operate independent from central 
government and without any hindrance to their actions allowed numerous clans to 
align themselves with the faction that would best serve their purpose, chiefly the 
royalists and the active opposition they took to the Clan Campbell. 
During the Covenant Movement the appointments to committees and 
commissions that were applicable to the Western Highlands and Isles were 
nationwide. However, these national appointments still resulted in a limited 
involvement in national politics. Similar to the attempts made to enforce regional 
appointments, such as the Committee for Disturbances of the North, appointment to 
national committees and commissions proved difficult to enforce in the Western 
Highlands and Isles. The importance of mustering and maintenance for the 
Covenant army, as well as various committees and commissions, are clear examples 
of central government's inclusion of the region, but also of the region's disregard for 
their commissions. 
Numerous orders were sent to the shires of Scotland in an attempt to 
organize opposition to the royalist forces, only a small number of which named the 
shires in the Western Highlands and Isles. An order issued on 1 December 1641 
specifically named Perth, Dumbarton, Inverness, Argyll, Bute and the Braes of 
Stirling to levy 3,000 men of whom 1,000 were to be Highlanders for service in 
Ireland. 40 Similarly a "List of number of men out of shires" was compiled on 1 
September 1643, requiring 2,000 foot and 120 horse out of the Earl of Seaforth's 
and Lord Lovat's division of Inverness, 1,600 foot and 120 horse, out of the Earl of 
Sutherland's part of Inverness and 1,200 foot to be levied out of the sheriffdoms of 
Argyll, Bute, and Dumbarton. 41 Following this levy order the Committee of Estates 
issued a "Proclamation to be in readiness" on 28 September 1643 dictating the dates 
and places for the aforementioned troops to muster; the Earl of Seaforth's and Lord 
Lovat's division of Inverness were ordered to meet at Chanonry of Ross on the 12`h 
39 The commissions against Montrose, MacColla, and their chief officers are discussed in the section 
V below. 
40 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 497. 
41 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/1/11v. 
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October, the Earl of Sutherland's division of Inverness and Caithness were to meet 
at Dornoch on the 17`h October, and the levies out of the sheriffdoms of Argyll, 
Bute, and Dumbarton were to meet at Inveraray on the 10`h October. 42 These orders 
illustrate that the government under the Covenanters had some success in levying 
troops in the early stages of the Covenant Movement; however, the shires involved 
in these orders were already under the superiority of Covenanters, such as Argyll, 
Seaforth and Sutherland, and prior to 1644 were not being encroached on by the 
Irish army and the emerging royalist faction. 
The Covenant regime's difficulty in levying troops from the Western 
Highlands and Isles is evident in several documents between 1643 and 1651, 
primarily as a result of the actions of Montrose and MacColla and subsequent 
devastation caused by the royalist victories. The "Act anent companies out of Bute 
and Dumbarton" on 11 December 1643 was necessary to warrant and command the 
Marquis of Argyll to use all diligence in bringing out the required two companies of 
foot from Dumbarton and Bute. 43 Furthermore, there appeared to be problems with 
raising troops within Argyll. A letter from the Committee of Affairs of the Army 
sent to the Committee of War for Argyll claimed that they had no account from the 
shire of what "diligence" was being used to raise the two regiments required to be 
levied from Argyll. The letter requested an account of the shire's progress to be 
submitted no later than the 15th of April, as most shires were nearly ready to 
proceed. 44 Levying troops out of Argyllshire continued to be troublesome as is 
indicated in a letter to the Marquis of Argyll on 29 April 1651. The letter gave 
orders to Argyll to bring up forces raised in the northern shires and reported that 
neighboring troops were reluctant to enter service due to the fact that men from 
Argyll's lands in Lochaber had not come out and that the neighboring Highlanders 
would not leave their homes until the Lochabermen did for fear of raids. Because 
the Lochabermen had already made incursions into neighboring areas, the 
Committee requested an account from the Marquis of Argyll as to what diligence 
was being used in raising the levies in Argyllshire. 45 Clearly, these orders were 
42 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PAI 1/1/25v. 
43 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PAl 1/1/93v. 
44 D. Stevenson (ed. ), The Government of Scotland under the Covenanters (SHS, 1982), 117. 
45 Stevenson, (ed. ), The Government of Scotland, 140. 
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difficult to enforce, even for Argyllshire, which due to the Marquis of Argyll had the 
strongest Covenanting ties in the Western Highlands and Isles. The complications 
involved in levying troops in Lochaber was simply due to the fact that a majority of 
"Lochabermen" were under the superiority of royalist chiefs, such as MacDonald of 
Keppoch, and would obviously be reluctant to join the opposition. Another possible 
explanation for this refractory behavior is the fact that Argyllshire was one of the 
areas worst affected by the royalist ravagings of 1644 and 1645 that resulted in a 
great deal of territorial devastation and financial hardship, thus making it difficult 
for the shire to afford to levy the necessary troops. 
Most documents pertaining to mustering troops in response to the imminent 
arrival of the Irish were not addressed to the shires of the Western Highlands and 
Isles even though the region was seen to be the point of entry and would have been 
the Covenanters' first line of defense. Instructions to the shires to levy troops sent 
on 24 November 1643 in response to the threat of an invasion from Ireland were not 
sent to any of the shires in the Western Highlands and Isles although the instructions 
pointed to the region as the prime target of the Irish invasion. 46 As the royalist 
military campaign under Montrose and MacColla gained momentum a series of 
orders and proclamations was issued. Although the "Proclamation for raising the 
country against rebels" issued on 2 September 1644 claimed to be raising the 
"country" it was clearly meant to raise the Lowlands. The proclamation stated that 
the Committee of Estates had received word that Montrose and MacColla were 
within fourteen miles of Stirling and were intending to "surprise" the town; therefore 
it was found necessary to command all those between sixteen and sixty to march 
towards Stirling within twenty days of the proclamation. The Committee ordered the 
proclamation to be sent to the following lowland sheriffdoms: Edinburgh, 
Haddington, Linlithgow, Teviotdale, Peebles, Lanark, Ayr, Renfrew, with the 
inclusion of only Dunbarton from the Western Highlands. 47 Furthermore, an order to 
the shires sent on 23 September 1644 required all shires to be put in a position of 
arms as the Committee had received word that the "rebels" were moving southward 
and it was found "needful" that the entire country begin exercising and training; 
46 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/1/68r. 
47 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/3/40v-41r. 
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again, the order was not sent to the Western Highlands and Isles. 48 The fact that the 
levying of troops during the most needed time was not accomplished indicates that, 
in regards to the mustering of "Lochabermen", the autonomy of the Clan Donald 
was stronger than the influence of central government and that the exclusion of the 
shires from the region in the 1644 proclamations shows government's continued 
belief in the irrelevance of the Western Highlands and Isles. 
Similar to levying troops, the lifting of a maintenance proved to be a nearly 
impossible task within the Western Highlands and Isles. Only a limited amount of 
financial support was raised in the region between 1644 and 1651. Explanation for 
this is the financial hardships created by the royalist victories combined with the 
reluctance of many to act against their royalist chiefs. According to "Ane list of 
bonds given be the committee of Estatis to those persons who lent money for 
supplee of the armies in England and Ireland" no bonds were issued to men from the 
Western Highlands and Isles with the exception of Argyll in March 1644.49 
In an attempt to counter the royalist victories between 1644 and 1645 the 
Committee of Estates issued an "Act anent Maintenance of the Army" on 27 
February 1645. The act ordered every burgh and shire to "entertain" a proportion of 
forces between 1 March and 31 August 1645 in response to the invasion of Irish 
rebels. The act included a roll of the necessary forces and monthly maintenance 
dictating what each burgh and shire was to raise. Out of the 30 shires covering both 
the Lowlands and the Highlands, the nine shires representing the north were to 
provide the following: for the shires of Inverness, 464 men and £945, Caithness, 105 
men and £945, Cromarty, 11 men and £99, Sutherland, 47 men and £423, Nairn, 35 
men and £315, Elgin, 210 men and £1,890, Dunbarton, 137 men and £1,233, Argyll, 
323 men and £2,907, Bute 51 men and £d59, and the burgh of Inverness 40 men and 
£360.50 However, a review of the "Accompt of Sir Adam Hepburn" who was 
treasurer for the Covenanting army reveals that the act was not adhered to by many 
shires, especially those of the Western Highlands and Isles. The "Account of money 
restand by the shires", 1 August 1646, lists monies owed by the shires and burghs 
for 
the period of 1 March 1645 to 1 August 1646 in accordance with the act 
issued by 
48 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/3/58r-58v. 
49NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/1/251r-259r. 
50 APS, vi, i, 170. 
the Estates. Calculating the sum owed by each shire for the seventeen months which 
Hepburn was concerned with it appears that a number of shires in the Lowlands 
made at least partial payments on their maintenance bills. For example, the total 
owed by the shire and burgh of Ayr totaled £109,395 and their outstanding debt 
according to Hepburn's calculation was £73,470 13s. 4d.; therefore, between March 
1645 and August 1646 Ayr made payments totaling close to £36,000. However, 
according to the sums entered by Sir Adam Hepburn none of the nine shires 
representing the north had made any payments toward their maintenance debt: 
Inverness owed £78,948, Sutherland owed £7,191, Cromarty owed £1,683, 
Caithness owed £16,065, Argyll owed £49,419, Bute owed £8,568, Nairn owed 
£5,967, and Elgin owed £36,108.51 
Similar problems arose in the attempts to collect victuals to support the 
army. As a result, a commission to buy victuals was issued to Alexander Bower of 
Dundee and William Marshall, writer, on 4 April 1651. As the king and committee 
understood that Alexander Bower of Dundee was employed in raising "the forty 
days' loan" Bower, with the addition of William Marshall, was granted all powers 
necessary to uplift the loans along with eight months' maintenance from the shires 
of Elgin, Nairn, Inverness, Caithness, Cromarty, and Sutherland. 52 This push for 
raising victuals and supplies was expanded into the Central and Western Highlands 
in letters addressed to "the shires north of the Forth" on 5 April 1651 as it was 
decided by "king and committee" that, having surveyed the provisions, they were 
found insufficient. Therefore, the "committee" was forced to utilize personal estates 
and fortunes for supply of victuals, and gave the shires the option to supply victuals 
or maintenance and forces. The shires were then ordered to report the number of 
forces and how much money or victuals they would be sending. The shires of Fife, 
Perth and Angus were given until the 15th of April to report, while the shires of 
Kincardine, Aberdeen, Clackmannan and Argyllshire were to report by the 22nd of 
April. 53 As with the problems faced in levying troops in the Western Highlands and 
Isles, the independence of many of the royalist chiefs combined with the financial 
51 C. S. Terry (ed. ), Papers Relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant, 1643-1647,2 
vols. (SHS, 1917), ii, 412. No sum was provided for Dunbarton. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Terry, (ed. ), Papers Relating to the Army, ii, 116. 
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ramifications of the royalists' victories were key factors in the noncompliance with 
the commissions and the region continued to function independent from central 
government. 
One interesting commission issued by the Covenant regime that did not 
pertain to the army but was likewise difficult to enforce was the Justiciary 
Commission. The "Appointment of Justiciary Commission for suppression of crime 
in Highlands" created on 3 December 1641 stated that the King and parliament 
thought expedient to establish circuit courts to handle malefactors and delinquents, 
especially within the Highlands. The Privy Council concurred with the decision to 
establish the circuit courts and appointed deputes in ten sheriffdoms including 
Dunbarton, Stirling, Perth, Forfar, Aberdeen, Banff, Elgin, and Inverness. The 
appointments were a mix of royalists and covenanters including the Earl of Atholl, 
the Marquis of Huntly and George, Lord Gordon. 54 As the commission was 
intended to deal with the crimes in the Highlands it is interesting that the Covenant 
regime chose to appoint the Earl of Atholl and members of the Clan Gordon because 
they were responsible for the risings in the Central Highlands and the northeast. 
The poor choice of commissioners made by the Privy Council was soon evident as 
the Estates was forced to send demands to various commissioners to perform their 
duties as Justiciary Commissioners. A "Charge to Commissioners of Justiciary in 
the Highlands to attend justice court" was issued 23 February 1643, after the Estates 
was informed that services had been neglected through non-attendance of the 
commissioners. A list of thirty commissioners was compiled and all were ordered to 
attend the justice court on the 11th of April. The delinquent commissioners were 
instructed to concur and assist the rest of the commissioners and were not to leave 
court until all the commissioners consented to the conclusion of business. Due to the 
risings in the Central Highlands and northeast it should come as no surprise that 
among those listed as absent commissioners were the Marquis of Huntly, Lord 
Gordon, Robert Farquharson of Invercauld, and the Earl of Seaforth, who by 1643 
had already begun to waver in his support for the Covenant. 55 
54 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 165. 
55 RPC, 2nd series, vii, 398. 
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V 
Central government's direct involvement with the Western Highlands and Isles 
during the Covenant Movement was an isolated response to the territorial 
devastation committed by the royalist forces. The majority of sources available 
illustrate the Covenant regime's focus on assistance to the shires devastated by 
Montrose and MacColla's army and consequential proclamations and acts against 
the "chief actors" of the rebellion. However, the focus on punishing those involved 
in the royalist risings appears to have been secondary to the Covenanters' schemes 
for assistance because after Montrose and MacColla departed, for Holland and 
Ireland respectively, a number of royalists laid down their weapons and returned 
home. 
The areas that suffered the most territorial devastation, thus requiring the 
greatest amount of aid, were Argyll and Highland Perthshire. MacColla and his 
Irish forces targeted these areas because of the dominance of the Campbells there. 
As a result they spoiled every township in Argyll and were able to persuade 
Montrose to quarter royalist troops in Perthshire for the winter of 1644. In 
November 1644 the Covenanting Parliament confirmed that the royalists had 
devastated eighteen parishes in Argyll and Breadalbane alone. 56 In response to the 
royalists' destruction, the Covenanter's assistance and relief scheme was established 
primarily to aid Argyllshire, but included all those "harried" by the rebels. 
One aspect of assistance provided by central government is seen in the 
"Proclamation anent persons herryed be the enemies" on 13 December 1644. The 
proclamation stated that the Committee of Estates had taken it into their 
consideration how many people had been pursued by "unnaturall countriemen and 
yrish rebells" of whom many had their homes burnt, lands wasted, and crops 
destroyed. The devastation was so severe that the Committee of Estates declared 
that every gentleman who had been attacked by rebels and was willing to take 
service would have employment in the army according to their "conditions and 
abilities". 57 Added to this guarantee of employment were numerous allowances and 
56 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 104. 
57 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/3/133r-133v. 
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funds granted to various Covenanters and districts. For example, the Covenanting 
leadership ordered the commissary to pay Lord Frendraught £400 Sterling on 30 
October 1645 with the understanding that his "great suffering" by the rebels would 
prevent him from continuing his "faithful service". 58 Similar allowances were made 
to Campbell of Glenorchy and the chief of Clan Menzies when Glenorchy was 
advanced £10,000 Sterling and promised a further £5,000 Sterling in reparations two 
months later, and both Glenorchy and Menzies were exempt from the required troop 
levy for the Army of the Engagement. Finally, the Covenanters' assistance and relief 
scheme established a limited fund for Breadalbane to aid widows and orphans in 
January 1647. s9 
Relief for Argyllshire was more immediate due to the Marquis of Argyll's 
political dominance within the Covenant regime. Through Argyll's persistence the 
government dispatched substantial quantities of malt and meal to Argyllshire at the 
outset of 1646 to the value of £18,500.60 According to the accounts of Sir Adam 
Hepburn, 2,500 bolls of meal bought for the provision of forces in Ireland were 
instead to be employed for the relief of Skipness, Campbell of Ardkinglass's 
regiment, and for supply of the ministers of Argyll, totaling £20,833 6s 8d. 61 
Subsequent accounts on 11 August 1646 record a "discharge to distressed ministers 
of Argyll", namely Mr. Evan Cameron and Mr. Dougall Duroch, for their "relief and 
subsistence" totaling £2,000, and an order for the "transportation of meal to the 
distressed people of Argyll" of 40 chalders of meal to be imported from Mr. Rodger 
Mowatt. 62 By the outset of 1647, the Marquis of Argyll was also able to get all 
public dues payable out of Argyllshire suspended and to get reparations granted, 
£15,000 Sterling to Argyll himself and a total of £20,000 Sterling to be divided 
among the other landowners in Argyllshire. 63 
In analyzing the schemes employed by the Covenanters to assist those 
affected by the royalist victories it is clear that aid was given not for humanitarian 
reasons but in order to maintain the strength of the Covenant Movement. The offer 
58 Stevenson, (ed. ), The Government of Scotland, 21. 
59 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 105. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Terry, (ed. ), Papers Relating to the Army, ii, 403. 
62 Terry, (ed. ), Papers Relating to the Army, ii, 395. 
63 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 105. 
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of employment for those "harried" was clearly intended not only to assist the 
sufferers but to enlarge the Covenanting army. Similarly, in looking at the monetary 
aid given to Lord Frendraught, the Committee of Estates specifically stated that the 
aid was provided to allow him to continue his service for the cause. Even though 
showing charity as a religious group may have been enough to persuade some to 
align with the Covenanters, no assistance was provided to those who suffered 
devastations at the hands of the Covenanters, regardless of whether they were 
royalists or neutral. 
Documents that survive from the period of the royalist victories show that 
the Covenant regime's reaction was still not directed at the region responsible, 
namely the Western Highlands and Isles. Rather, the punishments issued by central 
government were concerned more with those seen as traitors or Irish officers than 
with the common man who went in arms under his superior. The harshest actions 
taken by the Covenant regime were seen in a series of proclamations and acts 
between 1644 and 1646. On 12 September 1644 a proclamation was issued against 
Montrose for his insurrections. The proclamation stated that Montrose had cast off 
all fear of God, respect and loyalty to his native kingdom, pressed new oaths 
contrary to the Covenants, and threatened all those who refused to comply with 
immediate death. It was ordered by the Committee of Estates that no subject was to 
reset, supply or "intercommune" with Montrose. The proclamation ended with a 
£20,000 bounty and pardon for all bygone actions during the rebellion to anyone 
who apprehended Montrose and presented him before The Committee of Estates, 
dead or alive. 64 A similar proclamation to the one against Montrose was issued 
against Alasdair MacColla only this proclamation was more concerned with the 
amount of violence and bloodshed done by MacColla and the Irish than any 
transgressions of loyalty and religion. Therefore on 17 September 1644 a £20,000 
bounty was placed on MacColla's head along with the promise of a pardon to the 
person who brought him before the Committee. 
65 Clearly, the promise of a pardon 
was intended to entice Montrose and MacColla's own men to turn them in; however 
6' NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/3/46r-46v. 
65 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/3/50v-51r. 
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their plan failed since MacColla was able to escape to Ireland and Montrose was not 
apprehended until 1650, not by one of his own but by Donald MacLeod of Assynt. 66 
The fact that the Covenant regime was primarily interested in prosecuting 
the ringleaders of the royalist faction is magnified in their dealings with the Irish 
officers of MacColla's army. A warrant to Edinburgh Castle to hang Irish officers 
was issued on 16 October 1645, which ordered the constable of Edinburgh Castle to 
transport Colonel Manus Roe O'Cahan and Major Thomas Laghton to Castlehill and 
hang them on the 20th of October. 67 The actions taken by the Covenanters against 
the royalists can be seen as justifiable in light of the excessive devastation caused by 
MacColla's forces, but what is most interesting is the position they took when 
dealing with those who were not classified as inciters of the rebellion. 
In looking at the Committee of Estates' dealings with the men of Atholl 
and other accomplices to the royalist forces the actions are of a more subtle nature. 
In the Committee of Estates instructions to the Earl of Tullibardine and Lord 
Burleigh on 28 September 1644, it was stated that a large group of men from Atholl 
had offered to leave the rebel army and return home. As a result, Tullibardine and 
Lord Burleigh were to offer full pardons to the rebels in Atholl if they agreed to 
provide intelligence of the royalists' campaign, with the exception of those who 
were deemed to be officers and "chief actors". Interestingly, the instructions 
specified that if the rebels would not cooperate because of the omission of the 
officers in the pardon then Tullibardine was authorized to divide the "chief actors" 
and give some of them pardons, and if that was still not sufficient he was authorized 
to give pardons to all ranks. 68 As these instructions were sent during the height of 
the royalist campaign it is clear that the Committee of Estates was willing to do 
whatever was necessary to hinder the royalists even if that meant issuing pardons to 
"chief actors"; Tullibardine and Burleigh were essentially ordered to do whatever it 
took to get the Athollmen to lay down their weapons and go home. 
Another interesting document among the Supplementary Parliament Papers 
is a draft of a transportation order estimated to be written sometime between July 
66 E. Furgol, "The Northern Highland Covenanter Clans, 1639-1651", Northern Scotland, vol. 7 
(Aberdeen, 1987), 199-23 1, at p. 122. 
67 Stevenson, (ed. ), The Government of Scotland, 5. 
68 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/3/63v. 
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and September 1646. Although it is merely a draft there is a clear change in the tone 
in which it is written when contrasted with the markedly hostile tone of the bounties 
issued on Montrose and MacColla and the warrant to execute the Irish officers. The 
draft states that James Graham, Marquis of Montrose, Lord Lodovick, Lord Lindsay, 
Alisdair MacColla, and General Major Weir are exempt from all pardons except for 
the benefit of safe transportation, never to return without warrant from parliament. 
The draft also promises to give full assurance of their lives and fortunes to all landed 
men who were currently or had been involved in the rebellion, on the condition that 
they lay down their arms immediately and return home. 69 This document appears to 
expose the Covenant regime's desperation to end the "troubles"; they had no 
intention to prosecute those involved in the rebellion as long as they were peaceful 
again and were willing to give safe transportation to the ringleaders of the royalist 
army. 
After the defeat of the royalist forces at Philiphaugh in 1645 and the 
subsequent massacre of most Irish officers, the Covenant government became 
increasingly concerned with those seen as traitors. In 1646, the Committee on 
Public Affairs imposed enormous fines on many royalists, targeting anyone who had 
shifted their allegiance to the royalists during the campaign of Montrose. As a result 
sixteen Mackenzies were ordered to "lend" a total of £28,666 13s 4d. to the 
Covenanting government. These loans were actually just a nice way to say fines, 
and the breakdown of these fines show that the Committee went easier on others 
than on Mackenzies because of their perceived treacherous shifts in allegiance. 70 
Further evidence that the Covenant regime was concerned with those who 
surprised the leadership and aligned with the opposition is seen in their response to 
those who took part in the Engagement. The "Act against officers involved in the 
late rebellion and Engagement" issued by the Committee of Dispatches on 29 
January 1649 was aimed at Covenanting officers in the various garrisons throughout 
Scotland who aided or joined the "rebels". The Committee of Dispatches ruled that 
officers who took part in either the royalist "rebellion" or the Engagement were no 
69 NAS, PA7/4/1 1. 
70 A. Mackenzie, History of the Clan MacKenzie with Genealogies of the Principal Families 
(Inverness, 1879), 192. However, these fines were deemed unobtainable in Easter and Wester Ross; 
Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 91. 
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longer permitted to stay or reside in any garrison. They were to remove themselves 
from the garrisons within forty-eight hours and failure to do so would result in 
imprisonment "until further course be taken against them by parliament or the 
committee". 71 
The Committee of Estates' attacks on their own officers are understandable 
in light of the difficulty of winning a war when you do not know who the enemies 
are. It was obvious to all involved in the Scottish "troubles" that a large number of 
Highlanders, such as the MacDonalds and Gordons, were royalists, but the regime 
was caught off guard when men in their own ranks joined the opposition. As seen in 
the "loans" required from the Mackenzies and the Act against the officers within the 
Covenant garrisons, those who could no longer be trusted had to be removed from 
positions of power and severely punished in order to maintain the integrity of the 
Covenant Movement. 
Central government's understanding that participation in the rebellions 
varied and was the result of multiple influences is seen in the 1646 Act of Classes. 
This established guidelines for punishments handed down to those found delinquent 
but who were not to be executed. The delinquents were put into three classifications 
depending on the level of their involvement; however, this did not include most 
officers cr ringleaders as they were either massacred or executed immediately after 
Philiphaugh, so it was only applicable to the lesser players in the rebellion. The first 
classification consisted of those who were at Philiphaugh or received commissions 
from rebels, thus was aimed at the junior officers and constituted the highest offense. 
The Act of Classes ordered those in this classification to be fined four to six years' 
rent and discharged from all offices. The second class comprised those who raised 
"Horse or Foot", those who furnished the rebels with arms, and anyone who stayed 
with the rebels for twenty-four hours or longer. This group of delinquents was fined 
two to four years' rent and suspended from all offices. In the Covenanters' dealings 
with those deemed to be in the third classification government's leniency came into 
play. Those who "intercomouned" with Montrose and MacColla, exchanged 
intelligence, or provided money to the royalists would be in the lowest grouping of 
delinquents. The act recommended the third classification to be fined one-half to 
71 Stevenson, (ed. ), The Government of Scotland, 86. 
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two years' rent. However, it was left to the judges to decide on the punishment 
based on whether or not those brought forward as delinquents acted against the 
Covenant merely for their own protection and not out of disloyalty to the cause. 
Therefore, the opportunity existed to avoid being fined and being suspended from 
office if it could be proven that their actions were out of self-preservation. 
Aside from the fact that this act showed leniency to some delinquents the 
locations chosen for the proclamation to be read also reveals that the Estates were 
not concerned with those from the Western Highlands and Isles. The act was only 
read in Edinburgh, Perth, Dundee, Aberdeen, Stirling, St. Andrews, and Glasgow. 72 
As the Covenant regime was strongest in the southern burghs, the choice of these 
locations emphasizes the Estates' concern with those seen as traitors to the cause or 
anyone close enough to the center of government who could pose a threat to the 
regime, both conditions implying that the Western Highlands and Isles in general 
were exempt. 
VI 
A key element to the success of the royalist victories between 1644 and 1645 was 
the fact that the Covenanting government relied solely on the Clan Campbell 
network, and failed to exploit the tensions and rivalries within local politics to its 
own advantage, whereas Montrose realized the value of local politics when 
harnessed for a national cause. Although the Covenanters were afraid of an invasion 
of Irish forces sent by the Earl of Antrim they made no attempt to recruit his 
possible accomplices, nor did they make any strong attempts to prevent the 
Highlanders on the seaboard from joining. Instead, defense of the western seaboard 
remained solely reliant on the Clan Campbell network. Montrose and MacColla 
were the first to employ the region using the existing clan networks that formed the 
foundation for their local politics. By utilizing the region's hostilities amongst 
clans, and particularly the numerous clans' animosity towards the Marquis of Argyll, 
Montrose and MacColla were able to employ the clans almost as mercenaries, 
72 APS, vi, I, 203-4. 
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partaking in the "troubles" for their own benefit and with the intention to destroy the 
Clan Campbell. 
A critical mistake made by the Covenant regime was their neglect in 
enlisting those who subscribed to the National Covenant to actively support the 
cause. Had the Covenanters attempted to entice the clans with land and booty seized 
from royalists, similar to the tactics used by Montrose and MacColla, it is quite 
possible that the lines of allegiance would have been drawn differently. Instead of 
building on the support implied in the subscription to the Covenant cause, the 
Committee of Estates attempted to counter opposition to the Covenant by 
establishing committees and commissions to deal with the Highlands on a regional, 
case by case basis; however, there were no committees or commissions directed 
specifically at the Western Highlands and Isles to prevent a rebellion or to thwart 
royalist recruitment in the region. The question remains then, why did the 
government under the Covenanters neglect to involve the Western Highlands and 
Isles? 
One of the prime reasons was the Covenant regime's reliance on the Marquis 
of Argyll and the Clan Campbell network. After the fall of the Lordship of the Isles 
in 1493, royal authority over the region was entrusted to the Gordons, Mackenzies, 
and Campbells. According to Dr. Jane Dawson, "After 1493 royal authority was 
exercised in the Isles but only at one remove through the use of proxies from among 
the Highland clans. The Campbells, the Gordons, and the Mackenzies were 
entrusted with the task of enforcing the crown's will throughout the Highlands and 
Islands. These clans were all based on the mainland and used their position as royal 
agents to extend their own influence out over the Isles as well as that of their 
sovereign". 73 By the outbreak of the Bishops' Wars, the Clan Campbell had 
extended their power over the region to such an extent that the Marquis of Argyll's 
authority and high ranking within the Covenant regime placed him in a position that 
allowed him to act almost as a second monarch. Therefore, when the Western 
Highlands and Isles needed to be dealt with the Covenant regime left the task in the 
hands of "Prince Argyll" as is seen in his defense of the western seaboard, begun in 
73J. Dawson, "The Origins of the `Road to the Isles': Trade, Communications and Campbell Power in 
Early Modern Scotland", R. Mason & N. Macdougall (eds. ), People and Power in Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1992), 96. 
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1639, and in a letter to the Earl of Seaforth stating that the Estates had referred his 
request to stay in the north to Argyll as lieutenant of the region. 74 
A second reason for central government's neglect of the Western Highlands 
and Isles during the "troubles" was the fact that the region was too far removed from 
the hotbed of the conflict. The Covenant issues were seen to primarily involve the 
south-west, Lothian, and Fife and had nothing to do with subjects beyond the 
Highland Line. Although the Covenant regime did attempt to gain the region's 
subscription to the National Covenant and later Solemn League and Covenant, few 
of those who subscribed were employed in the Covenanters' service. The bulk of 
involvement from those who subscribed was through appointments to Committees 
of War for their shire. Even though the fighting men from the Western Highlands 
and Isles were known throughout Europe for their exceptional military competence 
during the Thirty Years' War, only a handful were actually given commissions and 
employed as officers in the Covenanting army. Again, this can be attributed to the 
fact that the region was seen to have little vested interest in the issues revolving 
around the Covenant Movement. 
This decline of government interaction and resulting neglect of the Western 
Highlands and Isles can be traced back to the beginning of Charles I's reign. By no 
longer forcing the chiefs to appear before the Privy Council and to be held 
accountable for their behavior, central government allowed the region to revert to a 
local rather than national mentality, thus making it difficult to enforce national 
committees and commissions. The increase in autonomy that resulted from central 
government's neglect of the region allowed the clans to once again function 
independent from central government and forced the clans to look for other avenues 
by which to maintain or increase their political status in the region. Therefore, once 
the Western Highlands and Isles slipped out of central government's grasp the stage 
was set for alliances and rivalries to take priority in the patterns of allegiances and 
the region's involvement in the Covenant Movement. 
74 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA11/3/24v-25v. 
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Chapter 5 
Religion from Reformation to War 
We have also had to encounter many perils, besides those I have 
related, in the Highlands, where there are more zealous and constant 
Catholics to be found in the space of three miles than in some entire 
provinces of the kingdom. ' 
Annual letter to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, 
1632 
As the cause of the Covenant Movement was purported to be open 
opposition to the alterations to the Church of Scotland an assessment of the religious 
situation in the Western Highlands and Isles is clearly relevant. When attempting to 
understand the allegiances of the clans a primary question is whether or not religion 
played a role in the loyalties of the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles. In 
order to answer this question the strength and influence which the Church of 
Scotland and the Catholic Irish Franciscan missionaries wielded over the inhabitants 
must be determined. Therefore, this chapter will examine religion on the local level 
and looks at the state of both religious organizations from the point of view of the 
inhabitants rather than from Edinburgh or Dublin. Taking this perspective of 
religion raises secondary questions such as whether or not there was a satisfactory 
clergy and regular religious services provided by either the Protestants or Catholics. 
By gleaning information from the records of the Church of Scotland and the Synod 
of Argyll an understanding of the issues associated with the spread and preservation 
of the Protestant religion, and subsequent Covenant Movement, in the Western 
Highlands and Isles can emerge. Likewise, critical analysis of the reports of the 
Irish Franciscan missionaries and the Church of Scotland's reaction to them helps 
provide some indications as to the size, strengths and weaknesses of the Catholic 
presence in the region. 
The reformed Church of Scotland faced numerous hurdles in its attempt to 
spread Protestantism through the Western Highlands and Isles. The Western 
1 W. Forbes Leith (ed. ), Memoirs of Scottish Catholics during the 176 and 18'h Centuries (London, 
1909), 147. 
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Highland and Isles' parishes, in general, lacked ministers for more than half a 
century after the Reformation; the first appointment to a Hebridean parish was not 
until 1609. One of the contributing factors to the lack of ministers was the language 
barrier which resulted from the local inhabitants being native Gaelic speakers and 
the majority of the reformed clergy being either English or Scots speaking. Another 
hindrance to the Kirk's effort to establish a strong Protestant foundation in the 
region was the hostile geography and its effect on providing ministers and 
maintaining a regular attendance at church services. The shortage of ministers and 
the inaccessibility of the Western Highlands and Isles allowed Catholicism to linger 
and created an opportunity for pilgrimages to Ireland, amongst the Islanders, to 
maintain their connection with Catholicism. A 1615 report on the religious state of 
the island of Islay claimed "that the religioun that the cuntrie pepill has heir amongst 
them is Popishe". 2 With a few exceptions, ecclesiastical affiliation was determined 
by intermittent missionary activities by both Catholics and Protestants. 
The Reformation in the Highlands faced numerous challenges as the impact 
of the first generation of reformed ministry began to lessen. The early Highland 
ministers lacked the main instruments of evangelism: there was no vernacular 
catechism prior to 1653, no vernacular psalm book until 1659, and no regular kirk 
sessions until well into the seventeenth century. According to one view of the 
Reformation, "The result was that in many respects the progress of the Reformed 
Church after 1560 depended on a series of local reformations, each moving at its 
own pace and with its own distinctive problems to surmount. "3 This was clearly the 
situation throughout the Highlands as there were complaints as late as the 1690s that 
there were more Catholic priests than Protestant ministers in the region. 4 
Preliminary remarks to a report from the Irish Franciscan missionaries to 
their superiors highlighted the problems faced in spreading religion through the 
Western Highlands and Isles, problems which were applicable to both the spread of 
Catholicism and the Reformed Kirk. According to the report which was meet with 
some skepticism there was a vast potential harvest but few priests to attend to it, the 
2 As quoted in I. B. Cowan, Regional Aspects of the Scottish Reformation (London, 1978), 34. 
3 M. Lynch, "Calvinism in Scotland, 1559-1638", in M. Prestwich (ed. ), International Calvinism 
1541-1715 (Oxford, 1985), 229. 
4 M. Lynch, Scotland: A New History (London, 1997), 363. 
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territory was a difficult place to live in, and the inhabitants had a greater taste for 
military exploits. Two chief complaints from the missionaries explain the primary 
difficulties in establishing any form of religion in the region: inaccessibility and a 
language barrier. The issue of inaccessibility was claimed to be the reason why 
many inhabitants were uneducated and why the region had been overlooked by the 
Catholic Church for at least the past 60 years. Hopes for a successful mission were 
founded on the language barrier between the Gaelic-speaking Western Highlands 
and the rest of Scotland. As the report stated, "there is nobody near them who 
knows their Gaelic tongue". 5 Therefore, the Gaelic-speaking Irish Franciscans 
hoped to be able to penetrate the region and counteract the influence of the Scots or 
English speaking Protestant ministers 
Information regarding religion in the Highlands, especially the Western 
Highlands and Isles, is mostly derived from the upper stratum of Highland society. 
The religious practices of the common people are relatively unknown; therefore, in 
many cases information needs to be deduced from the data provided by the elite 
class. 6 There is little doubt that religious customs varied from place to place and 
time to time due to the diversity of the obstacles within particular regions, for 
example, the inaccessibility of many parts of the Highlands. Due to the remoteness 
of Lewis there is no evidence or indication before 1610 that the inhabitants had had 
the benefit of spiritual guidance. According to the account of Colin MacKenzie of 
Kintail's visit to the island of Lewis in 1610, he was accompanied by Monsignor 
Fearchar. While Colin was attempting to gain secular authority over the island it 
was reported that Fearchar married people who had been cohabiting for years, 
baptized people fifty years old, and had to baptize the locals at random by using a 
sprig of heather to sprinkle them with holy water. It was also reported that some in 
Lewis still observed non-Christian rites as late as the 1690s which raises the 
question of the effectiveness of the Reformation and the post-Reformation attempts 
to spread religion in the region. According to a report on the Western Highlands and 
Isles by Martin Martin, people in Lewis were sacrificing to Shony, a sea-spirit, and 
5 C. Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission to Scotland 1616-1646: Documents from Roman Archives 
(Dublin, 1964),, 47. 
6 T. McCaughey, "Protestantism and Scottish Highland Culture", in J. P. Mackey (ed. ), An 
Introduction to Celtic Christianity (Edinburgh, 1989), 187. 
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maintained numerous customs associated particularly with seasonal festivals. The 
non-Christian customs of the inhabitants of Lewis appear to have survived a 
reformation which was initially an upper-class affair and had little effect on the lives 
of ordinary clanspeople, 7 and were, thus, allowed to flourish because of the Church 
of Scotland's inability to provide a satisfactory ministry. 
However, these accounts of the state of religion in the region, along with 
those provided by the Church of Scotland and the Irish Franciscan missionaries, 
raise a question as to their historical accuracy due to the potential propaganda 
agendas of the two religions. As will be seen throughout this chapter, many of the 
reports from both Protestants and Catholics are pessimistic and paint a very bleak 
picture. Although the specific details can be questioned as possible exaggerations 
laced with pessimism, such as the shortage of supplies and maintenance for the Irish 
Franciscans or the number of ministers provided to parishes in the isles, the fact that 
the same point is found repeatedly throughout their respective reports indicates there 
were definite obstacles to overcome but the exact degree of severity is open to 
discussion. 
What is a known fact is that the reign of Charles I was faced with liturgical 
and doctrinal division within the Church of Scotland. These divisions in the Kirk 
were further complicated by the fact that it had difficulties in establishing a strong 
Protestant foundation in the Western Highlands and Isles. In a letter from Charles I 
to the Privy Council of Scotland in 1631 he relayed a report from the Bishop of the 
Isles regarding the state of his diocese. According to this letter: 
... Johne Bischop of the 
Iles hath represented us the great barbaritie 
used among the Ilanders of his Diocie, and how there is no ordour 
amongst them for encreasing ather of religoun or civill policie; and 
notwithstanding that ther ar articles condescended upon tuitching that 
purpois (none of them as we ar informed being observed) yit ther is 
no punischment inflicted upon delinquents: --Our pleasure is that 
having appointed a day in April or May ensuing, you call the chief 
men amongst them befor yow and by the advises of the said Bischop, 
that yow use your best meanes for establishing religioun and 
government according to the effect abonespecifeit... and if yow find 
that by that meanes yow cannot effectuat the same, that then yow 
detene them with yow until we ourselfi shall come to that our 
McCaughey, "Protestantism and Scottish Highland Culture", 188. 
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kingdome, that we may caus proceid therin as we shall find most 
requisite. 8 
It is apparent through this letter that the conditions of both the Statutes of Iona and 
the 1616 Regulations were thought to be no longer adhered to by the island chiefs. 
According to the agreement reached on Iona and echoed in the 1616 Regulations the 
island chiefs accepted the responsibility to provide for the ministry in their territory, 
to obey the clergy, rebuild churches and to keep the Sabbath. As indicated by 
Charles's orders to the Privy Council the chiefs were deemed delinquent in their 
religious duties as reported by the Bishop of the Isles to Charles. Furthermore, 
comments made in regards to "civill policie" indicate that the chiefs were further 
negligent in the civil components of both the Statutes of Iona and, more importantly, 
the 1616 Regulations. Although it is not clear which aspects of the 1616 
Regulations regarding civil obedience the chiefs were accused of ignoring the fact 
that Charles's instructions to the Privy Council were based on a letter from the 
bishop indicates a connection between religious piety and civil duty. However, 
based on the attendance records of the annual meetings, it appears that the Bishop of 
the Isles's claims were not taken seriously by the chiefs nor the Privy Council as 
none of the chiefs attended. In 1631 six of the chiefs were granted excuses from 
attendance while only three were fined for non-compliance, while in 1632 only 
MacLeod of Dunvegan attended and the other seven were excused. 9 As the Western 
Highlands and Isles were still relatively peaceful and excuses from attendance were 
granted it is quite likely that the report to Charles was an exaggeration on the part of 
the bishop in an attempt to increase the church's revenue since the chiefs' 
appearance would most likely result in fines being issued which the bishop would 
then claim. Whatever the motive was behind the report and Charles's subsequent 
instructions to the Privy Council the idea that there were troubles enforcing religious 
and civil policies prompted the General Assembly in 1638 to make specific 
provisions for the establishment of religion in the region. 
8 Collectanea de Rebus Albanicis (Iona Club, 1848), 127. 
9 See Appendix 5 "Attendance Record of Annual Meetings 1616-1642". 
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I 
From the time of the Reformation it was realized that the nobility would be the key 
factor in spreading the Reformed Kirk. As the nobility was essential in maintaining 
law and order it was assumed by reformed ministers that they could be counted on to 
implement sweeping ecclesiastical reforms. Some chiefs were genuinely committed 
to reform, but understanding the constraints of their kin-based society they wished to 
achieve reform by working within the existing frameworks of Highland society. 
Futhermore, in lieu of parish schools, the noble household became the locus, in 
many cases, for education creating a second means by which to spread the faith. As 
a result, an essential component of ecclesiastical organization within the Highlands 
was the noble retinue, or tour, which served to supplement or replace the parish as a 
primary local unit of religious organization. 10 
During the reign of James VI, the Kirk had been able to establish at least a 
presence in most Highland parishes on the mainland. However, just as the rest of 
the kingdom was dividing over religious doctrine so too was the Highlands; the 
difference being rather than a schism developing between moderate and more radical 
strands of Protestantism, the Highlands included the division between Protestantism 
and Catholicism. The Kirk could increasingly count on support from Highland 
families such as the Munros of Foulis, Rosses of Balnagown, MacKenzies of 
Kintail, Mackintoshes of Dunachton, Frasers, as well as the various branches of Clan 
Campbell. Conversely, opposition came from Catholic households such as the 
various branches of the House of Gordon, including the cadet branches of the Earl of 
Huntly, the MacDonalds of Keppoch, MacDonalds of Glengarry, and Clanranald. 
This division in the north emphasized the Kirk's need to breach the Highland Line 
and provide a competent ministry in the territory. 
The spread of Protestantism through noble retinues is best seen in the tours 
of the various branches of Clan Campbell through their Highland territories. Major 
Campbell households moved constantly between a series of residences carrying 
Protestant worship throughout their estates. These tours were able to reach remote 
10 J. Dawson, "Clan, Kin and Kirk: the Campbells and the Scottish Reformation", in N. S. Amos, et at. 
(eds. ), The Education of a Christian Society (Aldershot, 1999), 229. 
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places which were previously without access to Reformed services, resulting in 
many of the lesser members of Clan Campbell having their first Protestant 
experiences within the chiefs touring household. Furthermore, these tours allowed 
the Earls of Argyll to enforce national standards within the region's parish churches. 
In July 1574, the 6`h Earl of Argyll personally carried out a form of ecclesiastical 
visitation, ensuring each parish had a minister and that he received an adequate 
stipend. 
The tours of the Campbells cannot be considered typical due to the vastness 
of the territory they covered and because of the great political strength of the 
Campbells of Argyll, especially the 5th and 8" earls. Due to the tours, the spread of 
Protestantism among the Clan Campbell was clearly widespread to such an extent 
that, when the 7th earl defected to Catholicism, the senior members of the clan elite 
severed their support of the earl in favor of his son, Lord Lorne, later 8th earl and 1St 
marquis. Although the defection of Archibald Campbell, 7th Earl of Argyll, came as 
a surprise the fact that the fine disassociated from the earl and provided Lorne with 
financial aid shows how successful the retinues were in instilling a devout adherence 
to Protestantism among the clan. 
The power the Campbells of Argyll wielded throughout the Western 
Highlands and the impact that their household retinues had on the spread of the 
Protestant religion prompted the Bishop of Argyll to write to James VI requesting 
the Earl of Argyll's assistance. In the letter written by Andrew Boyd, Bishop of 
Argyll, to James on 24 February 1615 he stated: 
HEREWITHE it wald please your sacred Majestie remember that the 
parties of your Majesteis kingdome committit to my spiritual] 
ouersicht being so barbarous that without sever animadversione thay 
can nocht be cohibite from thair wonted savage behaviour: Nather 
can this be so convenientlie done as by the presence of the Erle of 
Argyll; whua at my last assemblie nocht onlie gave to me in secrete 
exceiding guid prove of his religione, baking the same with no worss 
knowledge; bot in publict offerit (undir your Majestie) to caus all 
obedience be given in discipline, churches to be builid and violent 
detenaris of ministeris glebis and mansis thairoff dispossessed ... I 
humblie request your Majestie, in regairde heiroff ather to direct him 
[i. e. Argyll] to his awin cuntrie, or confine him within the samin. 
' 1 
" Collectanea, 120-1. 
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Although the Statutes of Iona were not addressed after 1609 the agreement reached 
in providing for the ministry was apparently still expected to be adhered to. Even 
though Argyll was not involved in the Statutes of Iona, it appears that Boyd still 
expected him to support the church in a manner similar to the one agreed to on Iona. 
Andrew Boyd's letter specifically states that inhabitants in Argyll were withholding 
the ministers' financial assistance and were disobedient in both building churches 
and in following the instructions of the clergy. The issues Boyd raised were all 
explicitly named as obligations of the chiefs in the first statute agreed in the Statutes 
of Iona. The fact that Argyll was the strongest supporter of the Protestant religion in 
the region, as well as the most influential noble, the bishop hoped to rely on Argyll 
for enforcement of the Statutes of Iona. Just as the Campbells of Argyll were looked 
to by the Church of Scotland as proponents of the Reformation they were likewise 
relied on as protectors of the faith in the region. 
Due to the ardent support of the Campbells of Argyll for the Protestant faith 
and especially the political power of the Marquis of Argyll the National Covenant 
was apparently eagerly signed in Argyll. Subscription to the National Covenant in 
the early stages of the emerging "troubles" was met with some success among the 
chiefs and nobles beyond the Highland Line. After the covenant was signed in 
Argyll, subscription then spread through the Highlands; in Moray the document was 
signed by Alexander Brodie of Brodie, Alexander Brodie of Lethen, Sir James Grant 
of Freuchie, Sir Robert Innes of Innes, John Hay of Lochloy, Hugh Rose of 
Kilravock, John Grant of Glenmoriston, and Hugh Fraser, Lord Lovat. Also giving 
his approval was William Mackintosh of that Ilk, who claimed that he supported the 
Covenant but was unable to sign "being from home". Support for the Covenant was 
also found in Ross-shire through the subscription of the Earl of Seaforth, the Laird 
of Foulis, and the Laird of Balnagown "with many heads of minor houses". 
However, the signature gathering tour of the Covenant Movement was so 
widespread that the signatures of many were questionable. As the historian John 
Mackey states, "Many signed it for reasons of expediency, prominent among them 
being Lords Seaforth and Reay". 12 
'2J. Mackey, The Church in the Highlands (London, 1914), 119-120. 
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Due to the potential political ramifications of not signing the National 
Covenant subscription did not necessarily equate with adherence to the Covenant 
Movement nor the Protestant religion. Among those reported to have subscribed 
were Catholic MacDonalds who would make their aversion to Protestantism and the 
Earl of Argyll well known. Furthermore, the subscription by Protestants was not a 
guarantee that when the Western Highlands and Isles broke out in open warfare that 
those who signed would join the Covenant cause. The Earl of Seaforth, MacLean of 
Duart, and even Cameron of Lochiel who were men loyal to Protestantism or to the 
Earl of Argyll would join the ranks of the Royalists. As will be discussed in chapter 
seven, allegiance to the Covenanters and Royalists could not be clearly discerned 
based solely on subscription to the National Covenant and their religious affiliation. 
II 
A large obstacle faced by those attempting to build a strong religious structure 
within the Western Highlands and Isles was the geographical isolation of many 
inhabitants in the region. The hostile terrain and remote location of many 
settlements and houses of worship hindered regular church services and impeded the 
attendance of both the clergy and the laity. The Reformed Kirk's attempts to solve 
the problems of accessibility and the ramifications it had on attendance ranged from 
hiring ferries to transport the ministers and parishioners to church to disciplining 
ministers found negligent in enforcing regular services. Although efforts were made 
to remedy the dire situation of the Kirk in the Western Highlands and Isles, it 
appears that the Isles remained more immune to the Reformed Kirk than some 
mainland areas by reason of their geographical situation. 13 According to a 1626 
report written by Thomas Knox, Bishop of the Isles, in which he lamented the state 
of the Kirk in his diocese, he stated that he counted only ten ministers in the whole 
of the Hebridean parishes, but in actuality there were 19 ministers and two readers 
present. 14 The situation was so dire in the isles that the island of Cumbrae had one 
minister, Bute had three ministers, Arran had two ministers, Islay had two ministers, 
13 F. Macdonald, "Ireland and Scotland: Historical Perspectives on the Gaelic Dimension 1560-1760" 
PhD thesis University of Glasgow (1994), 264. 
14 Collectanea, 122-125; Macdonald, "Ireland and Scotland", 258. 
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Mull had three ministers, Coll and Tiree had one minister each, Iona was serviced by 
Knox himself, Colonsay had only a reader, and Gigha, Cara and Jura were all served 
by the same minister based in Jura. 15 Knox continued his report by detailing the 
ministry in the North Isles, stating that the entire island of Skye had four ministers 
and one reader, Uist was "servit be ane verie auld man callit Donald MacMillen", 
Harris had two ministers who also served the island of Barra, and the islands of 
Muck, Rhum, Canna, and Eigg were all served by the minister from Strathordale and 
Sleat on Skye. 16 The report submitted by Knox was intended to draw attention to 
the region and to prompt the church to increase its provision of competent ministers. 
Therefore, the discrepancy in the number of ministers reported by Knox to those 
actually present is a prime example of exaggeration in order to highlight the dire 
situation in the isles; yet, even 19 ministers and two readers were still not sufficient 
to cover such a vast area. The condition of the island parishes, along with some on 
the western seaboard, worsened with the outbreak of war in the mid-seventeenth 
century. 
To complicate matters for the Kirk in its attempt to overcome the 
geographical obstacle, according to Professor James Kirk, 
if the kirk could not in fairness be said to have neglected the 
Highlanders, it was still possible for Highlanders to neglect the 
kirk.. . too many parishioners had to remain content merely with a 
resident reader instead of having their own minister living within the 
parish. There was ample opportunity, therefore, even in more settled 
times, for parishioners in remoter communities-and even in not so 
remote communities-to avoid all contact with the kirk. 17 
Local parish attendance was vital to the Protestant ideal; all inhabitants were to 
attend church regularly to hear the Word of God and receive the sacraments. 
However, the parishes of the Western Highlands and Isles covered large 
mountainous areas, sometimes 20 miles across, and many of the churches were in 
inaccessible locations due to the transformation of old monastic houses, often 
located on islands off the coast or in the middle of a loch, into parish churches. Not 
15 Collectanea, 124. 
16 Collectanea, 125. 
17 J. Kirk, "The Kirk and the Highlands at the Reformation", Northern Scotland, vol. vii (1986), 19. 
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only did the geography and breadth of the parishes affect the laity, the clergy faced 
the same obstacles when trying to conduct church business. 
Following the drafting of the National Covenant, a General Assembly was 
called to meet in Glasgow in 1638. Due to the strength of the Earls of Caithness and 
Sutherland, the northern province was fairly well represented. A total of 14 
ministers and nine elders were sent from the presbyteries of Forres, Inverness, 
Dingwall, Tain, Dornoch, and Caithness. 18 Likewise, Argyllshire sent ministers 
from Inveraray, Kilmore, and Kilmun as well as Alexander Campbell of Kilmun and 
the Provost of Rothesay as elders. 19 In an attempt to strengthen the integrity of the 
Church of Scotland and to improve the staffing capabilities of the kirks within the 
Western Highlands and Isles, the Glasgow Assembly erected the Synod of Argyll 
with the support of Archibald Campbell, Marquis of Argyll. The "Order of 
Provincial Assemblies with Presbyteries Contained" issued on 17 December 1638 
dictated the Synod of Argyll to include the presbyteries of Dunoon, Kinloch, 
Inveraray, Kilmore, and Skye in the bounds of the Sheriffdom of Argyll and Bute 
with part of Lochaber to meet at Inveraray on the fourth Tuesday of April. The 
order also prescribed the Synod of the Isles to encompass all kirks in the north-west 
Isles between Skye and Lewis and the rest of the isles formerly under the Diocese of 
the Isles, except for the south-west isles joined to the presbytery of Argyll, to meet at 
Skye on the second Tuesday of May. 20 Although the presbytery of Skye was 
ordered to attend the provincial meetings at Inveraray and ferries were arranged to 
transport the clergy to the meeting, the island remained refractory. As a result, after 
deliberation the "Act anent joining Skye to the Synod of Argyll" was issued, 
ordering the ministers and elders of Skye to keep their meeting and reiterated the 
fact that the presbytery of Skye was within the jurisdiction of Argyll "without any 
further question to be made there anent". 21 
The purpose of both the Synod of Argyll and the Synod of the Isles was 
intended to facilitate the uniformity of doctrine in Scotland and to expedite 
communications between the Church and the Presbyteries, especially those in 
18 Mackey, The Church in the Highlands, 121. 
19 The provost of Rothesay was most likely John Campbell because a 1643 commission in APS, VI, i, 
V30, states, "John Campbell, sometime provost of Rothesay". 
0 A. Peterkin (ed. ), Records of the Kirk of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1838), 38. 
21 Peterkin (ed. ), Records of the Kirk of Scotland, 323. 
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remote locations. Essentially, the Synods were to act as an intermediary between the 
Western Highlands and Isles and the rest of Scotland and, accordingly, made some 
of the more significant advancements in rectifying the church's shortcomings in the 
region primarily through its attempts to establish a clear religious organization and 
recruitment of Gaelic-speaking ministers. 
In response to the mandatory presbytery meetings subsequently ordered by 
the General Assembly of 1638, the Synod of Argyll minutes for 24 April 1639 stated 
"In respect of the distance of our bounds and the difficulty of the way that we cannot 
have our presbeterial meetings as frequent and commodious as in other parts of this 
kingdom, " and the synod ruled that it was sufficient to keep monthly meetings. The 
synod also ruled that, due to the ministers of the Isles having to take ferries across to 
the mainland to attend the meetings, they were licensed only to attend in June and 
August. 22 More specifically, the records of the Presbytery of Dunoon show that 
their weekly presbytery meetings had lapsed eight times between 1643 and 1649; the 
gaps ranged from five to thirteen months. 23 
Following on the minutes of the synod in which the island ministers were 
licensed to keep their meetings only in June and August, more specific licenses were 
issued on 7 October 1641. Out of consideration of the long journey and numerous 
ferries needed to transport the minister at Ardnamurchan, Mr. Duncan McCalman, to 
the presbytery meetings at Kilmore, the Synod of Argyll ordered that he only had to 
attend in June and August. 24 However, by October 1643 Mr. McCalman was still 
having trouble attending the two meetings due to a dispute with a local ferry 
operator. In response, the Synod of Argyll requested the Sheriff of Argyll to take 
order with John Roy McEan McDouill, ferrier, for refusing to transport Mr. 
McCalman from Lismore to Appin. 25 Due to the difficulty in navigating the islands, 
the Synod of Argyll was also forced to mandate the ferrying of the laity to enable 
them to attend regular church services. Specific instructions were sent by the synod 
to Hector MacLean of Kingairloch on 7 May 1640 to furnish a ferry at Kingairloch 
22D. C. MacTavish (ed. ), Minutes of the Synod ofArgyll, 1639-51 (SHS, 1943), 5. 
23 NAS, Presbytery of Dunoon Records, CH2/111/2/6-31. The lapses were between 20 September 
1643- 10 April 1644,3 July 1644- 21 January 1645,21 January 1645- 8 May 1645,6 August 1645- 1 
June 1646,1 June 1646- 27 July 1647,27 July 1647- 14 February 1648,14 February 1648- 27 June 
1648, and 2 September 1648- 31 January 1649. 
24 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 27. 
25 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 83. 
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whereby his tenants and people might repair regularly to the church at Kilmaluag on 
Lismore. Subsequent efforts were made for transportation to Lismore on 1 May 
1650 when the synod sent a "recommendation" to the Marquis of Argyll to establish 
ferries at Lismore to better accommodate his people going to church. 26 
Although the use of ferries was intended to assist people in attending church, 
the vastness of the Highland parishes and the number of vacant parishes often 
proved an insurmountable problem. In order to improve the religious situation in the 
Highlands the Church of Scotland re-introduced a scheme for planting ministers in 
the region. Some critics called the scheme "devilish" because the redistribution of 
ministers and readers left one minister in charge of three to four parishes and one 
reader for each parish. 27 Furthermore, the scheme left numerous vacant parishes 
because of the size of the Highland parishes which left the kirks too far apart for 
pluralism to work; for example, in the Isles, a single minister served churches on 
clusters of neighboring islands and had to rotate his weekly services between the 
islands under his charge. 28 
In looking at the breakdown of the Dioceses of Caithness and Ross in 1614, 
the difficulty in providing a sufficient staff is seen in the decline in the number of 
clergy for such large areas. In 1607 Caithness had 20 ministers for 24 parishes with 
only four vacant parishes, but by 1614 those numbers had dropped to 13 ministers 
for 20 parishes with nine parishes vacant. 29 The number of ministers and parishes 
for the Diocese of Ross was just as unbalanced as Caithness by 1614. In an attempt 
to service the entire diocese, the parishes of Applecross, Gairloch, Lemlair, 
30 and 
Dingwall were conjoined under one minister, creating a single parish that stretched 
from coast to coast. The amalgamation of these parishes was finally found to be too 
formidable a challenge for one minister and the plan was abandoned in 1614, 
leaving only Gairloch and Applecross joined under the charge of one minister. With 
26 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 14 & 172. 
27 J. Kirk, "The Jacobean Church in the Highlands, 1567-1625", in N. MacLean (ed. ), The 
Seventeenth Century in the Highlands (Inverness Field Club, 1986),, 32. 
28 M. Todd, The Culture of Protestantism in Early Modern Scotland (New Haven, 2002), 58. 
29 Kirk, "The Jacobean Church", 33. 
30 Lemlair is also known as Lumlair; I. B. Cowan, The Parishes of Medieval Scotland (Scottish 
Records Society, 1967), 129. 
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the dissolution of the conjoined parishes, the Diocese of Ross reportedly had 25 
ministers and one reader for its 35 churches. 31 
The situation in the Bishopric of Argyll was just as complicated as the rest of 
the Highlands. The one difference was the advantage of having the religious support 
and political influence of the Campbells of Argyll. As a result, the Bishopric was 
able to claim in 1574 that every parish in Lorne, central Argyll, and Cowal had the 
service of a minister and a reader; however, the Synod of Argyll was not able to 
make such an impressive claim when it conducted its own survey in 1649-50. A 
number of parishes within Argyll were amalgamated in the early seventeenth 
century and the ratio dropped to 32 ministers for 44 parishes. Like the Diocese of 
Ross, the amalgamation of parishes within the Bishopric of Argyll placed one man 
in charge of providing pastoral care to an area so large that even two or three 
ministers would have had trouble tending to his duties. By 1618 the parish of 
Kilcolmkill was joined with Kilblane, while Kilkerran, Kimichael and Kilchousland 
were combined, 32 and Glenorchy was conjoined to Inishail. However, a petition 
from the conjoined parishes to be separated was denied in 1621.33 
Unfortunately for the Church of Scotland, the restructuring of religious 
authority did not rectify many of the problems found at the parish level, specifically 
the enormity and vacancy of many of the parishes in the Western Highlands and 
Isles which limited the amount of control the Kirk wielded during the Scottish 
Revolution. The number of vacant parishes in the region was magnified by the 
devastation created by Alasdair MacColla and his Irish regiments in 1644-5. After 
MacColla's departure, the Synod of Argyll attempted to assess the condition of its 
presbyteries. Information compiled by the Synod in 1649 and 1650 listed the vacant 
kirks in the presbyteries of Skye, Lorne, Argyll, and Kintyre. The presbytery of 
Skye had ten parishes vacant for between four and six years; the presbytery of Lorne 
had four kirks vacant for one to five years, as well as all the kirks in Mull; it also 
claimed that the kirks of Kilvoruy, 34 Kilmallie, and Kilmonivaig had remained 
31 Kirk, "The Jacobean Church", 35. 
32 Kilchousland is also spelled as Kilchusland and is also known as Glenquhissillan; Cowan, 
Parishes, 97. 
33 Kirk, "The Jacobean Church", 37. 
34 Kilvoruy is also known as Kilmoroy in Arasaig, but is more commonly referred to as Arasaig; 
Cowan, Parishes, 7. 
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vacant since the Reformation. Further investigation by the synod also revealed that 
the presbytery of Argyll's kirk in Craignish had been vacant for two years, the kirk 
in Inveraray had been vacant for one year, and the island of Arran within the 
presbytery of Kintyre was without a minister in Kilmory for five years and Kilbride 
for a year. 35 
The number of vacant parishes should not have come as a surprise to the 
synod due to the long list of petitions from various kirks for a minister. Once the 
Synod of Argyll was established, urgent supplications were presented pleading for a 
minister and describing the lengths parishioners had to go to in order to get pastoral 
care. For example, Alan Cameron of Lochiel sent the Synod of Argyll a 
supplication for a minister on behalf of the parishioners of Kilmanevaig and 
Kilmalzie in Lochaber in October 1642. According to the supplication "many souls 
are ignorant of the word of God throw the want of preaching" and "we are forced to 
repair to other kirks land distant out of our bounds" for baptism and marriages. In 
an attempt to rectify the situation the assembly ordained Mr. Ewan Cameron, 
minister of Dunoon, and failing him Mr. Neil Cameron of Dysart to go to Lochaber 
March 1St"because the winter quarter is not fett for travelers to those bounds". 36 The 
lack of clergy available resulted in ministers, such as Ewan Cameron, being shuffled 
around to various parishes to give occasional church services. A similar petition 
submitted from Kingarth in October 1643 resulted in the Presbytery of Dunoon 
ordaining service to be conducted at least once in twenty days because they could 
not provide a minister to conduct weekly service. The problem was still not 
resolved in May 1644 and the presbytery of Dunoon was forced to assign Mr. 
Patrick Stewart "to preach one Sabbath between this provincial and the next". 37 
Even with the employment of ferries and the re-structuring of the Highland 
parishes, the Reformed Kirk still faced a serious problem in enforcing regular church 
attendance. It became obvious to the Kirk that the problem of attendance was not 
easily solved by providing ferries or by appointing one minister to three churches; 
therefore specific members of the clergy and the laity were censured in an attempt to 
improve the state of religion. According to the minutes of the Synod of Argyll on 
35 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 149-50. 
36 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 42. 
37MacTavish (ed. ), Synod ofArgyll, 80; NAS, Presbytery of Dunoon Records, CH2/111/1/19. 
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26 May 1642, the main focus of business was on the negligence of the clergy in 
performing their duties and the absence of the laity from divine services. The 
minutes report that Mr. Donald Campbell, minister at Kilmartin, was found 
negligent in celebrating communion on 26 May 1642. As a result, Mr. Campbell 
was ordained to celebrate communion twice before January 1643.38 
On the issue of negligent attendance of the laity, the Synod of Argyll stated 
that "considering the great hindering that the negligence of haveing publict divyne 
exercises works to the growth of knowledge and religion, especially in the yles and 
Morvern" the synod found it necessary that all kirk sessions were to put diligently 
into execution the act of the last assembly against absenters from divine service. 39 
With the responsibility to enforce regular church attendance falling on the kirk 
sessions, the Kingarth kirk session, established in 1648, recorded various 
disciplinary actions taken against the laity. For example, on 24 April 1648 Gilchrist 
McKomas, David Liggat, Donald Campbell and William Andrew appeared before 
the session and were all found guilty of breaking the Sabbath. The council ordered 
McKomas to stand before the congregation for three Sundays since he was found to 
be the instigator of the offence and the other three were to stand for two Sundays. 40 
Likewise, Mary McMurchie was "delated" for gathering "litt", a plant that yields 
dye, on the Sabbath. The minutes of 24 April 1648 state that McMurchie confessed 
that as she was herding her cows on Sunday she "took up the litt in her hand and 
brought it home. " As a result the session found her guilty of breaching the Sabbath 
and ordered her to stand two Sabbaths in front of the congregation but because she 
was poor they forgave her unlawfulness and did not find it necessary to fine her. 41 
III 
The difficulty in providing an adequate clergy for the Western Highlands and Isles 
was another problem which the Church of Scotland was forced to address. The 
38MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 29. 
39MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 31. 
40 NAS, Kingarth Kirk Session Minutes, CH2/219/1/9. 
41 NAS, Kingarth Kirk Session Minutes, CH2/219/1/9. 
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clergy appointed to the Highlands during the reign of James VI were not able to 
adequately bridge the gap between Protestant and Catholic and, thus, fully complete 
the process of the conversion of the inhabitants to Protestantism. The clergy in 
many Highland parishes were Lowlanders. These clergymen were often 
cosmopolitan figures, educated in Lowland or Continental universities, and were 
frequently employed in royal service. With these characteristics, the clergy 
attempted to facilitate and improve contact and communication between the 
Highlands and the Church. 42 However, these characteristics also severely hindered 
the progress of the Church. The fact that these men were cosmopolitan Lowlanders 
and educated in Lowland universities meant that few were willing to take positions 
in remote Highland parishes which habitually provided a severely limited income in 
comparison to other areas of Scotland and, even more importantly, few were Gaelic- 
speaking. Even the Irish Franciscan missionary, Fr. Cornelius Ward, pointed out 
that the Catholic mission to the Highlands could be successful due to the fact that the 
Anglo-Scots sent to minister to the locals were unsuitable because the difference 
between the Scots and the Celts was as different as "the Scots and the Greeks" 43 
The ineptitude of the clergy in the Highlands opened the door for the Irish 
Franciscans to attempt to reintroduce and, in some areas, foster the lingering 
adherence to Catholicism in areas neglected by the Protestant clergy. 
The complications created by the shortage of Gaelic-speaking ministers were 
continually brought to the attention of the Kirk. During a visitation of Alvie and 
Laggan in Badenoch in 1626, the Synod of Moray found that the assigned minister 
should be forcibly retired due to incapacity. The synod found the minister to be "of 
verie gryt age, infirme in body and hes no thing of the Irishe language, quhilk be 
thair vulgar" and as a result, the synod sought two qualified recruits for Badenoch 
"quhilk lyeth destitute of the confort of the Word and sacramentis, for the most part, 
and altogidder without disciplin quhairby the gryest part lyethe in damnable 
atheisme". 44 Similarly, the Synod of Moray found Patrick Dunbar "unfruitful" as 
It was becoming the minister of Dorr "through want of the [Gaelic] language' 
45 
42Kirk, "The Jacobean Church", 25. 
43 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 90. 
44 As quoted in Kirk, "The Jacobean Church", 42. 
45 As quoted in Todd, The Culture of Protestantism, 58. 
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increasingly apparent that the mere presence of a minister was not sufficient to 
spread the Reformed faith. In order for Protestantism to build a strong foundation it 
was vital that the Word of God was clearly understood to save the inhabitants from 
"damnable atheisme". The difficulty in finding a Gaelic-speaking ministry reached 
such a height that the assistance of the king was requested in 1643. According to a 
presentation to the king on 19 August 1643, it was reported that the Kirk was unable 
to find six qualified persons to fill the vacant kirks in the Highlands. The 
presentation requested that Charles would accept a list of three men from which 
Charles would hopefully "accept of any one qualified man, who shall be able to 
speak the Irish Language for kirks vaiking in the Highlands". 46 
In 1643 the Kirk realized the importance of rectifying their clerical deficit 
and put a new emphasis on providing an adequate ministry in the Highlands. In 
order to improve the religious situation in the Gaelic-speaking Highlands, a new 
emphasis was put on the education system. On 16 August 1643 the General 
Assembly issued a "Recommendation to Presbyteries and Universities anent 
students having Irish". It was believed that students who knew Gaelic should be 
trained in Letters, especially in the studies of Divinity. The Assembly's 
recommendation stated that "Considering the lamentable condition of the people in 
the Highlands, where there are many that gets not the benefite of the Word ... in 
respect there are very few Preachers that can speak the Irish language". Therefore, 
the Assembly requested that Gaelic-speaking students were to be preferred for 
bursaries so they "may be sent forth preaching the Gospel in these Highland parts, as 
occasions shall require". 47 In response to this recommendation, the Synod of Argyll 
took measures to ensure the flow of financial support to students throughout its 
presbyteries. On 7 October 1643 it ordered that the moderator of each presbytery 
was to use all diligence in collecting contributions for the students because of the 
"negligence of diverse of the brethren". To ensure the students received their 
contributions they were ordered to repair to the moderator's home on the 20th of 
November and to remain there until they received their sum. 48 Through the 
Assembly's recommendation and the measures taken by the Synod of Argyll, the 
46 Peterkin (ed. ), Records of the Kirk of Scotland, 353. 
47 Peterkin (ed. ), Records of the Kirk of Scotland, 351. 
48 Peterkin (ed. ), Records of the Kirk of Scotland, 79. 
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target of a Gaelic-speaking ministry became the focal point of the Kirk's campaign 
to spread the Reformed faith through the Highlands. 
Although 1643 proved to be a significant turning point in the Kirk's attitude 
towards the Gaelic language, the associated problems of providing an adequate 
ministry and bridging the linguistic division continued. An "Overture presented to 
the General Assembly" on 18 June 1646 suggested a list of measures that the Kirk 
should take "to the intent the knowledge of God in Christ may be spread through the 
Highlands and Islands (for in lack whereof the land hath smarted in the late troubles) 
these courses be taken". The first measure suggested reiterated the 1616 
Regulations in that it recommended all gentlemen who were able were to send at 
least their eldest sons to be "bred" in the "Inland". Secondly, it was recommended 
that a ministry be placed among the Highlanders with ministers and expectants who 
could speak Gaelic, so that the kirks would be provided for like other kirks in the 
kingdom. Thirdly, the Overture requested that ministers and ruling elders who 
possessed a working knowledge of Gaelic be appointed to attend to neighboring 
parishes. The last measure suggested to the General Assembly was that "Scots 
Schools", meaning a structured education system where Scots could be taught, were 
to be erected in all parishes "where convenient". It appears that the General 
Assembly was continuing in their pursuit of spreading Scots, but in the interim was 
attempting to recruit Gaelic speaking ministers who were able to spread the "Word 
of God" until the inhabitants were literate in Scots. The General Assembly approved 
the measures in the Overture and recommended the issue to "further consideration" 
in the hopes "that more Overtures may be prepared thereanent". 
49 
The issue of Gaelic and the ministry surfaced again in the Assembly of 1648. 
Apparently no new Overtures had been presented to the General Assembly and a 
statement was issued echoing the 1646 Overture. 
50 In compliance with the General 
Assembly's statement of 1648 which reiterated that schools were to be erected in all 
parishes, the Synod of Argyll appointed the locations for the schools to 
be 
established in three of their presbyteries. On 9 May 1649 the synod specified the 
following appointment of schools: in Cowal at Kilfinan, Kilmodan, and 
49 Peterkin (ed. ), Records of the Kirk of Scotland, 449. 
50 For the text of the 1648 General Assembly's statement see Mackey, The Church in the Highlands, 
126. 
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Lochgoilhead, in Argyll at Kilmichael in Glassery until they were able to move to 
Kilmartin, Castlesween, and some part of the country around Lochawe, 51 and in 
Lorne at Kilmore and Kilmaluag in Lismore and a third location which was left 
blank. 52 
At the same time as the Synod of Argyll was establishing schools and 
funding the education of students within their presbyteries it was still struggling to 
attract a satisfactory clergy and provide pastoral care to its parishioners. As a result, 
in May and October 1649 the Synod of Argyll continued in its attempt to spread the 
Reformed faith through their bounds by turning again to the liturgy. On 9 May 1649 
the Synod of Argyll ordained the "Shorter Catechism" to be translated into Gaelic as 
well as passages from the Bible. The job of translating the catechism was given to 
the seven Gaelic-speaking ministers found within the Synod: Mr. Ewan Cameron, 
Mr. Colin McLachlan, Mr. Dugald Campbell, Martin McLachlan, Mr. Nicoll 
McCalman, Mr. John McLachlan and Mr. Dugald Darroch. The Synod of Argyll 
ordained the ministers to confer on the catechism and that it was to be collected at 
the next meeting. Furthermore, the synod had been advised that there were various 
translations of Biblical passages written by some of the clergy within the synod. In 
an Attempt to bridge the linguistic shortcomings of the Reformed Kirk, the Synod of 
Argyll also ordained whoever had translations of any piece of the Bible to present 
their copies immediately to their presbyteries in the hopes that a Gaelic Bible could 
soon be drafted. 53 What is interesting about these orders is that in 1567 John 
Carswell, Bishop of the Isles, undertook the task of translating the Book of Common 
Order and the catechism into Gaelic. In his book, Foirm na n-Urrnuidheadh, 
Carswell used Calvin's shorter catechism as a guideline but did make a few 
substitutions. For example, when asked what means were used in baptism one could 
not merely say the Word of God and water, but had to add that it ruled out "the other 
things which were used hitherto in the Papist church". 54 The altered catechism 
highlighted the fact that the Highlands had an imperfect grasp of the Reformed faith, 
as well as an enduring adherence to Catholicism. These issues which Carswell 
51 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 129. 
52 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 130. 
53 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod ofArgyll, 127. 
sa J. Dawson, "Clan, Kin and Kirk", 231; McCaughey, "Protestantism and Scottish Highland 
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already addressed in his translation were being tackled again nearly 90 years later by 
the Synod of Argyll. This raises the question of what happened to Carswell's 
contribution which was the first attempt to bridge the linguistic gap and to spread the 
Protestant religion throughout the Western Highlands and Isles. It appears as though 
the book was completely ignored by the Synod of Argyll, nowhere in their 
instructions does the synod order the ministers in charge of carrying out the 
translations to use Carswell as a guideline. There are two possible explanations for 
Carswell's work being overlooked; either there were few or no surviving copies 90 
years later or the synod felt that Carswell's version, written in scholarly Gaelic, 
would not suffice and they needed a vernacular version. However, given the fact 
that Foirm na n-Urrnuidheadh does not appear to have undergone a second printing 
the more likely answer is that there were few or no copies to be had for reference. 
Unfortunately for the Church of Scotland, there would be no vernacular catechism 
until 1653, no vernacular psalm book until 1659, and a Gaelic Bible would not be 
sanctioned until 1754 and even then it was printed with the English text on the 
opposing page. 
Although the synod was slowly making progress in improving the liturgy, 
they were still faced with a scarcity of qualified ministers. In October 1649 the 
Synod of Argyll was forced to send invitations to specific expectants and ministers 
known to speak Gaelic pleading with them to take up the ministry in the region. 
Three ministers and three expectants were sent letters requesting their service: Mr. 
John Dallas, Mr. Jeremy O'Queine, in particular for Inveraray, Mr. Archibald 
McClaine, and expectants Mr. Archibald Campbell, Mr. Alexander McClaine, and 
Mr. John Cameron. 55 
As is evident from the remedial actions taken by the Synod of Argyll, as late 
as 1649 the Western Highlands and Isles were still without a full, competent 
ministry large enough to service the entire area. Unfortunately, the measures put in 
motion to create a Gaelic-speaking ministry were inevitably long-sighted plans 
which were of little immediate benefit. Even with the new emphasis on Divinity 
among Gaelic-speaking students in universities, it would still take them years to 
55 MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 152-3. 
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finish their degrees, and the schools appointed by the Synod of Argyll had yet to be 
established. 
IV 
Under the leadership of Fr. Cornelius Ward, and later Fr. Patrick Hegarty, the Irish 
Franciscan Mission to the Western Highlands and Isles found nominal success in the 
Hebrides and the western seaboard of Scotland. Due to the strength of Protestantism 
in various pockets throughout the west of Scotland the main goal of the missionaries 
was to target the isles known to be inhabited by latent Catholics and then, using the 
Isles as a base, spread their mission throughout the west. An early report from the 
missionaries claimed that the inhabitants in the Hebrides possessed a great eagerness 
to receive the faith and that the "temptation and evils of the times" drew Scotland 
away from the faith, not through perversity or inconsistency of the people. The 
report continued by stating that the inhabitants were deprived of instruction, but had 
a faint recollection of the old faith. 56 
Whereas the Reformed Kirk had some success in employing the Highland 
chiefs to support their cause, primarily through the Campbell network, the Irish 
Franciscan missionaries were simultaneously gaining stronger support from some of 
the Catholic chiefs in the Western Highlands and Isles. Due to the fact that the 
majority of the Reformed ministry was Lowland based they were forced to rely 
primarily on the Clan Campbell retinues to spread Protestantism through the 
Western Highlands and Isles. The main drawback of this arrangement was that they 
focused their energy on one noble to enforce ecclesiastical organization and once 
that retinue departed so too did a portion of the Kirk's authority. On the other hand, 
the Irish Franciscans specifically targeted a number of chiefs who were already 
known to support their beliefs and who could best assist the missionaries in 
maintaining and spreading the faith over a larger area. 
Just as the Reformed Kirk was calling on the assistance of nobles, such as the 
Earl of Argyll, so too was the Catholic Church. Specific instructions from the 
56 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 7. 
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Catholic nuncio in Brussels to the Irish Franciscan missionaries mirrored the 
Reformed Kirk's reliance on the nobility. The instructions began with orders to visit 
particular people of the islands, those more inclined than others to embrace the faith. 
It was explained that Hector MacNeil at Carskey in Kintyre was "very well disposed 
towards Catholics" and that Colla Ciotach, Laird of Colonsay, was Catholic and the 
missionaries were to take advice from him, especially on how to visit other islands. 57 
The Catholic chiefs in the Western Highlands and Isles not only aided the 
spread of Catholicism but also provided testimonials of the Irish Franciscans' 
success in an attempt to sustain the mission. A copy of a testimonial letter from 
Capt. Donald MacDonald, formerly in the service of the King of Spain, written at 
Colonsay 23 March 1629, stated that Fr. Cornelius Ward brought "a very great 
number" back to the faith in both the Hebrides and the Highlands. The letter 
continued that Fr. Ward, in the company of MacDonald, had visited Kintyre, 
Colonsay, the territory of Clanranald, and Glengarry where he administered the 
sacraments and further attested that Ward labored there for three years. According 
to MacDonald, those whom Fr. Ward converted preserved the faith even though they 
seldom saw priests and he admitted that some had strayed through fear of the local 
ministers. 58 A similar letter from Colla Ciotach, Laird of Colonsay, re-emphasized 
the importance of the nobility by supporting the statements made in the letter from 
MacDonald and more importantly by recounting the protection given to Ward by 
Colla. According to Colla's testimonial letter written at Colonsay 1 April 1629, Fr. 
Ward visited three times and he reported that Frs. Ward, Hegarty, and O'Neill had 
converted almost all the inhabitants. Colla Ciotach also explained that in 1629 
ministers and "heretics" tracked down Fr. Ward with the intention of arresting him 
and that Fr. Ward had nobody to go to for protection. As a result, Colla risked his 
life and goods to rescue the missionary, and was severely injured in doing so. 59 The 
picture painted by these testimonial letters shows that, like their Protestant 
counterparts, the Catholic chiefs were essential to whatever success there was on the 
part of the Franciscan missionaries by assisting the Fathers in spreading the faith and 
by the protection afforded to them by the power of the clans. 
57 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 24. 
58 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 122. 
59 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 125. 
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Similar to the Church of Scotland, the Irish Franciscans faced debilitating 
limitations which hindered the spread of the Catholic faith. Although well qualified 
and in close proximity, being just across the North Channel, to be able to minister to 
the inhabitants of the Western Highlands and Isles, the Irish Franciscans were only 
able to conduct a guerilla style attack on the Protestant religion. The recurrent issues 
which stalled the missionaries' progress are continually mentioned in their reports, 
primarily the threats to their physical well-being, the lack of resources, and the 
shortage of priests. 
Nearly every report submitted by the Franciscan missionaries mentioned the 
threats to their persons by Protestant ministers and gentry in the region which made 
it difficult to travel the region in safety and forced them to flee to various and more 
remote islands throughout their missions. Often the missionaries made just a 
passing mention of the hostilities they faced; however, the frequency with which 
they were mentioned implies that it was an underlying problem in the progress of the 
mission. As these reports were forwarded to the Congregation as evidence of the 
missionaries' successes and failures, there is a propaganda element involved in 
determining the historical validity of these reports. However, the repetition of their 
points and the testimonial letters from prominent Catholic figures in the region 
indicate that there was real substance behind the complaints about the difficulties 
they faced in carrying out their mission. 
In the reports from Frs. Patrick Hegarty and Cornelius Ward, both 
missionaries recounted the attempted attacks by the local ministers. In Patrick 
Hegarty's account of his travels in Kintyre during the winter of 1624, he reported 
that due to threats to his person he had to hide during the day in caves only to 
venture out to say Mass twice a night. 60 Hegarty also mentioned in his account that 
in Islay he was in danger of his life and was only able to stay for fourteen days, at 
which point 30 Catholics intervened and saved him from capture. Likewise, a report 
from Cornelius Ward covering the period July 1624 to the beginning of 1625 states 
that the minister in Kintyre attempted to attack himself and Paul O'Neill because 
they had converted one of the gentry in the area who happened to be a friend of the 
minister. Fortunately for the missionaries, intervention by Colla Ciotach thwarted 
60 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 33. 
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the minister and the missionaries were able to flee to Cara. 61 Another attempt on 
Ward's life was made in Eigg in August 1625 by the local minister, Neil 
MacKinnon. According to the report from Ward, MacKinnon was angered by the 
number of inhabitants Ward had converted and traveled to Eigg with a military 
entourage intending to capture or kill the missionaries. Apparently, the newly 
converted gentry of the island threatened MacKinnon and, apparently out of fear of 
revenge, the laird negotiated with MacKinnon allowing him to keep one-third of the 
teinds as long as the minister did not molest Catholics. 62 
Although the Church of Scotland fell short of completing the spread of 
Protestantism, it was nevertheless effective in hindering the spread of Catholicism 
and in maintaining its dominance in Protestant pockets throughout the Western 
Highlands and Isles. Through the threats made to the missionaries' life and English 
assistance in the imprisonment of Ward and Hegarty the Church of Scotland was 
able to limit the movements of the Franciscan missionaries and reduce the number of 
inhabitants who had their Catholic faith strengthened by the missionaries' presence 
or who could possibly be converted. 
Added to the problems inherent in the threats made to the missionaries, the 
scarcity of resources served to aggravate the situation. Similar to the brief mentions 
of the threats made by the missionaries, comments are consistently made throughout 
the reports which highlight the limited resources of the missionaries and indicate 
that, although the details can be exaggerated, the fact remained that the lack of 
supplies and maintenance was a key factor in the level of success or failure of these 
missions. During the 1620s and 1630s the reports repeatedly pointed to the scarcity 
of food and lack of bread and wine for communion as key components for the limits 
of the mission. Again, the reports from Ward and Hegarty provided evidence as to 
the scarcity of resources available to them. Ward stated that the region was lacking 
in resources and was so wild that it was impossible for the inhabitants to be 
hospitable. As a result, Ward and Paul O'Neill were forced to separate because the 
shortage of food made it difficult for them to work together; neither man had eaten 
61 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 51. 
62 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 63. 
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on Colonsay and Mull. 63 The shortage of food was also a factor in the progress of 
Hegarty's work on Arran. According to Hegarty's report, he stayed for only eight 
days on Arran where he had to live in a cave subsisting on only butter, cheese and 
water, and he echoed Ward's summary of the inhabitants, claiming they were so 
poor they could not give anything to support the missionaries. 64 Although the lack 
of food to support the missionaries was of concern, the biggest problem as far as 
resources was the lack of wine and "the host" for religious services. In Hegarty's 
explanation for temporarily leaving the mission, he stated that the things necessary 
to promote the faith were not obtainable in the Highlands and Isles. The explanation 
summarizes the numerous mentions made by both Hegarty and Ward in the 1620s. 
Both missionaries blamed the limitations of their services on not having the 
resources to perform the sacraments; Hegarty had to send his assistant to the 
Lowlands to acquire wine and Ward was unable to give communion or consecrate a 
church and cemetery. 65 
Numerous requests for resources, subsidies and greater manpower were sent 
to the Congregation throughout the mission; however, all concessions were 
temporarily withheld due to delays in verifying the content of the reports and 
testimonials submitted. It was relayed to the missionaries that Scots present at the 
Congregation questioned the validity of the reports and, in order for the concessions 
to be granted the reports, especially the summary of Hegarty's 1630-1 report, were 
forwarded to the Nuncios in Flanders and France for verification. Due to the 
delayed response by the Congregation the mission began to collapse. As early as 
1625 Ward was finding it difficult to convert the gentry in South Uist because they 
had not had a priest visit them in 100 years and they had nobody to continue 
instructing them once the missionaries left. 66 The lack of priests as well as 
missionaries became a major issue in the continuance of the mission. A later report 
from Ward in 1637 stated that the missionaries were worn out by the excess work 
and lack of aid; the only ones still working were Hugh Ward and Patrick Hegarty. 67 
For the majority of the mission there were on average only four missionaries 
63 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 55 & 53. 
64 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 33. 
65 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 33,64,71. 
66 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 69. 
67 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 175. 
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working in the Western Highlands and Isles, and requests for greater manpower 
were delayed by the Congregation while they verified the reports. The problem of 
subsidies and manpower reached such a level that Hegarty wrote to the 
Congregation from Waterford on 29 August 1646, airing his frustrations at the lack 
of strong support for the mission. Hegarty claimed that "there is now a greater 
chance than ever of winning over the Scots to the true faith" and that if the 
Congregation wanted the mission to continue they had to double the allowances and 
send two more missionaries from Louvain. Although Daniel MacNeill and Daniel 
Laertius had finally arrived in Scotland, Hegarty requested that the Congregation 
also send John Gormley and Anthony Gearnon because they needed the extra 
manpower to take advantage of the current situation. Hegarty finished his letter by 
stating that if the Congregation could not grant the above concessions he requested 
to "be relieved of his post as prefect of the mission". 68 
The combination of threats of physical harm, lack of resources, and limited 
manpower greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Irish Franciscan mission. Yet, 
Catholicism persisted in the Western Highlands and Isles even though the spread of 
the faith was sporadic and was not adequately maintained. As indicated by Patrick 
Hegarty, a number of islanders were traveling to Bonamargy in Ireland for Catholic 
religious services. 69 As a result, the threat of a Catholic invasion or uprising 
remained even though, in reality, the menace posed by the Irish Franciscans 
themselves was severely hampered. 
V 
The difficulty for the Kirk in regard to Catholics was not limited to the incursion 
made by the Irish Franciscans in the Western Highlands and Isles; outward 
conformity of some Catholics to the Reformed faith in order to avoid prosecution for 
their beliefs proved almost as great an obstacle. An anonymous letter written around 
1651 stated that "The natives of the islands adjacent to Scotland can, as a rule, be 
properly called neither Catholic nor heretics. They abhor heresy by nature, but they 
68 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 187. 
69 Giblin (ed. ), Irish Franciscan Mission, 180. 
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listen to the preachers from necessity. They go wrong in matters of faith through 
ignorance, caused by the want of priests to instruct them in their religion. "70 As late 
as the mid-seventeenth century it was difficult to classify the locals into one 
religious group; however, the letter indicates that the Islanders' neglect of 
Catholicism was the result of a shortage of priests and not because they followed the 
Protestant beliefs. This duality among the population of Catholics throughout 
Scotland, and especially in the Western Highlands and Isles, is more clearly revealed 
in letters from the Captain of Clanranald and from a Jesuit priest. 
A letter sent by lain Muideartach, 12th Chief of Clanranald, to Pope Urban 
VIII in 1626 stated: 
We humbly beg of Your Holiness that in the absence of any other 
means of redeeming our lives or goods, it may be permitted to us and 
to the other Catholic nobles by favour of the Holy Apostolic See to 
be present at the preaching of the heretics, but only when we shall be 
summoned before the supreme Council of the Kingdom or before the 
pseudo-bishops, on this condition, however, that we shall then 
publicly protest that we are Catholics according to the faith and 
religion of the Roman Church, asserting, at the same time, that we go 
to their churches not willingly nor from conviction but from 
compulsion and obliged by an unjust law of the kingdom, in order not 
to lose life and goods, not willingly nor from motives of religion. " 
The compromise suggested by Clanranald was increasingly becoming a common 
practice amongst the Catholic community, not just in the Highlands and not just 
within the nobility. A letter sent by John Leslie, a Scots Jesuit, on 13 June 1633 
from Glasgow to Father Mutius Vitelleschi, Superior General of the Society of 
Jesus, illustrated the same mentality as that shown in the letter from Clanranald. Fr. 
Leslie reported that he had to admonish a common woman for attending a "heretic 
worship" and that her reply was that other Catholic orders were more understanding 
of the predicament many Catholics were faced with. The confessor continued by 
explaining that "It is in opposition to our own wishes that we pretend to be heretics, 
profess to belong to the Calvinist sect, and go to listen to the sermons of the 
sectaries in obedience to the orders issued by ecclesiastical, parliamentary and royal 
70 Quoted in 0. Blundell, The Catholic Highlands of Scotland., The Western Highlands and Isles 
(Edinburgh, 1917), 6. 
71 J. L. Campbell, "The Letter Sent by lain Muideartach, Twelfth Chief of Clanranald, to Pope Urban 
VIII, in 1626", Innes Review IV, no. 2, (1953) pages 110-6, at p. 116. 
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authority. We hold the Catholic faith in our hearts, while with our lips we join in the 
ritual of the new gospel, under penalty of losing all we have in the world if we acted 
differently". 72 
Although Penal Laws were in place to declare forfeit the goods belonging to 
Catholics, surprisingly many were given the opportunity to conform and maintain 
their possessions. It is quite possible that the leniency shown to some Catholics, 
including former ministers who had joined the priesthood, was an attempt to win 
their hearts and minds through a show of compassion. As seen in the Synod of 
Argyll's proceedings against Catholics, both Lady Lergy and Mr. William Campbell 
of Eorobolls were given the opportunity to confer with the local minister and to 
conform to the Reformed religion. 73 According to the minutes of 7 October 1642, 
Lady Lergy was to repair to Dunoon to confer with Mr. Ewan Cameron and 
Campbell of Eorobolls was to repair to Inveraray to confer with Mr. Donald 
McOlvory. 74 The two ministers reported on 25 May 1643 that Lady Lergy on all 
occasions did resort to the exercises of public worship and that Campbell of 
Earobolls gave satisfaction to Mr. McOlvory on many points but claimed that, since 
he had been a papist for so long, it would take some time to "have him liberat of all 
scruples. "75 Numerous speculations can be made as to why after the minute entries 
for 25 May 1643 there was no further mention of these two papists. One possibility 
is that the ministers were actually successful in converting Lady Lergy and Mr. 
William Campbell of Eorobolls to Protestantism; the other is that both papists were 
able to use outward conformity to shake loose the suspicions of their religious 
inclination. Whatever the cause may be, the fact that the Kirk allowed them the 
chance to conform rather than seizing their property indicated the Kirk's need, as 
late as 1642, to gain support during the early stages of the Covenant Movement. 
However, this leniency disappeared after the arrival of Alasdair MacColla and his 
Irish regiments. 
The assumption of the time was that the Irish Catholics were planning an 
invasion of the west coast of Scotland with the intention of joining forces with the 
72 Leith, Memoirs of Scottish Catholics, 146-7. 
73 The exact identity of Lady Lergy and Mr. William Campbell of Eorobolls could not be found other 
than the titles given in the minutes. 
74MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 60. 
75MacTavish (ed. ), Synod of Argyll, 67. 
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remnant Catholic forces in Scotland. As indicated by the remonstrance of the 
General Assembly of 1646 concerning the province of Argyll, the Assembly claimed 
to the Committee of Estates that the enemy in Argyll was supported by a number of 
priests and friars who were intent on seducing the people in Kintyre and the Isles to 
popery and the Assembly believed that the Roman Catholics were attempting to 
topple the Protestant churches in both Europe and Britain. 76 Due to the perceived 
connection between the Irish Catholic regiments brought over by MacColla and the 
Roman Catholic attempt to topple Protestantism, the Kirk took a strong approach 
when dealing with those found to be involved with the "rebels" through 
excommunication regardless of their being Catholic or Protestant. A series of 
excommunications were issued when the royalist campaign of MacColla and 
Montrose came to an end in 1646. In July and August 1646 the General Assembly 
declared all "pryme actours of this bloodie and wnnaturall rebellion" 
excommunicated which included, among others, Alasdair MacColla, James Ogilvie, 
Earl of Airlie, and George MacKenzie, Earl of Seaforth. 77 Further steps were taken 
against the rebels by the Synod of Argyll in September 1648 when a list of 42 men 
was to be pronounced excommunicated by Mr. Dugald Campbell in Inveraray on the 
27th of September. Because of the persistent threat of Catholicism combined with 
the devastation by the rebels throughout Argyll the list of men was expanded to 
include those who were a specific threat to the stability of the Kirk in the region 
such as Angus MacDonald of Glengarry and John MacRanald, Captain of 
Clanranald. 78 
The fears of a Catholic invasion from Ireland and the resulting 
excommunications in the late 1640s served as a barometer of the Church of 
Scotland's success in establishing a strong Protestant following in the Western 
Highlands and Isles. Although steps were taken to remedy the deficiencies within 
the Kirk, many of the measures put in place fell short of solving the problems during 
the first half of the seventeenth century. As a result, the Western Highlands and 
Isles continued to resist a full programme of conversion to Protestantism because the 
76Mitchell, A. F. & Christie, J. (eds. ), Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies 1646 
and 1647 (SHS, 1892), 70-1. 
77 Mitchell & Christie (eds. ), Commissions of the General Assemblies 1646 and 1647,19 & 55. 
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Church often was not able, as it did in southern Argyll, to exploit potential links 
with the kin-based, Gaelic-speaking culture; nor was it able, in more hostile territory 
such as that of Clanranald, to circumvent the habits and natural loyalties within the 
local Gaidhealtachd. Because of these fissures, or weaknesses, within the foundation 
of the Church of Scotland in the Western Highlands and Isles, the Kirk was forced to 
admit as late as the early eighteenth century that the Reformation had not yet entered 
Clanranald's bounds. 79 
79 Macdonald, "Ireland and Scotland", 280. 
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Chapter 6 
Indebtedness in the Western Highlands and Isles 
As will be discussed in the follwing chapter, the economic position of the 
clans in the Western Highlands and Isles at the outbreak of the Civil Wars had a 
strong influence in the development of allegiances in the region. The economic 
ramifications of warfare were many; for example, the economic status of the clan 
dictated the size of the chief's mustering capabilities. Likewise, the financial losses 
through territorial devastation and the gains through pillage directed the clans to 
align with a particular faction. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
economic climate in the region to understand how these forces played a role in the 
war. This chapter will focus primarily on the level of indebtedness if the clans 
before and during the conflict paying particular attention to the causes and means of 
accruing debt while using the financial dealings of the Captain of Clanranald, 
Lamont of Lamont, and Campbell of Glenorchy as case studies to illustrate how 
different clans dealt with their financial circumstances. 
The level of indebtedness among the chiefs of the Western Highlands and 
Isles resulted from the development of a close connection with central government. 
The chiefs found it increasingly difficult to adjust from their former warlord role to 
one of a proprietor. This dilemma was partly the product of the annual appearances 
of the chiefs before the Privy Council in Edinburgh. The annual appearances 
necessitated periods of absence from the chiefs' estates resulting in the dilapidation 
of their property and created administrative problems. An analysis of the surviving 
testaments among the Highland chiefs shows a dramatic increase in the amount of 
debt left by the deceased. An examination of 31 testaments conducted by Dr. 
Douglas Watt revealed that the average debt between 1570 and 1589 equaled £819, 
roughly 18 percent of the chiefs movable assets, while the debt accumulated 
between 1590 and 1609 was £2,765, roughly 39 percent of assets. ' These figures 
would steadily increase as a result of the mandatory annual meetings and the 
1 D. Watt, "Chiefs, Lawyers and Debt: a study of the relationship between Highland elite and legal 
profession in Scotland C1550 to 1700 ", PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh (1998), Appendix IX, 
300-1 & 223. 
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increase in the chiefs' expenditure while residing in Edinburgh. For many chiefs, 
conspicuous expenditure in the form of luxury purchases and socializing 
transformed the clans' financial situation from "acute financial embarrassment into 
chronic insolvency" by the 1640s. 2 Another contributing factor to the indebtedness 
of the chiefs was the economic impact of the civil war of the 1640s. The chiefs 
found themselves faced with the costs of fighting campaigns, heavy fines for the 
insurgents, and severe losses in rents. When the financial implications of the annual 
appearances were combined with the economic impact of the civil war the result was 
near destruction of many of the clans from the Western Highlands and Isles. 
Financial troubles for the clans began in the late sixteenth century with the 
beginning of the transformation of the chiefs from warlords into proprietors, a 
process which would gain further momentum throughout the seventeenth century. 
This transformation was brought about by government pressures to abandon the clan 
system's traditional subsistence based economy which allowed the clans to function 
independently from the rest of the kingdom, and a new emphasis was to be placed 
on a cash based market economy that would foster a connection between the clans 
and market towns. The problem which arose for the chiefs was in the conversion of 
rents and payments previously made in kind to the newly required cash payments. 
The difficulty in transitioning to a cash based economy was common throughout 
Scotland; therefore, the impact it had on the Gaidhealtachd was similar to the new 
demands being placed on the estates of landholders and tenants across Scotland. 
As with Lowland landholders, in order to convert farm goods into ready 
cash, clan chiefs were faced with two options: take responsibility for taking goods to 
market to be sold for cash, or to place the responsibility on the tenants and require 
them to convert the goods into cash for rent payments. According to Robert 
Dodgshon, it appears that chiefs adopted both processes. 3 Both practices made the 
chiefs' income relatively flexible and increasingly dependent on market values. The 
decision to take rents in kind or to demand cash rents varied. For example, if the set 
2 A. Macinnes, "The Impact of the Civil Wars and Interregnum: Political Disruption and Social 
Change within Scottish Gaeldom", in R. Mitchison & P. Roebuck, (eds. ), Economy and Society in 
Scotland and Ireland 1500-1639 (Edinburgh, 1988), 62. 
3 R. Dodgshon, From Chiefs to Landlords: Social and Economic Change in the Western Highlands 
and Isles, c. 1493-1820 (Edinburgh, 1998), 108. For an extensive discussion of the conversion of 
rents in kind to cash rents see Dodgshon's chapter on "The Transformation of Chiefs into Landlords", 
102-22. 
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value of grain was less than the market value the chiefs often opted for rents in kind 
enabling them to make a profit at market, but if the market value was less the chiefs 
chose cash payments and passed the financial burden on to the tenants. 
Consequently, the chiefs' income was based on tenant farming which meant that the 
chiefs' cash flow was heavily dependent on the viability of the harvest and the 
subsequent market values of agricultural goods. As a result, the chiefs' income was 
often a combination of rents in kind and in cash; the trouble with this was that the 
chiefs were increasingly burdened with cash liabilities arising from the annual 
meetings and financial transactions in the Lowlands that could not be paid in kind. 
Depending on the year's harvest the chiefs' accounts may or may not have had 
enough ready cash to fulfill their obligations and forced many chiefs into debt. 
Although the process of integrating the Highland chiefs into national politics 
failed due to the collapse of the annual meetings, aspects of integration of the chiefs 
still remained. The fact that the chiefs were spending more time in Edinburgh and 
interacting on a greater level with Lowlanders meant that they were becoming 
increasingly exposed to and involved in the social and economic activities of 
Lowland society. As seen in the problem of indebtedness among the chiefs of the 
Western Highlands and Isles conspicuous consumption and financial dealings with 
the Lowland debt market kept the chiefs partially involved in the Lowlands, even 
after their attendance at the meetings was no longer enforced. Merchant and legal 
bills accrued by the chiefs indicate that they had been exposed to the fashion trends 
of the Lowlands as well as the social activities of the Lowlands, primarily gambling, 
and the benefits of using the legal system to settle disputes. Although the chiefs 
were no longer politically integrated through state formation policies, they were still 
linked with the center economically. 
In looking at the payments of royal rents from the Western Highlands and 
Isles it appears that the instituting of the annual meetings had an effect on the 
regularity with which payments were made. The number of royal lands in the region 
was relatively small, but the lands were much larger in comparison to Lowland 
territories resulting in rather significant sums due. The revenue from the Western 
Highlands and Isles appears to be a reason for direct crown interest; for example, the 
crown's rental income on Islay alone was £6,000 which explains the crown's interest 
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in the Islay rebellion as stability in the region would ensure timely payments being 
made to the crown. 4 Between 1600 and 1616 only 3 payments were made by the 
Clan Donald for their possession of Islay, one of which was a partial payment, while 
the average annual income from the region was £2,874. However, after the Islay 
rebellion when Campbell of Cawdor was granted possession of the island the rental 
payments of £6,000 were paid more consistently which raised the average rental 
payment between 1616 and 1635 to £7907. A survey of rental payments made 
between 1600 and 1635 shows a consistent pattern in payments made from Argyll 
and portions of Inverness-shire, with the exception of Islay which was embroiled in 
feuds and rebellion between the 1580s and 1616.5 In some cases payments were 
made in arrears, such as Clanranald's payment in 1617 for £2,408 for three years' 
payment. 6 Prior to 1617 Clanranald, MacDonald of Sleat, and MacLean of Duart 
made irregular rental payments either by not making a payment or by making only a 
partial payment while the Clan Campbell rental payments were more regular. This 
pattern with which payments were made prior to the annual meetings appears to 
continue through the duration of the annual meetings. After 1629 when the 
frequency of the annual meetings began to decline the crown continued to receive 
regular payments from the Campbells for their lands in Islay, Kintyre, Jura, 
Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, and Sunart which constituted the bulk of the region's 
revenue and the yearly payments averaged £8,621; however, Clanranald, 
MacDonald of Sleat, and MacLean of Duart are not registered as making their 
payments. 
In the cases of Clanranald and MacLean of Duart the probable explanation 
for their neglect in paying their royal rents throughout the late 1620s and early 1630s 
was the level of debt both chiefs were faced with during this period; as will be 
discussed in this chapter both chiefs were faced with financial insolvency. The fact 
that the revenue collected from the Western Highlands and Isles remained relatively 
stable prior to the annual meetings indicates that the financial difficulties of the 
4 NAS, Exchequer Records, E24/22-52,1600-1635; Appendix 6: Royal Rent Payments from Argyll 
and Portions of Inverness-shire, 1600-1635; see also W. Purves, Revenue of the Scottish Crown, 
1681, ed. D. Murray Rose (Edinburgh, 1897), 74 for later survey of crown property in Argyll which 
can be compared in the same volume to other shires. 
5 See Chapter 2, "The Western Highlands and Isles in Context" p. 25-27 for discussion of the Islay 
rebellion. 
6 NAS, Exchequer Records, E24/36,1617-8. 
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chiefs were not a result of existing financial responsibilities, such as royal rents, but 
were the result of the new financial obligations created by their integration into 
Lowland society and national politics. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the 1616 Regulations imposed various 
rules on the clan system with the largest financial effect radiating from the annual 
appearances. Along with the requirement to attend the meeting with the Privy 
Council came further orders which increased the severe financial burdens faced by 
many of the chiefs in the Western Highlands and Isles. The first of these new 
measures is easy enough to explain; the chiefs were to retain a lawyer in Edinburgh 
who would serve as a conduit between the Privy Council and the chiefs for 
summons and other official business. The employment of such agents would not 
allow for the chiefs' usual excuses of "I didn't know" when they ignored a 
summons. In a report to James VI by the Privy Council the intention was "so the 
saidis Yllismen pretend no ignorance of the same". 7 Of course these lawyers did not 
work for free. The legal expenses accumulated by the chiefs fell into two categories: 
pensions and costs of the legal process. The pensions paid to lawyers were a set sum 
which served as a retainer, meaning that the lawyer was on the chiefs payroll and 
was to be at the chiefs beck and call. The costs of the legal process were composed 
of the court fees for filing documents, such as a sasine, and the additional charges by 
the lawyer for having to appear in court. The retention of lawyers served as a direct 
financial burden on the chiefs; John MacLeod of Dunvegan paid a pension of 50 
merks a year to John Nicoll between 1629 and 1633.8 Furthermore, with the 
increase in financial and legal transactions resulting from a great deal of time being 
spent in the Lowlands for the annual visits, MacLeod's financial difficulties grew to 
such an extent that for the years 1636-7 he owed his attorney, John MacLae, £3,632 
for both his pension and for court costs. 9 Although the increase in legal transactions 
indicates one positive effect of the annual meetings through the increased use of the 
7J. Munro, "When Island Chiefs came to Town" in Notes & Queries: The Society of West Highland 
and Island Historical Research XIX (Dec. 1982), 11-9, at p. 12. 
8 Dunvegan Papers, Accts. Box 1,4/29,5/54 as quoted in Munro, "When Island Chiefs came to 
Town", 18. 
9 F. J. Shaw. The Northern and Western Islands of Scotland. - Their Economy and Society in the 
Seventeenth Century (Edinburgh, 1980), 45. 
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courts to settle disputes rather than the sword, the mounting legal fees had a much 
greater negative effect because they pushed many, like MacLeod, into serious debt. 
The use of cautions and sureties imposed by the annual appearances went 
hand in hand, and like the retention of lawyers, had a twofold impact on the chiefs. 
The caution was a sum of money put up by one chief guaranteeing another's 
appearance for the following year, and the surety was a second sum that secured a 
chief's promise to keep the peace in his bounds. Clearly, both practices had 
significant impacts on the chiefs' finances; the sums for sureties alone ranged from 
5,000 merks to £10,000 Scots. 1° The forfeiture of cautions became a common 
occurrence after 1629; for example, MacLean of Duart, MacLean of Morvern, and 
MacLaine of Lochbuie were decerned against for their failure to appear in 1629 and 
again in 1631, with the addition of Clanranald. " These measures made it more 
difficult for a chief to avoid answering for the behavior of himself and his clan. Not 
only was this because he faced being put to the horn and fined, but he also had to 
face the other chief who was now out of a large sum of money because he had 
guaranteed an appearance or peace-keeping. The combination of the agents, 
cautions and sureties which came out of the annual meetings slowly brought an end 
to the turmoil in the Isles as seen during James VI's reign. This transformation 
came by holding chiefs accountable for their own behavior and by making them 
provide caution and surety for their neighbor, both points having their own monetary 
repercussions. 
The chiefs also faced indirect financial burdens which resulted from the 
logistics behind attending the annual meetings as well as the need to live a more 
sophisticated Lowland lifestyle. The logistical complexities in traveling from the 
Highlands to Edinburgh and Glasgow resulted in the accumulation of enormous 
costs. The "Accounts by Gregor Grant of his expenditure on behalf of Sir John 
Grant of Mulben, younger of Freuchie, in two journeys to Edinburgh in 1620" 
provide a clear and detailed glimpse into the costs of traveling and residing in 
Edinburgh along with the financial dealings with lawyers in the city. In February 
1620 Sir John's journey took nine days and he was accompanied by six gentlemen 
1°A. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996), 72. 
u RPC, 2 "d series, ii, 218; RPC, 2 "d series, iv, 280. 
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with their horses and nine servants. The second journey in June 1620 again included 
six horsemen and their servants. The combined expenses paid out by Gregor Grant 
for the two journeys which included travel expenses, accommodation, and legal fees 
totaled £1,358 6s 5d. 12 The expenses of Sir John's journey provide a rough estimate 
of what the typical costs amounted to for somebody of his status and geographical 
location; however, it can be assumed that the costs of the journey for the island 
chiefs would be slightly higher and that the more powerful chiefs would have a 
larger retinue to support and would partake in entertaining while in the Lowlands. 
Therefore, Sir John's expenses can be applied to the expenses of the chiefs of the 
Western Highlands and Isles as the minimum expenditure that a chiefs journey to 
Edinburgh would amount to. 
To compound the issue, the socializing and shopping sprees of the Highland 
chiefs while in the Lowlands only served to further deplete their finances. The 
poems of Eachann Bacach, MacLean bard, provide evidence of Sir Lachlan 
MacLean of Duart's dealings while in Edinburgh during the 1630s. Bacach's poem 
"lorram do Shir Lachann", written about 1635, lamented his chiefs frivolous 
expenditures: 
Mhic Moire na greine 
A ghiulain do cheusadh, 
`S tu m'aighear is m'eudail `s mo threoir. 
[Son of Mary, Lord of the sun, who hast suffered crucifixion, Thou art my 
joy, my treasure and my strength. ] 
Greas thugainn dhachaidh 
Oighre dligheach na h-aitribh 
Nam piob is nam brataichean sroil. 
[Send home speedily to us the lawful heir of the house, the man of the pipes 
and the satin banners. ] 
An Dun Eideann nan caisteal 
Tha ceannand treun na mor aitim: 
'S ann ded' bheus a bhith sqapadh an oir; 
[The mighty leader of the great sept is in Edinburgh of the castles: it is a 
custom of yours to disperse gold, ) 
Is nach b'urrainn dod' dhutchaich 
Chur ad ghlacaibh de chuinne 
12D. Watt, "Chiefs, Lawyers and Debt", 200; W. Fraser, The Chiefs of Grant 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 
1883), iii, 22. 
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Na chosgadh tu chruintibh mu' bhord. 
[While your own land could never put as much money in your hands as the 
crowns you would spend round the gambling table. ] 
Gur buidheach na h-esgean 
De dh'uasal an eididhi 
Leat gun guidh buaidh threun anns gach toir. 
[The poets are grateful to the nobleman of the fine apparel; they will pray for 
a mighty victory for you in every pursuit. ] 13 
The actions of Sir Lachlan while in Edinburgh were not unique; many chiefs became 
involved in Lowland society and began to emulate the lifestyle and fashion of 
Edinburgh often replacing their Highland attire with the Lowland fashion which was 
perceived to be more civilized. 14 
After only about five or six years the costs of the annual meetings both direct 
and indirect began to mount and were putting many chiefs in financial predicaments. 
The warlords of James VI's reign were, by Charles I's accession, asking the 
government to be excused from the meetings and for immunity from their creditors 
before they would journey south to appear before the Privy Council. 15 The first such 
petition on the grounds of economic detriment came from Sir Rory Mor MacLeod of 
Dunvegan in 1622. In a letter to James VI, Sir Rory claimed that his yearly 
appearance in Edinburgh was "to my great hurt". MacLeod continued his letter by 
stating that "in regaird of the far distans of place fra the Counsell it haldis me yeirlie 
mekill of half ane yeir in the Laichland ... I am of 
intention to repair my houssis and 
theik them with lead and to plant and decoir the countrie and boundis thairin. " In an 
attempt to "decoir my houssis and plant yardis and orchardis and diffray my debtis 
and pay my Creditouris" MacLeod asked James VI for a seven year leave from the 
meetings; the king agreeing granted him three years to conduct the necessary 
business. 16 The ability of chiefs, such as MacLeod of Dunvegan, to draw a 
correlation between their financial status and their ability to administer their estates 
in accordance with the regulations outlined by the Privy Council led to an increase 
in the frequency of dispensations from the Privy Council. Once an excuse was 
13 C. O'Baoill, (ed. ), Eachann Bacach and other MacLean Poets (Edinburgh, 1979), 6-7. 
14 The Book of Dunvegan contains numerous merchant bills of the MacLeods of Dunvegan which 
include the purchase of silk, lace, and silver buttons, as well as an oven. 
15 A. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 72-3. 
16 NLS, MS 2133, pp. 1134. 
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granted on the basis of financial hardship numerous chiefs began requesting excuses 
on the same grounds. 
The pleas for an excuse from the meetings were not only filed by specific 
chiefs but also by the chiefs as a whole in an attempt to show a united front. Similar 
to the previous request from MacLeod, a supplication filed on 11 July 1633 
complained of the financial burden the annual meetings had on the region in general 
and on the chiefs' resources and, more importantly, their status. The supplication 
was submitted by MacDonald of Sleat, MacLeod of Dunvegan, MacLean of Duart 
and the Captain of Clanranald on behalf of themselves and other landholders of the 
islands on the grounds that the annual appearance was a major burden "it being a 
moithe and canker which eatis up our wholl estates and in tyme will overthrow us". 
The Privy Council agreed with the supplication's statement that the islands had been 
peaceful and excused the chiefs from the 1634 meeting. " It would be only ten years 
before the chiefs' predictions came true; by the early 1640s both MacLean of Duart 
and the Captain of Clanranald were faced with financial ruin stemming in part from 
the financial ramifications of the annual meetings. Although excuses were granted 
by the Privy Council prior to 1632, the dire economic situation in the Western 
Highlands and Isles became a compelling reason for a dispensation. 
Roughly the same time as the chiefs were petitioning the Privy Council for 
excuses from the annual meetings they were also requesting the Privy Council to 
issue protections from creditors. Many chiefs were faced with the threat of 
imprisonment by their creditors if they entered Edinburgh. As a result, the Privy 
Council began issuing protections which guaranteed the chiefs liberty for a specific 
time frame to enable the council and the chiefs to conduct government business as 
well as allowing the chiefs to resolve their debts within the city limits. The 
protection discharged all officers of the law from troubling or arresting the said chief 
for his debts. It appears that the Privy Council put greater emphasis on the ability to 
conduct government business with the chiefs that would further promote their 
`civility', rather than concerning themselves with private financial dealings. 
Such protections increased in frequency due to the increase of indebtedness 
among the chiefs. The number of protections being issued by the Privy Council 
17 RPC, 2nd series, v, 560-1. 
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grew to such an extent that within the Register of the Privy Council for Scotland the 
Minute Book of Processes gives a memorandum, entitled "Protectiones for severall 
persones", which only lists the names of those granted protections rather than 
providing an elaborate detail of the protection. However, in some cases, protections 
to prominent figures were given in minimal detail as seen in the documentation 
regarding the protections of the Earl of Caithness and branches of the Clan 
MacLean. The 1621 act which provided for the granting of protections was quickly 
taken advantage of by the Earl of Caithness and his son Lord Berridale in 1623. 
Although Caithness is not within the Western Highlands and Isles, the inclusion of 
the earl and his son provides an example of the negative effect that the issuance of 
protections could have on an estate due to the abuse of the system which allowed 
Caithness to circumvent his creditors and continue to accrue debts and interest. 
According to the Register of the Privy Council for Scotland the Council granted a 
protection to Caithness and Berridale on 12 June 1623 and it was to expire on the 
20th of August so that they might enter Edinburgh to negotiate with their creditors. 18 
No less than nine extensions to the original protection were granted on behalf of the 
Earl of Caithness and Lord Berridale which effectively extended protection from 24 
June 1624 to 31 March 1627.19 The intention of granting protections was to help 
preserve the standing of many nobles and Highland chiefs and to prevent their 
financial ruin; however, the extensions issued to Caithness and Berridale appeared to 
Charles I to be a hindrance and were not aiding the nobles. By allowing them to 
continually delay an agreement with their creditors and in the process accumulate 
interest, the financial situation of Caithness and Berridale was worsened and, as 
implied in a the letter from Charles I to the Privy Council in 1626,20 the time had 
come to settle their debts before further ruin was brought on their house. 
In contrast to the abuse of protections by Caithness and Berridale, the details 
of the protections issued to Sir Lachlan MacLean of Morvern and Hector MacLean, 
apparent of Duart, illustrate that the proper use of protections proved vital to their 
compliance with the laws of the realm. On 6 December 1631 Sir Lachlan MacLean 
18 RPC, xiii, 253. 
19 Extensions were granted on 25 August 1624,31 May 1625,14 July 1625,30 August 1625,29 
November 1625,24 February 1626,28 March 1626, and 25 June 1626. RPC, xiii, 597; RPC 2nd 
series, i, 38,74,125,207,241,257,317. 
20 RPC, 2nd series, i, 448. 
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of Morvern requested a protection from his creditors in order to enter Edinburgh free 
from prosecution allowing him to resolve his debts with various creditors. Sir 
Lachlan was granted the necessary protection which was to remain in effect until 31 
January 1632. However, Sir Lachlan's protection was later extended to 30 April 
1632 so that he would be able to remain in Edinburgh and appear before the Privy 
Council to resolve a financial dispute between himself and Hector MacLean, 
apparent of Duart. 21 In order for the Privy Council to resolve the conflict between 
MacLean of Morvern and MacLean of Duart it was deemed necessary to issue a 
similar protection to Hector MacLean because the Council had been informed that 
Sir Lachlan intended to have Hector MacLean arrested for outstanding debts owed 
to Sir Lachlan, and it was imperative that Hector be able to appear before the 
Council to answer to the charges brought against him by Sir Lachlan. Therefore, on 
13 March 1632 Hector MacLean and Lachlan MacLean of Coll, were issued 
protections until the 27th of March, but like Sir Lachlan MacLean of Morvern their 
protections were extended until 15 April in order to allow the Council to resolve the 
matter. 22 The protections issued to the MacLeans serve as a prime example of the 
growing financial troubles of the chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles; both 
chiefs were severely in debt and in order to ruin the other and potentially gain 
financially one kinsman threatened to imprison the other. The growing lists of 
protections granted to Highlanders and recorded in the Register of the Privy Council 
are indicative of the overall financial epidemic of the region. 
The financial difficulties of many of the chiefs in the Western Highlands and 
Isles were worsened by the effects of the Scottish Revolution. The costs of the 
fighting campaigns and the subsequent devastations resulting from the wars only 
served to exacerbate the precarious position of many clans. Direct evidence of the 
financial impact of the military campaigns is limited; however it is reasonable to 
assume the cost was large. A rough estimate of the military expenditure can be 
deduced from the personal expenses of the Marquis of Argyll. Although Argyll was 
the most involved actor in the wars and therefore had the greatest expenses, the ratio 
of his personal expenses to the payments received from the Covenant regime 
21 RPC, 2nd series, iv, 385,426. 
22 RPC, 2nd series, iv, 445. 
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illustrates the financial deficit of those involved in the military campaigns. Argyll's 
activities during the Bishops' Wars personally cost him £72,004. This sum included 
the costs of suppressing dissent, advancing taxation, public loans from Argyll and 
the Isles, donating silver, patrolling the North Channel, and fortifying Kintyre all of 
which was for the Covenant cause. However, of the £72,004 paid out by Argyll 
only E19,167 was reimbursed by the Covenant regime leaving Argyll with a 
financial deficit of £52,83723 It can be assumed that the reimbursement made to 
Argyll was greater than those made to lesser Covenanters due to Argyll's high rank 
within the regime; therefore, Argyll's ratio of expenditure to reimbursement serves 
as a best case scenario. For other nobles this ratio can be assumed to be much less 
than that of Argyll's which resulted in many being near bankrupt. 
To complicate matters for many of the landholders in the Highlands, 
especially in the Western Highlands and Isles, the devastation left in the wake of the 
military campaigns left many estates utterly ruined and severely impacted their 
ability to collect their rents. As explained by Prof. Keith Brown, "land is of little 
value if it fails in its primary function of growing crops and grazing stock, and when 
all is said and done noble wealth was largely dependent on a fairly insecure 
agricultural economy"; 24 therefore, territorial devastation effectively destroyed the 
nobles' income. A bulk of the devastation was inflicted on the Clan Campbell and 
their allies by Alasdair MacColla, his Irish regiments, and his Western Highland 
contingents. The burning of crops and the stealing or slaughter of livestock within 
Campbell territory carried out by MacColla hit the Campbells where it hurt the most, 
in the pocket book. According to the Book of the Thanes of Cawdor the rents 
collected from Campbell of Cawdor's lands in Islay and Muckairn averaged between 
£20,000 and £22,000 annually prior to the war. However, in 1651 the reported 
rental income plummeted 90% to £2,216 10s 2d. 25 Likewise, the Campbells of 
Glenorchy also faced a drastic reduction in their rental income. Due to the raids of 
Montrose and MacColla "in the zeiris of God 1644 and 1645 the laird of Glenorchy 
his whole landis and esteatt betuixt the foord of Lyon and point of Lismoir weir 
23 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 98. 
24 K. Brown, "Aristocratic Finances and the Origins of the Scottish Revolution", English Historical 
Review 104 (1989), 46-87, at p. 58. 
25 C. Innes, (ed. ), The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor: A Series of Papers Selected from the Charter 
Room at Cawdor, 1236-1742 (Spalding Club, 1859), 303. 
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brunt and destroyit" which were estimated to have caused 1,200,000 merks 
damage. 26 The destruction of Glenorchy's estates clearly had a severe negative 
impact on his rents, "all the rent of the estait did not reach 2800 merks be reason of 
the devastations". 27 Lastly, a letter from Mr. John Middleton to the Marquis of 
Argyll illustrates the damage done to those allied with the Campbells and the 
Covenant regime. On 14 January 1646 Mr. Middleton wrote to Argyll requesting 
aid to be given to Duncan Forbes of Culloden by the Committee of Estates: 
... he hes all his Lands spoiled and waisted by the Rebells, his Come burnt, and truelie himself brought to that extremitie, that unless his 
loss be taken to consideratioun he cannot be able to subsist. . . This I thought fit to represent to your Lordship, and shall intreat in his 
behalff that your Lordship will befriend him at the Committees, and 
by thinking upon some way both how his loss may be repaired, and 
for his subsistence in the mean tyme, in respect of his fidelity and 
constancie. 28 
The indebtedness of the chiefs in the Western Highlands and Isles gave rise 
to an increase in money lending. Due to the increasing indebtedness of Lowland 
nobles an extensive debt market was already developing around Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, and the addition of the debts from the chiefs expanded the market in the 
Lowlands and extended it into the Highlands, primarily within the Campbell sphere. 
There were few men in the Western Highlands and Isles who had the economic 
resources to be creditors, therefore, the extension of the debt market into the region 
was primarily facilitated by Archibald Campbell, Marquis of Argyll, his son 
Archibald, Lord Lorne, and George Campbell, sheriff depute of Argyll. As a result, 
when hostilities broke out in the Highlands in the 1640s a number of allegiances 
were based on the involvement of the Campbells in the debt market. 29 
Often individuals would borrow relatively small sums from other chiefs or 
larger sums from the Campbells or lawyers and merchants in the Lowlands. The 
debt markets had both a political and financial function because of the obligations 
26 C. Innes, (ed. ), The Black Book of Taymouth: With other papers from the Breadalbane Charter 
Room (Kilchurn Society, 1986), 96,102. 
27 NAS, Breadalbane Muniments, GD112/39/113/23. 
28 D. Forbes, (ed. ), Culloden Papers (London, 1875), 5-6. 
29 For details of the economic impact on allegiances see chapter 7 "Western Highlands and Isles 
Allegiances" especially the MacLeans of Duart's reaction to the financial manipulations of the 
Marquis of Argyll. 
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set out in the contracts between creditor and debtor as well as with the cautioner to 
the debt. 30 It was not uncommon for a lesser clan chief to loan his superior money 
or to stand caution for him in another contract. This new relationship often placed 
the lesser chief in a beneficial social situation due to the favor he performed for his 
superior. A prime example of this is the transaction between Campbell of Argyll 
and Campbell of Glenorchy. In 1634 Sir Colin Campbell of Glenorchy gave 
Archibald Campbell, future Marquis of Argyll, 8,000 merks in exchange for 
Argyll's bond that he would not question Glenorchy's rights of the lands he held in 
Argyll . 
31 However, this new relationship also put many in financial trouble because 
many superiors did not pay their debts and the obligation to pay was passed down to 
the cautioners. For example, as cautioners, both Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat and 
John MacLeod of Dunvegan were forced to accept responsibility for Argyll's debt of 
£10,000 on 14 December 1633.32 For those lesser chiefs and various money lenders 
who were able to collect on their loans their economic situation improved due to the 
interest rates imposed on the debtor, which was eight percent on the principal, but 
those unable to collect were forced to turn to the justice system in order to get 
satisfaction. 
The process of borrowing money was not as difficult as trying to collect on 
defaulted payments. When a chief or noble was in need of financial assistance he 
would sign an obligation to their creditor, either to pay back money borrowed or to 
pay off a merchant or lawyer bill. The obligation was a straightforward document 
which stated the names of the creditor and the borrower with the principal sum and 
often the interest rate, as well as the due date of payment. Unfortunately for the 
creditor, the necessary steps to collect on the loan were not as easy. In many cases 
the debtor would default on his payment and issue a second or third obligation with 
a new payment date. As a result, many debts went uncollected for years and many 
creditors were forced to turn to raising an apprising. 
When a debtor was delinquent in his payment the creditor petitioned the 
crown for letters of apprising to be issued under the signet. The letters of apprising 
were addressed to the messenger-at-arms who was instructed to summon a court of 
30 Dodghson, From Chiefs to Landlords, 36. 
31 The Black Book of Taymouth, 77 & 261. 
32 The Book of Duvegan, 178. 
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apprising in either the head burgh of the territory or in Edinburgh "wher advyse may 
be had". 33 The messenger-at-arms was a public servant and served as an executive 
officer of the law appointed by the Lord Lyon; his primary duty was to collect 
outstanding debts on the creditor's behalf. 34 Once letters of apprising were issued 
the first step taken by the messenger-at-arms was to charge the debtor to pay 
according to his legal obligation. If the debtor remained obstinate, the messenger-at- 
arms denounced the debtor a rebel and began the process of poinding. Poinding was 
the seizure by the messenger-at-arms and his assistants of moveable goods, with the 
exception of laboring animals and steelbow, as collateral on the debt. If poinding 
failed to resolve the debt, often because the moveable goods were not sufficient to 
cover the debt, the next step was to apprise the heritable property of the debtor. 35 
The apprising of property was allowed to be carried out only when it was 
deemed that the total value of moveable goods and cattle was insufficient. The 
decreet of apprising which authorized the process of forfeiture required an 
independent party, led by the messenger-at-arms, to assess and calculate a monetary 
value on the estate. Once the estate had been valued the debtor was given a final 
opportunity to resolve his debt. If payment was still not received the creditor was 
given permission to use any means necessary to acquire his portion of the apprised 
estate which equaled the amount of principal, the interest owed, and the sheriffs fee 
which was 12d. per £ Scots owed. 36 This last step resulted in a sasine being issued 
and the creditor being given the appropriate portion of the debtor's estate. Although 
the debtor's estate had essentially been foreclosed on, there remained a final option 
for the debtor to regain possession which appears rarely to have been a viable 
option. 37 Apprised lands were redeemable as long as the payment was made in one 
lump sum which included the amount owed for principal, interest, sheriff's fees, and 
other expenses accumulated during the apprising and infeftment of the estate. 
However, there was a statute of limitation that specified that the redemption of the 
33 P. Gouldesbrough, Formulary of Old Scots Legal Documents (Stair Society, 1985), 115; Sir 
Thomas Hope, Major Practicks 1608-33,2 vols., ed. J. Clyde (Stair Society, 1937-8), VI. 28.7. 
34 M. H. B. Sanderson, Mary Stewart's People: Life in Mary Stewart's Scotland (Edinburgh, 1987), 
136-7. 
35 Hope, Major Practicks, VI. 28.8,41 & 42; Sanderson, Mary Stewart's People, 138. 
36 Hope, Major Practicks, VI. 28.36. 
37 No evidence was found that any apprisings from the Western Highlands and Isles were redeemed 
by the debtor. 
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apprised land had to be conducted within seven years of the apprising, unless the 
debtor was a minor in which case he had until his 25`h birthday regardless of the 
seven year expiry date, otherwise the debtor was without recourse. 38 
In an attempt to ward off the creditors, many chiefs and nobles were inclined 
to grant wadsets to their kinsmen and allies, but in dire situations were forced to rely 
on anybody financially solvent, including those not considered friendly to the clan. 
A wadset was a real estate transaction that gave temporary possession of a 
designated piece of land with its income attached in exchange for a lump sum of 
money. One technical aspect of wadsets that classified the transaction as a loan 
rather than a sale was the mandatory inclusion of a reversionary clause. The 
reversion stipulated that the chief who granted the wadset was allowed to buy back 
his estate with interest, and although the provision was there to regain their estate 
often many were unable to. In some cases the reversionary clause was unrealistic 
due to the principal borrowed, the interest owed, or even the date by which the debt 
had to be paid. The issuing of wadsets was common practice after the Reformation 
due to the new laws regarding usury, or the charging of interest; by the middle of the 
seventeenth century the frequency of wadsets being issued increased in proportion to 
the excessive debts accrued by many nobles and chiefs. Many chiefs were forced to 
wadset a majority of their territory to pay other debts; in essence the chiefs used 
wadsets in order to rob Peter to pay Paul. The increasing interaction with the debt 
market and the number of wadsets against the chiefs estate only served to 
temporarily relieve their financial situation. 39 The clan's long term economic status 
worsened because at some point the creditors would collect on their loans. 
Given the complex nature of seventeenth-century economics it proves 
beneficial to examine the economic situation of specific clans in order to see how 
the mechanism functioned in practice. By conducting case studies of Clanranald, 
Clan Lamont, and Campbell of Glenorchy the intricate procedures for accruing debt 
and collecting on debts can be put into context. These clans have been selected for 
two reasons: the availability of documents and the fact that they are typical 
representations of various debt patterns. A long list of indebted clans can be 
38 Hope, Major Practicks, 111.11.6 & 18, VI. 28.38; Gouldesbrough, Formulary, 115. 
39 Dodghson, From Chiefs to Landlords, 37. 
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compiled which would include, among others, MacLeod of Dunvegan, MacLean of 
Duart, and the Earl of Seaforth; however, the extensiveness of documents for 
Clanranald, Lamont, and Glenorchy facilitates the most complete accounting of their 
indebtedness and, thus, provides the clearest examples of debt patterns. An 
investigation into the financial transactions of John MacRanald of Moidart, Captain 
of Clanranald, reveals a chief faced with the possibility of financial ruin and how, 
through creative real estate transactions, he was able to salvage his clan's socio- 
economic status. In contrast to Clanranald, the examination of the finances of Sir 
James Lamont of Lamont renders an extreme example of a chief near complete ruin 
due to his extensive borrowing for the royalist regime and his defaulting on 
numerous loans. Lastly, the economic details of the Campbells of Glenorchy 
illustrate the fact that indebtedness was a non-discriminating epidemic and 
highlights the economic effects of the Civil Wars experienced by many landholders. 
The bulk of the financial difficulties of John MacRanald of Moidart, Captain 
of Clanranald, can be dated back to as early as the 1610s with the institution of the 
annual appearances before the Privy Council. For Clanranald this proved to be an 
expensive venture due to the recurrent hostilities of his clan. A letter from Rory 
Mor MacLeod of Dunvegan to James VI, in 1622, requested to be excused from the 
annual meetings and included a request that Clanranald also be excused so that he 
too could resolve his debts. According to MacLeod, his son-in-law, Clanranald, was 
unable to pay 'the large debts accumulated by his father through his attempts at 
"reducing his kin, tenants and neighbours to the king's obedience". 40 Every instance 
of insurrection by the Clanranald resulted in the chief losing his surety, which 
averaged 10,000 merks, and in some cases resulted in additional fines or reparations 
being charged to the chief. Although Clanranald was already suffering from large 
debts due to his clan's lawlessness their hostile behavior continued through the first 
half of the seventeenth century and complicated his financial situation to such a 
point he was forced to turn to Lord Lorne, eldest son of the Marquis of Argyll, for 
assistance in paying his debts. 
Between 1625 and 1627 piracy throughout the Western Isles was rampant; 
one particular incident which cost Clanranald dearly was an attack on a merchant 
40 NLS, MS 2133, p. 113-4. 
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ship out of Glasgow by his kinsmen and the Clan Maclan in 1627. In the autumn of 
1627 Clanranald and Clan Maclan boarded a ship off of the coast of Barra where 
they ate and drank the cargo which included tea, wines, and various other victuals. 
They then took with them a further "5 butts of wine, 8 casks of herring, 8 score of 
pounds, 300 double ells of plaiding". 41 At the following Privy Council meeting 
Clanranald was ordered to give satisfaction to the Glasgow merchants for the goods 
robbed by "him, his tennentis and followaris" and was kept in ward in Edinburgh 
and Canongate until 29 November 1627.42 Clanranald's liberty was granted on the 
condition he promised to behave himself as a good and peacable subject. Aside 
from promising to obey the laws of the realm, Clanranald was required to also see 
"God honnoured" and "the resoirt and ressett of Jesuitis and priests restreaned". He 
was to ensure the ministers were cherished, and was "not [to] heir messe nor suffer it 
to be said in his boundis" under pain of 10,000 merks. To verify that these 
conditions would be fulfilled Clanranald was to meet and confer with the Bishop of 
Dunblane and others "quhairby he may be instructed in the trew religioun and resave 
resolutioun of his doubtis and scruples thairin" 43 These additional conditions to his 
release would later result in supplementary financial ramifications due to his 
religious convictions. 
Upon release from ward Clanranald obeyed the Privy Council's order to 
make reparation for the goods stolen from the ship. A discharge by Walter Stirling, 
merchant burgess of Glasgow, recorded in the Clanranald Papers, states that 
Clanranald was discharged "for certain sums of money on account of goods which 
they took in the isle of Barra from a ship of Leith, sailing from the river Clyd to the 
town of Danskine". 44 Clearly this incident cost Clanranald a great deal of money: 
not only did he have to pay the surety for his clan's disobedience, he was also forced 
to pay for the goods they stole and had to promise another surety of 10,000 merks. 
Although this financial impact was detrimental it was apparently not enough 
to persuade him to follow the religious conditions dictated in his grant of liberty. 
The fact that Clanranald ignored the religious implications of his release is made 
41 A. McDonald & A. McDonald, Clan Donald 4vols (Inverness, 1896-1904), ii, 326. 
42 RPC, 2nd, ii, 28. 
43 RPC, 2nd, ii, 137. 
44 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/18. 
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evident in his continued support of the Irish Franciscan missionaries. In 1630 
Clanranald was forced to surrender his surety again, which resulted in his having to 
pay another 10,000 merks, for interfering with the apprehension of the Irish 
Franciscan missionary, Fr. Patrick Hegarty, and was to transport and exhibit two 
kinsmen resulting in additional costs for their travel expenses. 45 
While Clanranald was faced with extraordinary expenses due to his clan's 
lawlessness he still had other financial commitments to meet, such as annualrents 
and teinds. Analysis of the obligations and discharges of Clanranald indicates that a 
great deal of his expenditure went to annualrents, teind and taxation payments. A 
discharge from John Gordon of Buckie, sheriff of Inverness, records a payment 
made by John McRonald of Illindtirrim, Captain of Clanranald, on 14 August 1627 
of £365 Scots as three terms' payment of taxation that was granted to his Majesty in 
October 1625.46 The next mention of taxation payments made by Clanranald does 
not appear until August 1630 when Adam Keltie, clerk of the Exchequer, issued a 
discharge to him for £l 1 Scots as four terms' payment of taxation for his lands in 
Ballevanich and £48 16s Scots as teind payment for financial support of the Bishop 
of the Isles. 47 
Many of the obligations and discharges were not as specific as those relating 
to taxation in regards to the original contract; many discharges merely stated the 
amount paid, to whom and when. For example, a discharge by Colin MacKenzie, 
Earl of Seaforth, issued on 20 August 1630, stated that Clanranald made a partial 
payment of 800 merks for his annualrent of 8,000 merks and paid 12,000 merks as 
part payment of the principal sum owed to Seaforth, but the specific territory 
associated with these payments was not clearly defined 48 However, further 
investigation reveals that Clanranald held the 27 merk land of Moidart and the 24 
merk land of Arisaig from the Earl of Seaforth. Later payments to the Earl of 
Seaforth verify that the land in question was Moidart and Arisaig as Clanranald was 
as RPC, 2nd, iv, 391. For more on Clanranald's support of the missionaries see chapter 4 "Religion 
from Reformation to War", especially Clanranald's letter to Pope Urban VIII in 1626. 
46 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/14. John MacRanald of Moidart, Captain of Clanranald, also 
went by the title of MacRanald of Illindtirrim due to his possess of the island castle of Tioram in 
Moidart. 
47 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/25. 
48 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/28. The term annualrent was often used to represent the 
interest charged on a loan or consisted of an annuity. 
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issued another discharge for 204 merks as "feu-duty" on these lands on 2 March 
1633.49 The sum total of the annualrent and feu-duty payments made by Clanranald 
to Seaforth, as well as to MacLeod of Alaskar, Cameron of Lochiel, Guthrie of 
Gagie and Lord Lorne constitutes the majority of his expenditures. Between 1629 
and 1635 the combined total paid in annualrent and feu-duties equaled 24,234 
merks. It appears from surviving documents that many of the annualrents 
constituted both feu-duty payments as well as interest payments even when the 
distinction is not clearly stated. Although it is difficult to state with certainty which 
payment is being made at any given time, statements such as "for £84 as annual rent 
of 1,261 merks" used in the discharge from Guthrie of Gagie indicates a high 
probability that the payment was for interest against the original debt of 1,261 
merks. Therefore, the 24,234 merks Clanranald paid between 1629 and 1633 can be 
classified into the following categories: 2,204 merks to Seaforth for both feu-duty 
and interest payments, 10,700 merks to MacLeod in interest payments, 2,000 merks 
to Cameron for feu-duty payments, 126 merks to Guthrie in interest payments, and 
9,204 merks to Lorne for feu-duty payments. 50 
No valuation rolls exist for the years between 1629 and 1633; however, a 
valuation roll of the Isles compiled in 1644 gives some insight into a portion of 
Clanranald's income. According to the valuation roll his estate in the Isles was 
worth £9,700 or 14,697 merks a year, making him the fifth largest landholder in 
Inverness and Ross: £1,733 6s 8d for Eigg, £4,000 for his lands in the parish of 
Skim and Kilphedder, and £4,000 for his lands in Kilmorie. 51 If the 24,234 merks 
owed between 1629 and 1635 are spread over the six years in which it was 
accumulated it would equal roughly a debt of 4,000 merks a year which could have 
been easily offset by the projected income from Clanranald's island estates. 
Therefore, it is surprising that in 1633 Clanranald was faced with such financial 
difficulties that he was forced to enter a contract with Lord Lorne; however, these 
figures do not yet include the financial transactions with merchant burgesses, 
including Clanranald's largest creditor, Archibald Thomsone. 
49 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/35. 
so NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/23; GD201/1/28; GD201/1/33; GD201/1/35; GD201/1/42; 
GD201/1/44; GD201/5/906; GD201/5/908; GD201/5/911. 
51 C. Fraser-Mackintosh, Antiquarian Notes (Stirling, 1913), 360 & 370-1. 
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Like many chiefs from the Western Highlands and Isles, Clanranald 
participated in the extensive debt market established in Edinburgh and Glasgow. 
Many of the debts owed by Clanranald to various merchants were small sums 
ranging from 40 to 200 merks. Analyzing the same time frame, 1629 to 1635, the 
total owed to merchants was at least 8,798 merks. 52 If we extend the date to 1642 the 
total increases only 2,200 merks. 53 However, of the total owed 8,208 merks was due 
solely to Archibald Thomsone, tailor burgess of Edinburgh. According to a bond 
issued by Thomsone in favor of Clanranald in November 1632 in which Thomsone 
was "superseding payment til Whitsunday 1633", Clanranald owed Thomsone 
"£5,472 Scots and other sums". 54 This bond is one of the main reasons Clanranald 
turned to Lord Lorne for financial assistance in 1633. 
In an attempt to resolve his financial crisis, which arose from the 
combination of fines for lawlessness, annual rents, and bonds owed to burgesses, 
Clanranald turned over his debts to Archibald Campbell, Lord Lorne, in 1633. An 
agreement was reached between the two in which Lorne would advance Clanranald 
money to pay his creditors in exchange for superiority over Moidart and Arisaig. A 
draft contract between Clanranald and Lorne dated 1 June 1633 stated that Lorne 
was assigned the debts owing to Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat totaling 26,921 
merks 10s 8d and "to that effect to use ane lawfull ordour of redemptione conforme 
to the tenor of the reversione". 55 In looking at "Ane compt of the money payit and 
advancit be my Lord Lorne for the capitane of ClanRannald at the terme of mertimes 
1633" we see that the first item paid by Lorne was to Sleat for the exact sum of 
26,921 merks 10s 8d. 56 This transaction is officially recorded in detail on 29 June 
1633 in the Argyll Sasines where the exact flow of money is finalized. What 
appears to have transpired is that Lorne advanced Clanranald the money to pay his 
debt to Sleat and enable Clanranald to receive from Sleat a reversion on the original 
wadset between Sleat and Clanranald issued on 22 February 1633; then Clanranald 
renounced the reversion in favor of Lorne, effectively transferring the wadset and 
52 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/27; GD201/29; GD201/1/32; GD201/1/34; GD201/1/46. This 
sum is based on the surviving documents in the archive and is, therefore, a rough figure due to the 
possibility that not all debts are accounted for. 
3 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/49; GD201/1/50; GD201/1/53; GD201/l/55; GD201/1/56. 
sa NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/1/34. 
ss NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/5/903. 
56 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/5/902. 
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attached debt owed by Clanranald from Sleat to Lorne. According to the original 
contract, in exchange for clearing his debts to MacDonald of Sleat, Clanranald "be 
the tenor heirof binds and obleiss him his aires successers and signayis foirsaides to 
presentlie entir and posses the said nobill Lord [Lorne] and his forsaides in and to 
the landis underwrettine". 57 These lands included the territories of Arisaig and 
Moidart laid out in the original wadset to Sleat and lands held by Clanranald under 
the superiority of the Earl of Seaforth for other debts paid on Clanranald's behalf, 
primarily to Archibald Thomsone. 
Although Clanranald no longer owed outstanding debts to Sleat and to 
Archibald Thomsone, he now owed Lord Lorne a total of 32,971 merks 10s 8d. The 
only payment made against this debt appears to have been in 1634 and according to 
the accounting of Lome's payments on behalf of Clanranald the sum was only 1,300 
merks. 58 As a consequence of his failure to reimburse Lome, Clanranald was forced 
to convert the wadset transferred to Lorne in 1622 into an irredeemable sasine of the 
27 merk land of Moidart and 25 merk land of Arisaig. The sasine registered 15 
August 1634 gave Lorne legal superiority over Clanranald's estates which were held 
in feufarm of the Earl of Seaforth. Therefore, Clanranald was to pay an annualrent to 
Lorne as his immediate superior and out of that payment Lorne would forward on 
the appropriate sum due as feu-duty to Seaforth. The end result was that as of 
September 1634 Clanranald paid 1,602 merks 6s 8d "for the Rent and dewtie of theis 
Landis with the pertments sett", 59 and Lorne would pay Seaforth the 204 merks feu- 
duty on the lands. 60 The purpose of this sasine was to ensure that Lorne would 
eventually be reimbursed by charging Clanranald around 1,400 merks in excess of 
the original feu-duty. 
The financial dealings between Clanranald, MacDonald of Sleat, and Lord 
Lorne were complicated transactions which in the long run did relieve a majority of 
Clanranald's indebtedness. Although the original creditors were paid off, 
Clanranald still owed over 32,000 merks but instead of it being owed to various 
57 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/5/903. 
58 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/5/902. 
59 NAS, Clanranald Papers, GD201/5/908. 
60 The actual payment made by Lorne to Seaforth could not be located; however a discharge to 
Clanranald in 1633 indicates that the feu-duty on the 20 merk land of Arisaig and 27 merk land of 
Moydart was 204 merks. 
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creditors the debts were transferred to Lord Lome and meant that he was still faced 
with a financial crisis. Although Clanranald was forced to pay a larger annualrent 
for his property he was able to maintain possession of his estate. The 1634 sasine 
effectively rolled his debts and rent into one lump sum which allowed him to make 
regular payments against the debt and, thus, avoid complete forfeiture of his estate. 
By consolidating his debts under one creditor, Lord Lorne, Clanranald got his clan 
back on the right financial track and enabled the clan to retain their socio-economic 
status in the Western Highlands and Isles. 
The financial ruin of Sir James Lamont of Lamont in 1646 proves a valuable 
case study of the monetary impact of the Civil Wars. Although Lamont was faced 
with excessive debts by 1638 the level of his borrowing reached new heights due to 
his military campaigning for the royalist cause. Between 1634 and 1638 Lamont 
had borrowed over £21,000, but between 1639 and 1645 he had added another 
£33,000 principal to his overall debt . 
61 A "Note" prepared in retrospect by an 
advisor to the Marquis of Argyll in 1660 addresses the actions of Lamont during the 
course of the Civil Wars: 
In anno 1640, he [Lamont] being drown'd in debt made ane fashion 
to undertake some service for the king as one means to recover his 
estate, bot how far he heard that there wes any discovery of it, he 
wreat ane lettir to the Committee of Estates, swearing by his solemn 
& great oath, and under all the paynes contained in the law & gospell, 
that in effect he should do no more so, and sent therein the secrets he 
was upon for his Majesty's service. 62 
The analysis of Sir James's borrowing indicates that he was gambling with his 
clan's financial resources on the outcome of the Scottish Revolution, and as 
indicated in the "Note" he was already in debt and was shifting his allegiances to 
save his estate from financial ruin. The fact that only three payments were made on 
his outstanding loans supports the argument that Sir James believed the money he 
borrowed to support the king's cause would be reimbursed or absolved when the 
royalists won the war. Further evidence that Sir James involved himself in a risk 
which was extremely speculative as to the outcome of the war was that he did not 
borrow from his own kinsmen; rather, they were employed as cautioners. 
61 H. McKechnie, The Lamont Clan 1235-1935 (Edinburgh, 1938), 156. 
62 Stonefield MSS I, fol 122 as quoted in H. McKechnie, The Lamont Clan, 158. 
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Unfortunately, Lamont's gamble failed and in 1646 his creditors foreclosed on his 
estate. In an attempt to regain possession Lamont admitted to Charles II that by 
1656 the total debt he incurred for the royalist cause was over £64,000. 
In order to clearly grasp the severity of the indebtedness of Sir James Lamont 
the income of Lamont's estate in Cowal needs brief mention. In 1642 Lamont's 
total income in cash and kind was roughly £5,000 a year. Out of that total income, 
Lamont had to pay out about one-fifth for teinds and at least one-tenth for estate 
management and clan administration, leaving him with a disposable income of about 
£3,500 a year. 63 According to the documents collected in An Inventory of Lamont 
Papers, Lamont's accumulation of debt began in 1634. By 1638 he already owed 
over £21,000 which if divided over the four years that he accumulated the debt 
shows that he borrowed over £5,000 a year. By 1645 this would increase to over 
£7,000 a year borrowed in the name of the "king's cause", 64 making it 
mathematically impossible to salvage his estate from foreclosure. According to Sir 
James's admission that he owed £64,000 in 1656, the total debt he had accumulated 
exceeded the whole value of his estate by one-third. 65 
A survey of Sir James Lamont's obligations compiled in The Lamont Papers 
provides a glimpse of his excessive borrowing on the eve of the royalist campaign of 
1644-5. The majority of the obligations issued by Sir James between 1639 and 1645 
averaged 2,000 merks with the largest number being issued between 1643 and 1645. 
The largest single obligation issued during this period was to George Campbell, 
sheriff depute of Argyll, for £5,000 payable at Candlemas 1645.66 Unbeknownst to 
Campbell, Lamont was outwardly supporting the Covenant regime while secretly 
plotting with the royalist regime. The fact that Sir James was in need of large sums 
to mount his secretive royalist campaign is made evident in the dramatic rise in the 
sums and frequency of his borrowing. The increase in obligations issued by Lamont 
to train and equip his men coincided with the preparations being made by royalists, 
63 N. Lamont of Knockdow, Sir, ed., An Inventory of Lamont Papers 1231-1897 (Edinburgh, 1914), 
153-4. 
64 H. McKechnie, Lamont Clan, 156. 
65 N. Lamont, An Inventory of Lamont Papers, 156. Lamont cited the total owed as including the 
foreclosed estate in his report to Charles II in the hopes of having his debts cleared and the sasines on 
his estate reversed because they were the result of his royalist support. 
66 N. Lamont, An Inventory of Lamont Papers, 192. 
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such as the Earls of Antrim and Atholl, for a joint military venture between Irish 
Catholic regiments and Highland royalists. 
Of the obligations printed in The Lamont Papers only five appear to have 
been issued between 1639 and 1642 and totaled roughly 2,500 merks, but between 
1643 and 1645 Sir James issued eight obligations, four of which were issued in 
February 1643, and totaled 18,952 merks. Although the obligations are valuable 
pieces of information that point toward an increase in Sir James's debts they are 
incomplete; of the £33,000 borrowed between 1639 and 1645 these obligations 
constitute only £19,658. In order to get a more detailed account of Sir James 
Lamont's finances the apprisings raised by a handful of his creditors provide more 
specific information as to the exact amount of the debts owed by Sir James after the 
collapse of the royalist campaign. 
Sir James Lamont's financial gamble came to a climax on 30 October 1646 
when four of his chief creditors successfully filed apprisings against his estate and 
were later granted sasines to the bulk of his property. The first apprising raised 
against Sir James Lamont was by George Campbell, sheriff depute of Argyll, on 24 
October 1646. An interesting note on this apprising is the fact that George Campbell 
was a dedicated Covenanter and was obviously pursuing Lamont's debts because of 
his royalist support, hence the process of apprising being enacted in 1646 
immediately following the collapse of the royalist campaign. The fact that the 
Campbells viewed Lamont as a "turn-coat" due to his unforeseen shift in allegiance 
to the royalists when the Irish regiments arrived in Cowal added to the animosity 
with which George Campbell proceeded against Lamont. According to the Decreet 
of Apprising, Sir James refused to make payments on the several bonds issued to 
Campbell and others which totaled £9,800.67 Failure on the part of Sir James to 
make restitution resulted in George Campbell being infefted by a Precept from the 
Chancery in the lands and barony of Inneryne which was simultaneously enforced 
by a crown charter on 30 October 1646. As compensation for the £9,800 principal 
and £490 "Sheriff fee" Campbell was granted the "lands and barony of Inneryne 
with the church lands of Killenane, the town and lands of Killenane extending to 
three merk land of old extent, with an annual rent of 40s of the same, and rectorial 
67 N. Lamont, An Inventory of Lamont Papers, 201. 
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and vicarial teinds of the parish church of Killenane". 68 Similarly, a crown charter 
granted to John Stewart, fiar of Balscharge, as assignee for Henry Glen, merchant 
burgess of Glasgow, carved out a portion of Lamont's estate for failure to pay 3,900 
merks and included £130 for the "Sheriff fee". 69 The third apprising to be filed on 
30 October 1646 was at the insistence of William Home, sometime Baillie of 
Glasgow, for "payment to Home for himself and as trustee for several other 
persons". The combined amount owed by Sir James was an astonishing £28,222 6s 
8d plus the "Sheriff fee" of £1,411 2s. 7° The last apprising filed in October 1646 
was by John Herbertson for payment of £846 13 s 4d and £42 6s 8d for the "Sheriff 
fee". 7' Therefore, the combined sum of these October apprisings, including the fees, 
totaled £46,850. Following on these apprisings and crown charters all four men 
were issued Sasines on Crown Charter to their designated portions of Lamont's 
estate; George Campbell and John Stewart's were issued November 1646 while 
William Home and John Herbertson's were issued April 1647. 72 
Like many chiefs who became financially involved in the military campaigns 
of both the Covenanters and royalists, Lamont believed that any debts incurred for 
the cause would be remedied when his faction won. Unfortunately for Lamont, he 
chose the losing side and because he had originally given his support to the 
Covenanters and later shifted his allegiance he was dealt with harshly by his 
Covenanting creditors. By the spring of 1647 Lamont was officially bankrupt to the 
point that his wife, Dame Margaret Campbell, Lady Lamont, was forced to petition 
for power and warrant to be granted to her and her children to make use and enjoy 
the "conjunct fee lands" provided for her by her marriage contract. Because the 
lands belonged to Lady Lamont her intention was to insure that her lands would not 
be apprised in the future against her husband's debts. Lady Lamont's supplication 
was granted 16 February 1649 but with the condition that the "Act nowayes 
prejudices lawful Creditors of James Lamont". 73 
68 N. Lamont, An Inventory of Lamont Papers, 203. 
69 N. Lamont, An Inventory of Lamont Papers, 204. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 H. Campbell, (ed. ), Argyll Sasines: Particular Register, 1617-1675 (Edinburgh, 1933), 94-5; H. 
Campbell, (ed. ), Argyll Sasines: General Register, 1617-1670 (Edinburgh, 1934), 247. 
73 N. Lamont, An Inventory of Lamont Papers, 208. 
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The issue of indebtedness was not a problem confined to the lesser nobility; 
by the middle of the seventeenth century debt had become a non-discriminating 
epidemic that affected every level of society. Periods of financial crisis were even 
experienced by various cadet branches of the powerful Clan Campbell, including 
Campbell of Glenorchy. Although the Campbells of Glenorchy were residing 
primarily within Highland Perthshire, their financial difficulties are relevant to the 
Western Highlands and Isles because of the expanse of their territory and their 
subsequent involvement in the region. Aside from their possession of Breadalbane, 
the Campbells of Glenorchy retained possession of their original settlement at 
Kilchurn Castle on the northern end of Loch Awe in Glenorchy; by the mid 
sixteenth century, their estate stretched from Breadalbane in the east to Glenorchy 
and Nether Lorne in Argyll and the isles of Seil and Luing in the west. 74 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the Campbells of Glenorchy illustrates the level of 
destruction carried out by the royalist army, especially by Alasdair MacColla and the 
Clan Donald. During the royalist military campaign of Montrose and MacColla, 
Glenorchy's estate was continually ravaged in Highland Perthshire and in Argyll. 
Therefore, the estate finances of Glenorchy are essential to developing a 
comprehensive assessment of the financial situation in the Western Highlands and 
Isles before, during, and after the Scottish Revolution. 75 
The financial crisis of the Campbells of Glenorchy was originally caused by 
extensive liferents issued to the wives of successive chiefs and a large number of 
inherited obligations. As a result the Lairds of Glenorchy were forced into deeper 
levels of borrowing from both inside and outside of their kin-group. To complicate 
matters the territorial devastation in the wake of the civil war so severely reduced 
their rental income that by 1652 Sir Robert Campbell, 9th Laird of Glenorchy, owed 
over £100,000 to his creditors. 
The financial difficulties of the Campbells of Glenorchy began with the 
inability of Sir Colin Campbell of Glenorchy to promptly resolve the debts left to 
him on the death of Sir Duncan Campbell, 7`h Laird of Glenorchy. According to the 
testament of Sir Duncan Campbell written in June 1631, his assets totaled 55,260 
74 See Appendix 4: Clan Map with Civil War Allegiances 
75 Robert Dodgshon appears to have also thought Glenorchy a viable case study for his work on the 
economics of the Western Highlands and Isles; see Dodgshon, From Chiefs to Landlords. 
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merks of which 21,960 merks were in movable goods, 23,300 merks were in 
steelbow, and 10,000 merks were reported to be rents still outstanding from 1630. 
The liabilities listed in the testament appear to have outweighed Sir Duncan's assets 
with a total of 61,997 merks owed: 41,250 merks in obligations, 7,092 merks for 
servants' fees, and 12,405 merks for his legacy. The obligations ranged from 1,000 
to 13,000 merks and were issued to eleven different creditors, nine of whom were 
kinsmen. 76 Therefore, on his death Sir Duncan left the Glenorchy estate with a 
budget deficit of 6,737 merks. Although the deficit was a small sum the assets 
included in Glenorchy's balance sheet included movable goods, such as gold cups 
and silver spoons, and steelbow which was grain and farming goods supplied to the 
tenants to work the land. In order to repay the debt left on the estate it would have 
been necessary to sell the movable goods and take back the steelbow, but to do so 
would have had a negative effect on the status of the estate and its rental income; the 
lavishness of the estate would be lost in selling its household goods and the tenants 
would be unable to farm the land in order to pay their rents. The only viable option 
for trying to lower the debt on the estate was to turn to the debt market, which helps 
to explain why Sir Duncan borrowed 41,250 merks when his assets, minus the 
outstanding rents for 1630, totaled 45,260 merks. 
The problem faced by Sir Colin Campbell, 8 ̀h Laird of Glenorchy, on 
succeeding to the estate was the fact that one creditor, Sir Henry Wardlaw, 
Chamberlain to Queen Anne, had assigned his debts to another of Glenorchy's 
creditors, Sir Archibald Campbell, brother to the Laird of Lawers. The problem was 
not so much that he owed Archibald Campbell rather than Wardlaw; the problem 
was that the combined total now held by a single creditor was 12,000 merks. Faced 
with owing such a large sum to his kinsman, Sir Colin, in an effort to show good 
faith, issued a bond in 1638 to Sir Archibald acknowledging the assignation of Sir 
Henry Wardlaw. 77 It appears from a copy of Sir Colin's latterwill written three 
years before his death that he was unable to rectify his family's financial position in 
the short time he was Laird of Glenorchy. The latterwill written 4 May 1638 
76 NAS, Breadalbane Muniments, GD112/1/488; GD112/26/5. 
77 The Black Book of Taymouth, 81. 
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showed that the sum of the obligations left outstanding by Sir Colin was 54,700 
merks, constituting an increase of 13,450 merks over seven years. 78 
What is known of the financial condition of the Glenorchy estate on the 
death of Sir Colin in 1641 is deduced from the Black Book of Taymouth accounts of 
the debts left to Sir Robert Campbell, 9th Laird of Glenorchy, and his increased 
borrowing in 1643. According to the debts left to Sir Robert, Sir Colin left a total of 
18,000 merks in obligations to Sir Archibald Campbell, thus increasing his inherited 
debt to his kinsman by 5,000 merks. The second largest obligation passed down by 
Sir Colin was for 22,000 merks in cautions for another kinsman, Patrick Campbell 
of Edinample. How Sir Archibald became creditor for both sums is unclear, but the 
Black Book of Taymouth records that Sir Robert now owed Sir Archibald the 
combined total of 40,000 merks. The fact that Sir Archibald was kin meant that Sir 
Robert was able to take advantage of family loyalty to resolve the debt. Whereas 
many creditors would have filed apprisings to denude Sir Robert of his estate, Sir 
Archibald allowed Sir Robert to make annual payments on the debt. The two agreed 
that Sir Robert would pay £8, or 12 merks, per 1,000 merks owed annually, equaling 
a yearly payment of 4,800 merks. 79 
The agreement reached between Sir Robert and Sir Archibald appeared to 
have rediced the financial problems of Sir Robert to a manageable level, 4,800 
merks a year was easier to pay than a lump sum of 40,000 merks. However, Sir 
Robert's financial position in 1643 forced him deep into the debt market and led to 
borrowing from outside the clan. The reason for Sir Robert's renewed financial 
difficulties was due to his "being totallie exhaustit by paying the ladies of 
Glenurquhy ther yearly rents, and paying other creditouris" 
80 The payments to the 
ladies were primarily annual stipends and liferents to the surviving widows of Sir 
Duncan and Sir Colin which, as Laird of Glenorchy, Sir Robert was obligated to 
pay. Consequently, Sir Robert turned to the debt market and borrowed 67,303 
merks from non-kinsmen in 1643. The accounts, of Sir Robert show that he 
borrowed £20,000 from Sir Charles Erskine of Cambuskenneth, 20,000 merks from 
Mr. Roger Mowatt, advocate in Edinburgh, 8,000 merks from Captain John Short, 
78 NAS, Breadalbane Muniments, GDl 12/26/13. 
79 The Black Book of Taymouth, 95. 
80 The Black Book of Taymouth, 96. 
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provost of Stirling, 5,000 merks from Patrick Hepburn of Willyes, apothecary in 
Edinburgh, and 4,000 merks from Hew McCorquodill of Phantilands. 8' 
Unfortunately, borrowing outside the kin group put Sir Robert in a precarious 
position because, unlike his dealings with Sir Archibald, he could not rely on family 
loyalty to save his estate from apprising. 
Shortly after Sir Robert issued these obligations the royalist campaign gained 
momentum and between 1644 and 1645 the Glenorchy estate suffered severe 
devastation to the estimated total of 1,200,000 merks presumably resulting from the 
burning of crops, the slaughter or stealing of livestock, and structural damage. The 
combination of the debts owed against the Glenorchy estate and the extreme 
destruction of the lands increased the overall deficit of the estate in excess of 
400,000 merks in 1648.82 The insolvency of Sir Robert's finances led to a series of 
apprisings being filed in December 1648 by his chief creditors and the widows of Sir 
Duncan and Sir Colin of Glenorchy. The first apprising filed against Sir Robert was 
by John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, as assignee to Dame Juliane Campbell, widow 
of Sir Colin, 8th Laird of Glenorchy. According to the apprising, Sir Robert owed 
Dame Juliane Campbell £40,000 in principal plus an undisclosed amount in 
penalties for her yearly duties owed for 1644-1648. Therefore, the Earl of Loudoun 
"did compryse the laird of Glenurquhay his whole easteatt, and arestit his whole 
dewties for these soumes forsaid". 83 The second apprising raised against Sir Robert 
was by Dame Elizabeth Sinclair, widow of Sir Duncan, 7th Laird of Glenorchy, for 
her annual fees and related penalties. 84 The Black Book of Taymouth does not record 
the sum owed but it can be assumed that her fees would be roughly the same as 
those due to Dame Juliane as the widow of a former laird. Although it is surprising 
that the widows of the previous lairds filed apprisings against Sir Robert it is 
understandable. It cannot be assumed that the apprisings were raised because there 
was no family loyalty, rather the important fact is that the women's income rested on 
the financial support which Sir Robert was obligated to pay. Where it can be said 
that family loyalty was of no use to Sir Robert is in the apprisings raised by those he 
81 The Black Book of Taymouth, 96; D. Watt, "Chiefs, Lawyers, and Debt", 224. 
82 D. Watt, "Chiefs, Lawyers, and Debt", 224. 
83 The Black Book of Taymouth, 105. 
84 Ibid. 
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borrowed from in 1643 who were outside the kin group. In December 1648 
apprisings were raised by three of Sir Robert's chief creditors: Erskine, Mowatt, and 
Short. As indicated by the apprisings, Sir Robert still owed the original principal 
plus "annuals and penalties" which he borrowed five years previously: Sir Charles 
Erskine's apprising was for £20,000, Mr. Roger Mowatt's was 20,000 merks, and 
Captain John Short's was for 8,000 merks. 85 
In the aftermath of the royalist campaign the average rental income on the 
Glenorchy estate was roughly 2,800 merks. 86 This dramatic decrease in revenue not 
only led to the 1648 apprisings being raised against the estate but also drove Sir 
Robert deeper into the debt market. "Ane compt of Glenorchy's debts" calculated in 
September 1652 provides a detailed account of all outstanding debts owed with the 
applicable interest. Seven years after the royalist campaign and ensuing ruin of the 
estate the amount of debt was still overwhelming, comprising seventeen creditors for 
a total balance of £101,608 6s 8d, ranging from £666 13s 4d to £28,333 6s 8d. Not 
only is the level of debt astonishing but also the fact that of the seventeen creditors 
six were those who Sir Robert borrowed from in 1643 or who raised apprisings 
against him in 1648, thus, representing the bulk of the figure owed. According to 
the calculation of Glenorchy's debt he owed Patrick Hepburn, apothecary, £3,333 6s 
8d plus £1,316 13s 4d interest, Dame Elizabeth Sinclair, £22,000 plus £3,840 
interest, John Short, provost of Stirling, £5,333 6s 8d plus £3,240, Sir Charles 
Erskine £28,333 6s 8d, and Mr. Roger Mowat, advocate, £18,666 13s 4d plus 
£11,280 interest on the total owed to Erskine and Mowat. 87 Thus, Sir Robert owed 
his previous creditors seventy-five percent of his total debt in 1652 and again put 
himself in a dangerous financial position. It would not be until Sir John Campbell 
succeeded Sir Robert in 1657 that the fortunes of the Glenorchy family would 
improve. Through careful and crafty management on the part of Sir John the rental 
income on his lands would increase to 16,000 merks, 88 putting Glenorchy on the 
path to financial recovery. 
85 The Black Book of Taymouth, 106. 
86 D. Watt, "Chiefs, Lawyers, and Debt", 224. 
87 NAS, Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/3 8/3/3. 
88 D. Watt, "Chiefs, Lawyers, Debt", 225. 
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The financial details of the Captain of Clanranald, Lamont of Lamont, and 
Campbell of Glenorchy illustrate the evolution of indebtedness and the ease with 
which one could enter the debt market. The problem faced by all three families was 
the difficulty in pulling out of the debt market because, once in the market, it proved 
extremely hard to break the cycle of borrowing. The financial ramifications of the 
annual meetings and the civil war forced Clanranald, Lamont, and Glenorchy deep 
into the debt market. 
Although laws were passed regulating interest rates and for protecting 
creditors, no laws were enacted which would protect the debtor from getting himself 
in a financial crisis. As long as the chief was able to find a willing creditor there 
was no limit as to how much debt he could burden his estate with. As seen in the 
transactions of Sir James Lamont of Lamont, the amount of debt accrued drastically 
outweighed the value of his estate and he continued to borrow until his creditors 
were eventually compelled to apprise his estate. In some cases, such as the 
Campbells of Cawdor, the only option available for preventing the ultimate ruin of 
the family was for the "friends and family" to restrain their chief's spending and 
take control of the family finances. In an attempt to defray the debts on the 
Campbell of Cawdor estate a meeting was held sometime between 1620 and 1622 of 
those loyal to Cawdor during which they established an administration to manage 
the estate and placed control of the family finances in the hands of a group of 
chamberlains and auditors. 89 Had the family not intervened Cawdor would have 
most likely followed the same path as Sir James Lamont and have been completely 
denuded of his lands. 
Overall, the advent of the debt market when used in moderation could have 
been an asset to the chiefs and allowed them to expand or maintain their clan's 
socio-economic status. Unfortunately, the ease with which they could borrow 
money led to an abuse of the system. By entering the debt market at the levels 
which Clanranald, Lamont and Glenorchy did, it became necessary for them to 
continue borrowing in order to pay other debts; in essence they eventually had to 
start robbing Peter to pay Paul and set in motion a downward spiral into severe 
indebtedness resulting in more clans living on credit than being financially liquid. 
89 The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor, 254. 
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Therefore, the advent and expansion of the debt market in the Western Highlands 
and Isles allowed clans to put themselves in a precarious financial position by the 
outbreak of the Civil Wars. By aligning with one faction or the other the clans were 
able to alter their socio-economic position in the region at the expense of their rivals, 
thanks in part to the economic consequences of war, primarily the loss and 
acquisition of resources through pillage and destruction of property. As a result, the 
opportunities afforded to the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles to rectify their 
financial problems through their involvement in the conflict had a direct impact on 
their chosen allegiances. 
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Chapter 7 
Western Highland and Isles Allegiances 
The examination of the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles' motives 
for aligning with the Covenanters and royalists indicates that local politics and 
personal agendas, such as long-standing clan rivalries, self-preservation and 
territorial expansion, played a larger role in their allegiances than the traditional 
platforms of the two factions. The purpose of studying the allegiances during this 
period is to provide a better understanding of the instability of the Western 
Highlands and Isles and the resulting threat it posed to the outcome of the Scottish 
Revolution and subsequent Wars of the Three Kingdoms. This chapter will attempt 
to define the motives of various clan allegiances throughout the Scottish Revolution. 
What will emerge is the fact that none of the motives found among the clans were 
mutually exclusive, there was always an interconnection between them; however, by 
detailing the actions taken by the clans it can be seen that there were some issues 
that were given more weight than others. 
The Covenant Movement began as a revolt of the nobility and Protestant 
ministers against the policies of Charles I. The complaints against Charles were 
aimed at the religious innovations he introduced to the Church of Scotland and the 
power structure within the government. As the revolt escalated it divided Scotland 
in two by the summer of 1638, engulfing every social class from nobility to peasant. 
The motives behind the Covenanting faction within the Western Highlands and Isles 
can be classified into three categories: opposition to Charles I's policies, existing 
alliances and rivalries, and territorial expansion. Through these motives the cause of 
the Covenanters was propagated in a region previously removed from the issues of 
government due to the impact that these motives had on the locality. 
Royalist support during the Scottish Revolution developed in response to the 
rise of the Covenanting Movement. As an adversarial faction, the royalists' 
platform was obviously the support of both Charles I and his authority. An 
examination of the royalists' motives provides an explanation as to why the 
Covenanters dominated Scotland between 1637 and 1644. Prior to 1644, the 
motives behind the royalist allegiances were support of the king's authority and for 
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religious reasons, neither of which had a large following in the Western Highlands 
and Isles. However, the introduction of the revenge mentality among clans in the 
region provided the royalists with an advantage over the Covenanters. The addition 
of the MacDonald regiments, the vendetta Alasdair MacColla and the Clan Donald 
pursued against the Clan Campbell, and the connections Clan MacKay maintained 
with Christian IV of Denmark aided, the military endeavors of the Marquis of 
Montrose, which resulted in the victories of the royalists between 1644 and 1645. 
The fact that the royalists victories ended in 1645 was greatly due to the departure of 
MacColla and his regiments further proving that, although support for Charles was 
key to the overall royalist cause, the rivalry between clans and the opportunity for 
revenge were significant components of the royalists' success and that local politics 
in many cases influenced the Western Highlands and Isles' involvement in national 
politics. 
One of the difficulties in understanding allegiances to the Covenanters and 
royalists is the added component of clans who shifted their allegiance from one 
faction to the other and in some cases back again. A number of clans in the Western 
Highlands and Isles shifted their support in an attempt to align themselves with 
whichever faction had the upper hand at the moment; thus the study of these clans 
adds a "wildcard" element to allegiances in the region because their loyalty was 
undependable. Within this category we can include those who were provoked to 
change their allegiance as their reaction to a particular event was motivated by self- 
preservation. The fluctuating careers of Sir James Lamont of Lamont, Sir Lachlan 
MacLean of Duart, and George MacKenzie, 2°d Earl of Seaforth, illustrate the 
difficulty in categorizing the clans of the region and determining their motives. 
However, the careers of all three men can ultimately be classified as a desire to 
safely navigate their clan through the Scottish Revolution; the motive behind their 
allegiances was primarily the threat of retaliation either directed at them or that they 
could direct towards another, and was conducted to safeguard the family's status. 
Due to this survivalist mentality, few clans could unequivocally be classified as 
Covenanter or royalist, making it difficult at times to determine whom the two 
factions could rely on for assistance. 
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The study of allegiance' formation is essentially an exercise in political 
psychology, analyzing an individual's reasons for siding with a particular faction. 
The difficulty in conducting such a study for the Western Highlands and Isles is the 
lack of personal writings that verbalize the clans' ideology and motives. The 
motives discussed here are based on the evident connection between various clans' 
histories and their subsequent military and governmental involvement, supplemented 
when available by letters and bands of union. Therefore, the methodology used to 
conduct this study was a multi-step process. 
The first step was to determine the actual allegiance. A useful tool for 
determining the divisions within the Western Highlands and Isles is found in Allan 
Macinnes's work Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart 1603-1788 in which 
Professor Macinnes includes a clan map in his appendix illustrating the allegiances 
during the "Civil War 1644-47". Although this map proved a useful starting point 
for an in-depth study of the region, there is limited discussion of the motives that 
facilitated the creation of such a map. Therefore, once the allegiance was 
confirmed, the second step was to go chronologically through the clan history to 
determine the motives behind the clan's allegiance. In most cases this exercise 
provided significant insight into the alliances and rivalries that were already in 
existence prior to the outbreak of the Scottish Revolution and shed considerable 
light on the choices and actions made by the clans. In the case of Donald MacKay, 
Lord Reay, the analysis of the clan's history points to the clan's long-standing 
opposition to the Covenanting Earl of Sutherland's territorial ambitions aimed at 
gaining control of Strathnaver, the seat of Clan MacKay, as the reasoning behind 
Clan MacKay's allegiance to the royalist cause. 
Often a third step was needed to determine if a clan's loyalty shifted from 
one faction to another and why this occurred. By incorporating the general history 
of the conflict, especially the military history, it could be deduced that in most cases 
a deviation was caused by a threat or bribe from the Marquis of Montrose, as the 
royalists' representative, or from the Marquis of Argyll, as the Covenanters' agent. 
This step was vital in understanding when and why a number of chieftains broke 
away from the Covenant regime to join the royalists, and for some why they 
returned to the ranks of the Covenanters. A prime example of this fluctuation of 
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support is the mass exodus of chieftains from the Covenanting ranks in response to 
threats to property and person made by Montrose after the royalists' victory at 
Inverlochy in 1645. Although the prime shift in allegiance was in direct relation to 
the outcome of Inverlochy, men such as George MacKenzie, 2nd Earl of Seaforth, 
realigned with the Covenant regime after the defeat of Montrose at the battle of 
Philiphaugh. 
Overall, the motives of allegiance in the Western Highlands and Isles 
resemble the motives of the English and Lowland Scots during the Civil War. The 
English model of allegiances, developed by John Morrill, is evident in both the 
Lowlands and Highlands and consists of four motivational categories: religion, 
politics, self-preservation or advancement, and indifference. ' The religious rationale 
in both England and Scotland was based on a fear of popery at one end of the 
spectrum and a fear of religious anarchy that would come about through the 
destruction of the current religious hierarchy at the other; while the political motive 
was based on support for an absolute monarchy or for a constitutional monarchy, a 
monarch answerable to Parliament. Both the Parliamentarians in England and the 
Covenanters in Scotland feared popery and called for the leadership of central 
government to be placed in the hands of parliament rather than the monarch; while 
the Loyalists in England and the royalists in Scotland feared religious anarchy and 
supported the decisions and powers of Charles I. Although the issues of religion and 
politics can be applied in varying degrees to the Western Highlands and Isles, the 
self-preservation and advancement mentality found throughout England and 
Scotland was to have a greater prevalence in the Western Highlands and Isles and 
played a significant role in both forming and changing allegiances. 
Another commonality between the English and the Lowland and Highland 
Scots was the number of men who were indifferent to the situation. The reasoning 
behind this position was the belief that the local magnate or feudal superior had a 
better understanding of the situation, thus the lesser would follow the leader. In 
examining the actions of various clans one rarely finds a chief acting on his own and 
going against the direction of his clan or local magnate. This is clearly seen in Clan 
Chisholm's support of the Covenanters. Being a lesser clan, the Chisholms followed 
1 Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution, 188-9. 
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the lead of their strong neighbor, the Frasers of Lovat. Yet, this is where the 
similarities between English, Lowland, and Highland end because the Highlanders 
had one more motive indigenous to the Western Highlands and Isles-bloodthirsty 
revenge. Although there were feuds between families in England and Lowland 
Scotland, their desire for revenge was not as significant nor as violent as those found 
among their Highland counterparts. When the animosity between rival clans, 
especially towards the Clan Campbell, is added to the equation, a number of battles 
during the Scottish Revolution became outright massacres and facilitated the 
continuation of bloodfeuds that originated in the late 1500s. 
Although this chapter examines the four core motives of allegiances in the 
Western Highlands and Isles they were not mutually exclusive. Rather, the 
following examination of various clans is used to highlight how the different 
motives could manifest into allegiance formation. The available evidence does 
however point toward the largest influence behind their allegiance but they were by 
no means pigeonholed by their beliefs or circumstances. Obviously, there could be 
more than one reason to align with a particular faction or even motives that caused a 
conflict when trying to decide the appropriate course of action for the clan, but when 
the history of the clan is compiled from the numerous sources there are indications 
that there was a particular issue at the heart of the matter that took precedence over 
others. As a result, situations arise where a clan, such as the Clan Donald, aligned 
with the royalists due to the potential for self-advancement over the Campbells, 
which also had an indirect relationship to their religious preference. The religious 
connotation behind the MacDonalds' allegiance was an added incentive but not the 
principal reason for their animosity and vengeance toward the Clan Campbell. The 
Clan Donald could have argued on ideological grounds that religion was the 
deciding factor behind their allegiance; however, actions speak louder than words 
and when the destruction of Campbell territory and the murdering of thousands of 
Campbells is put in the context of the long and violent history between the two clans 
what emerges is the Clan Donald's desire to regain their ancestral lands and destroy 
the House of Argyll. 
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I 
The influence of the Lowlands combined with connections at court among the 
magnates in the Western Highlands and Isles, such as the Marquis of Argyll and the 
Earl of Sutherland, gave rise to the acceptance of the ideology behind the National 
Covenant, opposition to Charles I's government and his religious innovations. Like 
the Lowlanders, the magnates in the Highlands who were opposed to the Act of 
Revocation were angered by the threat of the restoration of church lands to the 
prelates and their increasing control over the government. Therefore, both the 
Lowland and Highland Covenanters called for the withdrawal of prelates from 
religious offices, but, more importantly, from secular positions. The fear among the 
lords was that if the bishops of Charles I and Archbishop Laud's choosing held 
office they would be used as instruments of direct rule from London, thus, the Scots 
Lords would no longer have a voice in their own government. 2 In order to give 
more power to the prelates appointed from London Charles removed some of the 
powers of the Scots by compulsory forfeiture of heritable offices and jurisdictions. 
For both Argyll and Sutherland the prospect of losing land to the prelates and the 
potential for a decline in their position in government made the earls extremely wary 
of their tentative dominance in their locality that could very well be undermined by 
Charles's new policies. 
Therefore, religion was an underlying factor in adherence to the Covenant 
regime and merely served to magnify the situation, the main aspect being a fear of 
increased power of the bishops that would result in the lords' loss of control. 
Furthermore, the influence of the Lowlands on the nobility of the Western Highlands 
and Isles did manifest itself as a devout adherence to Protestantism among some 
chiefs in the region even though the majority of the population who were not in 
contact with the Lowlands lacked a strong religious foundation. Those lords who 
bordered the Lowlands or had business that regularly took them south tended to have 
a greater exposure to the "true" religion. This link between the Lowlands and 
Highlands resulted in a number of Lords opposing Charles I's Episcopalian 
2 D. Mathew, Scotland under Charles I (London, 1955), 256-7. 
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innovations within the Church of Scotland, and primarily his alterations to the 
governmental structure. 
The political power gained through adherence to the "true" religion and 
support of the Covenant regime is seen in the career of James Grant of Freuchie and 
his numerous appointments within the Covenanting government. Grant, 7`h Laird of 
Freuchie, was one whose Covenant support was founded on his religious conviction 
and adherence to Protestantism. James Grant can be classified as one who opposed 
Charles's policies and stood by his religious convictions in the face of family 
opposition. Grant was one of the most active lesser nobles within the Covenanting 
ranks, holding appointments as commissioner for the County of Elgin in August 
1643, as well as to the Committee of War for Elgin, Nairn and portions of Inverness- 
shire in August 1643 and July 1644. In 1643, Grant also accepted the commission 
of Lieutenant Colonel of the Covenant Army under Colonel Murray and raised 1,000 
men to join Murray at Elgin. 3 However, out of fear of retribution, Grant temporarily 
joined the royalist faction after Montrose's victory at Inverlochy sending 300 men to 
join Montrose. Although this would appear to be a shift in Grant's allegiance it 
cannot wholly be deemed as such due to the smallness of the number of men he sent 
to Montrose and the fact that Grant himself did not attend. Once the tides turned 
back in the Covenanters' favor Grant realigned himself with the Covenanters and his 
convictions. 
One indication that Grant was sincere in his support of the Covenant is that 
he busied himself with gaining signatures to the National Covenant and raising 
troops in Grant country, even though close family members were in opposition. In 
1638, Grant approached his mother, Lady Grant, who was living off her life-rents at 
Castle Urquhart on Loch Ness, to get permission to campaign on her lands for the 
Covenant. As a result of Lady Grant's opposition to the Covenant regime, she 
refused to put in writing her permission to gather signatures to the National 
Covenant. Furthermore, Lady Grant refused to allow her son to levy troops in her 
territory, unless he came with the authority and instructions directly from the 
Committee of Estates. 
3 W. Fraser, ed., The Chiefs of Grant 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1883), i, 254 & 256. 
4 Fraser, ed., The Chiefs of Grant, i, 253. 
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A second sign that Grant was devout in his convictions and loyal to the 
Covenant in spite of his family is seen in three letters from family members that 
pleaded with the laird to join the royalists. Two of the letters are from his uncle the 
Earl of Tullibardine, and the third is from his brother-in-law, Sir Walter Innes of 
Balvenie; both men had joined the royalist party and feared the consequences Grant 
would face if he did not do the same. The first letter from Tullibardine, dated 25 
July 1638, warned Grant of the dangers of siding against the King stating, "My 
cownsell to you in this trublesum tyme [is] that you mey haue a speciell caire not to 
schowe your self against the Kings Majestie your sowerene". 5 However, Grant 
disregarded this and other letters, prompting Tullibardine to send a final letter on 8 
June 1639 to plead one last time for his nephew to align himself with the crown. In 
this final letter Tullibardine complained of not hearing from Grant since the 
"troubles" began and advised Grant to "schowe this letter to your grandonkls, and 
adwyse spedelie with them and with the best affected of your friends that loueis the 
standing of your hous, and be not careyed awaye as you hawe beine with a traitor to 
his Majestie and to your house". 6 The third letter that still survives is from Sir 
Walter Innes of Balvenie, and is of a more ominous tone than those of Tullibardine. 
On 11 March 1639, Sir Walter wrote: 
Quhat danger may be in keeping such meitingis, I leawe to 
yourself to judge of, and can not bot, owt of my lowe, advertise yow 
to bewar... Now, brother, let me intreat yow to be wyse in tym, and 
lose not se faire hoopis of the greatest hounour and good that evir ye 
sail attaine to; quhich iff ye doe, as ye sail lose all your trewest 
frendis, and procure yourself too michtie enemies, so it fears me it 
salbe the ruine and overthrow of that hows that he descended to yow 
from your worthie ancestoris. 7 
Although Sir Walter warned Grant that his house would be in danger if he persisted 
in his course against the king, it is clear that again Grant ignored the advice and 
followed his convictions. By 1643 James Grant had become one of the leaders of 
the Covenant Movement in the north. 
s Fraser, ed., The Chiefs of Grant, ii, 64. 
6 Fraser, ed., The Chiefs of Grant, ii, 68. 
7 Ibid. 
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A second clan that adhered to the traditional Covenant platform was John 
MacLeod of Dunvegan. MacLeod, 16th chief of MacLeod, held numerous offices in 
the Covenant government as a result of his family's long-standing support of the 
Protestant religion and was one of the rare Highlanders who supported the Covenant 
in spite of the local rivalries on the Isle of Skye. MacLeod first appears in support 
of the Covenant regime in October 1637 when he added his signature to the 
Supplication. As the precursor to the National Covenant, the Supplication was 
signed by Lowland commissioners with the addition of five signatures on the back, 
including MacLeod, stating "we underscribers assents and adheres to the within 
written parchment". 8 MacLeod's signature to the document shows considerable 
independence and a strong conviction, because none of his neighbors, who included 
MacDonald of Sleat, were in support of the Covenanters .9 The Synod of Argyll 
complained on several occasions about the inhabitants of Skye being indifferent and 
unwilling to sign the Covenant, which proves that MacLeod's support of the 
Covenant was in spite of his neighbors. Furthermore, subscription to the 
Supplication was completely voluntary which indicates he supported the cause 
without the need of persuasion. Although MacLeod's signature does not appear on 
any surviving copies of the National Covenant, it is most probable that he signed 
given the fact he signed the precursor and later held offices within the Covenant 
regime. 
John MacLeod's involvement in the Covenanters' government began with 
his election to Parliament in 1639. MacLeod sat as one of the two commissioners to 
Parliament for Inverness-shire, at which time the new regime ratified all the acts 
proposed by the General Assembly including the abolition of the Lords of Articles 
and the act that made subscription to the National Covenant compulsory. Although 
MacLeod was elected again in 1641 he is mentioned only once during the 
proceedings when he stood caution for Glengarry against charges of raiding brought 
8 I. F. Grant, The MacLeods: The History of a Clan, 1200-1956 (London, 1959), 276. 9 After the death of Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat, his son and heir James MacDonald opted to 
remain neutral even though the clan elite were in support of the royalists. This resulted in a partial 
schism within the clan culminating in James allowing his men to join other branches of the Clan 
Donald regiments but James himself not taking an active part. 
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forward by Sir Lachlan MacKintosh. 10 Between 1641 and 1646, MacLeod was 
more involved in the Covenant government at the local level serving on the 
committee for the sheriffdom of Argyll in 1643 and 1644, as well as tax collector for 
the Isles and Inverness in 1643. It was not until 1646 that MacLeod became 
militarily involved in the conflict when he was appointed to the Committee of War 
for Inverness-shire, and, along with his brother Rory, was named chief officer in 
command of the Covenanters' garrison in Inverness. I 
I 
Aside from John MacLeod's long list of office holdings in the Covenant 
faction, further evidence of his support of the cause is seen in his petition to the 
Committee of Estates in 1649. MacLeod submitted a petition to the Estates in 
response to threats of legal actions against him by the local tax collector. MacLeod 
claimed he was unable to pay his taxes not out of any hostility to the government, 
but, since the "Irish Rebels" landed, his lands had been wasted and in the past five 
years he had not received the equivalent of one year's rent. Because of MacLeod's 
service to the regime and his "notorious suffering", the Estates granted him a tax 
exemption. 12 
On the whole, religious affiliation in the Western Highlands and Isles was a 
greater factor in supporting the Covenant than in opposing it which limited the scope 
with which religion affected the allegiances in the region. Protestantism was able to 
maintain a limited hold in Argyllshire, Sutherland, and Caithness as a result of the 
strength of the local earls and their connections to the Lowlands and to court. 
However, most of the Western Highlands and Isles lacked a strong and organized 
religious institution which resulted in a number of inhabitants being religious but 
devoid of regular services due to the failure of both the Church of Scotland and the 
Irish Franciscans to provide a preaching ministry. 13 The fact that many inhabitants 
did not benefit from regular church services meant that the innovations which the 
Covenanters were opposed to had little bearing on the religious beliefs of the 
populace and, therefore, played a lesser role in their allegiances. 
10 Grant, The MacLeods, 283. See chapter 3 "Central Government and the Western Highlands and 
Isles" for details of the suit filed by Mackintosh against Glengarry on 27 August 1641. 
11 RPC, 2nd series, vi, 623. 
12APS, vi, II, 355. 
13 See chapter 4, "Religion from Reformation to War". 
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II 
Conquest in the name of religion was an age-old practice that all of early modem 
Europe was familiar with. The emergence of the Covenant Movement provided the 
opportunity for many clans to expand their territory and authority. During the 
Scottish Revolution, one of the most common ways to gain territory was to acquire 
commissions from the Covenanting regime against the inhabitants of the desired 
property. Therefore, the impact that economics had on allegiances was that it 
instigated many to act nationally in an attempt to improve their position in the 
locality because more territory equaled more power for the clan and chief in the 
form of increased revenues and greater mustering capabilities. This resulted in local 
and national interests existing simultaneously, but with greater importance being 
placed on the locality. An expert in this practice was the Marquis of Argyll, 
especially in regards to his acquiring commissions to justify his actions as seen in 
his commission against the clans in Atholl and surrounding areas. It must be noted 
that Argyll was a devout Protestant, however it must be equally noted that he used 
his position within the Covenant regime to expand his clan's territory. The fact that 
Argyll acted nationally as a result of the effect it would have on the locality meant 
that the interests of the Covenanters and of Argyll intersected, but in looking at the 
chronology of Argyll's actions in Atholl it is evident that he was placing his interests 
first and the regime's second. 
On 12 June 1640 the Committee of Estates issued a commission of "fire and 
sword" to the Marquis of Argyll against royalists in the Central Highlands. The 
commission declared that those named proved enemies to the country and religion 
and were either awaiting an opportunity to attack the Covenanters or join in an 
invasion from abroad. Those named as enemies of the state included the Earl of 
Atholl, Lord Ogilvie, and their accomplices in Atholl and the Braes of Angus, the 
entire Farquharson clan and their accomplices in the Braes of Mar, and other known 
royalists in Badenoch, Lochaber and Rannoch. Issuance of the commission 
authorized Argyll to pursue the above-mentioned with "fire and sword" until they 
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were either destroyed or gave assurance for their future good conduct. 14 With this 
authority Argyll was able to combine his public and private interests, suppression of 
the royalists' faction in the area and the extension of his own and his clan's power. 
The suppression of royalists in the central Highlands was of particular 
concern to Argyll due to the strength of the Earl of Atholl and the threat he posed to 
branches of Clan Campbell. In May 1640 a letter from Lord Ogilvie, son of the Earl 
of Airlie, who had fled to England at the outbreak of the "troubles", indicated that 
the royalists were organizing a rising in the central Highlands and that the Earl of 
Atholl had promised his assistance. 15 Although, the Earl of Atholl had not openly 
opposed the Covenant, he was rebuked numerous times by the Committee of Estates 
for disobeying orders to muster men for the Covenanting Army. The combination of 
the intercepted letter and the Earl of Atholl's suspicious behavior prompted the 
Marquis of Argyll to warn his kinsmen of the Stewarts and other "Athollmen" and 
advised them to prepare for a rising in the region. 
While Argyll was preparing for a rising in Atholl he also announced his 
intentions to take possession of Badenoch and Lochaber on the pretence of the 
inhabitants' royalist activities. In actuality, Argyll was intent on seizing property of 
the nearly bankrupt Marquis of Huntly. Huntly and Argyll had previously entered 
into a financial agreement in which Argyll had become cautioner for a portion of 
Huntly's debts, as well as for the dowries of his daughters. It was agreed that should 
Huntly default on his debts Argyll would take possession of the lands and lordships 
of Badenoch and Lochaber as compensation. 16 In order to lay claim to the lands and 
to weaken royalist strength in the region, Argyll paid Huntly's debt before it became 
necessary and in May 1640 declared Huntly's lands forfeit. 
Edward J. Cowan states early on in Montrose: For Covenant and King "the 
`Anti-Campbell coalition' was largely the creation of Hamilton during the summer 
of 1638 has been overlooked" and that Hamilton was the one "who hit upon the idea 
of exploiting the widespread antipathy towards Sliochd Diarmaid". 17 Granted, it 
was Hamilton who joined the clans in opposition to the Covenant and thus Argyll, 
14 HMC, Report IV, MSS of Earl of Argyll, 491-2. 
is D. Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-44: The Triumph of the Covenanters (Newton Abbot, 
1973), 198. 
16 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 97. 
17 Cowan, Montrose, 50. 
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however it was Argyll's actions which created the Anti-Campbell sentiment 
allowing Hamilton to merely provide a banner for the clans to unite under. 
Unfortunately for Argyll he perpetuated the animosity towards his house by his 
actions during the Bishops' Wars and did little to rectify the hostile situation he 
himself had created. Argyll's commission against the men of Atholl was intended to 
bolster the Covenanters' cause and remove the royalist threat in the central 
highlands but Montrose had already secured Airlie Castle for the Covenanters and 
entrusted it to Lt. Col. Sibbald. Rather than being satisfied with the castle being in 
Covenanter possession, Argyll still marched his men through the region creating 
£7,000 worth of damage. In fact, Cowan quotes an order from Argyll to Campbell 
of Inverawe found in the Argyll Transcripts in which Argyll instructs his kinsman to 
destroy the castle of Forthar or Forter, ""ye shall fyre it weill, that so it may be 
destroyed. Bot ye neid not to lett know that ye have directions from me to fyre it". Is 
Why would Argyll be giving orders which he did not want anyone to know were 
coming from him if he was doing it solely for the cause of the Covenant? The 
secrecy and manipulation implicit in this quote when combined with his other 
actions during the course of events appears to paint an unflattering picture of Argyll 
in which his personal ambitions played a key role in his decision-making. 
Apparently, Argyll was preparing for a military expedition into Atholl and 
the surrounding areas to assert his claim to Huntly's land and to prevent a royalist 
rising in the central Highlands at least a month prior to his commission. Argyll's 
acquisition of a commission of "fire and sword" merely served to legitimize his 
expedition. The fact that Huntly and the Athollmen were royalists meant that Argyll 
was able to use his affiliation with the Covenanting Movement to not only rid the 
regime of the threat of a royalist rising but also to gain personally from the endeavor 
by acquiring Huntly's territory. Therefore, the commission against the Athollmen 
allowed Argyll to use his public position within the Covenanting regime for his 
private gain. 19 However, the fact that he was acting prior to his national commission 
indicates the motives behind his actions were primarily the expansion of his power 
:g As quoted in Cowan, Montrose, 96. Original is found in Argyll Transcripts, July 1640. 
19 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-44,198-99; Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the 
House of Stuart, 97; J. P. Kenyon & J. Ohlmeyer, "Background to the Civil Wars" in Kenyon & 
Ohlmeyer, eds., The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660 
(Oxford, 1998), 23-4. 
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and territory and subsequently the Covenanters' need to thwart the royalists in the 
Central Highlands. 
The issue of economic indebtedness among the clans also became a factor in 
their allegiance. The advent of the debt market in the mid-seventeenth century 
allowed many chiefs to extend their resources beyond their means. Whereas 
indebtedness among nobles in the Lowlands led some to align with the Covenant, 20 
the financial crisis experienced by the chiefs in the Western Highlands and Isles led 
some to support the royalists or to shift their allegiances. This difference was 
primarily due to the control the Clan Campbell had over the debt market in the 
region; principally through the Marquis of Argyll and George Campbell, sheriff of 
Argyll, who were the holders of many of the debts in the region, and in some cases 
took on the role of debt consolidators. It was hoped by those clans faced with 
financial insolvency that a royalist victory would result in the destruction of the 
Campbells, thus removing the financial control the Campbells wielded over the 
clans they were creditors of, and would allow for the reacquisition of territory lost 
due to their debts. 
The Clan Lamont is a prime example of a clan that shifted its allegiance 
because of its economic situation. Historians have labeled Sir James Lamont of 
Lamont as an adventurer and self-seeker, which appear to be accurate terms to 
describe his actions during the Scottish Revolution. 21 As a result of Sir James's 
financial situation his allegiance was based solely on his desire to advance his clan's 
position by gaining the district of Cowal in Argyllshire. This goal resulted in Clan 
Lamont vacillating between the Covenanters and royalists, as well as Sir James's 
"double-dealing" at times. Sir James was viewed by the Covenanters, especially the 
Campbells, as an "unscrupulous turn-coat" who "in all things played for his own 
hand" because he had first supported the Covenant regime, but switched loyalties to 
the royalists when Montrose and the Irish regiments were in the midst of a series of 
military victories; thus bettering his odds for self-preservation and possible 
20 For more on this argument see K. Brown, "Aristocratic Finances and the Origins of the Scottish 
Revolution", English Historical Review 104 (1989), 46-87. 
21 E Furgol, "The Civil Wars in Scotland", in P. Kenyon & J. Ohlmeyer, eds., The Civil Wars: A 
Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638-1660 (Oxford, 1998), 62. 
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advancement. 22 However, Lamont's maneuverings failed; by the end of the Scottish 
Revolution, Sir James had effectively been deemed bankrupt and this resulted in the 
seizure of a vast amount of Lamont territory by his creditors in 1648, including 
George Campbell, sheriff of Argyll. 3 
The reason behind Sir James Lamont's shift in allegiance was simply 
because by siding with the dominant faction he would be better able to strengthen 
his claim to Cowal. The fact he changed allegiances due to his waning power in 
Cowal is seen in his one condition for supporting the royalist regime. Sir James 
agreed to align with the royalists as long as his colors were unfurled at Cowal by an 
Irish force, large enough to ensure subjection of the inhabitants. 24 The Irish 
regiments had already gained a reputation for being fierce fighters, and by having 
the Irish raise Lamont's colors at Cowal the intention was to visually link Lamont to 
the Irish forces. This intimidation factor was not something the Covenanters could 
offer Lamont at the time; thus he aligned with the side that could best aid his own 
agenda. Not surprisingly, however, as a royalist, Lamont did not rally his forces 
around the Marquis of Montrose or Alasdair MacColla; instead he pursued his own 
feuds in Argyllshire against the Campbells and continued in his pursuit of Cowal. 
As with religion, the effect economics had on allegiances was a direct result 
of the impact it would have on local politics. The economic advantages afforded to 
the various clans in the Western Highlands and Isles magnified the political situation 
within the locality because of the potential to disrupt the current political structure. 
As seen in the Marquis of Argyll's commission against the "Athollmen", Clan 
Campbell was able to increase its power and territory through its allegiance to the 
Covenant, while Clan Lamont's indebtedness resulted in calculated shifts in 
allegiance that enabled the clan to temporarily regain their dominance in the district 
of Cowal. Clearly, the economic possibilities that could increase a clan's power 
were a key aspect behind allegiances in the Western Highlands and Isles due to 
relationship between economics and local political status. 
22 As quoted in H. McKechnie, The Lamont Clan, 1235-1935 (Edinburgh, 1938), 148. 
23 For details of the Clan Lamont's debt see chapter 4 "Indebtedness in the Western Highlands and 
Isles" and Sir Norman Lamont of Knockdow, An Inventory ofLamont Papers, 1231-1897 




Looking at a map of the Western Highlands and Isles illustrating the support of the 
clans for the Covenanters and royalists it is clear that a majority of the allegiances 
were drawn along the same lines as the long-standing alliances and rivalries between 
neighboring clans. 25 Many of the allegiances that were founded on existing alliances 
often resulted in the lesser clan following the lead of their superior out of both fears 
of the consequences if they did not and the belief that their superior was better 
informed of the situation. Calling on the support of their subordinates served as the 
quickest and easiest way for the Covenanters to increase their numbers. The 
examination of Clan Chisholm's support for the Covenant clearly portrays the 
regime's use of alliances in building their forces. 
The key to understanding Clan Chisholm's loyalty to the Covenant lies in 
their relationship to the Frasers of Lovat and their neighboring clans. John 
Chisholm of Strathglass, also known as Chisholm of Comer, had a close relationship 
with the Frasers of Lovat dating back a generation prior to the Scottish Revolution. 
The inventory of Chisholm writs is dominated by transactions between the two 
clans, one of significance being a contract between John Chisholm and Simon 
Fraser, Lord Lovat, dated 13 March 1621. In this contract John Chisholm of Comer 
promised his attendance at Simon Fraser's "court" and promised his services to the 
Frasers. 26 There is no indication that this contract was reversed prior to the outbreak 
of the Bishops' War; therefore, the assumption can be safely made that the Frasers 
of Lovat called on the service of Chisholm of Comer as promised in the contract in 
support of the Covenant. 
Added to the relationship between Chisholm and Fraser was the fact that 
Chisholm's territory was surrounded by Covenanters. The geographical position of 
the Clan Chisholm further illustrates that in some cases the safest course to take was 
to follow the dominant leader. The Frasers of Lovat encircled Chisholm's land and 
beyond the Frasers the nearest clans were the Grants and Munros, both committed 
25 See Appendix 4: Clan Map with Civil War Allegiances. 
26 J. Munro, Inventory of Chisholm Writs 1456-1810, New Series 18 (Scottish Record Society, 1992), 
17. 
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Covenanters, as well as the Earl of Seaforth, who had periods of Covenanting 
sympathy. Although Chisholm was Protestant and may have joined the Covenant 
Movement regardless of Fraser's influence, his unwavering support was ensured by 
the fact that he was the smallest out of the five clans and the obvious and safest 
course for Chisholm to follow was to side with their stronger neighbors to avoid the 
repercussions of breaking their bond with the Frasers and the possible attacks on 
their territory as an adversary. 
Similar to the Covenanters' use of alliances in gaining support, the use of 
rivalries proved equally effective. A lingering effect of the feuds that occurred 
during the late 1500s and early 1600s was that a number of clans had either a score 
to settle or feared retribution from another clan. In the case of Clan Campbell, the 
clan as a whole feared the repercussions of their acquisition of MacDonald territory. 
Although many Scottish historians have discussed the Campbell-MacDonald feuds 
at length, the motive of rivalry amongst the Clan Campbell that arose from this long 
history requires a brief mention. 
In general, Campbell loyalty was to the Marquis of Argyll and the Covenant 
Movement to rival the Clan Donald loyalty to the Marquis of Montrose and the 
crown. However, this rivalry was heightened by the fact that Charles I was 
promising to reinstate various MacDonald leaders in their hereditary lands that had 
been seized by the Campbells. Between 1603 and 1625 the Campbells had acquired 
roughly a quarter of MacDonald territory, including Kintyre, Ardnamurchan and 
Islay, which Charles I in his campaign for sympathy promised to Ranald 
MacDonnell, the Earl of Antrim, Donald Gorme MacDonald of Sleat, and Alasdair 
MacColla respectively. 27 There was little doubt in the minds of the Campbells and 
onlookers that these promises would result in massacres of Campbells to ensure that 
not only the Covenant but also the Campbells would be destroyed, thus allowing for 
the transfer of property. The threat to Campbell survival posed by the Clan Donald 
and their blood-relation to the MacDonnells in Ireland, who were ready to cross the 
Irish Sea for an invasion, was the main reason the Marquis of Argyll established a 
system of warning beacons along the western seaboard and manned the outposts 
27 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, 100; A. Macdonald & A. MacDonald, The Clan Donald, 4 vols. (Inverness, 1896-1904), ii, 56; D. Stevenson, King or Covenant? Voices from the Civil War (East 
Linton, 1996), 148. 
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around the clock with Campbells, as well as the motive behind his targeted attacks 
against various branches of MacDonalds 28 
The use of rivalries in the recruitment of royalists within the Western 
Highlands and Isles was rooted in the territorial ambitions of the Marquis of Argyll 
and the Earl of Sutherland. The most important polarizing factor within the region 
prior to the Scottish Revolution was the maneuverings of the nobles in their attempt 
to strengthen their power. The way in which the Earls of Argyll and the Earl of 
Sutherland expanded their territory either threatened or victimized a large number of 
clans, especially the MacDonalds and the MacKays. Because the Marquis of Argyll 
and Sutherland supported the Covenant, support for their opposition provided the 
means to regain lands lost to the earls and the opportunity to wreak havoc on their 
aggressors. 
The Clan Donald was opposed to Campbell expansion dating back to the 15th 
century. Most recently, the 7th Earl of Argyll had seized Islay and Kintyre through 
his destruction of the MacDonalds of Dunyveg in the early 1600s. Campbell's 
acquisition of this land gave rise to one of the most extreme cases of anti- 
Campbellism seen through the career of Alasdair MacColla. David Stevenson 
cleverly describes the mentality of MacColla; he "probably didn't give a damn about 
the king". 29 In fact, his allegiance to the king ranked sixth in a list of his personal 
priorities. At the top of MacColla's list was his allegiance to Clan Donald and the 
attempt to regain Kintyre and Islay. Like the Earl of Antrim, MacColla wanted to 
revive the Lordship of the Isles and renew the fame and fortune of Clan Donald, 
which, in effect, meant destroying the Clan Campbell. MacColla's hostility toward 
the Campbells manifested into a personal war against Argyll, resulting in a number 
of massacres of Campbells after royalist victories. MacColla's motive of revenge 
was made clear when he declined to involve himself in the invasion of England, and 
instead persuaded Montrose to allow him to lead the Irish regiment and a large 
portion of Highlanders into Argyll where he was able to fulfill his desire to enact 
revenge on the Clan Campbell by thoroughly devastating the region. 
28 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, 101. 
29 Stevenson, King or Covenant, 140. 
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Further evidence that the Clan Donald were in support of the royalist cause 
because it allowed for the killing of Campbells is seen through the vernacular poets 
of the Clan Donald. The most prolific of these poets was lain Lom who acted as a 
'wartime correspondent during the Scottish Revolution. His poem praising the 
military might of Clan Donald at the battle of Inverlochy on 2 February 1645 clearly 
shows the clan's hatred for the Campbells and the glee in their destruction: 
`S lionmhor claidheamh claisghorm comhnard 
Bha bualadh `n lamhan Chlann Domhnaill. 
`N uair chruinnich mor dhragh na falachd, 
`N am rusgadh nan greidlean tana, 
Bha iongnan Dhuibneach ri talamh 
An deidh an luithean a ghearradh. 30 
[Numerous are the blue-fluted, well balanced swords that were wielded in the hands 
of Clan Donald. When the great work of blood-letting -came to a height at the time 
of unsheathing slender swords, the claws of the Campbells lay on the ground with 
sinews severed. ] 
Although this battle was a major victory for the royalists, the vocabulary used by 
Iain Lom clearly indicates that the victory was seen as a triumph over the Campbells 
more than a defeat of the Covenanters. A second poem written in 1646, by an 
anonymous MacDonald, specifically addresses the desire to regain the former glory 
that was the Lordship of the Isles: 
Gheibh gach cealgair mar thail e, 
Theid gach traoitear a smaladh, 
Cha bhi chuing oirnn `ga giulan, 
`S chan'n fhaigh luchd diumbaidh an ailein, 
Gun teid luchd nam beul fiara, 
A chur sios fo ar sailean, 
`S bidh Clann Domhnuill an uachdar, 
Mar bu dual do'n an al sin. 31 
[Every rogue will get what he deserves, every traitor will be snuffed out. We will 
not have to bear the yoke and spiteful ones will not get their wishes. The Campbells 
will be under our heels and Clan Donald will be on top as is the custom of that 
progeny. ] 
30 As quoted in Macinnes, "Gaelic culture in the seventeenth century", 173. 
31 As quoted in Macinnes, "Gaelic culture in the seventeenth century", 175. 
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The reference made to the Campbells "under our heels" and the Clan Donald being 
"on top as is the custom of that progeny", is a reference to the Campbell acquisition 
of the former territory of the Lordship of the Isles and the desire of the Clan Donald 
to reclaim what was hereditarily theirs. Not only do these two poems provide 
evidence of the rivalry and revenge motives of Clan Donald, but they also served as 
propaganda and inspiration for the clan's attacks on the Campbells. 
The opportunity to regain lands lost to the Clan Campbell was used by 
Charles to attract the support of Clan Donald. The fear of the MacDonalds began 
with a commission to Sleat and Antrim issued 5 June 1639. The commission 
named Sleat and Antrim "conjunctlie and severallie" His Majesty's Lieutenants and 
Commissioners in the Western Highlands and Isles with full power to convocate the 
lieges and pursue Covenanters with fire and sword. 32 For doing so, Charles 
promised the lands of Ardnamurchan to Sleat and the land of Kintyre to the Earl of 
Antrim, both former MacDonald territories. In reality it is difficult to believe that 
Charles would restore the Lordship of the Isles and bestow it upon the Clan Donald, 
because it would decrease the crown's authority and the revenues received from the 
region. If the lordship had been resurrected the Clan Donald, who had proven 
themselves to be a thorn in the side of the crown, would wield such power in the 
isles that they would be uncontrollable and could possibly function as a principality 
independent from any influence from the crown; however, this did not stop Charles 
from using the lordship as an incentive for the Clan Donald's allegiance. Although 
the grants to the Clan Donald were illusory they appear to have been obtainable 
goals in the minds of the MacDonalds; the actions of the MacDonalds during the 
course of the royalists' victories indicate that they were upholding their end of the 
agreement and were set on destroying the Clan Campbell in order to restore the 
lordship. 
Since Clan Donald's main objectives were the restoration of their lands and 
destruction of the Campbells, bribery was essential in maintaining their support of 
the crown. However, the use of bribery only added to the instability of the region as 
the MacDonalds used the conflict primarily for their own agenda; thus proving the 
Marquis of Hamilton's warning to Charles that the Clan Donald would side with the 
32 MacDonald & MacDonald, Clan Donald, ii, 720 & iii, 55-6. 
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king "not for anie great affection they caryie to your majesty bot because of ther 
spleen to Lorne and will dou if they durst just contrarie to whatt his men doeth" 33 
A second clan that joined the royalist faction out of a rivalry with their local 
magnate was the Clan MacKay under the charge of Donald MacKay, Lord Reay. 
The mentality of the Clan MacKay had always been to die "in defence of their 
fathers' lands"; this mentality resulted from the clan being caught in the middle of 
the hostilities between the Earls of Sutherland and Caithness. 34 Throughout the 
early part of the seventeenth century both earls were attempting to gain possession 
of Strathnaver and, subsequently, superiority over the Clan MacKay because of the 
value of their territory and their military strength. By 1625, the Earl of Sutherland 
had virtually destroyed Caithness leaving him near bankrupt and had partially ruined 
MacKay in the process. Sutherland's territorial maneuvers and attempts to gain 
Strathnaver prompted MacKay to support the royalist cause in the northwest to 
counter Sutherland's position as his superior. 
At the beginning of the Scottish Revolution, MacKay's actions were the 
product of his desire to avoid any unwise choices which might have resulted in his 
complete ruin. In a letter from the Committee of Estates Lord Reay's attendance 
was requested at a meeting in Inverness where the commissioners would meet with 
local barons and gentlemen, "Informing yow truelie how loyalie we haue proceidit 
from the beginning". This letter also implied that Reay's non-attendance would be 
in defiance of his feudal superior, the Earl of Sutherland. 35 Because the royalists in 
the Highlands had not yet organized themselves, Reay was compelled to sign the 
National Covenant to prevent any attacks from the Earl of Sutherland. However, 
Lord Reay believed he had been tricked into treason by his subscription and sent his 
son to wait on the royalist Marquis of Huntly and to order arms for a royalist rising 
in Strathnaver. 
Although Lord Reay had publicly sided with the Covenanters he soon came 
under suspicion as being a royalist. Two incidents occurred in March 1639 that 
prompted the Earl Marischal to state that MacKay was not a "good Covenanter". 36 
33 HMC Report XI Appendix vi, MSS of Duke of Hamilton, 95. 
34 W. Fraser, ed., The Sutherland Book 3 voll (Edinburgh, 1892) ii, 152-3. 
's NAS, Papers of Lord Reay, GD84/2/194. 
36 J. Spalding, Memorialls of the Trubles in Scotland and England, 2 vols. (Aberdeen, 1792), i, 163-4. 
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The first incident occurred when Montrose, while in command of the Covenanters, 
had taken the Master of Reay prisoner in March 1639 when Montrose attacked 
Huntly. The association between Huntly and the Master of Reay implied that a 
possible alliance was forming between the Clan MacKay and Huntly. The 
suspicions regarding Clan MacKay were manifested by the Covenanters' seizure of 
arms ordered for Strathnaver by the Master of Reay and Huntly. As John Spalding 
reported, "there was also taken by the Covenanters certain carbines, muskets, pikes, 
corslets and ammunitions pertaining to the Lord Reay, and taken out of an barque 
happening by chance to come to Petershead, as she was carrying them to 
Strathnaver, to the said Lord's country". 37 The loss of the cargo temporarily ruined 
Reay's scheme of a royalist rising in the north-west that was to be joined by the 
MacKenzies and Sinclairs. 38 However, the opportunity would present itself again 
due in part to Lord Reay's association with Christian IV of Denmark. 
By the summer of 1642, Sutherland and the Gordons had increased their 
powers over Clan MacKay through Charles I's promotion of Sir Robert Gordon and 
the erection of the barony of Gordonstoun. The erection of the barony was intended 
to sway the Gordons' support in favour of the crown and to harness their influence 
to advance the levying of troops for the royalist cause; however, the promotion only 
served to weaken the king's position, as well as Lord Reay's. The powers granted to 
the Gordons gave them the authority to muster troops in MacKay country, primarily 
in the disputed area of Strathnaver, which reignited the hostilities between 
Sutherland and MacKay over superiority of the region. The grant to the Gordons 
allowed them to muster MacKay's men for the Covenant regime; thus reducing Lord 
Reay's authority over his own clansmen and prevented him from mustering his men 
for the royalists' army. 39 
In an attempt to thwart the Gordons, Lord Reay sailed to Denmark to gain 
the assistance of Christian IV. In November 1643, MacKay returned from Denmark 
with letters patent from Christian IV ordering him to raise a regiment of foot soldiers 
37 Spalding, Memorialls, i, 137. 
38 A. MacKay, The Book of MacKay (Edinburgh, 1906), 138. 
39 I. Grimble, Chief of MacKay (Edinburgh, 1993), 134. 
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in Strathnaver to be transported to Denmark. 40 It is clear through this patent that 
Lord Reay and Christian IV intended to use the Thirty Years' War as a pretext for 
raising troops for Charles I, and the patent was a means to circumvent the authority 
of Sutherland within MacKay country and allow Reay to regain control over his own 
territory. Unfortunately for the royalists, Alexander Leslie, Earl of Leven, took 
MacKay prisoner when MacKay returned from Denmark and partook in the 
fortification of Newcastle. While MacKay was held in the Tolbooth in Edinburgh 
the clan held a gathering in which they drew up a pact, which was to serve as a 
warning to Sutherland. The pact pledged that the Clan MacKay would not take part 
in any disloyal actions and would attack any who should try to "molest" them 4' 
This pact made it clear that the whole name of MacKay were royalists and were 
determined to protect themselves against further encroachment by Sutherland, thus 
reiterating the mentality that they would die "in defence of their fathers' lands". 
Lord Reay was released from the Tolbooth when Montrose, now leader of the 
royalists, laid siege to Edinburgh in August 1645, and returned to Strathnaver in 
October where he continued his service for the royalists. 
Local politics also played a large role in shifting allegiances as seen in the 
response of the Clan MacLean to the imprisonment of Sir Lachlan MacLean of 
Duart by the Marquis of Argyll. Looking at the history of the MacLeans of Duart it 
would be expected that the clan would have been one of the most dedicated 
adherents to the Covenant Movement because of their religious beliefs, affiliation 
with the Campbells of Argyll, and the effects of Charles I's Act of Revocation on 
the clan. However, the MacLeans of Duart were one of the many clans in the 
Western Highlands and Isles that shifted their allegiance to the royalist cause. At the 
outbreak of the Scottish Revolution, Sir Lachlan attempted to remain neutral out of 
prudence and lack of financial resources, but actions of the Marquis of Argyll 
against Sir Lachlan MacLean forced the MacLeans of Duart to join the royalists. 
Traditionally, the MacLeans of Duart were staunch Protestants and allied to 
the Campbells of Argyll. The two clans had joined forces in the suppression of the 
Catholic rising in Ireland, known as Tyrone's Rebellion, and in the destruction of the 
40 Grimble, Chief of MacKay, 138; original patent is in Latin in NAS, Papers of Lord Reay, 
GD84/2/197. 
41 NAS, Papers of Lord Reay, GD84/2/200. 
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Catholic MacDonalds of Dunyveg. Both campaigns cost the MacLeans a great deal 
of money, and by 1625 the clan was facing serious financial difficulties. Charles I's 
Act of Revocation further complicated the monetary troubles of the clan, when 
Charles singled out Sir Lachlan to return church lands feued to his family in the 
1570s by John Carswell, Bishop of the Isles. The letter from Charles to Sir Lachlan 
stated, "we do will and command you restore unto the Bishop the absolute 
possession of the said Island [Iona] without further hearing or delay". 42 * The 
combination of the religious position of the MacLeans and the forced forfeiture of 
Iona would have given Sir Lachlan enough reason to side with the Covenanters, but 
the lack of funds to support a regiment played a larger role in his decision to remain 
neutral. It was not until the Marquis of Argyll took actions against Sir Lachlan that 
the MacLeans of Duart took an active part in the Scottish Revolution for the 
royalists. 
The first sign of strain between MacLean and Argyll was the result of the 
campaign against the MacDonalds of Dunyveg. MacLean had joined the 7th Earl of 
Argyll in destroying the MacDonalds on the assumption that MacLean would gain 
the Rinns of Islay as compensation, a region that had been disputed between the 
MacDonalds and MacLeans since the 1580s. However, instead of granting the lands 
to MacLean, Argyll used his position at court to arrange for the entire island of Islay 
to be granted to Campbell of Cawdor, leaving MacLean with no compensation for 
his efforts. 3 Troubles between MacLean and Argyll continued to escalate until 
1639 when the Marquis of Argyll had Sir Lachlan imprisoned in Carrick Castle for 
one year. Argyll claimed he imprisoned MacLean on the grounds of outstanding 
debt. Argyll had begun acting as a debt consolidator for many clans, including 
MacLean, as part of his expansionist agenda; 44 but the MacLeans claimed their chief 
was imprisoned for refusing to sign the National Covenant and join Argyll. As a 
42 Collectanea de Rebus Albanicis (Iona Club, 1848), 185-6. 
43 C. Innes, ed., The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor: A Series of Papers Selected from the Charter 
Room at Cawdor, 1236-1742 (Spalding Club, 1859), 237. 
44 For more on financial problems of clans and the role of Argyll see: F. Shaw, The Northern and 
Western Islands Islands of Scotland: Their Economy and Society in the Seventeenth Century 
(Edinburgh, 1980), 43-6; "The Ewill Trowbles of the Lewes", J. R. N. MacPhail, ed., Highland 
Papers, 4 vol. (SHS, 1914-1934), ii, 262-88; "The Genealogie of the Surname of M'Kenzie", J. R. N. 
MacPhail, ed., Highland Papers, 4 vols. (SHS, 1914-1934), ii, 2-68; Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce 
and the House of Stuart, 74-5. 
210 
result of the Clan MacLean's belief that Argyll had acted against Sir Lachlan 
because of political and not financial reasons, "friends" of Sir Lachlan met at 
Bunessan in the Ross of Mull where, according to the Minutes of the Synod of 
Argyll, "they agreed some conclusions contrary to the Covenant". 45 This meeting 
was the first step taken by the MacLeans of Duart and "friends" to align themselves 
with the royalists in opposition to the Marquis of Argyll. 
With the support of the clan already inclined toward the royalist faction, Sir 
Lachlan seized his opportunity to publicly declare for the royalists after Argyll's 
defeat at Inverlochy in February 1645. The MacLeans of Duart were among a long 
list of clans from the Western Highlands and Isles that met Montrose at Killiwheim, 
near Elgin, and subscribed a band of loyalty to the king and the royalist army. The 
band swore allegiance to the king and bound all subscribers to "wse all the best and 
most vigorous oppositione against the Actors and Instruments of all those 
abominable and monstruous crymes". 46 Although Sir Lachlan's personal 
convictions, chiefly his devotion to Protestantism and his feud with MacDonald of 
Dunyveg, should have aligned him with the Covenanters, the need to protect his 
family from the encroachments of the Marquis of Argyll, one of the leading "Actors 
and Instruments" mentioned in the band, forced Sir Lachlan to side with the 
royalists. For the remainder of the royalists' military campaign the MacLeans of 
Duart remained steadfast supporters and distinguished themselves at the battles of 
Kilsyth and Inverkeithing. 
One of the most complex characters during the Scottish Revolution was 
George MacKenzie, 2°d Earl of Seaforth. It is difficult to determine Seaforth's 
personal convictions because he changed allegiances numerous times between 1638 
and 1649; the only dependable aspect of the Earl of Seaforth's career was that he 
was undependable. Seaforth's loyalty throughout the conflict shifted to the faction 
that was enjoying a temporary victory or to the faction that posed the greater threat 
to him at the moment. This shifting suggests that his motive was the desire to 
preserve his family and to stay on top of the social hierarchy within the Western 
Highlands and Isles, and clearly indicates that Seaforth's position within his locality 
as D. C. MacTavish, ed., Minutes of the Synod ofArgyll, 1638-61,2 vols. (SHS, 1943), i, 13-14. 46 NAS, Montrose Papers, GD220/3/184. 
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directly influenced his actions on the national level. Although Seaforth's actions 
were unpredictable, his mustering capabilities remained unhampered. Neighboring 
clans, such as the MacRaes of Kintail, MacLeods of Assynt, and the majority of the 
MacKenzie branches, felt obliged to follow his lead making Seaforth's loyalty a 
benefit to whomever he chose to align himself with, further emphasizing the power 
that local politics within the Western Highlands and Isles had over national politics. 
It appears that attempts by Seaforth to establish himself as a formidable force 
in the Western Highlands and Isles were hampered by the jurisdiction Argyll already 
held. For example, in March 1634 Seaforth had his power in the isles legitimized by 
a commission from the Privy Council to pursue and apprehend the Islesmen who 
were raiding Ross with further instructions to then turn the prisoners over to the 
Sheriff of Inverness. Just over a month later Lord Lorne, later Marquis of Argyll, 
had the commission changed; Seaforth was not to prejudice Lorne as Justiciar of the 
Isles and was to turn over any prisoners directly to Lome for trial 47 Similarly, in 
November 1641 Seaforth had his infeftment of Lewis and Stornoway Castle ratified 
by an Act of Parliament which Argyll immediately protested against on the grounds 
that the ratification should be without prejudice to Argyll as Justiciar. 48 
A bond of friendship entered into by Seaforth and Argyll on 22 June 1638 
indicates that these events did not cause too much animosity but it did keep Seaforth 
in a subservient position to Argyll. 49 In fact, on numerous occasions both men were 
appointed to the same service, such as the Justiciary Commission for Suppression of 
Crime in the Highlands on 3 December 1641 and the Commission for the 
Apprehension of Jesuits on 5 July 1642.50 Furthermore, both Argyll and Seaforth 
sat in Parliament together no less than four times between 1639 and 1648.51 As the 
two highest ranking nobles in the Western Highlands and Isles it appears that both 
men had an amicable relationship even though Argyll had the influence at court to 
manipulate or direct Seaforth's actions. 
47 IHMC, 6`h Report, Appendix, MSS of Duke of Argyll, 625; HMC, 4`h Report, MSS of Duke of 
Argyll, 487. 
48 APS, iv, 1625-41,530 & 583. 
4 HMC, 4`h Report, 483. 
50 RPC, vii, 165 & 288-9. 
51 The sessions attended together were in 1639, July 1641, August 1641, November 1641. APS, v, 
251,258,308,330,425. 
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Unlike other clans, such as the MacLeans, who had tumultuous relations 
with Argyll, Seaforth does not appear to have used the Civil Wars as a means to 
overthrow Argyll's superiority. Although Seaforth's desire for self-advancement 
occasionally put his clan in opposition to the direction Argyll was leading, his 
maneuverings were intended to gain him power by aligning with the winning faction 
and were not directed at Argyll personally; Seaforth and Argyll did not meet on the 
field of battle as adversaries and Seaforth did not partake in the royalist ravaging of 
Argyllshire. In fact, when it served Seaforth's purpose he used his subservient 
position to Argyll to regain the Covenanters' trust as seen in the series letters 
between the Committee of Estates, Seaforth and Argyll regarding Montrose and 
MacColla's movements during the summer of 1644 and the direction Argyll wished 
Seaforth to take against them. 52 
The difficulty in determining the Earl of Seaforth's allegiance begins with 
the campaigning efforts of both the Covenanters and royalists. During the first half 
of 1638, both factions were actively pursuing the clans in the Western Highlands 
and Isles in an attempt to gain their support. By holding meetings, similar to the one 
attended by Lord Reay and the Earl of Sutherland in Inverness, the Covenanters 
were laying claim to a number of clans, while the Marquis of Hamilton was 
conducting his own recruiting campaign for the royalists' cause. The efforts of the 
two factions resulted in a number of clans being claimed by both groups. The Earl 
of Seaforth was one of the men who supposedly pledged his allegiance to the 
Covenanters; however a letter from Hamilton to Charles I indicates otherwise. In 
the letter, dated 15 June 1638, Hamilton reported the success of his recruiting 
efforts, which included the claim that Seaforth was to be in command of the 
Islesmen "who are at present reasonable". 53 If Seaforth was indeed the "king's 
man" in the Isles, which could have been an over-optimistic claim on Hamilton's 
part, he quickly changed positions when the Covenanters offered him the 
appointment of General of the Covenanting Army north of the Spey. As General, 
Seaforth led 4,000 men in May 1639 through Moray and remained encamped in 
Speyside until orders arrived to disband after the Treaty of Berwick was reached 
52 NAS, Parliamentary Papers, PA/11/3/24v-25v. 
53 HMC Report XI Appendix vi, MSS of Duke of Hamilton, 95. 
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between Charles I and the Covenanters. 54 The reasoning behind the earl's first shift 
of allegiance seems to have been the fact that the Covenanters offered Seaforth a 
commission larger than the one the royalists were able to offer at the time. 
By 1640, Seaforth's actions were under suspicion by the Covenanters. The 
combination of Charles I's march into York and the Earl of Montrose's defection to 
the royalists prompted the Covenanting Army to examine their ranks, and as a 
precautionary measure expelled or imprisoned suspected royalists. Among those 
brought before the Committee of Estates and warded in Edinburgh was the Earl of 
Seaforth on suspicion of his being a "lukewarm" Covenanter. After his escape, 
Seaforth met with the Earls of Traquair, Montrose, Wigtown, Atholl, and Hume in 
August 1641 where they collectively joined in a bond against the Covenanters. The 
bond, commonly known as the Cumbernauld Band, attacked the Covenant regime 
and the general course the movement was taking under the leadership of Argyll. 
Although he subscribed the Cumbernauld Band, Seaforth appears to have remained 
inclined toward the Covenant regime. In October 1644 Seaforth raised his men and 
joined the Covenanting Earl of Sutherland on his march into Spey. However, 
Montrose never reached Spey as he had heard of Argyll's movements in Lochaber 
and detoured to meet Argyll at Inverlochy. The battle at Inverlochy in January 1645 
resulted in one of the royalists' largest victories, as Argyll fled the field of battle and 
Montrose's forces killed 1,500 Campbells. 
Using the victory at Inverlochy to his advantage Montrose gained the support 
of many Covenanters out of fear of Montrose's army. Five days after the battle of 
Inverlochy Montrose drafted a bond of allegiance to the royalist cause at Killwheim 
which created a mass exodus of Covenanters, including Seaforth who signed in 
February 1645. Aligning with the royalists, Seaforth and his troops were among 
those listed in Montrose's ranks on his march toward Bog of Gight. 55 However, 
threats from the Covenanters' garrison at Inverness forced Montrose to allow 
Seaforth and others to return home to defend their estates. The possibility of an 
attack by the Covenanters' garrison persuaded Seaforth to ignore his oath of 
allegiance to the king and again join the Covenanters in order to protect his estate. 
54 A. MacKenzie, History of the Clan MacKenzie with Genealogies of the Principal Families 
(Inverness, 1879), 184. 
53 MacKenzie, History of MacKenzie, 184-5. 
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Once Seaforth returned home he quickly tried to make amends with the 
Covenanters. Like many men who shifted allegiance, Seaforth claimed that he 
temporarily joined the royalists out of fear of Montrose. To prove his loyalty to the 
Covenanters he again raised his men and joined the Covenanting Army under the 
leadership of General Hurry. Although Seaforth was not totally committed to the 
cause and was apprehensive about taking on Montrose, he was persuaded by his own 
men to take to the battlefield alongside Hurry. Unfortunately for Seaforth, the battle 
of Auldeam was another royalist victory and he was ordered by Hurry to retreat. 
After the Covenanters' defeat at Auldearn in April 1645 and again at Alford in July 
Seaforth's loyalty to the Covenanters again began to waver. Out of frustration at the 
events in the north, Seaforth drafted a bond, which he called a Remonstrance, 
against the current condition of the government under the leadership of the 
Covenanters. The Covenanters reacted by declaring Seaforth an enemy of the public 
and had him excommunicated by the Church, to which Seaforth's response was to 
join Montrose for a third time at Inverness in April 1646.56 
Seaforth's loyalty would shift, yet again, in 1648 to the Covenant regime as a 
result of a new series of inquisitions following the failure of the Engagement. The 
Engagement was an attempt by moderate Covenanters and royalists to release 
Charles I from custody. Although the attempt failed it prompted the Committee of 
Estates to re-inspect their ranks as they had done in 1640. Seaforth had not taken 
part in the Engagement but had remained loyal to the royalists since rejoining 
Montrose in 1646, and was being scrutinized by the Committee of Estates for his 
dealing with the royalist army. In order to preserve his estate and prevent 
persecution Seaforth reached an agreement with General Middleton who on orders 
from the Committee of Estates offered Seaforth the opportunity to make public 
penance at St. Giles' Cathedral in Edinburgh in exchange for his excommunication 
being lifted. Yet, the Earl of Seaforth's shifting allegiance would continue with his 
departure for Holland in 1649 to go to the newly proclaimed King of Scotland, 
56 Sir Robert Gordon, A Genealogical History of the Earldom of Sutherland: with a Continuation to 
the year 1651 (Edinburgh, 1813), 529. 
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Charles 11.57 While in exile, Seaforth accepted the position of Principal Secretary of 
State for Scotland in the exiled court of Charles 11.58 
Unfortunately, a letter written from the Earl of Seaforth to Charles I on 2 
June 1646 does not help to shed light on the earl's true motives. The entry in the 
Historical Manuscripts Commission report records the letter in which Seaforth 
claimed: 
For however both his affection and actions have been 
questioned... his endeavour was, is, and shall be to show himself a 
faithful Christian by contributing to the advancement of the 
Protestant religion, a loyal subject by conducting to his Majesty's 
honour and a true hearted patriot by studying the preservation of law 
and liberty, etc. 59 
It is possible that the Earl of Seaforth was a moderate Covenanter, one who 
supported the Church of Scotland but also wanted to preserve the king's authority, 
but this does not adequately explain why Seaforth changed his loyalty numerous 
times. The most likely scenario is that Seaforth wrote this letter in an attempt to get 
back in the king's good graces and to excuse his conduct in another attempt to 
protect his station within the Western Highland and Isles. Although there were no 
predatory clans nearby, as an earl his position within national politics had a clear 
relationship to his power and status in the locality. Being an earl who was caught on 
the losing side of a battle posed a threat to his estate, whereas being on the winning 
side enabled him to preserve his household and provided an opportunity to expand 
his territory emulating the Marquis of Argyll. 60 Throughout his career Seaforth 
strove to place himself on the winning team which meant a number of shifts in his 
allegiance. Seaforth proved himself to be an expert tactician and by taking an active 
part for whichever factions he aligned himself he was able to repeatedly gain 
acceptance and forgiveness for his transgressions. 
57 Charles 11 was proclaimed King of Scotland in Edinburgh on 5 February 1649. s$ MacKenzie, History of MacKenzie, 194. 
59 HMC Report XI, appendix vi, MSS of Duke of Hamilton, 110. 
60 In 1648 Seaforth used his allegiance to the royalists to enforce his claim to the previously disputed 
lands of Aluien and Ledmore held by Donald MacLeod of Assynt, now a Covenanter, and laid siege 
to MacLeod's castle. For details of the lawsuit filed by Donald MacLeod of Assynt against George 
MacKenzie, 2nd Earl of Seaforth, See chapter 4 "Central Government and the Western Highlands and 
Isles", p. 68-9 
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IV 
Between 1644 and 1645 the actions that resulted from the allegiances of the clans in 
the Western Highlands and Isles gave rise to a period of instability in which local 
issues tended to take precedence over the political platforms of the Covenanters and 
royalists. Though a number of clans in the region did adhere to the traditional 
platforms of the two factions, a larger number used the conflict as a means to 
enhance their standings either as a result of retribution or avarice. The fact that the 
tides turned in favor of the royalists when the Western Highlands and Isles became 
involved indicates that the personal motives among the clans that laid the foundation 
for the region's local politics were vital to the success of either faction. 
The division between the Covenanters and royalists throughout Scotland was 
based on religious and political differences. The Covenanters emphasized the 
removal of bishops from religious and secular office. An added element to the 
Covenanters' platform was their desire to limit the king's authority in reaction to 
Charles I's Act of Revocation that resulted in the forfeiture or threatened forfeiture 
of former church lands held by the laity. The combination of these two principles 
formed a revolutionary perspective toward the monarchy, chiefly the destruction of 
the theory of Divine Right in which the king was answerable only to God and the 
creation of a constitutional monarch answerable to parliament. The royalist faction 
within Scotland formed out of a desire to preserve the instruments of government 
that the Covenanters wanted to abolish. Although these were the theoretical 
platforms behind the two factions, the emphasis varied from region to region and 
person to person. The examination of the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles 
indicates that these principles were not the main driving force behind the formation 
of allegiances in the region; instead, the motives of the clans discussed here were 
formed primarily out of personal agendas rather than public issues. 
Nearly all the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles had more than one 
motive for their actions; however, the mentality of self-preservation and self. 
advancement was the underlying basis to many allegiances. In looking at the 
allegiances of the Covenant regime in the region we find three prime motives, 
adherence to the Covenanters' cause, alliances and rivalries, and territorial 
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expansion. With the exception of those, such as Grant of Freuchie and MacLeod of 
Dunvegan, who actually believed in and supported the religious and political 
platforms of the faction, a number of those who aligned with the Covenanters had an 
underlying personal agenda. Opposition to the king was out of a need to defend the 
clan from an authoritarian king and power-hungry bishops, thus constituting self- 
preservation. The motives of alliances, rivalries, and territorial expansion arose 
from the mentality of self-advancement. The Marquis of Argyll's commission 
against the royalists in the Central Highlands is an example of one who was 
motivated to take an active part in the military campaign of the Covenanting regime 
by the opportunity to acquire land. The chronology of Argyll's actions in Atholl 
indicates that he was acting independent from the regime and belatedly requested a 
commission from the Committee of Estates to legitimize his territorial conquest; 
thus his personal agenda came before the public. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn when looking at the motives behind the 
royalists within the Western Highlands and Isles. A clear indication that the 
personal agendas of the clans came before the public cause is seen through the 
continuation of rivalries between clans. A majority of the royalist clans aligned 
themselves with the crown in an attempt to thwart or enact revenge on a 
Covenanting clan. As seen through the actions of the MacKays and MacDonalds the 
motivation for siding with the royalist faction was to maintain their land and if 
possible to regain lands lost to the Earl of Sutherland and the Marquis of Argyll. 
Because the nobles were Covenanters, the MacKays and MacDonalds were able to 
use the public issues between the two factions to promote their own cause. 
It is because of the importance of self-preservation and self-advancement 
that threats and bribery were common in the Western Highlands and Isles. The use 
of threats spawned a third division within the region, those who switched 
allegiances. It is through the examination of clans who defected from one group to 
the other, and often back again, that the instability of the area is highlighted. 
Depending on the current political situation, a number of clans were forced to 
change their allegiance to protect their lands from invasion. The shifting of 
allegiances became more common with the rise of Montrose and the resulting series 
of royalist victories. The majority of clans who changed their position were 
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Covenanters who were fearful of Montrose's forces, as is evident through the mass 
exodus of Covenanters following the royalist victory at Inverlochy. 
The battle of Inverlochy was a major turning point in the Scottish 
Revolution. It was during this battle that the leader of the Covenanters, the Marquis 
of Argyll, fled the battlefield, deserting his troops, while the MacDonalds partook in 
the killing of 1,500 Campbells, the largest post-battle massacre during the conflict. 
As a result of this defeat, a large contingent of Covenanting clans met with the 
Marquis of Montrose at Killiwheim, near Elgin, and pledged their loyalty to the 
crown. 61 Similar to many who switched their allegiance to the royalists, the Earl of 
Seaforth claimed on more than one occasion that his service in the royalist ranks was 
out of fear of Montrose and his Irish Army. Even the most ardent supporters of the 
Covenant could not ignore the dangers posed to their estates. Among those who met 
Montrose was the staunch Covenanter, James Grant of Freuchie, who sent 300 men 
to join Montrose's ranks and in a Proclamation from Montrose was to lead all 
persons in Badenoch, Strathavin, Glenlivet, Glenrinnes and Moray against the 
Covenanters. 62 Because the loyalty of the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles 
was influenced by a need for self-preservation, and they could be forced to switch 
sides at any moment, neither faction could wholly rely on their support. The use of 
threats to the clans' existence and property played a significant role in both the 
instability of the region and the success of the royalists between 1644 and 1645. 
Not only did threats prove a valuable incentive to align with the Covenanters 
and royalists, but the use of bribery, widely employed by Charles and the royalists, 
was an equally important tool. The use of bribery in the Western Highlands and 
Isles was most effective when directed at clans who wished to regain forfeited 
territory; thus playing on the personal agendas of the clans. As is evident in the 
study of the Clan Donald's motives, the restoration of their hereditary land was the 
primary issue behind their allegiance to the royalists. 
The Covenanters neglected to use the personal agendas of the clans in the 
Western Highlands and Isles to their fullest potential; instead it was the royalists 
who were able to capitalize on the survivalist mentality and dominate the mid 1640s. 
61 NAS, Montrose Papers, GD220/3/184 
62 Fraser, ed., Chiefs of Grant, i, 260 & ii, 15-6 
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Prior to 1644, the primary clan mobilized by either faction was Campbell of Argyll 
and they were employed by the Covenanters to defend and monitor the region. The 
active participation of the remaining clans of the Western Highlands and Isles was 
not considered to be crucial to the overall success of either faction compared to other 
regions of Scotland. However, the need to defeat the Covenanters prompted Charles 
I and the Marquis of Montrose to actively recruit the military excellence of the 
region and ensured victory by giving the clans individual incentives, such as the 
opportunity given to the MacDonalds to kill Campbells. The combination of bribery 
from Charles and threats to person and property from Montrose clearly drew the 
clans of the Western Highlands and Isles into the Scottish Revolution by playing on 
their personal agendas and local politics, thus temporarily altering the course of the 




The allegiances of the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles are a 
significant component of the history of the Scottish Revolution because they add a 
further dimension to the complex sequence of events and patterns of allegiance 
development, including the motives behind them. What arises from a regional study 
of the Western Highlands and Isles is a better understanding of the causes of the 
royalists' dominance, as well as of the region in general. Furthermore, the motives 
behind the clans' adherence to one faction over another and the shifts in allegiance 
provide a great deal of information about the numerous social and political issues of 
the time, such as religious differences and the struggle for political dominance in the 
region which would have an indirect correlation to the clan's economic status. 
These issues along with how they influenced the Western Highlands and Isles clans 
can be extrapolated and applied to other regions in Britain. The actions taken by the 
nobility across Britain can be further understood and the magnitude of the Civil 
Wars made more comprehensible by applying the models for allegiance formation in 
the Western Highlands and Isles formulated by using religion, politics, and 
economics as primary factors. 
It is a historical fact that the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles 
became involved in the conflict in 1644, but what is not clear is the reason why. The 
problem in attempting to answer this question is that each clan reacted to a certain 
set of circumstances unique to their current state of affairs. Many studies have 
approached this question from a single angle, primarily religion, but the ferocity and 
animosity between the clans is not fully comprehended until all the factors have 
been considered. Using a multi-stranded approach by analyzing the political, 
economic, and religious situation on the eve of the conflict and looking at how 
specific clans reacted to these factors helps to shed light on the mentality of the 
clans. It becomes clear that power, wealth, and faith coalesced, with some aspects 
taking precedence over others in the formation of allegiances. 
A great deal of work has been conducted on the Scottish Revolution on a 
national level; however little attention has been given to the significance of regional 
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studies to facilitate a better understanding of the situation. By dividing the kingdom 
into regions and analyzing the importance, or lack thereof, of the national issues to 
the individual, a regional study allows for the debates to be put in context based on 
their relevance to the locality rather than by the importance that central government 
put on them. For example, by analyzing the effect that Charles I's religious 
innovations had on the Western Highlands and Isles it can be said that there was 
little, if any, significance due to the lack of a strong religious foundation. By 
contrast, Dr. Sharon Adams's research on the radical south-west points to a strong 
connection between the impact of Charles I's religious policies and the region's 
support for the Covenanters. ' In looking at the allegiances of the Western Highlands 
and Isles in comparison to the south-west it becomes clear that the motives behind 
their allegiances were individually based in response to specific events or 
developments within the locality. 
In order to clarify the motives behind allegiances, analysis of the political, 
religious, and economic situation within the Western Highlands and Isles and their 
effect on the chiefs provide the clearest means through which the region's 
involvement can best be seen. This chapter is intended to highlight specific issues 
within the region which served as indicators for the clans' allegiances. 
The political situation prior to the institution of the annual meetings between 
the chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles and the Privy Council was a period of 
virtual autonomy of the clans. Before 1616 the primary objective of the clans was 
political dominance in the region. The desire for dominance meant that there was a 
strong inclination to focus on local politics which would increase the clan's socio- 
political status in the region and relatively little attention was paid to events outside 
of the locality unless they had a direct effect on the socio-political hierarchy of the 
region. During this period the Western Highlands and Isles were seen by outsiders 
as lawless and violent because they practiced their own form of justice independent 
from the crown's legal system. For example, cattle thieving was a frequent 
occurrence in the region because of the potential it afforded to increase one clan's 
political position at the expense of another by destroying their source of wealth and 
' S. Adams, "A Regional Road to Revolution: Religion, Politics and Society in South-West Scotland, 
1600-50", PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh (2000). 
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power, and it was an accepted practice within the clan system to retaliate and enact 
justice on a level equal to the offense. Therefore, it was customary that if one clan's 
cattle were stolen the clan would retaliate by stealing their aggressors' cattle. 
Although this process of administering justice was accepted and strictly regulated by 
the clans, it was viewed by central government as barbarous and uncivilized. This 
view of Highland justice was reinforced by the fact that few disputes were referred 
to the crown or courts for mediation or adjudication and the crown wielded 
relatively little power over the clans. Attempts by the crown to instill civility and to 
curb hostilities in the region were often regarded by the clans as merely a nuisance 
and had a minimal effect on the dynamics of the clan system. 
It has been said that James VI's Highland policies during this period were a 
"scatter-gun" of pet-projects, private enterprises and quasi-official policies, all 
aimed at reducing the clans to obedience and civility. 2 The policies enacted prior to 
1616 were not as successful as originally intended, such as the ill-fated campaigns of 
the Fife Adventurers in Lewis, because of the strength and independence of the clan 
system combined with the misconceptions of central government in its dealings with 
the region. However, central government's success rate significantly improved with 
the implementation of the 1616 Regulations which resulted in the promotion of the 
chiefs of the Western Highlands and Isles to the position of government agents being 
carried out on a large scale and no longer confined to superiors such as MacKenzies 
and Campbells. 
The inclusion of a broader range of chiefs in the administration of the region 
shifted their attention towards central government as a source of political power and 
as an alternative means of local dominance. The chiefs were no longer forced to 
seek legitimacy through their manipulation of local politics and recurring violence. 
Similar to the process of integration of the Welsh elites as government agents during 
the mid sixteenth century, the Highland chiefs found it increasingly beneficial to 
cooperate with central government. As in Wales, a reciprocal relationship 
developed between the chiefs and central government that facilitated the process of 
state formation. By working within the existing framework of the clan system and 
2 M. Lynch, "James VI and the `Highland Problem"', in J. Goodare & M. Lynch eds., The Reign of 
James VI (East Linton, 2000), 216. 
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the region's socio-political hierarchy, the crown was able to promote its needs while 
at the same time meeting the needs of the chiefs by empowering them with 
commissions and licenses. The end result of the meetings and subsequent 
promotions of chiefs to government agents was an increase in the clans' 
involvement in national politics and a decrease in the levels of lawlessness and 
violence. Unfortunately, the relationship between the chiefs and central government 
was damaged by the dissolving of the annual meetings. 
The Western Highlands and Isles chiefs then reverted to their customary 
practices with which they had previously acquired their status. The fact that the 
chiefs were no longer able to gain legitimacy from central government meant that 
the clans had again to enforce their political dominance through manipulation of the 
region's socio-political dynamics. As seen in the cattle thieving and murder carried 
out by the MacDonalds of Glengarry and the land dispute between MacLeod of 
Assynt and the Earl of Seaforth, the renewed emphasis on local issues brought about 
attempts to destroy neighboring clans' resources. 3 In looking at the events 
surrounding the bloodfeud between MacDonald of Glengarry and Mackintosh of 
Torcastle it becomes evident that theft and the process of Highland justice through 
retribution returned to their pre- 1616 prominence. 
The fact that the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles were increasingly 
preoccupied with local issues, such as land disputes, while central government was 
increasingly preoccupied with national issues, such as subscription to the National 
Covenant, resulted in limited interaction between the two parties. The result was 
that when central government came to direct its attention back to the Western 
Highlands and Isles during the Scottish Revolution, the chiefs were by then firmly in 
an autonomous position and it proved extremely difficult for the Committee of 
Estates to enlist the aid of the clans for mustering and maintenance in the mid 1640s. 
Even though the political integration of the clan elites of the Western 
Highlands and Isles collapsed, the economic link between the Highlands and the 
Lowlands continued and the chiefs remained embedded in the debt market. Just as 
politics was a source of power and status, so too was financial wealth and solvency. 
3 See chapter 4, "Central Government and the Western Highlands and Isles" for details of Glengarry's 
cattle thieving and MacLeod of Assynt's complaint against Seaforth. 
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As discussed in chapter six, between the 1570s and the 1640s there was a definite 
increase in the level of indebtedness among the clans. This increase in debt was 
primarily due to the political integration of the chiefs in the form of the annual 
meetings and was exacerbated by the financial impact of the Scottish Revolution. 
Simliar to Keith Brown's findings on the indebtedness of Lowland nobles, 4 
conspicuous consumption was a major contributor to the financial difficulties of the 
Highland chiefs. Many chiefs partook of the luxurious Lowland lifestyle while 
residing in Edinburgh, which included gambling and wearing fine apparel as 
lamented by the MacLean bard, Eachann Bacach. Conspicuous consumption had a 
definite negative effect on the chiefs' coffers, yet there was also a definite benefit to 
be gained due to the visual representation of the clans' socio-economic status. By 
not only gambling but also purchasing draperies, silk, and, in the case of MacLeod 
of Dunvegan, an oven, the clans made an impressive statement regarding their 
wealth and prestige. The fact that visual displays of wealth were more important 
than the monetary reality of their accounts is evident in the testament of Sir Duncan 
Campbell of Glenorchy. The testament provided a balance sheet of assets and 
liabilities, with the assets clearly outweighing the liabilities. Included in the assets 
were movable goods, such as gold cups and silver spoons, which were visual 
representations of the clan's wealth, however the clan was still in a dire financial 
situation because they lacked actual money. As a result of the importance of feasting 
as a means of displaying wealth and the chiefs eminence, the clan was reluctant to 
sanction the selling of moveable goods, even though to do so would have resolved 
their monetary difficulties. Due to the fact that the socio-economic position of many 
clans was vulnerable as a result of the increasing debts of the chiefs, the devastation 
caused during the conflict was directed at both the visual representations of wealth 
as well as the actual monetary income of the clans. During the military campaign of 
Montrose and MacColla, the royalist army became notorious for their destruction of 
the Covenanters' estates, especially the Campbell estates. Stealing cattle, burning 
crops and houses, and stealing movable goods all undermined the socio-economic 
4 See K. Brown, "Aristocratic Finances and the Origins of the Scottish Revolution", English 
Historical Review 104 (1989); K. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland (Edinburgh, 2000). 
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position of the Covenanting nobles, thus further reducing their influence in the 
locality. 
Whereas there were clear indications that politics and economics would play 
a large role in the development of allegiances within the Western Highlands and 
Isles, due to their impact on local politics and social status, the religious situation in 
the region appears to have had less influence. To understand the religious 
circumstances in the Western Highlands and Isles a bottom up view of the state of 
religion is necessary, adopting the inhabitants' perception of religion rather than the 
viewpoint of the Church of Scotland and the Irish Franciscan Mission whereby both 
religions were claiming success and exaggerating their difficulties in establishing 
their respective churches in the region. What emerges from this perspective is a lack 
of a strong religious foundation which is exemplified in the difficulty in breaching 
the Gaelic language barrier and the difficulty in accessing places of worship. 
The inhabitants had an indifferent view of the Church of Scotland, largely 
due to the lack of an adequate ministry. The fact that a strong religious organization 
was lacking for many in the Western Highlands and Isles was not only the fault of 
the Church of Scotland but also the failure of the Irish Franciscan Missions. The 
result was that neither the Protestant nor the Catholic religion was adequately 
equipped with both the ability and the resources to properly provide for the strong 
establishment of their respective church in the region. This is not to say that the 
inhabitants were not religious; they still maintained their beliefs and customs, but the 
majority of the inhabitants of the Western Highlands and Isles could very well be 
classified as non-practicing due to the limitations of the church in its attempt to 
establish places of worship with satisfactory ministers and to provide an adequate 
doctrine in the region. 
Where the Covenanters and royalists could have hoped to win support was 
among the Highland elites who maintained some form of religious service within 
their household, such as the Campbells of Argyll and the Captain of Clanranald. 
However, support for the Covenanters, or even for the royalists, based on religious 
beliefs was only one component in the development of allegiances. The simple truth 
was that the religious connotations behind the Scottish Revolution had relatively 
little impact on local politics and social status. For many clans, adherence to one 
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faction or the other had a coincidental relation to their religious preference and was 
primarily associated with their network of alliances. The promotion of one religion 
or the other had no direct impact on the political or economic situation in the 
Western Highlands and Isles other than the benefits available by aligning oneself 
with the victorious faction, but again this had little to do with religion itself and 
more to do with the fruits of victory. The defection of MacLean of Duart and 
Campbell of Edinample, brother of Campbell of Glenorchy, to the royalist ranks 
indicates that their protestant beliefs were outweighed by other factors. For 
MacLean of Duart his primary concern was the maneuvering of Campbell of Argyll 
against him personally as well as his clan, while Campbell of Edinample deserted 
his family in favor of his loyalty to the king. Evidently, the religious components of 
the Covenanters and the royalists were not enough to dissuade these two devout 
protestants from acting on their principal concerns unrelated to their religious 
beliefs. 
The development of allegiances was a direct result of the power struggle in 
the Western Highlands and Isles that arose after the collapse of the annual meetings 
which provided a source of political power derived from central government. 
Although the issue of power and the importance of local politics can be applied to 
varying degrees in every region involved in the Civil Wars, the overwhelming 
significance it played in the Western Highlands and Isles marks the region as an 
extreme case. The renewed emphasis on legitimacy of power which could be 
derived from the locality gave rise to a series of personal agendas of which self- 
preservation and self-advancement were primary, and it was these which eventually 
dictated allegiances. 
The reason for the delayed and short-lived involvement of the region was 
because neither the Covenanters nor the royalists took the initiative to offer any 
incentives which would have an effect on the socio-political hierarchy within the 
Western Highlands and Isles. The loss of power which had previously been gained 
by the chiefs through their closer relationship with central government and the 
subsequent neglect of the region resulted in the Western Highlands and Isles lacking 
a vested interest in the national platforms of the two factions. The issues of religious 
innovations and landownership were less significant to the chiefs than the political 
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dominance of the Clan Campbell. Of special concern was the political and economic 
maneuvering of the Campbells of Argyll. 
Archibald Campbell, Marquis of Argyll, wielded a great deal of power in the 
Western Highlands and Isles. Through his position as Justiciar of Argyll and the 
Isles and as a high ranking official within the Covenant regime, Argyll left little 
room for other clans to partake in the distribution of power in the region. As a 
result, the region's involvement in the Scottish Revolution was based primarily on 
the opportunity to regain or expand clan territory and to gain financial rewards from 
military victories, both incentives having a definite effect on the socio-political 
hierarchy of the region. Due to the fact that land value was closely linked to social 
and political status the military campaigns were characterized by territorial 
devastation in an attempt to diminish various clans' position within the locality. 
Consequently, support for the Covenanters and royalists was closely related to the 
patterns of alliances and rivalries which dated back to the sixteenth century. The 
current conflict was used as justification for clans to continue their feuds and attempt 
to restructure the hierarchy within the Western Highlands and Isles. As a result, the 
Clan Campbell became prime targets because of the number of clans they had 
alienated through their political and economic maneuvers in the region. 
The fact that the Campbells were at the top of the political hierarchy and 
were primary creditors for many chiefs created a political and economic situation 
that gave rise to much anti-Campbell sentiment. Although anti-Campbell sentiment 
was the primary motive behind the personal agendas and the subsequent 
involvement of the region in the conflict, it was not necessarily Campbell versus 
MacDonald. Although the majority of the clans victimized or threatened by the 
Campbells were MacDonalds, the conflict escalated into a broader struggle 
involving a large portion of the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles against the 
dominance of the Campbell network. 
In view of the fact that Argyll was a high ranking official in the Covenant 
regime, support for the Covenant was partially confined to the Campbell network. 
The Covenant regime's strong reliance on the power of Argyll meant that the regime 
was limited in its attempt to manipulate the political or economic situation in the 
region to its advantage which would enable them to increase their recruits, because 
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to do so would require the demotion of Argyll. As a result, the clans that flocked to 
the Covenanters' banner were clans which had escaped Argyll's manipulations or 
were already incorporated into the Campbell network. Conversely, the royalist 
regime was in a prime position to take advantage of the region's struggle against 
Campbell dominance. 
Although the army of Montrose and MacColla was fluid and subjected to the 
ebb and flow of the clans there is a clear indication that as the royalists were gaining 
strength at the expense of the Campbells, primarily Argyll, the ranks of the royalist 
army swelled with Highlanders opposed to the power and influence Clan Campbell 
held over them. After MacColla's recruiting campaign in the Western Highlands 
and Isles in October 1644 the list of men recruited doubled the existing army to 
roughly 3,000, while his second recruitment in July 1645 resulted in 1,400 men 
being raised in arms. 5 Further evidence of the animosity towards the Campbells is 
seen in the number of men who joined MacColla after he departed Montrose's 
company in September 1645. The fact that MacColla led such a large number of 
men in his attacks on Campbell property in Argyllshire serves as further evidence 
that the desire to topple the current political hierarchy was a major cause for the 
region's involvement in the conflict. 
The fact that the royalists took advantage of the anti-Campbell sentiment 
that was running rampant in the Western Highlands and Isles is also evident in the 
limited time the region was involved in the conflict. The departure of MacColla 
from the royalist ranks broke the tie between the clans of the Western Highlands and 
Isles and the royalist regime as Montrose on his own could not offer the same 
benefits as MacColla. Unfortuantely for those still fighting in Argyll, MacColla's 
later flight to Ireland left the clans without his ingenuity and command which 
hindered their ability to wreak havoc on the Campbells and the region's involvement 
dwindled to the point where the clans returned to their original patterns of feuds and 
forays. 
This study set out to determine the factors behind the clans' allegiances 
during the Scottish Revolution by analyzing the political, religious, and economic 
5 See Chapter 2 "The Western Highlands and Isles in Context". Numbers compiled from D. 
Stevenson, Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 2003). 
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factors which would influence allegiance to the Covenanters and royalists. What 
emerged was not a strong adherence to the national political issues surrounding the 
Scottish Revolution, but rather an overwhelming emphasis on the socio-political 
hierarchy in the region and the opportunities the campaigns afforded the clans to 
influence local politics and to alter the region's dynamics. Prof. Allan Macinnes's 
statement that the espousal of the Covenanting cause served as a "cloak" for 
territorial ambitions can be applied on a large scale to explain the relevance of 
national issues on a local level. 6 Within the Western Highlands and Isles the 
importance of national politics was its ability to legitimize the struggle for political 
dominance within the locality. By aligning with a nationally based faction the clans 
were able to justifiably attack their adversaries who had aligned with the rival 
faction. 
Although support for the Covenanters and royalists allowed for the 
continuation of hostilities between clans, for the remainder of the Wars of the Three 
Kingdoms the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles took relatively little part in 
the conflict. By distancing themselves from central government for a third time 
during the first half of the seventeenth century, the clans renewed their feuds and 
refocused their attention on issues directly related to local politics. 
While the royalist campaign of 1644-5 was successful in devastating large 
portions of the Campbell estate, it did little in the way of altering the political and 
economic situation which prompted the Western Highlands and Isles to become 
involved. The issue of Campbell dominance, both politically and economically, 
continued to be a primary concern for many clans long after their involvement in the 
Scottish Revolution. The success of the radical kirk party furthered the Marquis of 
Argyll's political power and continued to foster the threat he posed to the region, 
particularly to the Clan Donald and the MacLeans of Duart. However, numerous 
risings and rebellions occurred between 1645 and 1745 which could have afforded 
the clans of the Western Highlands and Isles opportunities to accomplish their 
mission begun in the royalist campaign of 1644, but the region did not partake in 
subsequent activities on the level they had during the Scottish Revolution. 
6A Macinnes, "Gaelic culture in the seventeenth century: polarization and assimilation", in S. Ellis 
& S. Barber eds., Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725 (New York, 1995), 
173. 
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During many of the military campaigns which occurred in the hundred years 
following the Scottish Revolution the participation of the clans in the Western 
Highlands and Isles was not deemed acceptable to the instigators of the risings. 
Although Highlanders would constitute the majority of the armed forces, the clans of 
the Western Highlands and Isles were considered a liability rather than an asset due 
to their actions during the Scottish Revolution. Many of the clans, especially the 
Clan Donald, were able and willing to raise arms but their offers to serve were 
repeatedly declined. A prime example of this is the recruitment of forces for the 
Engagement of 1647-8 which specifically excluded the involvement of "malignants" 
because of the desire of the Engagers to legitimize their campaign and to appeal to 
the moderate Covenanters.? By excluding "malignants", the clans of the Western 
Highlands and Isles were not enlisted even though they were willing to join because 
of the Engagers' opposition to the Marquis of Argyll. 
A similar situation occurred when Montrose returned from exile in what 
would be his final attempt to overthrow the kirk party. In 1649 Montrose raised 
forces in Orkney and sailed to Caithness in 1650, but did not enlist the clans which 
had proved beneficial to his cause in 1644. As David Stevenson points out, the 
choice to sail to Caithness rather than to the Western Highlands suggests that 
Montrose was "determined that the royalist causes should not, as in 1644-5, be 
dependent on the fickle western clans". 8 The actions of the western clans during the 
Scottish Revolution were indeed fickle because their motive for involvement was the 
destruction of the House of Argyll and not for the causes at the heart of the royalist 
regime; the opportunistic nature of the clans' involvement resulted in their following 
their own agenda rather than Montrose's. 
A number of Highland activities in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century were primarily the product of the clans of the central and eastern Highlands. 
The involvement of Highlanders during Glencairn's Raising, the Highland Host, and 
the Jacobite Risings was markedly lacking participation of the clans of the Western 
Highlands and Isles. Armed forces for Glencairn's Rising in 1653 were recruited 
from the Lowlands and central Highlands with the exception of Cameron of Lochiel 
7 D. Stevenson, Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 2003), 268. 
8 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 270. 
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and MacDonald of Glengarry. Similarly, the recruitment of men for the Highland 
Host in 1678 was carried out in the eastern Highlands while the 1689 Rising again 
included few clans from the west. The situation changed slightly during the Jacobite 
Rising of 1715 when the Jacobites welcomed the involvement of the clans from the 
Western Highlands and Isles. The list of clans that joined in the Jacobite cause 
included the MacDonalds of Clanranald, MacDonalds of Glengarry, and the 
MacKenzies but again the majority of support was from the central Highlands. 
Although Highland recruitment in general increased between 1715 and 1745, so that 
during the 'Fifteen they constituted 70 percent of the army at Sheriffmuir and 94 
percent of the army at Prestonpans during the 'Forty-five, 9 the activities of the Royal 
Navy had a definite impact on the Jacobites' recruitment capabilities within the 
Western Highlands and Isles. A number of clans, especially the MacNeils of Barra, 
Clanranald, MacLeans, and Camerons were forced to remain at home to defend their 
estates from the "terrorist attacks" of the Royal Navy. 10 
When the royalist campaign of 1644-5 is put in context and compared with 
subsequent Highland activities it becomes clear that the events of 1644-5 were 
unique. The level of involvement of the clans in the Western Highlands and Isles 
during the Scottish Revolution was not to be equaled during the next hundred years. 
Events that have been classified as Highland risings, such as Glencairn's Rising and 
the Jacobite Risings, clearly did not implicate the entire Highland region. Although 
anti-Campbell sentiment continued through to the Jacobite Risings and was 
widespread, the Western Highlands and Isles played a very limited role even though 
they appeared to have the greatest incentive to participate, the possibility of finally 
destroying the dominance of the Clan Campbell. Unfortunately for the clans of the 
Western Highlands and Isles, the opportunity to alter the political dynamics in the 
region was lost after the defeat of the Jacobite forces at Culloden on 16 April 1746. 
9 A. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996), 163. 
10 B. Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650-1784 (London, 1984), 159; B. Lenman, 
The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689-1746 (Aberdeen, 1980), 248. 
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Map: The Highlands c. 1400 
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Appendix 2 
Map: The Western Highlands 
The Western Highlands: Counties, Towns and Districts 
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Appendix 4 
Map: Clan Map with Civil War Allegiances 
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1. MacKay 
2. Sinclair of Caithness 
3. MacLeod of Assynt 
4. Sutherland Men 





9. Chisholm of Strathglass 
10. Fraser of Lovat 
11. Mackintosh & Clan Chattan 






18. MacDonald of Sleat 
19. MacLeod of Raasay 
20. MacLeod of Dunvegan 
21. MacKinnon 
22. MacRae 
23. MacDonald of Glengarry 
24. MacDonald of Clanranald 
25. Cameron 
26. MacDonald of Keppoch 
27. Menzies 
28. Atholl men 
(Stewart, Murray & Ferguson) 
29. Robertson 
30. MacNeill of Barra 
31. MacLean of Coll 
32. MacQuarry 
33. MacLean of Duart 
34. MacLean of Ardgour 
35. Stewart of Appin 
36. MacDonald of Glencoe 
37. Campbell of Glenorchy 
38. Maclaine of Lochbuie 
39. MacDougall 








48. MacDonald of Largie 
49. MacNeill of Gigha & Taynish 
(& MacDonald of Sanda) 
50. MacDonnell of Antrim 
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Appendix 5 
Attendance Record of Annual Meetings 1616-1642 
Clans included in annual meetings: 
MacDonald of Sleat MacLean of Duart 
Clanranald MacLean of Morvern (1626) 
MacKinnon of Strathordale MacLeod of Dunvegan 
MacLaine of Lochbuie MacNeill of Barra (1629) 
MacLean of Coll 
1616 
Attended: Absent: 
Clanranald MacDonald of Sleat, excused (ill) 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
1617 
MacDonald of Sleat MacLean of Duart (sent brother, Lachlan) 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
1618 
MacKinnon of Strathordale MacDonald of Sleat 
MacLaine of Lochbuie Clanranald, excused 
MacLean of Coll, excused (ill) 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, excused 
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MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
none attended 
1619 
1620 Privy Council cancels meeting 
next meeting to held February 1621 
1621 (10 February) 
MacDonald of Sleat 
1622 
MacLean of Duart, excused 
1623 
MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
MacLean of Coll, excused 
MacLean of Duart, excused 
1624 
MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
Clanranald, sent agent 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, sent agent 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, sent agent 
MacLean of Coll, sent agent 
MacLean of Duart, sent agent 





MacDonald of Sleat 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLean of Morvern 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
1627 
MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald (late) 
MacLean of Coil (late) 
MacLean of Duart (late) 
MacLean of Morvern 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
1628 
MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald (late) 
MacLaine of Lochbuie (late) 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
Clanranald, fined 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, fined 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, fined 
MacLean of Coll, fined 
MacLean of Duart, excused 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, excused 
Clanranald 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, fined 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, fined 
MacLean of Coll, excused 
MacLean of Duart, sent son, Lachlan 
MacLean of Morvern, sent brother Lachlan 
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1629 
MacNeill of Barra (30 June) 
1630 
MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll (late) 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLean of Morvern 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
MacNeill of Barra (last meeting attended) 
1631 
1632 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
Clanranald, excused 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, excused 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, fined 
MacLean of Coll, excused 
MacLean of Duart, fined 
MacLean of Morvem, fined 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, excused 
MacKinnon of Strathordale (presumed ill) 
MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
Clanranald, fined 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, excused 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, fined 
MacLean of Coll, excused 
MacLean of Duart, fined 
MacLean of Morvern, excused 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, excused 
MacNeill of Barra, excused 
MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
Clanranald, excused 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, excused (ill) 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, excused 
MacLean of Coll, excused 
MacLean of Duart, excused 
MacLean of Morvern, excused 
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1633 
MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Morvern 
1634 
none attended MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
Clanranald, excused 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, excused 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, excused 
MacLean of Coll, excused 
MacLean of Duart, excused 
MacLean of Morvern, excused 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, excused 
1635 
MacDonald of Sleat 
MacLean of Morvern 
MacLaine of Lochbuie (late) 
Clanranald, sent agent 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
1636 
MacDonald of Sleat, sent agent 
Clanranald, sent agent 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, sent agent 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, absent 
MacLean of Coll, sent agent 
MacLean of Duart, sent agent 
MacLean of Morvern, sent agent 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, absent 
1637 
none attended MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLean of Morvern 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
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163 8 
none attended MacDonald of Sleat, excused 
Clanranald, excused 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, excused 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, excused 
MacLean of Coll, excused 
MacLean of Duart, excused 
MacLean of Morvern, excused 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, excused 
1639 
none attended July or November MacDonald of Sleat, charge issued 
Clanranald, charge issued 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, charge issued 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, charge issued 
MacLean of Coll, charge issued 
MacLean of Duart, charge issued 
MacLean of Morvern, charge issued 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, charge issued 
1640 
none attended, no record of attempt MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLean of Morvern 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
1641 
none attended, no record of attempt MacDonald of Sleat 
Clanranald 
MacKinnon of Strathordale 
MacLaine of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
MacLean of Duart 
MacLean of Morvern 
MacLeod of Dunvegan 
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1642 (April) 
none attended, order ignored MacDonald of Sleat, ordered to appear 
Clanranald, ordered to appear 
MacKinnon of Strathordale, ordered to appear 
MacLaine of Lochbuie, ordered to appear 
MacLean of Coll, ordered to appear 
MacLean of Duart, ordered to appear 
MacLean of Morvern, ordered to appear 
MacLeod of Dunvegan, ordered to appear 
Compiled from RPC, x (1613-16)- 2 "d series, vii (1638-43) 
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Appendix 6 
Royal Rent Payments from Argyll and Portions of Inverness-shire, 
1600-1635 
E24/22,1600-1 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) E123 
Feuar of Urquhart, Glencairn, Glenmor (Grant) f172 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 142 16s. 8d. 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
John Chisholm 53s 4d. 
Angus MacDonald (Islay and Kintyre) £2,000 
E24/23,1601-2 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 142 16s. 8d. 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
Angus MacDonald (part payment for Kintyre) £93 6s. 8d. 
E24/24,1602-3 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £64 
Feuar of Urquhart, Glencairn, Glenmor (Grant) £ 172 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 142 16s. 8d. 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
E24/25,1603-4 
John Chisholm 53s. 4d. 
Lachlan MacLean of Duart £3,333 6s. 8d. 
E24/26,1604-5 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £64 
Feuar of Urquhart, Glencairn, Glenmor (Grant) £344 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 142 16s. 8d. 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
Angus MacDonald (Kintyre) £2,000 




Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £32 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 142 16s. 8d. 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
E24/29,1609-10 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £162 16s. 2d. 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
Angus MacDonald (Islay and Colonsay) £3,000 
Lachlan MacLean of Duart £9,958 3s. 
E24/30,1611-12 
Feuar of Urquhart (Grant) £4 15s. 4d. 
Feuar of Glencairn (Grant) £172 
Feuar od Dundonald (Campbell) £33 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £ 128 6s. 8d. 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 162 16s. 2d. 
Clanranald £165 6s. 8d. 
Lachlan MacLean of Duart £2,308 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail £533 6s. 8d. 
E24/31,1612-13 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £142 16s. 2d. 
MacDonald of Sleat £3,000 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail £133 6s. 8d. 
Lachlan MacLean of Duart £1,538 
E24/32,1613-14 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £64 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £172 16s. 2d. 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail £400 
Clanranald £124 
E24/33,1614-15 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £32 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £142 16s. 2d. 
Feuar of Urquhart (Grant) £8 15s. 4d. 
MacDonald of Sleat £262 6s. 8d. 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail £266 13s. 4d. 
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E24/34,1615-16 
Feuar of Urquhart (Grant) E12 17s. 4d. 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 142 16s. 2d. 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail £266 13s. 4d. 
E24/35,1616-17 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £64 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £162 16s. 2d. 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £12,000 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £490 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Cowal (Campbell) £72 6s. 8d. 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail (including Mull, 
Morvern) £ 1,533 
E24/36,1617-18 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £32 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £172 13s. 4d. 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £1,500 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £490 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail (including Mull, 
Morvern) £ 1,666 13.4d. 
Clanranald £2,408 
E24/37,1618-19 (badly damaged) 
Feuar of Dundonald (Campbell) £32 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £162 16s. 2d. 
MacDonald of Sleat missing 
Sir Rory MacKenzie, Tutor of Kintail £1,333 6s. 8d. 
E24/38,1620-1 
Feuar of Urquhart (Grant) £13 4s. 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £490 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £162 16s. 2d. 
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E24/39,1621-22 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £490 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6000 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 162 16s. 2d. 
MacDonald of Sleat £666 13s. 4d. 
E24/40,1622-23 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £490 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £162 16s. 2d. 
Sir Rory MacKenzie of Coigarth, formerly Tutor of 
Kintail £833 6s. 8d. 
E24/41,1623-24 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £480 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 162 16s. 2d. 
MacDonald of Sleat £533 13s. 4d. 
E24/42,1624-25 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £480 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 162 16s. 2d. 
E24/43,1625-26 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £480 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 162 16s. 2d. 
E24/44,1626-27 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £480 2s. 4d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) £ 162 16s. 2d. 
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E24/45,1627-28 
Hector MacLean of Duart 
E24/46,1628-29 
£1,616 13s. 4d. 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £907 8s. 7d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £4,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £12,000 6s. 8d. 
Hector MacLean of Duart £1,616 13s. 4d. 
E24/47,1629-30 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) 
E24/48,1630-31 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) 
Feuar of Bute (Campbell) 
Feuar of Oronsay (Campbell) 
E24/49,1631-32 
£480 14s. 3d. 
£2,000 
£6,000 13s. 4d. 
£480 14s. 3d. 
£2,000 
£6,000 13s. 4d. 
£ 162 16s. 2d. 
£5 1 s. 8d. 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £480 14s. 3d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 13s. 4d. 
Feuar of Oronsay (Campbell) £5 1 s. 8d. 
E24/50,1632-33 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £480 14s. 3d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 13s. 4d. 
Feuar of Oronsay (Campbell) £5 1s. 8d. 
E24/51,1633-34 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) £480 14s. 3d. 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) £2,000 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) £6,000 13s. 4d. 
Feuar of Oronsay (Campbell) £5 1 s. 8d. 
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E24/52,1634-35 
Feuar of Colonsay, Ardnamurchan, Sunart (Campbell) 
Feuar of Kintyre and Jura (Campbell) 
Feuar of Islay (Campbell) 
Feuar of Oronsay (Campbell) 
£480 14s. 3d. 
£2,000 
£6,000 13s. 4d. 
£5 Is. 8d. 
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